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A bstr a c t
This thesis examines the collapse of Soviet state power from an international 
perspective. It assesses the extent to which the Soviet Union’s international 
confrontation with the capitalist West, and the end of that confrontation, 
contributed to the strengthening and weakening of the Soviet state. It shows that 
the state’s international stance of hostility, in both social-systemic and 
geopolitical terms, became a central component of Soviet state power.
Central to this study is the assumption that the continuation of state power is 
contingent on the successful reproduction of the institutions of political rule. To 
this end, the thesis develops a historical sociological theory of the state which 
builds on a critique of neo-Weberian institutional-functional theories of the 
modem state. Using this theory, the thesis examines the development of Soviet 
state power and draws out the ways in which the international confrontation with 
the West reinforced the Soviet state and came to develop and shape its structures 
and institutions.
Following an examination of the end of the Cold War, the thesis considers the 
way in which the change in international policy undermined elements of Soviet 
power, particularly in terms of ideology, legitimacy and material-organisational 
structures. The retreat from this posture, undertaken by Gorbachev through the 
1980s, removed the conflict as a structure of the state, contributed to its 
weakening and helped make the state vulnerable to the challenges of the 1990-91 
period. The thesis concludes that the international confrontation played an 
important ideational and material role in the development and undermining of 
Soviet state power. Moreover, the international confrontation was a vital part of 
the architecture of the Soviet state which helped make the state’s claim to rule a 
more robust and effective socio-political mechanism.
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The Soviet Union had possessed the largest military machine ever 
assembled on this planet by a single political authority. It had been 
governed by an apparently monolithic party with historically 
unparalleled instruments of compulsion. Tentacles of its elaborate 
bureaucracy had reached into every crevice of its subjects’ lives. Its 
ideology had purported to reveal the secret of harnessing the very tides 
of history. How could such a state simply have destroyed itself?1
All major geopolitical processes appear to be working against the 
continuation of Soviet world power. Cumulative disadvantage should 
be expected to reach major proportions in the next century, and the 
coincidence of crises on several fronts simultaneously could occur at 
any time.2
After all, the Soviet Union seemed to be such a giant block of stone, 
such a vast and powerful state, uniting people of more than a hundred 
different nationalities.3
[T]he chances of system breakdown in the Soviet Union within the 
next five to ten years are probably better than even.4
It is not now (nor will it be during the next decade) in the throes of a 
true systemic crisis, for it boasts unused reserves of political and social 
stability that are sufficient to endure the most severe foreseeable 
difficulties.5
1 Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account o f the Collapse 
o f the Soviet Union New York: Random House, 1995, p. 6.
2 Randall Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986,
p. 208.
Mikhail Gorbachev, On My Country and the World New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999, p. 83.
4 R.V. Burks, ‘The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union’ in Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. 
Kaplan (eds.), The Soviet Union and the Challenge o f the Future. Volume 2: Economy and 
Society New York: Paragon and PWPA, 1989, pp. 115-65; p. 115.
5 Paul Dibb, The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower London: USS/Macmillan, 1988,
p. 260.
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Chapter
1
l  In t r o d u c t io n
1.1 Thesis
This thesis is an examination, from an international perspective, of a collapse of 
state power. Its aim is to assess the role of international factors in state collapse, 
and their implications for International Relations (IR) theory.6 In particular, it 
examines the extent to which the Soviet Union’s international confrontation with 
the capitalist West, and the end of this confrontation, contributed first to the 
strengthening and then to the weakening of the Soviet state. It argues that this 
confrontation, of which the Cold War was the acute second phase, became an 
element of the architecture of the Soviet state, that this confrontation reinforced 
the Soviet party-state fusion, and that this fusion helped make the state’s claim to 
rule a more robust and effective political mechanism. From the 1920s the 
USSR’s international stance of manifest hostility, in both social systemic and 
geopolitical terms, had become a crucial component of Soviet state power. The 
retreat from this posture, undertaken by Gorbachev and his leadership team from 
the mid-1980s, undermined key institutional-functional aspects of the Soviet 
state by removing this support mechanism and weakening the state.
The thesis aims to make three contributions to IR. In focusing on the 
international factors which built up and undermined Soviet power, it is a 
specifically international account of the reproduction and then collapse of the 
USSR. Second, it is an application of historical sociological methods to IR and to 
a specific ER research question. The method used here involves a critique of
6 IR refers to the academic study of international politics which is distinct from the actual events 
of world politics which the discipline studies.
10
certain neo-Weberian strands of historical sociology. The dominant approaches 
of Skocpol and Mann are challenged by the events which this thesis is exploring 
and as such demand revision in this light. Third, the thesis suggests a 
reconsideration of a central issue in IR: the nature of the relationship between 
international and domestic political realms. In short, the thesis offers a novel 
narrative, from an international point of view, of the making and breaking of 
Soviet power. It uses and critiques historical sociology in IR and through this 
provides a way to reconceive the domestic-international relationship.
It should be made clear at the outset that this thesis does not claim that the 
end of the Cold War alone caused the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse 
of a state is a highly complex event that can never be reduced to one overriding 
cause such as economic crisis, failed leadership or inadequate military power. 
Events such as these can only be understood as products of both longer-term 
processes and shorter-term conjunctures. This study will examine one part of this 
process in the Soviet Union, the role played by the end of the international 
confrontation with the capitalist West in making the Soviet state vulnerable. 
Although not claiming that this was the sole cause of the Soviet collapse, this 
study will argue that the end of the confrontation was, because of the nature of 
the USSR, a very important factor. The Soviet state had been able to resolve a 
myriad of economic, political and social problems in the past. The thesis argues 
that part of the reason why the Soviet state was made fatally vulnerable to its 
very real economic, social and ethnic problems at this time was the removal of 
the international conflict from its structures of power.
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to sketch out the basic claims 
of the thesis, put them in the context of the literature which they address and then 
lay out the plan for the thesis as a whole. As a study of the relationship between 
Soviet state power and its international environment, it is necessary to begin with 
a critical overview of the existing literature.
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1.2 C o n t e x t  o f  t h e  T h e sis
An examination of the role that the international confrontation played in 
contributing to the weakening the Soviet regime straddles a number of fields 
rather than sitting neatly within one contained literature. The breadth of the 
literature, approaches and theoretical commitments engaged with should be 
regarded as a strength of this approach and should not be considered problematic. 
This section will critically examine the three main fields on which this study 
draws: Political Science studies of the collapse of the Soviet Union; IR studies of 
the end of the Cold War; and Historical Sociological studies of the state and its 
form of social power. In advancing the argument that international confrontation 
supported the institutions of the Soviet state and that its demise weakened them, 
it is necessary to integrate these three sets of literature and, ultimately, to move 
beyond their particular limitations.
1.2.1 The Collapse o f the Soviet Union
In political science and economic circles there has been an abundance of 
writing on the collapse of the Soviet Union7 and the transition to what has come 
to be called post-communism.8 Despite the breadth of literature which sets out to 
explain the collapse of the Soviet Union, either in causal or historical terms, it is 
striking that this corpus almost uniformly describes the collapse as an entirely 
internally driven event. Aside from glancing towards the international context in 
the form of a costly arms race, Afghanistan or a diplomatic squeeze, the literature 
tends to see the collapse wholly or predominantly as a domestic level event. The 
international dimension is not given thorough or systematic consideration. 
Matlock’s monumental work stresses the failings—moral, political and 
economic—of the system and puts a heavy emphasis on the problems of empire
7 For an early bibliography on works on this period see Abraham J. Edelheit and Hershel Edelheit 
(eds.), The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Union: A Selected Bibliography o f  Sources in English 
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992.
8 Sound overviews of post-communism are Leslie Holmes, Postcommunism Cambridge: Polity, 
1997 and Richard Sakwa, Postcommunism Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999.
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as lying at the root of the Soviet collapse. While he acknowledges the role of 
individuals, such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin, one is left in no doubt as to his 
conclusion: the state collapsed due to the systemic failures of an ‘evil empire’.9 
Hough’s grand study of the period focuses on the internal social conditions for 
change with a Rostowian emphasis on communism as a transitional phase 
between agrarian and industrial forms of development.10 The Gorbachev reforms, 
he argues, were a Trimberger style ‘revolution from above’ which was the result 
of the leadership’s reaction to the state’s social conditions understood as the 
culmination of its specific form of industrialisation.11 Despite its scope, his 
argument is almost devoid of references to international developments; even 
Afghanistan escapes his eye.12 Similarly, Kotz and Weir use the concept 
‘revolution from above’ in their study of the end of the Soviet system. They 
argue that the Soviet Union fell apart due to the abandonment of the Soviet 
system by its elites which was itself a result of the failure of the socialist 
economic system.13
Laqueur’s reflection on the end of the USSR tries to broaden the 
understanding of this event by placing it alongside the collapse of the other great 
empires of modem history, specifically Byzantium, and the Ottoman and Austro- 
Hungarian empires.14 While he cites many of the internal failings and 
international political pressures, Laqueur concludes that the edifice tumbled 
because of the USSR’s profound spiritual crisis. This crisis produced a 
breakdown of self-confidence which, through poor leadership, ultimately rent the 
empire asunder. Cox’s edited volume does not address the collapse in strictly 
causal terms, but, rather, places it in the context of ‘Sovietology’ as an academic 
field and addresses broader questions on the origins of the implosion and the
9 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire. This book is part memoir and part analysis, but for the 
purposes of classification it is influenced by a clear political science understanding of 
developments distinct from the memoir and IR literatures.
10 Jerry Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-91 Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
11 Ellen Trimberger, Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, 
Turkey, Egypt and Peru New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978.
12 There is one slight reference to the conflict; Hough, Democratization and Revolution, p. 486.
13 David M. Kotz with Fred Weir, Revolution From Above: The Demise o f the Soviet System 
London: Routledge, 1997.
14 Walter Laqueur, The Dream That Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994.
13
failure of social science to have contemplated Soviet collapse.15 Dallin and 
Lapidus’s edited text covers the developments of crisis and the causes of the 
collapse in great breadth but not much depth. The broader weakness of the book 
stems from the fact that most of the essays are republications of earlier pieces.16 
The chapters cover the whole gamut of domestic, international, social and 
economic pressures, but, as with so much of the other literature, the domestic 
origins of the collapse are the focus.
Following this broad pattern, although with an even heavier emphasis on
internal forces, de Tinguy argues, as do the authors of the other essays in her
collection, that the Soviet system crumbled from within: the causes were internal
tensions of ideological failure, the illegitimacy of the one party system and the
11retardation of economic development. On a more polemic note, Suraska argues 
that the Soviet Union collapsed due to its despotism which had prevented 
‘proper’ modernisation from occurring. Suraska argues that this ‘proper’ 
modernisation is necessary for such a massive multi-national state to function in 
the modem world.18 While Suraska emphasises the warped development of state 
institutions as the primary cause of the collapse, Carrere d’Encausse argues that 
the bonds of the USSR were undone by the inevitable strains of nationalism 
within an autocratic multinational empire.19 In an overtly historical materialist 
study Lockwood gives international factors greater credence, but, avoiding 
political analysis, he argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a direct
onproduct of the globalisation of capitalist relations of production.
In his evaluation of the rise and fall of socialism, Lane ascribes the 
collapse of the Soviet Union primarily to domestic tensions arising from 
systemic problems within the USSR, with a specific emphasis on economic
15 Michael Cox (ed.), Rethinking the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death o f Communism and 
the New Russia London: Pinter, 1998.
16 Alexander Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (eds.), The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse 
Revised Edition, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.
17 Anne de Tinguy (ed.), The Fall o f the Soviet Empire Boulder, CO: East European Monograph 
Series, 1997.
18 Wisla Suraska, How the Soviet Union Disappeared: An Essay on the Causes o f Dissolution 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998.
19 Helene Carrere d’Encausse, The End o f the Soviet Empire: The Triumph o f the Nations New 
York: Basic Books, 1993.
20 David Lockwood, The Destruction o f the Soviet Union: A Study in Globalisation Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000.
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decline combined with a Tocquevillian expectations gap.21 While he emphasises 
domestic systemic causes, Lane notes that several important international 
factors—relative failure, the dynamism of global capitalism and the influence of 
foreign leaders on the Soviet leadership—played an important part in the 
collapse. Here he is joined by a number of authors of shorter pieces who try to 
draw together the balance of internal and external factors which drove the Soviet 
collapse. Duedney and Ikenberry argue that, when faced with a dynamic West 
and a re-stoked Cold War, the limitations of the Soviet form of modernisation 
were thrown into stark light and the leaders, in their efforts to reform the state, 
undermined the Soviet Union 22 Halliday argues that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and communism more broadly was due to the relative failure of the 
economic system in the context of a dynamic capitalist world.23 In general, 
however, the literature which has sought to provide explanations of the Soviet 
collapse has overwhelmingly stressed the domestic sources of weakness. The 
emphasis may vary—some argue that nationalities were the pre-eminent 
problem, others the economy, and yet others the system of rule—but without 
question the vast majority of scholars have chosen not to locate the Soviet state 
collapse in its dual international and domestic context. This thesis seeks to rectify 
this neglect.
1.2.2 International Relations and the End o f the Cold War
In the field of IR, broadly conceived, there are two bodies of relevant 
literature: firstly, the analytic and theoretical studies which often use the end of 
the Cold war to settle theoretical scores; and secondly, memoirs and 
contemporary histories which are in many ways the best historical sources for the 
period.
21 David Lane, The Rise and Fall o f State Socialism Cambridge: Polity, 1996, particularly 
pp. 105-61.
Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The International Sources of Soviet Change’ in 
International Security 16.3, 1991, pp. 74-118.
23 Fred Halliday, Rethinking International Relations, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1994.
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Theoretical and Analytic Studies
In the ten years or so since the end of the Cold War, the IR literature 
examining this event has developed substantially. IR most commonly deals with 
the end of the Cold War as a means to evaluate theory and as a blunt instrument 
with which to bludgeon theoretical approaches of which one disapproves. 
Gaddis, an international historian, strongly critiques American ER theory which 
he claims failed utterly on its own terms.24 Allen and Goldmann’s set of 
behaviouralist essays is of a less provocative bent than Gaddis, but their common 
theme is, similarly, that the end of the Cold War has undermined some of the 
core theoretical notions of IR theory.25 Realism in IR theory had been under 
critical fire for some time in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War gave more 
credence to these claims. Kratochwil takes the opportunity to demonstrate the 
failings of neorealism, arguing that the end of the Cold War has shown that 
explaining systems change in terms of an anarchical structure and the distribution
96of capabihties within that structure is inadequate. Lebow uses it as a means to 
launch a broader attack on realism,27 and Nobel follows his lead with a specific 
attack on Morgenthau’s theory of power.28 Lebow and Risse-Kappen’s volume is 
probably the most cited text in this field.29 The essays are generally hostile to 
realism; the broad line of argument which the majority follow is that realism 
prepared us poorly for the end of the Cold War and therefore IR needs a new 
theoretical focus. The authors conclude that IR theories should include such
24 John Lewis Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’ in 
International Security 17.3, 1992-3, pp. 5-58.
25 Pierre Allen and Kjell Goldmann (eds.), The End o f the Cold War: Evaluating Theories o f  
International Relations The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992.
26 Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-realism as the Science of 
Realpolitik Without Politics’ in Review o f International Studies 19.1, 1993; pp. 63-80. For a 
further development of this see Rey Koslowski and Friedrich Kratochwil, ‘Understanding 
Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System’ in 
International Organization 48.2, pp. 215-247, 1994.
27 Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism’ in 
International Organization 48.2, pp. 249-278, 1994. See also his ‘Rise and Fall o f the Cold War 
in Comparative Perspective’ in Review o f International Studies 25.5, 1999, pp. 21-39 for a 
discussion of some of the methodological and theoretical challenges faced in examinations of the 
rise and fall of the Cold War.
28 Jaap Nobel, ‘Morgenthau’s struggle with power: the theory o f power politics and the Cold 
War’ in Review o f International Studies 21.1, 1995, pp. 61-86.
29 Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), The End o f the Cold War and 
International Relations Theory, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995. This collection of 
essays were originally published as a symposium in International Organization 48.2,1994.
16
factors as ideas, values, norms and mass-movements within their ontologies and 
epistemologies. Despite this, realism has not been without its stout yeoman 
defender, in this instance, the defender of the realm is William Wohlforth who 
argues that the end of the Cold War is fully compatible with realist theory. He 
maintains that the shifts in international politics reflected changing power 
relations and that these power relations were central to the considerations and 
reasoning of decision makers.30
Beyond the theoretical broadsides, Kegley establishes a framework for an 
‘autopsy’ of the Cold War.31 Brooks and Wohlforth argue that material 
incentives present in the 1980s—specifically the relative decline of the Soviet 
economy and the globalisation of production in the context of the Soviet Union’s 
international position—explain the nature and timing of the end of the Cold War 
better than ideational-focused explanations.32 Duedney and Ikenberry set out to 
explain the event by striking a balance between domestic causal factors, the 
failings of the Soviet form of modernisation, and international ones, the West’s 
dual thwarting of Soviet expansionism and the presentation of an appealing 
alternative. Similarly, Halliday argues that the Cold War ended due to this 
balance of international and domestic sources: his catchy phrase, that it was not 
the gun boat, but the T-shirt which won the Cold War for the West, sums up his 
case.34 Two volumes of diplomatic history essays, edited by Armstrong and 
Goldstein and Hogan respectively, make short and temporally limited 
judgements on aspects of the strategic and economic causes and implications of
30 William C. Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’ in International Security 19.3, 
1995, pp. 91-129; William C. Wohlforth, ‘Reality Check’ in World Politics 50.4, 1998, pp. 650- 
80; Randall L. Schweller and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Power Test: Evaluating Realism in 
Response to the End of the Cold War’ in Security Studies 9.3, 2000, pp. 60-107. Wolhforth has 
been assisted by Stephen Walt who defends the utility of realism in his ‘The Gorbachev Interlude 
and International Relations Theory’ in Diplomatic History 21.3, 1997, pp. 473-9.
31 Charles W. Kegley, ‘How Did the Cold War Die: Some Principles for an Autopsy’ in Mershon 
International Studies Review, 38.1, pp. 11-41, 1994.
32 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, ‘Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold 
War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas’ in International Security 25.1, 2001, pp. 5-53.
33 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: 
Explaining Large Scale Historical Change’ in Review o f International Studies 17.3, 1991, 225- 
50.
34 Fred Halliday, ‘The Ends of Cold War’ in New Left Review, 180, pp. 5-23; and Fred Halliday, 
‘The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical 
Conclusions’ in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), International Relations Theory Today 
Cambridge: Polity, 1995, pp. 38-61
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the end of the Cold War.35 Summy and Salla’s edited text examines why the 
Cold War ended and concludes that it ended because of the failure of the Soviet 
economy.36 Kolodziej argues that the end of the Cold War and the Soviet 
collapse were produced by the Soviet Union’s failure to respond to the inevitable 
imperatives of order, welfare and legitimacy in modem political life. Finally, 
Bowker and Brown’s edited text contains a number of considerations of the 
relationship between the end of the Cold War and IR theory.38 Bowker examines 
Soviet foreign policy behaviour, arguing that internal weaknesses were largely 
the cause of foreign policy change.39 Also, Crockatt’s piece evaluates stability 
theories of international politics in light of the Cold War’s end.40
IR has also seen a number of works on the end of the Cold War which 
address specific questions. Chemoff, in contrast to explanations emphasising the 
impact of the arms race, argues that the West did not spend the Soviets to 
death.41 Risse-Kappen also supports the argument that the Reagan 
administration’s spending had little direct impact on Soviet spending and hence 
on its economic difficulties 42 Greenstein argues that personalities, particularly 
those of Reagan and Gorbachev, were the cmcial factors explaining the end the 
Cold War 43 Lynch’s text makes the unconventional argument that the Cold War
35 Michael Hogan (ed.), The End o f the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992; David Armstrong and Erik Goldstein (eds.), The End of the 
Cold War London: Frank Cass, 1990.
36 Ralph Summy and Michael E. Salla (eds.), Why the Cold War Ended: A Range o f  
Interpretations Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995.
37 Edward A. Kolodziej, ‘Order, Welfare and Legitimacy: A Systemic Explanation for the Soviet 
Collapse and the End of the Cold War’ in International Politics 34.2,1997, pp. 111-51.
38 Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds.), From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World 
Politics in the 1980s Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
39 Mike Bowker, ‘Explaining Soviet Foreign Policy Behaviour in the 1980s’ in Bowker and 
Brown (eds.) From Cold War to Collapse. For more on this see Mike Bowker, Russian Foreign 
Policy and the End o f the Cold War Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997.
40 Richard Crockatt, ‘Theories of Stability and the end of the cold war’ in Bowker and Brown 
(eds.) From Cold War to Collapse, pp. 59-81.
41 Fred Chemoff, ‘Ending the Cold War: The Soviet Retreat and the US Military Build-up’ in 
International Affairs 67.1, pp. 111-26, 1991.
42 Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Did “Peace Through Strength” End the Cold War? Lessons from INF’ 
in. International Security 16.1,1991, pp. 162-88.
43 Fred Greenstein, ‘The Impact of Personality on the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual 
Analysis’ in Political Psychology 19.1 March, 1998, pp. 1-19; see also his ‘Ronald Reagan, 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: What Difference Did They Make?’ in William 
C. Wohlforth (ed.), Witnesses to the End o f the Cold War Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996, pp. 199-219.
18
really ended in the 1960s with the settlement of the division of Europe after the 
construction of the Berlin wall.44
The Review o f International Studies dedicated a special issue to the end 
of the Cold War,45 the publication of which was timed to commemorate the tenth 
anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the issue Kramer argues that new 
archival evidence demonstrates that ideology played a more important role in the 
Cold War than many scholars realised or had conceded in their theories46 
Patman maintains that the Reagan administration’s bellicosity helped to induce 
Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ within the Soviet domestic sphere 47 Forsberg makes 
a more constructivist case. By comparing the Soviet rapprochement with 
Germany and its failure to soothe its relationship with Japan, he contends that the 
end of the Cold War was the product of a growth in trust between the main 
players.48 Sprinkle compares the East-West rivalry of the Cold War with the 
American North-South rivalry between the states as a way to understand the 
different outcomes of hostile relations.49 White and Revell argue that, in light of 
the end of the Cold War, it is fair to conclude that the Soviet Union was 
integrated into a normalised system of international diplomacy.50 Ralph briefly 
argues that America’s role as an agent of liberalism is central to understanding 
the Soviet convergence on liberal norms of governance.51 The issue also has two 
pieces on the role of the Afghanistan conflict. Halliday examines the impact of 
Afghanistan on Soviet foreign policy making,52 and Reuveny and Prakash argue
44 Allen Lynch, The Cold War is Over —Again Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992.
45 Review o f International Studies 25.4, 1999.
46 Mark Kramer, ‘Ideology and the Cold War’ in Review o f  International Studies 25.4, 1999, 
pp. 539-76.
4 Robert G. Patman, ‘Reagan, Gorbachev and the emergence of “New Political Thinking’” in 
Review o f International Studies 25.4, 1999, pp. 577-601.
48 Tuomas Forsberg, ‘Power, interests and trust: explaining Gorbachev’s choices at the end of the 
Cold War’ in Review o f International Studies 25.4, 1999, pp. 603-21.
49 Robert Hunt Sprinkle, ‘Two Cold Wars and why the ended differently’ in Review o f  
International Studies 25.4,1999, pp. 623-39.
50 Stephen White and Stephen Revell, ‘Revolution and integration in Soviet international 
diplomacy, 1917-1991’ in Review o f International Studies 25.4,1999, pp. 641-54.
51 Jason Ralph, ‘Security Dilemmas and the end of the Cold War’ in Review o f International 
Studies 25.4, 1999, pp. 721-5. For a similar and more detailed argument see Robert Jervis, ‘Was 
the Cold War a Security Dilemma?’ in Journal o f Cold War Studies 3.1, 2001, pp. 36-60.
52 Fred Halliday, ‘Soviet foreign policymaking [sic] and the Afghanistan war: from “second 
Mongolia” to “bleeding wound’” in Review o f International Studies 25.4, 1999, pp. 675-91.
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that the Soviet experience in Afghanistan sowed the seeds of the breakdown of 
the USSR.53
The failure of realist theories either to predict or convincingly explain the 
end of the Cold War, the prominent role of ideas in this period, as well as the 
growing constructivist trend within IR more generally, have generated a body of 
constructivist and ideational based accounts of the end of the Cold War. Within 
Katzenstein’s influential edited proto-constructivist text, Herman makes the 
argument that the turn in Soviet international policy was due to ‘cognitive 
evolution’ and ‘policy entrepreneurship’ within networks of elites.54 Fierke’s 
unnecessarily complex argument is that the western-based human rights, peace 
and anti-nuclear movements provided the Soviet elite with new ways of thinking 
about the conflict and provided the intellectual step ladder for elites to get out of 
the Cold War mindset.55 While she uses Wittgensteinian language theory to 
make the point, ultimately Fierke argues that the end of the Cold War was a civil 
society informed elite-diplomatic rapprochement. In a similar vein, Evangelista’s 
study examines the role played by transnational movements such as anti-nuclear 
weapons activists and scientists in the providing a language and set of ideas 
which brought about the end of the Cold War.56 Checkel is also interested in the 
origins of the new thinking evident in the Gorbachev foreign policy elite, but he 
examines the role of the new generation of elites within the Soviet Union.57 
Checkel argues that new thinking was the product of the arrival of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ who furnished the ideas that led to what he also portrays as a 
diplomatic-rapprochement event. English, examining a similar area, examines 
the role that the intellectuals around Gorbachev played in promoting the ‘idea of
53 Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, ‘The Afghanistan War and the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union’ in Review o f International Studies 25.4, 1999, pp. 693-708.
54 Robert G. Herman, ‘Identity Norms and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy 
Revolution and the End of the Cold War’ in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 
no. 271-316.
K.M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998.
56 Matthew A. Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
57 Jeffrey Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behaviour and the 
End o f the Cold War New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
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the West’ as one which the Soviet Union should reform itself around.58 Forsberg, 
cited above, is another example of the constructivist approach. Kubalkova 
undertakes what she describes as a ‘rule oriented constructivist examination’. 
She argues that the transformation of Soviet new thinking ended the Cold War, 
and that the rational choices made under this new aegis had the unintended 
consequence of bringing about the collapse of the Soviet Union.59 Evangelista 
tries to forge a consensus between constructivist and more realist accounts of the 
end of the Cold War by using the idea of heresthetics—the use of language to 
manipulate the political agenda—to show that both ideas and material incentives 
played a role in Gorbachev’s movement to end the Cold War.60
Memoirs and Current Event History
Garthoff s momentous diplomatic history of the transition of US-Soviet 
relations is the standout in the current-event history field.61 Oberdorfer’s text is 
an excellent account of the negotiations between the leaderships from 1985 
through to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which rightly emphasises the 
importance of the personal relationships between Gorbachev, Reagan, Schultz 
and Scheverdnadze.62 Beschloss and Talbott’s text is an insider’s account of the 
Soviet-US relationship which begins with Bush’s inauguration, and, like 
Oberdorfer’s book, emphasises the role of personal relationships in shaping the 
negotiations between the powers.63 Wolhforth’s edited volume is an interesting 
collection of transcripts from conferences at which the major participants in the
58 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea o f  the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End o f  
the Cold War New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
59 Vendulka Kubalkova, The Tale o f Two Constructivisms at the Cold War’s End Working Paper 
9, Research Group in International Security, Programme Conjoint Universite de Montreal/McGill 
University, Montreal, 2001.
60 Matthew Evangelista, ‘Norms, Heresthetics and the End of the Cold War’ in Journal o f Cold 
War Studies 3.1, 2001, pp. 5-35.
61 Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End o f the Cold 
War Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994.
62 Don Oberdorfer, From Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983- 
91 Revised Edition, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
63 Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f  the End o f  the 
Cold War London: Little Brown, 1993.
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diplomatic proceedings raked over old coals, some declassified documents and 
several analytic essays.64
The accounts of Zelikow and Rice on the one hand, and Levesque on the 
other, focus on the relationship between events in Eastern Europe, the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War and do not focus exclusively on the 
diplomatic rapprochement.65 One should note that Rice was wearing her first 
Bush Administration hat at the time of the events which she recounts and the 
narrative bears these scars. Finally, there are four pieces of revisionist history 
which warrant mention. Gaddis’s 1992 collection evaluates America’s role in the 
process with a longer historical view than most other works of contemporary 
history.66 His 1997 text is more a revision of longer-held truths on the Cold War, 
but his revisions are heavily influenced by the end of the conflict and an 
increased recognition of the role of ideology in the confrontation. Lebow and 
Stein’s text is a trenchant critique of nuclear deterrence informed by an end-of- 
the-Cold-War perspective.68 Finally, FitzGerald argues that Reagan and the SDI 
did not drive the Soviets to the negotiating table. She does, however, note that 
Reagan played an important role in humanising relations with the Soviet leader 
and, as a result of this, humanising American relations with the Soviet Union.69
While the current-event history is a reasonably diverse literature, it 
suffers from two broader problems: firstly, it views the end of the Cold War as a 
purely diplomatic and foreign policy level event, that is, an agreement of elites 
and nothing more; secondly, it takes the Cold War as a self-evident and 
unproblematic fact and does not consider what the Cold War was, what the 
underlying cause of the conflict was, and what its dynamics might have been.
64 Wolhforth (ed.), Witnesses to the End o f  the Cold War. The essays look at the role o f the 
leaders: Greenstein, ‘Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War’, and the 
role of perception and misperception, Robert Jervis, ‘Perception, Misperception and the end of 
the Cold War’, pp. 220-39.
65 Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995; Jacques Levesque, The Enigma o f  
1989: The USSR and the Liberation o f Eastern Europe, Berkeley, CA: University o f California 
Press, 1997.
66 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, 
Reconsiderations, Provocations Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
67 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
68 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994.
69 Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End o f the Cold 
War New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.
22
Memoirs are an important source when analysing this kind of 
contemporary history, particularly when much of the official documentation is 
either unavailable or reveals very little. While one must be aware of the 
limitations of such works, there is a remarkable number available from both the 
American and Soviet points of view. Bush and Scowcroft’s recent memoir 
reiterates the story of high-level negotiations and is peppered with post-hoc 
ruminations.70 Holdings similarly examines the period from 1989-1991. As an 
NSC staffer, his depiction of the American diplomatic side of the story is part 
eyewitness account, part memoir and part analysis.71 Gates’s memoir covers a 
longer time frame and his view is overly deterministic on the American side. 
Still, his narrative is revealing; the account is dramatic and he firmly believes 
that the Cold War was a crusade in which the forces of righteousness were
79victorious. George Shultz’s memoir is an excellent source which reflects on the 
shortcomings of both the attitudes, and much of the analysis within, the Reagan 
administration.73 Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker, takes over from where 
Shultz left off and, while interesting in his own right, provides a remarkable fit 
with the Bush and Scowcroft memoir. Like much of the other literature in this 
field, Baker emphasises the importance of personal relationships in building trust 
and forging alliances.74 The Reagan memoir put together by Morris—a relevant 
historical source despite its semi-fictional form—does not spend much time on 
the end of the Cold War, but the pages devoted to it predictably make the 
argument that Reagan declared ‘moral war’ on the Soviet Union, set out to spend 
the Soviets to death, and, ultimately, won the secular crusade against 
communism.75
70 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed New  York: Knopf, 1998.
71 Robert Holdings, American Diplomacy and the End o f the Cold War: An Insider’s Account o f  
U.S. Policy in Europe Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1997.
72 However, his conclusion on Gorbachev and his intentions differs dramatically from much of 
the hawkish advice he gave when in office. Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate 
Insider’s Story o f Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War New York, Touchstone, 
1997.
73 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary o f  State New York: Robert 
Stewert, 1993.
74 James A. Baker, The Politics o f Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 New 
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995.
75 Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir o f  Ronald Reagan London: Harper Collins, 1999.
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Soviet memoirs are themselves testimony to the changes brought about 
by Gorbachev and the reformers. Gorbachev’s memoir is a weighty tome which
*7(\is surprisingly light on detail and circumspect in judgement. Insight into the 
motivations behind new thinking and reform process are there but discussed in 
loose terms. Gorbachev clearly feels betrayed, but also recognises certain 
mistakes. The memoir harbours a curious belief that the reform could have
77  •succeeded. Likewise, Shevardnadze’s ‘non-memoir’ tends to the disappointing 
in its insight into motivation and decision-making, but its coverage of the ideas 
behind foreign policy reform is still good.78 Palazchenko, Gorbachev and 
Shevardnadze’s principal interpreter, argues that the peaceful end to the Cold 
War was the product of the growth of trust and friendship among the leaders on 
both sides.79 Dobrynin’s account spends the bulk of its not inconsiderable 
number of pages dealing with the longer-run histoiy of his encounters with 
American presidents.80 He feels betrayed by Gorbachev, for he argues that the 
Soviet state collapsed because of the incompetence of the reformers who, he 
maintains, never truly understood the nature and scope of the Soviet problems, 
nor the effect that their reforms would have on Soviet society. He claims that, if 
handled correctly, the USSR could have been reformed and saved. Boldin’s 
scathing review of the Gorbachev period is coloured by the fact that it was 
written while he was serving a jail sentence for his participation in the August 
coup.81 Like Dobrynin, he lays the blame for the Soviet collapse squarely at 
Gorbachev’s feet, but, despite the bias, the memoirs reveal much about the 
indecisiveness, poor judgement and vanity of Mikhail Gorbachev. Chemyaev’s 
account is widely cited as the most objective memoir of the period. It charts 
Gorbachev’s successes and mistakes with a candid eye and is charitable in its
76 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs London: Bantam, 1997 [orig. 1995].
77 In Gorbachev’s On My Country and the World he continues this theme in rather strident terms. 
Chapters entitled ‘The Coup: A Stab in die Back -  and the Intrigues o f Yeltsin’ and ‘The Union 
Could Have Been Preserved’ reveal strongly-held resentments.
78 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom London: Sinclair-Stevenson 1991.
79 Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir o f  a Soviet 
Interpreter University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1997. Forsberg echoes this 
argument, but does not cite the memoir, Forsberg, ‘Power, interests and trust’.
80 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War 
Presidents, 1962-1986 New York: Times Books, 1995.
81 Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era as Witnessed by his Chief 
o f StaffNew York: Basic Books, 1994.
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defence of Gorbachev and his reforms.82 Two other important memoirs which 
cover this period are those of Ligachev and Pankin.83 Each conveys the period 
well and demonstrates the initial appeal and then increasing problems of the 
faction fighting and egos inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin. Ligachev, like Chemyaev, 
covers the longer-term and has more reflective analysis whereas Pankin’s is a 
blow-by-blow account of the final months of the USSR.
1.2.3 Historical Sociology
Historical Sociology and IR
The final literature that this thesis draws on and seeks to move beyond is 
the expanding corpus of historical sociology with an international focus. 
Historical sociology is the study of the development and production of social
84 ■structures over time and their influence on the outcome of specific events. It is 
not necessarily international in scope or explanatory framework, but it does 
address concepts central to IR, notably the state, and has developed much 
directly relevant analysis of the international dimension. Since the mid 1970s this 
literature has grown significantly, and has focused on the state and its 
development as a repository of social power. Such work was not bom of the 
1970s, but has a longer history stretching back to the ‘classic’ social theorists, 
Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. The writers of the 1970s and beyond were not 
starting with a tabla rasa; much ground had been cleared not only by the 
‘classic’ theorists, but also by Elias, Braudel, Moore and others.85 Skocpol’s 
examination of the revolutions of France, Russia and China argues that state
82 Anatoly S. Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2000 [orig. 1993].
83 Ygor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs New York: Pantheon Books, 1993; 
Boris Pankin, The Last Hundred Days o f the Soviet Union London: I.B. Tauris, 1996.
84 See generally Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology Shepton Mallet: Open Books, 1982.
85 For example, Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History o f Manners New York: 
Urizen Books, 1978; Fernand Braudel, Civilisation and Capitalism: 15th-18‘h Century 3 Volumes. 
London: Collins, 1981-5; Barrington Moore, Social Origins o f  Dictatorship and Democracy: 
Lord and Peasant in the Making o f the Modem World London: Penguin, 1967; Marc Bloch, 
Feudal Society London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962; Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays o f 
Otto Hintze Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
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weakness, in both its international and domestic context, led to social revolution 
in semi-agrarian states, and that social revolutions tend to produce strong 
centralised states.86 Hers was the first of such international historical sociological 
studies which took dissatisfaction with existing accounts of the state as a point of 
departure. Tilly’s work on the Vendee had presaged this approach to an extent,87 
and his later work on the historical development of the European state as an 
institution of resource-extraction and war-making further developed this 
approach.88 Evans et al.’s S SRC-sponsored volume formalised the aim of making 
the historical and social development of the modem state the focal point of this 
general approach.89 Mann’s two volume study of the development of 
institutionalised social power culminates in his four part theory of modem state 
power and firmly established a neo-Weberian mould for historical sociological 
research.90 In his critique of historical materialism, Giddens further enhanced the 
neo-Weberian institutionalised theory of the modem state as an analytical device 
and historical claim.91 The most Weberian of all, Collins, has tended to be 
ignored in IR circles. This is surprising as his notions of geopolitical power and
M
the state are a close fit with IR-realist understandings of world politics. 
Goldstone’s study of rebellion and revolution in the early modem world also 
develops the Weberian-institutionalist understanding of the state. His analysis 
also utilises demographic studies to explain the weakening of state institutions 
among the pre-modem empires.93
86 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f France, Russia and 
China Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
87 Charles Tilly, The Vendee London: Edward Arnold, 1964.
88 Charles Tilly and Garbriel Ardent, The Formation o f National States in Western Europe 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European 
States, A.D. 990-1990 Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Charles Tilly and Willem Blockmans, Cities and 
the Rise o f States in Europe, 1000-1800 Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994.
89 Peter B. Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985.
90 Michael Mann, Sources o f Social Power, Volume I: A History o f Power from the Beginning to 
AD 1760 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986; Michael Mann, The Sources o f Social 
Power, Volume II: The Rise o f Classes and Nation-States 1760-1914 Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993; see also his States War and Capitalism Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
91 Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence Cambridge: Polity, 1985.
92 For example see Randall Collins Weberian Sociological Theory Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986 and Randall Collins, ‘Long Term Social Change and the Territorial Power 
of States’ in Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change Vol. 1,1978, pp. 1-34.
93 Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modem World Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1991.
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More recently, a sociological approach has become popular within JR. 
Hobson explicitly deploys Mann’s theory of state power to devise an explanation 
of tariff policies among the European powers in the late nineteenth century.94 In 
a study which draws on more ‘classical’ Marxian political economy, Rosenberg 
critiques the realist account of the rise of the state system. He argues that 
economic form is cmcial to the production and functioning of the state system 
and demonstrates the importance of economic form to the shaping of geopolitical 
relations.95 Spruyt’s study of the historical origins of the sovereign state 
demonstrates the historical contingency of this form of political rule.96 He shows 
that it is not the inevitable product of history, but of specific developments and 
conflicts. Halliday’s work on the international dimensions of revolution is 
influenced both by the Skocpolian view of state power and the Marxian emphasis 
on the political and social implications of economic forms and capitalism in
07particular. Hobden’s overview volume informatively shows the ways m which 
historical sociology has been used in IR,98 and Hobden and Hobson’s edited 
volume makes the case, from diverse views, for the utility and benefits of such 
an approach to the study of world politics.99 The historical sociology literature 
that the thesis draws on and seeks to expand is that body which is concerned with 
the state and conceptions of state power in its international and domestic context.
Randall Collins and the Collapse of the USSR
Perhaps the most pertinent example of the historical sociology-IR 
interface is the work of American Historical Sociologist Randall Collins. In an 
essay originally written in 1980, and then published in 1986, Collins notes that 
the Soviet state had passed the peak of its geopolitical powers and on this basis
94 John M. Hobson, The Wealth o f States: A Comparative Sociology o f  International Economic 
and Political Change Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
95 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire o f Civil Society: A Critique o f the Realist Theory o f  
International Relations London: Verso, 1994.
96 Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis o f Systems Change 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
97 Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall o f  the Sixth Great Power 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999.
98 Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down 
Boundaries London: Routledge, 1998.
99 Steve Hobden and John Hobson, Bringing Historical Sociology into International Relations 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
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predicted the decline and fall of the Soviet empire.100 Given the overlap of his 
work with the subject matter and methodology of this study, it is important to 
consider his argument in some detail. His prediction is based on a geopolitical 
theory of state power. This establishes a set of five causal processes which, 
through a cumulative dynamic, interact and determine the rise and decline of 
state power.101 For Collins, the most important aspect in any evaluation of state 
power is the state’s ability to project itself militarily into the international arena; 
all other politics is secondary to this relationship.
Collins’s five geopolitical principles which determine state power are as 
follows. The first principle states that the size and quality of land of a larger state 
will mean that it is more able to defeat smaller and less well-endowed states. The 
second principle notes that some states know that attack will not come from 
certain quarters as these have natural defences such as deserts, tundra and wide 
oceans and can thus focus military resources in fewer places. Related to this, 
Collins also points out that states whose contiguous neighbours are militarily less 
well-endowed have a distinct advantage.102 The third principle holds that interior 
states tend to be at a geopolitical disadvantage and have a tendency to fragment. 
The fourth principle states that eventually a ‘showdown’ war between successful 
marchland states will result. These conflicts tend to produce one of two 
outcomes: either the victory of one over the others, or a stalemate in which they 
decline and disintegrate due to the continuing costs of the conflict. The final 
principle insists that if a state is over-extended it will disintegrate.
When applied to the Russian case, Collins notes that Russia’s marchland 
advantage gave it a geopolitical empire which in time became a liability. After 
consolidating its East European ‘empire’, Russia found itself with a 58,000 km 
border and that it had been transformed into an interior state. The turning point in 
this 300 year transformation was the ‘showdown war’ of the Cold War. Also, he 
argues that Russia had over-extended itself in both ethnic and economic terms. In
100 Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory, pp. 186-209.
101 While initially a prediction, his subsequent publication is a vindication of this as an 
explanatory claim, see Randall Collins, ‘Prediction in Macrosociology: The Case of the Soviet 
Collapse’ in American Journal o f Sociology 100.6, 1995, pp. 1552-93.
102 Collins distinguishes between what he calls ‘marchland’ and ‘interior’ states. Marchland states 
are ones which are surrounded by few, militarily weak states, and have several frontiers which 
are impenetrable due to tundra, desert or wide and deep oceans. Interior states have a number of 
enemies on a number of fronts each of whom is capable of attacking it.
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institutional terms, the ‘autonomous states’ of the USSR provided a political 
infrastructure of both nationalism and organisation which would aid 
fragmentation, and would exacerbate the tensions of over-extension. Ultimately, 
his argument can be summed up in his own words: ‘All major geopolitical 
processes appear to be working against the continuation of Soviet world power. 
Cumulative disadvantage should be expected to reach major proportions in the 
next century, and the coincidence of crises on several fronts simultaneously 
could occur at any time.’103 In his post facto evaluation he claims that ‘the 
pattern, as predicted, was a coincidence of crises on multiple fronts, interacting 
and accelerating past a tipping point into a generalised breakdown of territorial 
authority.’104
Collins claims predictive success,105 and at first glance, he seems to have 
been right—Soviet power did decline, crises in Eastern Europe undermined 
Soviet control of the USSR and ultimately the Soviet state did break down. 
Reading his work nearly ten years after the Soviet Union collapsed he must be 
given credit for being among the few who contemplated the unravelling of Soviet 
power. Indeed, some of his conclusions were remarkably accurate: the Soviet 
state broke up along the ethnic lines associated with territorial power, the 
communist party was a locus of change and so on. But did the Soviet Union 
break down because of the geopolitical reasons that he claimed? In short, no.
There are a number of reasons why Collins’s explanation is ultimately 
unsatisfactory. First of all, his analysis reproduces one of the continuing myths of 
geopolitics—the timelessness of the geopolitical logic and imperative. It is 
simply not reasonable to talk of a Russia that is coherent as a centre of political 
power over 500 years when one is trying to explain a specifically Soviet collapse. 
The key reasons for Soviet collapse were very much of Soviet making—a weak 
economic system, an ideology no one supported and a weakness due to 
international conflict that derived from the political commitments of Soviet 
communism. Furthermore, there is more to the modem state than territorial 
control. State power is not simply geopolitically determined, it is the product of 
social, economic and political forces which must be considered and which
103 Collins, Weberian Sociological Theory, p. 208.
104 Collins, ‘Prediction in Macrosociology’, p. 1570.
105 Collins, ‘Prediction in Macrosociology’.
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Collins ignores. The geopolitical crises which Collins feels vindicates his 
argument were, in fact, political not geopolitical. In Collins’s world, there is no 
scope for agency, contingency and chance; individuals are not able to shape their 
environment but can merely cope with what history places in front of them. 
Moreover, his argument is deeply deterministic. His reliance on transhistorical 
geopolitical endowments gives an unwarranted sense of shape to history and to 
state power and which abstracts the historical realm from its capricious home. In 
short, Collins’s ahistoricism, the one-dimensional nature of his theory of state 
power, the absence of historical contingency, and his inaccurate reading of the 
events of the 1980s all combine to make his explanatory framework very weak. 
While he is right to talk of the inter-linked nature of the unravelling of the empire 
and of the origins of change coming from within the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU), his overall reasoning for predicting and later justifying the 
end of Soviet power are fundamentally flawed. In examining the international 
aspects of the weakening of Soviet power, this thesis seeks to provide a better 
explanation of Soviet state collapse than Collins and in so doing to provide a 
more effective historical sociological method for analysing state collapse in 
general.
Conclusion
This thesis seeks to bring together much of the work covered by the 
preceding three bodies of literature so as to help further our understanding of the 
international nature of the Soviet collapse. It is a study of the weakening of a 
form of social power—the state—viewed from a perspective that is at once 
international and historical-sociological. Historical sociology has been interested 
in the state as a form of social rule, but has tended to have a limited 
understanding of the international dimensions of modem state power. This thesis 
seeks to expand this element of the understanding of the nature of the modem 
state. At the same time, the thesis seeks to make a substantive contribution to our 
understanding of the process of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. In general terms, IR prefers to view these two central events in the 
ahistorical, anodyne manner of data-sets and event-points, or merely uses them to 
prove a theoretical point. For its part, the literature on the collapse of the Soviet
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Union has not paid sufficiently careful attention to international factors, the form 
of the Soviet state as a social structure and the role of the end of the Cold War in 
the eventual implosion. The thesis seeks to correct these imbalances and to 
integrate the domestic and international sources of the Cold War into an 
understanding the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, this study sets out to 
contribute to the growing literature within IR which insists that we must draw on 
the work of our colleagues in sociology. As such, this thesis, in attempting to 
answer the question of how an international confrontation contributed to the 
making and breaking of the Soviet state, advocates a certain methodological 
pluralism.
1.3 Conceptual  Fr am ew o r k
The two core concepts at the heart of this study—the idea of state 
vulnerability and Soviet international confrontation—are by no means self- 
evident. As such, the following section will examine these two concepts and 
establish how they will be used.
1.3.1 Political Process and State Vulnerability
IR has long had conceptual problems with the nature of the state and the 
range of domestic and international factors affecting state action. International 
historical sociology provides one way of dealing with this problem in a 
substantive manner. This thesis is, therefore, an attempt to use sociological 
concepts of state power to illuminate an important question within IR and is also 
an attempt to critique some historical sociological notions which are challenged 
by the events under examination. There are several reasons for using this 
approach in IR. It is an effective way to comprehend the social and historical 
nature of world politics; it allows us to conceive of the international and 
domestic spheres not as separate but as two parts of a broader social whole. This 
facilitates more judicious use of both international and domestic sources of state 
power and weakness in analysis. Second, it allows us to think in a more
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analytically useful manner about the state in its triple international context.106 
Third, it forces us to focus on the historical development of specific phenomena.
This study does not apply a pre-existing historical sociological approach 
to the research question. Rather, its ambition is to make an original contribution 
to the development of historical sociological approaches within IR. There are 
three ways in which the theoretical framework of this thesis fulfils this aim. First, 
it develops a theory of the state which is distinct both from IR notions of the state 
and institutional sociological theories. Second, it integrates the ideational—the 
role of ideas and perceptions—into a theoretical school which has tended to be 
overly materialistic. It does so by striking a balance between ideational and 
material determinants and avoiding the fetishism of ideas prevalent in much 
constructivist IR theory. Third, it develops Skocpol’s functional understanding of 
state power by using a processual dynamic to develop the notion of state power- 
as-practice.
The concern for the moment is with the peculiar phenomenon of great 
power vulnerability. The topic has not been studied widely in IR, although 
Kennedy and Kupchan’s two studies are notable exceptions.107 There are two 
reasons why these works are not used. First, Kennedy and Kupchan focus on 
empires and not on states and do not consider the functional aspect of political 
rule in any great depth. These works also both cling to a very realist notion of 
power and weakness and hence are concerned purely with the geostrategic 
dimensions of great power failure. A useful way to probe more carefully the 
matter of great power vulnerability is to conceive of them as one permutation of 
a larger form of social domination, that is as states. This means that we examine 
how, in functional and institutional terms, great powers operate. For it is in the 
practical aspects of statehood as an institutionalised form of rule that the 
anomalous notion of great power weakness seems less counter-intuitive.
106 The triple context in which states exist are: 1) the inward facing authority over a given 
territory; 2) the outward facing representative o f that territory; 3) the institution which straddles 
the international and domestic divide.
107 Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability o f  Empire Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994, 
and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict, 
1500-2000 London: Unwin, Hyman, 1988. Also, Lundestad examines the question of the 
weakness of great powers inspired by Kennedy’s work and the collapse of the USSR. See Geir 
Lundestad (ed.), The Fall o f Great Powers: Peace, Stability and Legitimacy Oslo and Oxford: 
Scandinavian University Press and Oxford University Press, 1994.
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The idea of the state used in this thesis will be discussed in depth in 
Chapter Two, but it is necessary to point out that it uses a distinct institutional- 
functional theory. This argues that the historical processes of state strengthening 
and weakening have much to contribute to our understanding of developments in
10Rinternational life. Thus, the idea of state vulnerability refers not to some 
permanent potential for collapse, but to a particular phase along a process of 
political change. As distinct from state weakness, the concept of vulnerability 
stems from the larger view that states, as complex institutions of social power, 
are constantly changing.109 This derives from the larger view, articulated by 
Barrington Moore, that in social science it is not change which requires 
explanation, but continuity. What Moore calls the ‘assumption of inertia* causes 
investigation to overlook some of the most crucial processes which ensure the 
perpetuation of specific values, systems and structures of rule.110 The question of 
Soviet collapse presupposes an answer to a prior question, why and how it lasted 
as it did. In recognising the importance of the process of reproduction to the 
perpetuation of states and functional institutions of political rule, the thesis first 
devises a processual theory of state power—one which takes the process of 
reproduction as its first concern—and second, develops an explanation of how 
the processes of reproduction are disrupted.
States, understood as social institutions, are constantly produced and 
reproduced by social processes. Their reproduction therefore is never 
guaranteed.111 States are powerful social institutions. The combination of 
physical might and what are seen to be legitimate principles of rule have ensured 
that, in modem times, states have tended to be strong and are able to survive 
weakening such as that caused by financial crisis, social upheaval or external 
threat. However, a state’s continued survival is never certain and in some 
circumstances the state can be weakened, become vulnerable and possibly 
collapse, be overthrown or overturned by revolution. Vulnerability is therefore 
one aspect of a larger process of political change. Unlike more traditional IR
108 The theory of the state used in the thesis develops the ideas set out in Mann, The Sources o f  
Social Power, Vol. II.
109 Christopher Pierson, The Modem State London: Routledge, 1996; and Gianfranco Poggi, The 
State, Its Nature, Development and Prospects Cambridge: Polity, 1990, pp. 97-105.
110 Moore, Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 486.
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studies, where vulnerability refers to a military threat or perceived threat,112 the 
notion is used in this study to indicate a situation in which the fundamental 
nature of state power has changed: the state is unable to reproduce itself in the 
old way but it has yet to find a new way of doing so and so therefore faces 
challenges to its mle.
The process by which state power is reproduced can be thought of as 
following two ‘tracks’, a stability track and an instability track. The image of two 
tracks represents the paths along which states travel in history. Given certain 
developments, such as famine, economic failure, or invasion, a state may no 
longer be able to reproduce its power, and is pushed onto the continuum of 
instability. This second track comprises five stages of state instability. While this 
track represents the downward steps of state control, it is not deterministic and 
states may, through dint of luck, leadership or circumstances, recover their 
previous grip on society and return, albeit chastened, to the stability track. The 
five stages follow this general pattern. The first is a profound crisis, the second is 
vulnerability, the third is breakdown, the fourth is conflict between factions and 
the fifth is reconstitution. This progression illustrates the stages of state change in 
weakened circumstances and highlights the progressive nature of such change. 
Obviously, states which undergo crisis or vulnerability can head-off this 
challenge and not progress on to breakdown and collapse. The purpose of this 
approach is to show that, when states are faced with trying circumstances, they 
may no longer be able to deal with the longer-term conditions with which they 
had, previously, been able to cope. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s is an example of how a state had, in the past, been able to deal with ethnic 
tension, but was not able to do so in changed circumstances.
The first stage of the process, state crisis, refers to the developments 
which jolt the state off the stability track. State crisis entails serious problems 
undermining the ability of the state to go on reproducing itself as it had in the 
past. These problems can range from demographic changes to fiscal crises, from 
famine to a change in elite attitudes to the state, or from war to a change in 
popular attitudes to the state. The problems may be singular or multiple,
111 On social processes and states see generally J.P. Nettl, ‘The State as a Conceptual Variable’ in 
World Politics 20.4,1968, pp. 559-92, and Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In.
112 For examples of such studies see above note 107.
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domestic or international. However, history shows that the sort of crises likely to 
destabilise state power are usually multiple, such as bankruptcy combined with 
popular resentment. The second stage is state vulnerability in which the anchors 
securing the state’s successful reproduction are loose, its condition is weakened 
and fragile and it has not yet found secure ground on which to re-anchor itself. In 
this situation, the state not only finds itself weakened but will also find it very 
difficult to deal with other matters besides the instigating crises.
The term vulnerability describes a situation in which three clear 
developments have occurred or are in the process of occurring. First, the old 
mechanisms for rule are no longer effective. Second, new mechanisms for rule 
have yet to be found, and third, there exist clear challenges to the state which 
have the potential to destroy it. If the first two developments have occurred, but 
there is no clear challenge or set of challenges, then it is unreasonable to talk of a 
vulnerable state. For example, the American state was not vulnerable during the 
Great Depression even though the old way of relating to the economy and to the 
social needs of its population could no longer continue. Although it hunted for a 
new way for several years there was no clear and meaningful challenge to its rule 
during this period.
If the state is made vulnerable and is not able to rectify the situation, then 
it begins to enter the third stage, state breakdown. Alternatively, if it has dealt 
with the crisis and has found a new way of going on, then the following stage is 
state consolidation. At this point of state breakdown the state may fragment and 
disappear in a manner akin to Iran in 1978-9. It may cling to the trappings of 
power even while those trappings have less and less meaning, as the Kerensky 
government did in Russia in 1917. State breakdown is a brief stage and is the 
prelude to the fourth stage which is the battle for the new state. This battle may 
involve revolution, coup, rebellion or further fragmentation. The hallmark of this 
fourth stage is the struggle between various groups for control of state power. 
Once state power has been claimed and the fight has petered out, then the fifth 
stage is entered. This final phase is the reconstitution and consolidation of the 
state with a new form of rule. This may involve new or old members of the elite, 
but it is signified by restructured state institutions, by clear state efforts to 
buttress its new institutions and principles of rule, and by the successful 
formulation of new and effective processes which reproduce state power.
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The implications of ‘vulnerability’ are clear. Upon entering this stage the 
state is under pressure to rectify and reconstitute the mechanisms with which it 
rules and with which it relates to the society below and the international above. If 
it fails to do so in an effective manner, then the challenges which are present will 
most likely overwhelm it and force revolutionary change. By revolutionary is 
meant change which involves a radical shift in the nature of economic and 
political structures of the state and society. By rights, great powers ought to be 
less prone to vulnerability, or, at the very least, should be better placed to cope 
with it. However, the converse may be closer to the truth because the size and 
complexity of great powers means that their structures of rule tend to brittleness 
or rigidity when weakened.113
The Soviet state underwent all five stages to emerge, in 1992, a loose-knit 
organisation of newly sovereign states, roughly based on liberal-capitalist 
systems of rule. Due to the complexity of the matter and the space limits of the 
thesis, the focus of this study is the second stage of this continuum, that is the 
vulnerability of the Soviet state. Specifically, it is concerned with the way in 
which the end of the Cold War contributed to the weakening of the Soviet state’s 
ability to continue to rule as it had in the past.
1.3.2 International Confrontation and the Cold War
From the outset, the Soviet Union existed in a state of international 
acrimony. The ideas and actions of the revolutionary state and the hostility to 
these by western powers produced a clear condition of confrontation and 
antagonism between the Soviet Union and the western powers. Since this study is 
concerned with the way in which this condition of international confrontation 
influenced the structures of Soviet state power, it is important to make clear what 
is meant by the notion of Soviet international confrontation. This confrontation 
refers to the conflict between two mutually antagonistic socio-economic systems 
—capitalism and Soviet communism—which was, ultimately, about which
113 The distinction between these two is important. The terms refer to the reaction of an institution 
upon the application of force. Brittleness refers to a liability to fracture or shatter rather quickly
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system could provide the better way of life, about who could make the world in 
its own image. The confrontation between the Soviet Union and the capitalist 
powers varied in intensity and location, and lasted for the duration of the Soviet 
Union’s existence. The conflict was not an accident or the product of 
misperception; it was both a product of the internal characteristics of the Soviet 
state and the challenge that the revolutionary power presented to the capitalist 
system. Specifically, the confrontation was provoked by the Soviet attempt to 
create a new and fundamentally better form of socio-economic life based on a 
radically different system of property ownership, production and distribution 
mechanisms, a system which overtly sought to replace capitalism. It was a clear 
threat not only to narrow national interests of other states, but also to the larger 
interests of the capitalist international system. Such a challenge naturally 
provoked reaction which aimed to remove the threat of Soviet communism— 
both direct and indirect—to the world at large. The counter-revolutionary 
impulse of 1918-21, the fascist challenge of the 30s and 40s in Italy, Spain and 
Germany, as well as the hostility of the Cold War were examples of these 
counter-revolutionary tendencies. Importantly, the confrontation consisted of a 
longer-term underlying socio-economic, ideological and geo-political hostility 
between the leading protagonists, before and after World War n.
The confrontation can be divided into two clear periods: the first, 1917— 
1941; and the second, 1945-1988. The period between 1941 and 1945 was 
marked by a state of warfare between one of the confronting powers, fascist 
Germany, and the Soviet Union as well as a temporary and uneasy alliance 
between the USSR and the other capitalist powers. The first period consisted of 
less overt hostility, but nonetheless involved clear competition and challenge 
between the capitalist powers and the USSR. The second period was the Cold 
War. This second phase of confrontation arose for similar reasons as the first 
phase—the socio-economic, geopolitical and ideological challenge presented by 
the Soviet Union and the hostility that this engendered in the West. Importantly, 
the Cold War phase accentuated the competition due to two important 
developments: nuclear weapons and the spread of Soviet revolutionary models
after the application of force. Rigidity refers to a stiffness or inflexibility which takes a longer 
period of time and great force to produce fracturing.
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around the world, particularly in the decolonising states of the former European 
empires.
To summarise, the East-West conflict that so shaped the Soviet state pre­
dated the Cold War. The Cold War itself was the second phase of this longer-run 
international confrontation which derived from the Soviet domestic socio­
political order. The conflict was propelled by Soviet domestic commitments, and 
international actions, as well as the counter-revolutionary tendencies of the 
capitalist states. The international confrontation consisted of socio-economic, 
ideological, and geopolitical competition in a longer-run conflict over which 
system could provide the better form of social life.
International Confrontation: 1917-1941
The first phase of international confrontation was marked by the 
acrimony between the capitalist powers and the Soviet Union. On the one hand, 
the USA was clearly the pre-eminent power, but was somewhat detached in 
terms of its international commitments. On the other, fascist Germany threatened 
the Soviet state in very clear geopolitical terms. The interventions in the Civil 
War of 1918-21, and the later German invasion were two violent book-ends of a 
period in which the foundations of the Soviet state were built. During this time 
the confrontation was most evident in Soviet domestic action, that is the effort to 
build an economic system which would not only outperform the capitalist 
system, but which could provide the wherewithal to fight off what was rightly 
seen to be an inevitable war with a militarised capitalist Germany.
While the confrontation—socio-economic, geopolitical and ideological 
—of this time was pre-eminently visible in domestic terms, it also had clear 
international aspects. The confrontation during this period was pre-eminently 
between the USSR and European powers, particularly Britain and Germany. Yet, 
Soviet-American relations are illustrative of the underlying ideological 
competition which in time underpinned the Cold War. For example, the reason 
that the US did not recognise the Soviet government until 1933 was not only the 
Soviet repudiation of debt and confiscation of property, but also the Soviet 
government’s failure to adhere to the norms of the international system,
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particularly the non-interference norm, and most specifically its overt 
revolutionary aims and practices.114 The language of State Department officials 
prior to the recognition was very clear: ‘the fundamental obstacle in the way of 
the establishment with Russia of the relations usual between nations in 
diplomatic intercourse is the world revolutionary aims and practices of the rulers 
of that country.’115
William C. Bullitt, the US ambassador to Moscow, in writing to the 
Secretary of State in July 1935 makes clear the sense of international 
confrontation: ‘it is my conviction that there has been no decrease in the 
determination of the Soviet government to produce world revolution.’116 For him 
the peaceful international political posture of the 1930s was merely a tactical
117respite, as he puts it ‘reculer pour mieux sauter\ The following year, he wrote
to the Secretary of State regarding the broad direction of US policy towards the 
Soviet Union. Bullitt reinforced the sense that ideological mistrust was the 
underlying character of the relations between the two powers: ‘We should not 
cherish for a moment the illusion that it is possible to establish really friendly 
relations with the Soviet government or with any communist party or communist
1 1 Qindividual.’110 It was a mistrust that emanated not from a concern about 
geopolitical power, but about ideology and the revolutionary challenge that the 
Soviets represented.
The first period of confrontation, as defined above, ended with Operation 
Barbarossa. But, as events in the post-war world made clear, the confrontation 
between the Soviets and the capitalist world had not been ended by a brief 
alliance to fight a mutual enemy. Rather, the systemic competition which had 
been patched over by war-time friendship returned with fresh vigour, re­
energised by key changes which produced the second phase of international 
competition—the Cold War.
114 For example, the statement by the Secretary of State on 31 August 1935 protesting against 
what he described as the violation of the protocols of the recognition agreement o f 16 November 
1933, Foreign Relations o f the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, 
Washington DC: United States Government Publishing Office, 1952, pp. 257-8.
115 Memo from Robert F. Kelly, Chief of Division of East European Affairs, Department of State, 
27 July 1933, inFRUS: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 6.
116 Letter of 19 July 1936, FRUS: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 224.
117 FRUS: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 225.
118 Memo from Bullitt, 20 April 1936, FRUS: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, p. 294.
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International Confrontation: The Cold War
As the Cold War represents the more obvious and acute part of the 
longer-run confrontation, it is necessary to spend some time discussing its 
meaning in historical and analytical terms. The second phase was marked by 
geopolitical and socio-economic conflict between an American-led West and a 
Soviet-led East. Three developments in world politics transformed the simmering 
international confrontation into an acute geopolitical and ideological conflict 
with global implications.119 First, the Soviet Union had developed economically 
to become a power of genuine international standing and magnitude. The success 
of Stalinist industrialisation meant that the Soviet Union could project itself 
internationally in socio-systemic as well as in military terms.120 Under a radically 
different socio-economic regime, the Soviets could produce tanks and missiles 
and teachers and engineers. Second, the major powers, notably Germany, France, 
Britain and Japan, had been destroyed by the ravages of world war. Also, 
fascism, the other major contestatory ideology of the twentieth century, had been 
crushed by World War II. Third, the USA shifted from being a state 
uncomfortable with its global power to one which was willing to lead the world
191in post-war reconstruction and redevelopment. Prior to World War n, the 
USSR had been unable to project itself, militarily and socio-economically, and 
the USA had been unwilling to do so. After 1945, all that changed.
It is illustrative to place the idea of the Cold War as the second phase of a 
longer-run international confrontation in the context of the wider literature. 
Alexei Filitov rightly notes that ‘no commonly accepted definition of what the 
Cold War was exists.’122 The basic question of what the Cold War was drives the 
disagreement among scholars and analysts. There is no settled opinion regarding
119 It is important to emphasise that while the rivalry had been intensified by material 
developments, the underlying international confrontation between the Soviet Union and western 
capitalism existed in a very similar sense.
120 On the industrialisation generally see R.W. Davies, Mark Harrison, and S.G. Wheatcroft (eds.) 
The Economic Transformation o f the Soviet Union, 1913-1945 Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993 and Naum Jasny, Soviet Industrialisation, 1928-1952 Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1961.
121 See generally D.K. Adams, America in the Twentieth Century: A Study o f the United States 
since 1917 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.
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the character of the Cold War. There are conflicting arguments regarding why 
the Cold War happened, what it was over, why detente occurred, and why it 
ended. Despite the proliferation of viewi one of several possible taxonomies sees 
a realist, a liberal, and a radical or internalist understanding of the Cold War. 
Each of these broad categories differs in terms of emphasis on the causes, the 
weighing of various facts, level of analysis and the understanding of the 
underlying dynamic of conflict.
The realist interpretation views the Cold War as a great power conflict 
between the two geopolitically dominant powers which emerged from World 
War II. Such views see the Cold War as pre-eminently a military struggle, 
emerging out of the breakdown of the World War II alliance and shaped by the 
verities of the ‘balance of power’ and relative threat perceptions in the context of 
global anarchy.123 This view is well illustrated by Wolhforth’s echoing of 
Thucydides: ‘the Cold War was caused by the rise of Soviet power and the fear 
this caused in the West.’124 Similarly, the liberal interpretation sees the Cold War 
as a military conflict, but a conflict that was not the result of power vacuums but
125the product of poor policy decisions, misperceptions and missed opportunities. 
For these writers the origins and dynamics of the conflict derive from the actions 
and ideas of the individual decision makers in the immediate post-war context. 
An important distinction between the realists and the liberals is the question of 
inevitability. Liberals argue that, with better knowledge and communication, the 
Cold War could have been avoided. Realists argue that, due to the distribution of 
power in the international system at the time, a conflict between the two great 
powers was inevitable. For the radical or ‘internalist’, the Cold War was a 
military conflict coloured with the patina of ideological rhetoric which was used
122 Alexei Filitov, ‘Victory in the Post-war Era: Despite the Cold War or Because of it?’ in 
Michael J. Hogan (ed.), The End o f the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications: Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 79.
123 Three good examples are John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: 
An Interpretive History Second Edition, New York: McGraw Hill, 1990, William C. Wohlforth, 
The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1993, and David S. Mason, Revolution in East-Central Europe: The Rise and 
Fall o f Communism and the Cold War Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992.
124 Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, p. 96.
125 Two examples of this are Deborah Welch Larson, The Origins o f Containment: A 
Psychological Explanation Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985; Daniel Yergin, 
Shattered Peace: The Origins o f the Cold War and the National Security State, London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1978.
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by both sides to establish and further the domination of their own spheres of 
influence.126 For these writers the Cold War was primarily used as an 
instrumental mechanism for elite control and to reinforce systems of rule within
1 07each bloc and was not really a conflict of values, ideas, or interests. Within the 
broad heading of ‘radical’ understandings there is also Halliday’s inter-systemic 
interpretation, a toned-down Marxist categorisation, which sees the Cold War as 
a conflict of both an ideological and geopolitical nature that was between two 
socio-economic systems and which was the product of the fundamentally
1 7Rantithetical and antagonistic universal claims which each state represented.
For the terms of this study, the first three categories are not satisfactory 
due, respectively, to their understanding of the historical record, their theoretical 
over-determinism and their explanatory weakness in the light of the end of 
hostilities. By locating the Cold War as the second half of a larger socio­
economic and ideological confrontation, this thesis avoids the over-determinism 
of the internalists who clearly overstate the extent to which leaderships on both 
sides understood the conflict and how it benefited them, and the historical 
limitations of the realists and liberals.129 Internalists also fail to recognise the 
compromised nature of decision-making on both sides, preferring a neat 
instrumentalism to the chaotic reality of politics. On the other hand, the realists 
and liberals are simply historically inaccurate. The absence of ideological and 
normative dimensions in their understanding is a manifest failing given the 
strategically irrational actions of both sides. In short then, the approach of this
126 For example, Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understanding East-West Conflict Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990; Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War New York: Pantheon, 1982; C. 
Wright Mills, The Causes o f World War ///N ew  York: Simon and Schuster, 1958; Michael Cox, 
‘The Cold War and Stalinism in the Age of Capitalist Decline’ in Critique 17,1986, pp. 17-82.
127 In this category there is a greater divergence among opinion than in the others, but there is still 
a clear thread of instrumentalism which unifies the group.
128 Fred Halliday, The Making o f the Second Cold War Second Edition, London: Verso, 1986 and 
Fred Halliday, ‘Cold War as Inter-Systemic Conflict: Initial Theses’ in Mike Bowker and Robin 
Brown (eds.), From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 21-34. This approach develops the view o f Isaac 
Deutscher articulated most clearly in his The Great Contest: Russia and the West Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1960.
129 Most histories of the Cold War begin some time between 1942 and 1947, for example, Lynn 
Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins: Soviet American Conflict over Eastern Europe Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974 or J.P.D. Dunbabin, The Cold War: The Great Powers and 
their Allies London: Longman, 1994. However, others go back to 1917 in their studies see for 
example, Andre Fontaine, History o f  the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean 
War, 1917-1950 London: Seeker & Warburg, 1965 or D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and its 
Origins, 1917-1960 Volume One, 1917-1950, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961.
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thesis eschews the determinism of the internalists and the simplification of the 
realists and liberals. The Cold War was an acute phase of the conflict between 
capitalism and Soviet communism. This longer conflict was a struggle to provide 
a better form of social life and to make the world in its own image. The 
international confrontation described here has close affinities with the inter- 
systemic thesis, but it differs by noting that the Cold War was one part of a 
longer-run ideological and socio-economic confrontation.
While the Cold War was not simply a ‘clash of ideas’, ideational 
antagonism underpinned much of the fear and loathing. The international 
confrontation, which was manifested after 1945 as the Cold War, was produced 
by five central developments: 1) the ideas of the Russian revolution and their 
rejection by Western capitalism, each side had antithetical, universalistic and 
evangelical imperatives; 2) the ability of the Soviets and American-led West to 
be able to make good these ideals; 3) the willingness of both sides to engage the 
other in competition, in both social-systemic and military-strategic terms; 4) the 
lack of any greater force, in ideological, military or economic terms, to prevent 
it; and, finally, 5) a logic of competition which ensured that specific actions and 
reciprocal reactions became both causes and effects of Cold War. Each of these 
played a role in inducing the Cold War and perpetuating it as a form of conflict.
The view of the Cold War as the second half of a larger conflict implies 
that the only way in which the Cold War was going to end was for one side to 
renounce that which it was fighting over, that is, its socio-economic system. So, 
while the fluctuation in the level of hostility during Cold War was produced by 
changing levels of intensity of the five developments, the demise of the Cold 
War was the product of a shift not simply in these, but in the underlying goals of 
the struggle; a shift away from confrontation over socio-economic systems.
Between 1917 and 1988-90 therefore, a condition of international 
confrontation existed between the USSR and Western capitalism. In the first 
phase the competition was more evident in ideological and socio-systemic terms. 
In the second phase, once the old order had been pushed aside, a process 
beginning with the Depression in the West and industrialisation in the East and 
ending with the Potsdam conference, political will, material capability, and fear 
produced the Cold War. From around 1947 until 1989-90 the Cold War persisted 
and was characterised by socio-economic and geostrategic rivalry between the
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two blocs, and was driven by the international and domestic commitments of the 
USSR and the American-led West.
One episode of the early 1980s illustrates some aspects of the 
international confrontation well. At a meeting between Gromyko and Reagan on 
28 September 1984, Reagan claimed that Soviet policy, from its earliest days, 
had been designed to promote world revolution. He went on to say that the US 
viewed the USSR as a revolutionary power, an expansionist state, and that while 
they did not wish to change the Soviets’ social system, they were willing to 
recognise and respect their status as a superpower.130 Gromyko responded by 
saying:
Certainly we take the view  that the capitalist order w ill be replaced by 
the socialist order, we believe this in the way people believe the sun will 
rise tomorrow morning -  but this process will occur quite naturally, as a 
result o f  historical development. We do not believe in political or 
military intimidation, and nobody should accuse us o f  trying to change 
America’s social structure by force, nor that o f  any other country. We 
have no such plans and never have had.131
Although this exchange should be seen in the context of three years of Reaganite 
anti-Soviet rhetoric, the nature of relations between the two and their larger view 
of their place in the world is well demonstrated in this dialogue. The exchange 
evokes the various layers of meaning that the Cold War had, the ideas, the fear, 
the clash of systems, the dogmatic rhetoric and the importance of military and 
strategic concerns in reinforcing ideological commitments. These layers of 
meaning were derived from the longer-run nature of the confrontation between 
the systems.
In sum, the international confrontation was a product of the Soviet desire 
to mould the world in its own image, the capitalist resistance to this, and their 
own desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion. As a result of the longer- 
term origins of the Cold War, the conflict cannot be understood as simply a 
military struggle, nor an economic one, but must be seen as a socio-economic
130 Such views had long been part of Reagan’s political persona, and were a key theme of his 
1980 presidential campaign and the hallmark of the early years of his presidency. In his first 
press conference as President he condemned detente and said ‘I know of no leader of die Soviet 
Union since the revolution, and including the present leadership that has not more than once 
repeated ... that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution and a one-world Socialist 
or Communist state.’ Morris, Dutch: A Memoir o f Ronald Reagan, p. 436.
44
battle for hearts and minds which involved a massive military commitment. The 
Cold War ended when the Soviets, under instigation from the reformist 
leadership, rejected the ideas, institutions and practices of the Russian revolution 
and its Stalinist successor and instead attempted unsuccessfully to build within 
the USSR a society based on the values of liberal capitalism.
Cox identifies a structure or ‘system’ of Cold War relations which
1 ^emerged after World War II based on strategic and ideological rivalry. While 
this thesis may disagree in some ways with his particular notion of system, it is a 
central concept in the sense that any analysis of the Cold War must see the 
conflict as more than simply the sum of Soviet-American relations. The 
confrontation between social systems established itself as a structuring element 
of international politics. The conflict established the framework of antagonistic 
relations and, more broadly, it constructed the parameters for international 
relations in the post-war period. This structure of international relations had a 
logic, a self-reinforcing dynamic, which shaped the inter-locking alliances, and 
conflicts across the world. Underpinning the system was a developing global 
capitalism against which the Soviets and their allies were fighting to create a 
different way of organising social fife.
The Cold War system provided both a moral and strategic context for 
political action. This meant that the Cold War permeated regional and local 
conflicts, and often gave them an international character which belied their actual 
underlying causes, and gave them further impetus which warped the original 
aims and made resolution more complex. While the Cold War shaped the 
political dynamics of post-colonial movements and other struggles, these 
struggles and conflicts were not proxy wars in the sense that they were wars 
fought on behalf of the Cold War protagonists. They had the character of Cold 
War stamped on them, but the struggles were local in substance, with Cold War 
rhetoric, armaments and aid fuelling their fights. While the conflict shaped 
international politics, and placed all political actors and movements within a
131 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era, p. 90.
132 He refers to a ‘system’ in which both powers recognised ‘that a carefully managed antagonism 
actually served their respective interests.’ Michael Cox, ‘From the Truman Doctrine to the 
Second Superpower Detente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War’ in Journal o f Peace Research, 
27.1, 1990, pp. 25-41; p. 30. See also Michael Cox, ‘Western Capitalism and the Cold War 
System’ in Martin Shaw (ed.), War, State, Society Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984, pp. 136-94.
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context in which they were constantly located, the Cold War was not the sole 
determinant of world politics. The bi-polar characterisation can be somewhat 
misleading, the world was not neatly cleft in two, rather there were two blocs 
involved in a large-scale sustained conflict.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The thesis will be set out in six further chapters. The second chapter will 
discuss the theoretical method, its ontology and assumptions, and will establish 
the parameters of the study. The final part of that chapter will set out the theory 
of the state which will be used to analyse the international sources of Soviet state 
power so that we can then make a judgement about the contribution of the 
international confrontation to the strengthening and weakening of Soviet 
structures of power. The approach builds on, but substantively diverges from, 
Mann’s theory of state power. The third and fourth chapters study the 
development and form of the Soviet state. So much space is devoted to this for 
two reasons. First, the argument turns on the understanding of what the Soviet 
state was and how the change in its international relations destabilised its 
structures of power. Thus a robust theoretical notion of the Soviet state is needed. 
Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union had its origins not merely in the 
squabbles of the CPSU in 1987-91, but in the longer-term structures of power 
which built certain fault-lines into the system. To understand this it is imperative 
to spend time elaborating the developmental questions of the state.
The third chapter examines the form of Soviet state power with particular 
reference to the role of the international confrontation in the consolidation and 
reproduction of Soviet structures of state power. The chapter pays close attention 
to the impact of the international confrontation on the shape of the Soviet state 
and its development in both instrumental and ideological senses and particularly 
its role as a form of state power-as-practice, a concept set out in Chapter Two. 
The fourth chapter examines the political-economic role of the international 
confrontation in Soviet state power and shows the importance of international 
factors to the stability of the Soviet economic system. It examines the way in 
which the conflict penetrated the structures of the Soviet economy and helped
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produce and reproduce the foundations of state power. The fifth and sixth 
chapters then complete the study by looking at the process of the end of the Cold 
War and the vulnerability of the Soviet state respectively. Chapter Five examines 
what is meant by the end of the Cold War. It shows that the cessation of this 
conflict of systems and states, and the end of a structure of international politics, 
was a product of important movements made within the two central states, the 
most significant of these being the reluctant rejection of the legacy of the Russian 
Revolution undertaken by the Soviet leadership. The sixth chapter brings the 
strands of the thesis together and evaluates how the change in the international 
conditions of Soviet existence contributed to the weakness of the state and 
thereby determines the extent to which the end of the Cold War contributed to 
Soviet vulnerability. The evaluation focuses on the way in which the lack of an 
international posture of both ideological and material strategic hostility fostered 
social forces which undermined the Soviet state’s hold on power. Finally, the 
thesis will conclude with a short chapter which evaluates the claims of the thesis, 
reviews its contribution and sets out a number of avenues for further research 
based on its insights and conclusions.
To begin a study of such a large historical canvas and with a complex 
theoretical disposition can be arduous. It can be difficult to know where to look 
first, what to ignore, and what to examine more closely. Among the morass of 
history and theory a reasonable first path can be cleared by a close examination 
of the theoretical concept at the heart of this study: the state. Thus we turn now to 
the historical sociological method of the thesis and the development of a novel 
theory of state power.
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Chapter
2
2 A  H istorical Sociological M e t h o d
Of the aims of International Relations (IR) enquiry perhaps the pre-eminent is the 
explanation of international events and phenomena, understood as the relations 
between states. ‘Why do states go to war with one another?* was the foundation 
question of the contemporary discipline, with more recent debates focusing on 
such problems as state co-operation under conditions of anarchy, and the rise of 
regionalism in world politics.1 Without question, many feel that one of the over­
riding intellectual purposes of IR is to explain international events.2 This thesis is 
an effort to explain aspects of the relationship between the end of the Cold War 
and the weakness and vulnerability of the Soviet state. It is not an explanation of 
why the Cold War ended. Rather, it is a study of the way in which a structure of 
world politics contributed to the development and weakening of Soviet power. It 
is situated within IR as it addresses the impact of an international conflict on the 
development and demise of state power. Yet, IR is not, theoretically speaking, an 
ideal place to be located.
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the methodological footing of 
the thesis as a whole and to establish a better theoretical place to commence a
1 For example, Robert Axelrod, The Evolution o f Co-operation New York: Basic Books, 1984; 
Charles Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Co-operation as Self Help’ in International Security 19.3, 
1995, pp. 50-90; Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds.), Regionalism and World Order 
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996; Andrew Hurrell, ‘Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world 
politics’ in Review o f International Studies 21.4, 1995, pp. 331-58.
While there is scant literature on explanation in IR, there are a number of discussions see Martin 
Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1992; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999; Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing 
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inferences in Qualitative Research Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1994; and Hidemi Suganami, ‘Agents, Structures and Narratives’ in European Journal o f  
International Relations 5.3, 1999, pp. 365-86.
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study of the international dimensions of Soviet state collapse. IR has always had 
theoretical difficulty with the state and has also preferred to maintain an analytic 
distinction between domestic and international. Yet the Soviet case requires 
careful scrutiny of both of these fields. In retrospect, the collapse of the Soviet 
state has forced analysts to rethink some aspects of causation. The manifest 
problems of Soviet rule—from corruption to alcoholism, economic stagnation to 
ideological disillusion—force us to ask not why the Soviet Union collapsed, but 
why and how it held itself together. This question is challenging and to answer it 
with any degree of sophistication requires asking an anterior question, that is 
how do states hold themselves together? This leads to an important part of this 
enquiry, the examination of the processes of the reproduction of state power. The 
ways in which a state comes to rule over a territory and a population, and the 
manner in which it is able to continue to do so are fundamental to understanding 
how it is that they are unable to continue to do so. In the light of the Soviet 
collapse, and the evident precariousness of its state structures, the nature of this 
process in the USSR is no small matter of concern. This thesis develops a novel 
historical sociological theory of state power which addresses this problem 
directly and from an international point of view. Given the difficulties of the 
Soviet state this theoretical approach may yield useful insights when applied to 
the case of the USSR.
While this thesis does not draw on traditional ER theory, it is not coming 
entirely from the darkness. Thus, the first part of this chapter will briefly chart 
and explain the rise of historical sociology in IR, the realisation of its pertinence 
and the increase in reference to and utilisation of this approach. The second part 
will set out the assumptions and method of this international historical sociology. 
The third section will elaborate these broader propositions and set out the theory 
of state power which will be used to come to terms with the role of the Cold War 
in the development and weakening of Soviet power. Ultimately, this chapter will 
advance the historical sociological dimensions of the thesis which will be used 
subsequently to make the empirical case. In modifying existing historical 
sociological approaches, this thesis makes three contributions: it sets out a novel 
theory of state power; it adds an ideational dimension to historical sociological
49
studies of international phenomena; and it expands Skocpol’s functional theory 
of state power to develop the analytic concept of state power-as-practice.
2.1 The R ise  of H istorical  Sociology  in  IR
-a
As Hobden demonstrates, historical sociology has been on the rise in IR. 
A recent debate in the Review o f International Political Economy demonstrates 
the interest this provokes within the field and the liveliness of the exchanges.4 Of 
course, IR has always had an historical dimension;5 one cannot read Waltz, 
Morgenthau, Carr, Wight, Bull, or Rosecrance, and overlook this aspect of their 
work.6 But the use of history in IR has not had a dimension that is also 
sociological and that has influenced the field in any significant and sustained 
sense. IR does have what can be called a sociological dimension which is most 
evident in the work of the English School and their notion of international 
society.8 However, while the heuristic device of ‘society* has provided a
3 Stephen Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries 
London: Routledge, 1998.
4 Review o f International Political Economy, 3.2, 1998, pp. 284-361 with John M. Hobson, 
Martin Shaw, Hendrik Spruyt, and Sandra Halperin.
5 For a good overview of this see Stephen Hobden, ‘Historical Sociology: Back to the Future of 
International Relations’ in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds.), Bringing Historical 
Sociology into International Relations Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. See 
also Thomas W. Smith, History and International Relations London: Routledge, 1999.
6 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace New York: Knopf, 1949; E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis London: Macmillan, 1939; 
Martin Wight, Power Politics Leicester University Press/RHA, 1978; Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World Politics Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977; and 
Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in 
Perspective Boston: Little, Brown, 1963.
7 The exception to this is the work of Raymond Aron. Yet, his work has not shaped the contours 
of the field in the manner one might have expected, due, in part, to the profound shaking of 
American IR by the behaviouralist ‘revolution’ going on at the time when Aron was at his most 
productive and influential. To gauge the reaction to Aron’s work, see the intemperate response to 
his Peace and War: A Theory o f International Relations, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1964 [orig. 1962] published by Oran Young, ‘Aron and the Whale: A Jonah in Theory’ in Klaus 
Knorr and James N. Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969, pp. 129-43.
8 See Evan Luard, Types o f International Society New York: Free Press 1976, Part I, entitled ‘The 
Case for a Sociological Approach’. Also, both Waltz and Armstrong use sociological notions in 
their work. They both deploy the concept o f socialisation to refer, in different ways, to the 
manner in which the international system co-opts states into behaving in a particular manner. 
Waltz focuses on functional similarity driving this, whereas Armstrong argues that the norms of 
international society socialise the recalcitrant revolutionary state. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory
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convenient tool to analyse IR, the concept is a limited one which hinges on a 
loose analogy rather than a systematic application of this complex notion. Their 
sociological dimension does not scrutinise the social nature, location and 
formation of international power, but deploys an analogy to describe the sociable 
nature of corporealised inter-state relations. While this sheds more light on the 
dynamics of international politics than Waltzian neorealism, it is still a limited 
understanding of the nature of IR. These views tend to down-grade the 
complexity of international life and homogenise disparate forces in the name of 
convenience dressed up as theoretical parsimony. Many felt that such approaches 
were insufficient and that something more was needed. Cox’s critical theory 
piece of 1981 was perhaps the first murmur of a sociological bent.9 Further 
explicit demands for an inclusion of a specifically historical sociological method 
in IR came from Halliday in 1987 and then Jarvis in 1989.10
Interest in historical sociology, like other developments in IR brought in 
from cognate disciplines, was slow to develop. In time, ER scholars found their 
interest piqued by the arrival of some major and influential works of historical 
sociology.11 There was a number of reasons for this interest in things historical 
and sociological. The 1980s saw an increasing dissatisfaction with realism 
expressed in much literature.12 Many scholars spent a great deal of time and 
energy both critiquing the dominant approach and clearing paths for ‘ways
o f International Politics Boston: Little Brown, 1979; David Armstrong, Revolution and World 
Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society Oxford: Clarendon, 1993.
9 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory’ in 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 10.2, 1981, pp. 126-55.
10 Fred Halliday, ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’ in Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies 16.2, 1987, pp. 215-29; Anthony Jarvis, ‘Societies, States and 
Geopolitics’ in. Review o f International Studies 15.3, 1989, pp. 281-93.
11 Of particular influence have been Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A 
Comparative Analysis o f France, Russia and China Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979; Michael Mann, Sources o f Social Power Two Volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986 and 1993; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990; Peter Evans et al (eds.), Bringing the State Back In Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985; John A. Hall (ed.), States in History Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; 
Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence Cambridge: Polity 1985.
12 Criticism came from all sides, for overviews of some of the key debates see: Robert O. 
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics New York: Columbia University Press, 1986; Rebecca 
Grant and Kathleen Newland (eds.), Gender and International Relations Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press, 1991; Jim George, Discourses o f Global Politics: A Critical (Re)introduction to 
International Relations Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1994; Ray Maghroori and Bennet Ramberg 
(eds.), Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations’ Third Debate Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1982; John A. Vasquez, The Power o f Power Politics London: Pinter, 1983; James der
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forward’. Historical sociology was one choice set out in the expanding ‘menu’ of 
theoretical approaches to the study of world politics. If the 1980s and early 1990s 
was the era of the critique of realism and the so-called ‘Third Debate’, then the 
late 1990s saw the fleshing out into substantive works of some of these suggested 
alternatives. The breadth and depth of the critique of realism opened theoretical 
terrain for alternative ways of thinking and doing IR. Alongside this, the end of 
the Cold War revealed the failing of realist approaches and brought home to 
scholars the need to think about the world in different ways. The changed 
circumstances in world politics also meant that the institutional context was 
much more conducive to non-realist approaches. Scholars were faced with these 
twin openings which facilitated substantive analysis of a non-realist nature. Thus, 
with some prodding, IR scholars realised that there were people doing work 
outside the confines of institutional IR which could be of clear benefit to the 
study of world politics. Slowly, historical sociology began to leach through the 
wall.13
Within the institutional domain of sociology, growing dissatisfaction with 
Parsonian functionalism and elite-based theory, as well as a scepticism of 
Marxist accounts of the state, led a number of scholars to examine the notion, 
development and power of the modem state.14 As Michael Mann reflectively 
remarks, ‘[we] came to identify distinctive autonomous power resources lying 
with states, especially in matters relating to war and peace.’15 The fact that these 
historical sociologists examine such phenomena as the state and its formation,
Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings 
o f World Politics Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989.
13 These openings have also facilitated the advances o f constructivism. Some notable 
constructivist works include: Wendt, Social Theory o f International Relations; Jens Bartelsen, A 
Genealogy o f Sovereignty Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Audie Klotz, Norms in 
International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1995; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Condition o f  Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989; and Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World o f Our Making: Rules and Rule in 
Social Theory and International Relations Columbia, SC: University o f South Carolina Press, 
1989.
14 Michael Mann, States, War and Capitalism Oxford: Blackwell, 1988 and The Sources o f  Social 
Power, Volume II: The Rise o f Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914 Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993; Tilly (eds.), Coercion, Capital, and European States; Giddens, Nation 
State and Violence; Evans et. al (eds.), Bringing the State Back In; John A. Hall, Coercion and 
Consent: Studies on the Modem State Cambridge: Polity, 1994.
15 Michael Mann, ‘The Polymorphous State and Ethnic Cleansing’, in Hobden and Hobson, 
(eds.), Bringing Historical Sociology into International Relations.
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wars and revolution has meant that this body of historical sociology is a natural 
point of departure for IR scholars dissatisfied with existing approaches, and 
consequently, ER has been most influenced by it.16 Its appeal was further 
enhanced by the very realist conception of the international used by these 
historical sociologists.17
Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions was the first and most 
clear-cut example of the sociological turn towards the state and the forms of its 
social power.18 It is her notion of state autonomy which has resonated most with 
ER scholars. In developing this concept, Skocpol breaks with the sociological 
wisdom of her time and identifies the state as an institution which has 
autonomous social power and which does not merely reflect the interests of the 
ruling class, nor the mode of production, and is not simply an arena in which 
interest groups and parties struggle for influence.19 Other writers within historical 
sociology who have been of major interest to ER scholars because of their 
engagement with the state and its historical development are Michael Mann, 
Charles Tilly and Anthony Giddens.20 All three develop the concept of state 
autonomy and consider the developmental and constitutive process of state 
development in its international context. While they each have specific theories, 
and deploy them in different ways, they share a broadly similar institutional- 
functional view of the state, and the historical development of this form of social 
power. For them, the rise and fall of particular states is driven by the strength or 
weakness of this autonomous power.
Historical sociology appeals to ER scholars not because it can simply be 
tacked-on to existing ER theory—it cannot—but because it can provide an 
alternative analytic lens through which world politics can be viewed. It is useful 
because it takes the state seriously as an international social institution, and sees 
it not as an eternal entity, but as a contingent social form, the product and 
transmitter of specific social forces. Historical sociology provides a clear basis
16 Though it is important to note that in so doing it did not present a fundamental challenge to 
existing IR theories.
17 On Tilly, Skocpol and Mann’s very realist understanding of the international see Hobden, 
International Relations and Historical Sociology.
18 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
19 For details on her notion of state autonomy see Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 24- 
32.
20 See above note 11.
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for analysing the material and ideological power of states, their international and
domestic contexts and the role of the world historical context in determining and
1shaping international phenomena. Specifically, historical sociology provides a 
historically grounded method for addressing specific research questions. The 
appeal and pertinence of historical sociology in IR is clear. An intellectual space 
for it was prised open by events in world politics, and the critique of realism 
which demanded a substantive, non-realist research agenda. While historical 
sociology is still an approach that is on the fringes, and the body of literature is 
still slight, its grounding as a question-driven research agenda and the results of 
this research may yet push it into the mainstream.
2.2 International  H istorical  Socio lo g ical  M ethod
2.2.1 Assumptions and Ontology
All social science methods are shaped by their theoretical commitments. 
Their parameters are established by their ontology, which is itself the product of 
basic beliefs and assumptions of what the social world is, how it works and 
consequently how we can come to know it. Smith writes that historical sociology 
‘is the study of the past to find out how societies work and change’,23 while 
Abrams claims that it *seek[s] to understand the puzzle of human agency and ... 
seek[s] to do so in terms of the process of social structuring.’24 As historical
21 For more details on the appeal of historical sociology to IR and an outline of a research agenda 
see John M. Hobson, ‘The Second Wave of Weberian Historical Sociology: The historical 
sociology of the state and die state of historical sociology in international relations’ in Review of 
International Political Economy 5.2, 1998, pp. 284-320; for an agenda for a Marxian approach 
see Justin Rosenberg, ‘The International Imagination: IR Theory and “Classic Social Analysis’” 
in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 23.1, 1994, pp. 85—108.
22 The more notable recent texts that have overtly adopted an historical sociological method are 
Hobson, The Wealth o f States', Justin Rosenberg, Empire o f  Civil Society: A Critique o f the 
Realist Theory o f  International Relations London: Verso, 1994; Sandra Halperin, In the Mirror o f  
the Third World: Capitalist Development in modem Europe Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1997; Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall o f  the Sixth Great 
Power Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999; Hobden, International Relations and Historical Sociology.
23 Dennis Smith, The Rise o f Historical Sociology Cambridge: Polity, 1991, p.3.
24 Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology Shepton Mallet: Open Books, 1982, p. x.
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sociology has multiple meanings,25 the following section will set out the 
ontological and epistemological foundations of this study.
The primary assumption in this thesis is that social structures embed 
human relations in particular frameworks at given times. They are flexible, 
mutable and vary in time and space. They shape people’s actions and are in turn 
re-shaped by these actions. Historical sociology seeks to identify and study these 
structures, with a particular interest in how they are produced and reproduced 
over time and how they affect people’s lives. An international historical 
sociology examines the complex cascade of power relations across, between and 
within states, and their interactions. As a result, this method eschews the limited 
focus of a particular level of analysis, and does not present a static 
methodological aperture; perhaps international historical sociology is best 
described as an analytic stance rather than a methodology as such. Substantive 
analysis is possible through a careful focus on social structures and agents behind 
particular developments, and not on a model which pre-determines the dominant 
forces.
There are three ontological claims which underlie this inquiry and its 
analytic focal points. The first is that all human institutions are inherently social. 
Second, these social institutions are historically constituted and located; they are 
produced by specific processes. Third, these social phenomena are inherently 
political and contested. That is, a particular institution exists because another one 
does not and this conflict and contest is crucial to the formation of the 
institution’s current shape. The focus, then, is not on perennial essential 
characteristics, but on the social forces which constitute world politics. Historical 
sociology is useful in many forms of social inquiry, but it is best suited to 
developments or trends over time. These need not be Targe scale’ trends such as 
states or revolution. Other concerns such as family, poverty and missile guidance
25 There are many forms of historical sociology, indeed many who are doing such research 
possibly would disagree with the ideas discussed here.
6 Checkel argues that this lack of a core ‘theoretical’ agenda is a weakness of constructivism 
The point o f such non-positivist approaches is to move away from the dry and limiting practice of 
abstract theory-building and instead to use an open analytic method based on certain 
assumptions. It involves a conception of theory and its underlying purpose which sits 
uncomfortably with North American positivist commitments because it avoids the limits of 
parsimony in favour of the possibility of complexity based on inductive and not deductive
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systems all have a sociological history.27 In the case of IR, the analytic position 
which Hobsbawm calls the ‘bird’s eye view’ is most useful.28
Social Structures
This thesis emphasises the concept of social structures. It is important to 
discuss this a little further so that the analytic coherence of the theory of the state, 
and the subsequent examination of the Soviet state, is readily apparent. In IR the 
notion of structure is often assumed. Generally, a structure is assumed to be a 
pattern of social relationships which imposes order by constraining the possible 
choices of action. However, the idea of social structure used in this method is 
more constitutive than this.29 It indicates the ordering of economic, political and 
social power institutions in a particular way which presents individuals with a 
menu of choices for action. Examples of these include the state, legal systems, 
class, the education system, and so on. These structures are not just external to 
people’s lives, they are part of those lives and are at the same time products of 
their choices. Giddens expresses this neatly: ‘Structure is both the medium and 
the outcome of the human activities which it recursively organises.’30 Within this
methods. Jeffrey Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory’ in World 
Politics 50.2,1998, pp. 324-48.
27 Some more notable ‘macro’ level works of historical sociology: Barrington Moore, Social 
Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making o f the Modem World 
London: Penguin, 1967; Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions', Fernand Braudel, Civilisation 
and Capitalism: 15th-18fh Century Three Volumes, London: Collins, 1981-5; Marc Bloch, 
Feudal Society London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962; Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and 
Rebellion in the Early Modem World Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991. For 
bird’s eye views of other social phenomena see Tony Novak, Poverty and the State: an Historical 
Sociology Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1988; Peter Laslett, Family Life and Illicit 
Love in Earlier Generations: Essays in Historical Sociology Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977; Donald A. Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: An Historical Sociology o f  Nuclear 
Missile Guidance Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990. The thesis avoids the distinction o f macro 
and micro deployed in much sociology as all social action involves both individual actions and 
socially generated structures, the differentiation is artificial, on this see Jeffrey C. Alexander and 
B. Grieson, ‘From Reduction to Linkage: The Long View of the Micro-Macro Link’ in Jeffrey C. 
Alexander et al. (eds.), The Micro-Macro Link, Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1987, 
pp. 1-42.
8 Eric Hobsbawm, Age o f Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century London: Michael Joseph, 
1994.
29 It should be noted that in most social theory the notion of social structure is so reliant on a 
specific system and set o f circumstances that definitions are not broadly transferable, for a classic 
example see the notion used in Talcott Parsons, The Structure o f Social Action: A Study in Social 
Theory With Special Reference to a Group o f Recent European Writers Second Edition, Glencoe, 
IL: Free Press, 1949.
30 Anthony Giddens, Social Theory and Modem Sociology Cambridge: Polity, 1987, p. 61.
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broad conception, structures have four general functions: they constitute actors, 
constrain them, liberate them and impose change upon them. The first two of the 
four tend to dominate references to structure in JR. For example, the ‘structure of 
anarchy* places a state in a situation in which it can do x, y, or z, but not a, b, or
*5 1 ,
c. ‘Structure’ refers to the social process which places the actor m a choice- 
making position and which shapes the possibility of choice. The structure which 
allows Nato to bomb Serbia for actions in Kosovo, but not Russia for actions in 
Chechnya illustrates this notion of structure
Structures can also be patterns which promote change. Whether through 
economic hardship, the transmission of ideas or through the nature of learning, 
structures can provide a possibility for action. The final sense refers to those 
moments in which structures are not forces for stability, but for change. That is 
when social life is organised so that radical and uncontrollable transformation 
results. Taking Giddens*s recursive view of structures, one can note that patterns 
arise in which action taken due to specific conditions can undermine the 
circumstances which produced the initial structure and then, in a zipper-like 
manner, induce subsequent action which yet further undermines the anterior 
conditions. These structures spiral the constituent social relations out of control; 
stock market crashes, state collapses and revolutions are examples of this. To 
reiterate, in this thesis, structures are recognised as having different forms which 
inter-relate, and they have a double purpose as both the medium and the outcome 
of social action.
31 This is the sense that Waltz uses the term in his Theory o f  International Politics. Choices are 
limited by the political considerations of a structure of anarchy and informed by relative threat
political realignment after war is a clear example. Also, the possibilities 
opened up by such structured change can be great. In Britain, the end of WWII and the Marshall 
plan facilitated the construction of the welfare state where previously it had been impossible. In 
South East Asia, the international political structure of Cold War provided the context for the 
creation of ASEAN.
33 A good example o f this is die self-fulfilling prophesy o f bank collapse in which a bank is 
rumoured to be on the verge of collapse, so customers pull out all their money thereby ensuring 
that it does collapse. Similarly, the near collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital 
Management was mainly due to the publication of a fax which was interpreted as an act of 
desperation, as a result of which no one would buy any of their assets and hence they teetered on 
the brink. For a good discussion of this see Donald Mackenzie, ‘Fear in the markets’ in London 
Review o f Books 22.8, April 2000, pp. 31-2.
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perceptions.
2 The international
An International Historical Sociology
Historical sociology underlines the essential historicity and contingency 
of the social realm, and attempts to focus theoretically on the historical formation 
of social structures and to examine the significance of these processes on 
contemporary developments. For IR, focussing on the social realm rather than 
the strictly ‘international’ allows us to transcend the traditional domestic- 
international dividing line which has been the defining point of the discipline. 
Inside the state there is the condition of hierarchy, outside it the condition of 
anarchy. This axiom has been the hallmark of much theorising in IR.34 The idea 
that the domestic and the international are discrete realms increasingly is being 
questioned, and rightly so. International historical sociology is one way of 
overcoming this divide which provides a specific means of conceiving of the 
relationship between overlapping and intersecting political and social realms. For 
example, when looking at revolutions arguably one can see an intemational- 
domestic-intemational causal chain which demonstrates the relationship between 
these two spheres. Taking this a step further, historical sociologists have argued 
that the international and the domestic are mutually constitutive and, as such, 
causal relationships will run from one realm to the other, and will not follow a 
single temporally or spatially delineated logic.36 But this, like the causal chain of 
revolutions above, only goes some of the way. An international historical 
sociology must see the social world as a whole which has been carved up into 
spheres by specific forces and processes.37 Thus the international and domestic
34 For an overview of this see Ian Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 15-32. There have been many critiques of this as a 
departure point for the study of IR, see for example, R.B J. Walker, Inside/Outside: international 
relations as political theory Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
35 Halliday, following Skocpol, establishes a causal chain, which claims that international events 
cause state-level weakness and revolutions which in turn then lead to international 
transformation, instability and war, in Fred Halliday, ‘“The Sixth Great Power” -  on the study of 
revolution and international relations’ in Review o f International Studies 16.3, 1990, pp. 207- 
221. This is then developed by John Hobson in his Wealth o f States with the discussion of the 
‘spatial trinity’ o f causation, see Chapter 7 and specifically, p. 266.
36 Initially articulated by Mann and Giddens.
37 On the argument for holism in international relations see Rosenberg, ‘The International 
Imagination’.
58
spheres should be seen as not just overlapping, nor as mutually constitutive, but 
as clear linked parts of a social whole which constitutes the modem world 
political system. A central element of this system is the social process which 
produces the formal differentiation of spheres—of domestic and international— 
despite their clear substantive overlap and inter-penetration.
An Ideational Historical Sociology
Historical sociology has rightly been accused of being too rationalistic 
and materialistic. It has at times shut out the role of ideas and identities in
‘l O
shapmg and giving meaning to social structures. One of the aims of this work is 
to begin to rectify the materialist imbalance in historical sociological studies. 
Ideas and norms are central to the production of social structures, and as such 
they must figure in any analysis that focuses on such structures. But it is crucial 
that the right balance is struck between the truism that everything is socially 
constructed and the over-determinism of the material structures of life. Clarity of 
position is cmcial when trying to strike this balance. In the sense that, in 
comprehending the world we mediate it with our subjective understanding of the 
world, then indeed all things are socially constructed and ideas are primary. But 
that is only acceptable if one is analysing how analysts or politicians think about 
the world. When ideas solidify into practice one must remember that these ideas 
come from a material location and go into one. Ideas are not bom free; 
everywhere they are in the chains of their material existence. It is precisely this 
balance which the theory of state power set out below attempts to strike.
Historical sociology is an engagement with a different set of questions 
from traditional ‘problem solving’ approaches in IR.39 The problematic 
underlying international historical sociology is the social structuring of 
international life. Here, international life is not limited merely to states and 
sovereignty. The international canvas is broad and it allows the investigation of a
38 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘History of Ideas and the Idea of History’ in Hobden and Hobson (eds.), 
Bringing Historical Sociology into International Relations.
39 The distinction between problem solving and critical theories is made by Cox, ‘States, Social 
Forces’.
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range of significant international social forces which shaped the development and 
decline of Soviet state power. Speaking more broadly, there is a rich promise in 
an historical sociological approach for IR because it illuminates the social 
dynamics of contemporary world politics and tries to substantiate, in real, and 
human terms, the social forces which shape modem life.
2.2.2 Method
As mentioned in Chapter One, studies of the Soviet collapse generally 
overlook, avoid or understate the international factors which caused the Soviet 
collapse.40 These studies are useful in their own right, and yet have distinct 
limitations. This thesis locates the collapse in its historical and international 
sociological context. In doing so, it seeks to strike the right balance between 
international and domestic causes, as well as provide a framework in which the 
role played by shifts within the Soviet elite, and the change in values and ideas 
can be better understood. The purpose of this approach is to use history to shed 
light on our understanding of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and to draw attention to the importance of historicising these 
developments. The method set out here is leavened with an awareness of the 
contingency of historical developments, and attention is paid to both the 
historicisation of social structures and the contingency of social phenomena.
The sociological approach of this thesis does not dwell on interests 
understood as the instrumental benefits of the ruling class over the population. 
Though these interests were clearly important in the Soviet case, and doubtless 
play a role in state reproduction the world over, this thesis is concerned with the 
interests of the state institutions themselves. The institutions are understood to 
have a pre-eminent interest in their own reproduction. These larger structures 
locate the ruling elite within a framework in which their interests are determined 
by these primary concerns. Our concern is with the way in which the structures 
and processes of the state interact with the international to reproduce their 
dominance.
40 See Chapter One, pp. 12-5 .
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This method is neither hermeneutic nor positivist, in the Humean sense, 
although it incorporates insights from both of these approaches. It is an attempt 
to examine the international elements of Soviet state collapse by focusing on the 
historical and political development of two social structures which were central 
to the fragmentation: the form of the Soviet state and its international 
confrontation with the capitalist West. This approach puts a particular focus on 
the processual nature of the relationships between structures and emphasises the 
broader importance of this view of the social world. There are at least three other 
strategies for a historical sociological analysis: counter factual analysis,41 
comparative analysis42 and complex process tracing 43
International historical sociology is built on the assumption that social 
structures exist, embed actors, give them meaning and shape their destiny. The 
difficulty, of course, is the selection and identification of these structures. In any 
given instance there is a bewildering array of structures operating at a range of 
levels, as well as a similarly staggering number of possible actors reacting to 
these situations.44 For example, trying to determine why an election was called, 
or why an electoral outcome came to pass is difficult, despite the fact that 
elections are events which are bounded, have limited participants, specific rules 
and clear motives. There are a range of structures which may influence the 
explanation: the political system; the party system; the electoral system and 
cycle; the economic system; international factors; the popularity of the candidate 
and the resonance of the issues she has raised with the electorate; the 
machinations of voting patterns; dissatisfaction with the incumbent; the effect of 
the economy on the electorate and such banal matters as the weather. This list is 
not exhaustive. In spite of the possibility of a profusion of structures, analysts
41 See David Sylvan and Stephen Mejaski, ‘A Methodology for the Study of Historical 
Counterfactuals’ in International Studies Quarterly 42.1, 1998, pp. 79-108. More generally see 
Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds.), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: 
Logical, Methodological and Psychological Perspectives Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1996.
42 An example of this sort is in Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, pp. 2-61.
43 See A.L. George ‘The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-making 
Behaviour: The Operational Code Belief System’ in L.S. Flakowski (ed.), Psychological Models 
in International Politics Boulder CO: Westview, 1979, pp. 95-124.
44 Goldstone uses the mathematical image o f fractals to refer to the way in which order emerges 
from the endless chain of structures and action in the social realm. For him, explaining social 
developments involves a ‘near fractal’ account, in which some structures more heavily drive 
order than others, Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, pp. 46-51.
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can confidently draw conclusions. They do this by ordering which elements are 
more important through empirical scrutiny. This may be via exit booth polls, 
direct polling, result scrutiny and so on.
Two of the most important changes in social structures which paved the 
way for the Soviet collapse were the end of the Cold War and the problems 
within the Soviet state. International confrontation—of which Cold War was the 
second and acute phase—played a considerable role in the institutional 
development of the Soviet state and the change in international stance 
precipitated by its end clearly played a role in the destabilisation of the USSR. 
The conflict of values, economic systems, missiles and threats that was driven by 
the domestic commitments of the protagonist states became a clear, though 
variable, structure of world politics. However, it was a structure which cannot be 
isolated in the international realm, for it was the production and reproduction of 
this hostility by the dominant states which impelled it. Furthermore, the 
development of states themselves was shaped by this system of relations.
Thus, our concern is the extent to which the Soviet international 
confrontation played a role as a support mechanism reinforcing the effectiveness 
of Soviet state rule and the impact that the ending of this system of conflict had 
on the stability and solidity of the Soviet institutions of rule. Accordingly, careful 
consideration of the nature of the Soviet state is required. This study begins with 
the assumption that the shape of the international political system affects states 
and their relationships with their societies and, in turn, the international political 
system is shaped by the action of states. It will use a historical sociological 
theory of the modem state to articulate a theoretical framework of state power. 
The nature of the Soviet state will be adduced from this theory. This allows the 
thesis to determine the extent to which the institutions of Soviet state rule were 
affected by this international structure which was itself partly the result of the 
Soviet state’s internal organisation. In short, a theory of state power will be used 
to help determine the role of the international confrontation in the formation and 
destruction of the Soviet state. A processual view of state power—one which 
focuses on the process of the reproduction of Soviet power—is used to examine 
how international confrontation helped the Soviet state stay together.
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Having set out the processes of the reproduction we can then consider the 
rupture in this mechanism using the continuum of political change set out in 
Chapter One. In this way we can then establish how the ending of the conflict 
undermined Soviet state institutions. The continuum, combined with the ideal 
type of state power set out below, will be used to judge the extent to which the 
end of the Cold War contributed to the vulnerability of the Soviet state. The rest 
of this chapter will elaborate the international historical sociological framework 
of modem state power.
2.3 A  Fram ew o rk  Theory  of M odern  State  Pow er
Theories of state power are necessarily complex. This section will discuss 
the theory in the following manner. It begins with an overview and critique of 
Mann’s theory of the state. From there it begins to reconstruct an institutional 
theory by defining the pattern of states in terms of five constituent elements. 
Third, it discusses the relationship between institutions and functions and 
examines how states reproduce themselves and the importance of this process to 
their power. This is developed using the idea of state ‘power-as-practice’. The 
section concludes with an examination of the structural and instrumental ways in 
which states use the international to reinforce their positions of political 
dominance.
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2.3.1 The Basis of a Theory of State Power
The modem state has been much theorised and discussed, and its form 
and nature have all been written on widely.45 This section will elaborate a theory 
of state power which develops Mann’s theory of the modem state. Mann is used 
as the basis as his approach is the most thorough and analytically useful theory 
that is not reductionist, is historically and socially grounded and is located in an 
international context46 The theory set out here has a sharper focus on two 
dimensions of state power neglected by Mann—the international and the process 
of state reproduction. More specifically, the theory will be based on an 
examination of the relationship between the institutions of the state and functions 
of the state and how this interaction—the process of production and re­
production—produces a key element of state power. This theory breaks the state 
up into its constituent elements, that is its institutions, functions, purposes and 
principles. Its aim, however, is to emphasise how these elements fit together and 
how this interlinking, in its simultaneous international and domestic contexts, 
produces the state as a complex actor with multiple dimensions located 
historically and internationally. This coagulation of social power is considered as 
a model against which the Soviet form will be measured so as to determine the 
nature and limits of the international confrontation’s impact on Soviet state 
power.
Mann’s theory developed from his interest in the manner in which states 
have come to play a greater and greater ‘structuring role in society’ which, he 
argues, is due to the historical configuration of his four sources of social power: 
ideological, military, economic and political.47 His approach borrows from the
45 Some of the notable monographs include Evans et al., Bringing the State Back In; Bob Jessop, 
The Capitalist State Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982; John A. Hall, Coercion and Consent: 
Studies on the Modem State Cambridge: Polity, 1994; Andrew Vincent, Theories o f the State 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1987; Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism London: New Left Books, 
1978; Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence; Robert A. Dahl, Democracy, Liberty 
and Equality, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986; and David Held, Political Theory and the 
Modem State: Essays on State, Power and Democracy Cambridge: Polity, 1989.
46 Mann, Sources o f Social Power, Vol. II, pp. 44-91.
47 He focuses overly on the domestic, or bounded sources of power, though he himself makes 
clear that social totality is not bounded and societies are far from unitary. For details on this see 
his Sources o f Social Power, Volume I: A History o f  Power from the Beginning to AD 1760 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, Chapter 1.
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insights of the five major theoretical notions of the modem state.48 But, in 
inductively arriving at a fluid, complex and idealised account of the state, he 
leans most heavily on institutional statists such as Giddens and Tilly 49 Mann 
attempts to emphasise a number of key characteristics of this coagulation of 
social power which led to its having a structuring role in domestic society below 
and realpolitik above. First, he establishes that the state has a certain degree of 
autonomy; it does not merely reflect the requirements of the ruling class or the 
mode of production, nor is it simply an arena in which interest groups and parties 
struggle for influence. Second, he emphasises that state and society are clearly 
related, but that neither are unitary in the sense that most tend to conceive of 
them. Third, the modem western state is polymorphous in the sense that it can be 
found in multiple places with multiple functions. These different roles—such as 
order imposition or security provision—create a range of power networks at the 
centre of which lies the state. Over time, these networks ‘crystallise’ in specific 
forms which structure the nature of the state, its relations to society, and thus 
society itself.
In Mann’s ‘partly institutional, partly functional polymorphous theory’ 
the institutional view carries the greater explanatory function, though it cannot be 
effectively utilised without the polymorphous conception of crystallisations of 
specific power networks. Mann’s definition is telling:
The state is a differentiated set o f  institutions and personnel 
embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to 
and from a centre, to cover a territorially demarcated area over
which it exercises some degree o f  authoritative, binding rule
making, backed up by some organized physical force.50
While he avoids setting out the functional specifics of states, he notes that 
functions help to ‘simplify multiple institutions in terms of the underlying 
functions undertaken by particular states.’51 The various crystallisations of power 
networks that comprise the state are, for Mann, ‘erratically entwined’, and it is 
these irregular entanglements which are the state. Despite all this tangling, he
48 The five theories which he draws together are: class-based; pluralist; elitist (which he equates 
with IR realism); institutional statism; and ‘cock-up/foul-up’ theory.
49 Giddens, Nation-State; Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States.
50 Mann, Sources o f Social Power, Vol. II, p. 55.
51 Mann, Sources o f Social Power, Vol. II, p. 76.
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argues, we can reasonably talk about a singular action of a state in which power 
has been invoked, and all citizens become ‘subject to the singular and sovereign 
power of the state.’52
For Mann, states are the products of the authoritative centralisation and 
institutionalisation of social relations in which they have despotic and 
infrastructural power over their bounded society.53 Despotic and infrastructural 
powers are inter-related, though not in any causal or necessary way. The final 
element of his notion of the state are the groups of people who mediate these 
power networks and bargain between state and society. He identifies three clear 
groups of people who undertake this role: state elites, parties54 and 
constituencies. These groups interact and are the mechanisms by which the state 
penetrates society and society penetrates the state. He argues that state elite 
power radiates out into society, the power of constituencies flows in to the state, 
and the power of parties tends to move in both directions.55
Mann presents a complex institutional theory of the state. The 
polymorphous-functional aspect attempts to give an analytic edge to the manifest 
diversity of the forms that states take so that we can understand their formation 
and dynamics in a broader comparative and historical sense. States are 
institutions of authority which centralise power networks in specific areas. Due 
to historical developments, he argues, states have tended to have certain 
dominant characteristics, and he identifies four of these: the capitalist, militarist, 
representative and the nationalist. Ultimately, the state is portrayed as having a 
degree of autonomy, but it is not unitary nor singular in this action at all times. 
Mann’s theory emphasises that state power hangs on the specific nature of the 
combinations of the higher level crystallisations. Finally, he carefully limits the 
ambitions of his theory. He does not claim that it explains state action, rather, he
52 Michael Mann, ‘The Polymorphous State and Ethnic Cleansing’, Conference Paper presented 
to ‘Bringing Historical Sociologies into International Relations’, University of Wales, 
Aberystwyth, July 1999, p.6.
53 Despotic power refers to the power of state elites over the population as a whole which can be 
undertaken without process or negotiation and in an arbitrary sense. Infrastructural power refers 
to the ability o f the state to ‘penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions.’ Mann, 
Sources o f  Social Power, Vol. II, p. 59.
54 He means parties in the Weberian sense, that is a term which refers to any organised group 
which seeks to influence politics, and not just formal political parties which participate in the 
governing o f a state.
5 Mann, ‘Polymorphous State’, pp. 4-8.
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claims that it provides an explanation for the patterns of state behaviour and 
action in the modem world.
Mann incorporates certain international aspects of state power. Though he 
tends to focus more on developments within the state rather than on the role of 
international factors in shaping the state, there is an explicit and implicit 
acknowledgement of this important source of power for states. Explicitly, he 
notes that his definition of the state establishes it in a network of political 
relations with other states.56 Yet, in his analysis, consideration of the 
mtemational is reduced merely to a realm of war and peace-making. While he
co
considers the parties influencing foreign policy and the role of war-making and 
the military revolution in further increasing the power base of states,59 there is 
little consideration of anything else ‘out there’ which may affect the 
polymorphous modem state’s reproduction of itself.60 A recognition of the 
necessarily international nature of the principles upon which the institutions of 
the modem state rely is implicit in this theory. There are three obvious 
international dimensions that figure in the background of his formulation but are 
not considered in sufficient detail: the role of global capitalism; the globalisation 
of the modem state; and the internationalisation of technology. Despite his 
awareness of the international dimensions of state power, Mann’s theory 
conceives of the international as simply a realm of war and peace between states. 
This is not enough for this thesis. More careful and systematic examination of the 
international is needed to shed light on the modem state generally, and the Soviet 
experience specifically.
If Mann does not pay careful enough attention to the international 
dimensions of state power, then in equal measure and related to this, he does not 
consider the processual nature of state power. This processual complaint has two 
dimensions. The first problem is that Mann does not consider the formation and 
re-formation (or production and reproduction) of state power as a continuous 
process of related social occurrences which mould the state as an actualised form
56 Mann, Sources o f  Social Power, Vol. II, p. 56.
57 What he terms the ‘duality of foreign policy’, Mann, Sources o f Social Power, Vol. II, p. 69.
58 Mann, Sources o f  Social Power, Vol. II, pp. 69-75.
59 Mann, Sources o f  Social Power, Vol. II, pp. 66-7.
60 Hobden critiques Mann along these lines in his International Relations and Historical 
Sociology.
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of social domination. The point is that the relations o f  the state, such as the 
practices of sovereignty, economic restructuring, and tariff barriers, create the 
state and the system of relations between them. Despite reference to the mutually 
constitutive nature of the relationship between the domestic and the international, 
Mann’s theory is unable to come to terms with the nature of this process of 
mutual constitution understood as the social mechanisms which at the same time 
produce apparently separate spheres. The second problem with his account is that 
it fails to realise that the functional-institutional theory of the state needs to be 
premised on that very functionality as a source of power. When organising a 
theory of the state it is a useful heuristic device to separate the institutional 
elements (such as bodies of rule-making) from functional ones (such as provider 
of security). Yet there is an ineluctable relationship between institutions and the 
functions of the state: they simultaneously are, reproduce and justify the state.61 
In essence, the provision of institutions and functions should be seen not only as 
a property of the state, but also as a dimension of its power.
Mann’s ‘polymorphous’ notion of the state, while a useful and influential 
theory, does not adequately capture the international and processual elements of 
state power. These two elements are crucial to understanding the nature of the 
modem state, the fragility of Soviet state power and the role of the international 
confrontation with the capitalist West in its development and demise.
2.3.2 Patterning o f State Rule
To build a theory of state power which more adequately copes with 
international and processual dimensions we must begin with the larger terms 
which depict what the state is and how it functions.62 States are made up of 
different elements arranged in a particular manner. How these elements relate to 
one another will determine the nature of state power in a given instance. The idea 
of ‘patterning’ refers to the way in which the inter-related institutions and
61 The situation in which certain elements o f state power are undermined due to a failure to 
adequately provide these can be thought of as a corollary of this theory.
62 This theory is an ideal-type theorisation o f the modem state based on the globalisation o f the 
western state.
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practices organise the state. A ‘pattern’ is a configuration of the elements of rule. 
The specific pattern of a state hinges on the nature of, and inter-relationship 
between, the central elements of rule. These elements are here deemed to be: the 
state’s functional institutions; the principles of legitimate rule; the form and 
relationship of these institutions to the system of economic production; and the 
form and nature of the penetration of society by the state in both despotic and 
infrastructural senses. These elements are connected by sets of social processes 
which facilitate the production and reproduction of the state over time. The idea 
of patterning thus refers to the way in which these elements are configured. A 
way of illustrating this is to think of the modem state as a constellation of social 
forms. Each part can be seen individually, but it is only as part of the broader 
pattern that it can be an effective mechanism for an overarching system of mle.
The role of state institutions dominates many discussions of the state. In 
this context, the concept of an institution of the state refers to specific 
circumscribed bodies which substantively fulfil specific functions and carry out 
the process of state mle. Each institution serves a specific and delimited 
purpose, such as the extraction of wealth, the guarding of territory, the 
enforcement of state mles and so on. The institution is the body established to 
achieve these ends. The functional institutions are some of the most important 
aspects of the pattern. How they relate to other elements, such as the principle of 
mle and the economic form, and how they go about fulfilling their functions will 
crucially determine the pattern of a given state.
The ideational aspect has generally been neglected in historical 
sociological studies and this theory seeks to rectify this neglect. Thus, the second 
important element of the patterning of the state is the principle of mle. This 
refers to the various underlying ideas which, to a greater or lesser extent, provide 
an ideational context, both liberating and constraining, for the holding together 
and effective functioning of the state pattern. The principle is both the idea and 
the conjugation of this idea in the material practice of state action. This links the 
notions of legitimacy utilised by writers such as Weber and Habermas with 
particular ideas of mle which establish political and social limits to the
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possibility of state action.64 For example, the underlying principle of evangelical 
liberalism which underpins the American state prevents it from considering the 
nationalisation of the finance and banking sector. On the other hand, one might 
have thought that, in Communist China, the underlying principle of communism 
would have meant that Deng’s Four Modernisations were beyond reach.65 In this 
case the political limits established by the principles were not as steadfast as they 
might have been in the US or Germany and the state was able to impose them on 
Chinese society. This was due to the malleable principles which were more 
easily shaped by the Chinese elite at the time, the level of despotic power of the 
Chinese state and an international context receptive to such action. The principle 
of rule is constituted by the values and ideas which it embodies. It is important to 
remember that, as an idea, it is an element of the patterning of state power, but it 
is only made meaningful through its playing out.
Third, the nature of economic relations, which are undertaken under the 
supervision of the state, is central to the form of the state. The nature of property 
and labour rights, the context of relations of exchange, the imperatives of 
production and so on have a profound affect on the shape and range of state 
power. This is true at an institutional level—the legal structure, the nature of land 
division, urbanisation etc.—but is equally true at the normative and functional 
level. The question of what the state should do in the economy will, in part, be 
answered by the economic relations within and between borders. This clearly has 
implications for the process of production. From agrarian subsistence to post- 
industrial capitalism, the nature of economic relations will limit what the state 
can do and what it thinks it can do in this process.
The last of the pattern’s elements of state power is the relationship 
between state and society. Essentially, this refers to the character of the means 
with which the institutions of rule interact with the population that they 
dominate. There are three major forms which this can take and that need to be
63 Formal delineation is not necessary as often formal declarations can obscure die real workings 
of states. The modem British structure of governmental power is an example o f such 
obscurantism.
64 Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis London: Heinneman, 1976, and Max Weber, Economy 
and Society: An Outline o f an Interpretive Sociology New York: Bedminster, 1968 Vol.l, 
pp. 212-301.
On the four modernisations see Richard Baiun, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age o f  
Deng Xiaoping Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 48-65.
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considered when elaborating a specific state’s pattern. The first is the level and 
form of the penetration of society by the state. The second is the limit of the 
state, that is, the nature of the borders of the state, where they are located and 
how consistently they are adhered to. The third is the means with which the state 
discriminates between the spheres of state and society. This refers to the fact that 
states treat the actions of its subjects differently from the way it treats its own 
and also recognises the fact that there is often a good deal of overlap between 
state and society. Of the elements of the constellation, this is perhaps the most 
variable across a period of time.
The two final aspects of the patterning of state power have to do with the 
relational mechanisms of the production and reproduction of state power. States 
are not static entities and the means with which they come into being, reinforce 
themselves and change themselves will clearly shape the pattern of their power. 
These two aspects are social processes and social networks. These two elements 
allow us to conceive how the state, as a complex social entity, functions. Social 
processes are the broad system of related interactions which facilitate the 
working of social systems, and in this instance, the patterning of state power.66 
Rescher expresses it well: a process ‘is a coordinated group of changes in the 
complexion of reality, an organized family of occurrences that are systematically
( \ 7linked to one another causally or functionally.’ ‘Networks’ are the routine 
pathways of social transactions which link the various patterns of the state to 
individuals inside and outside the state.68 For example, the transactions can be 
tax payments, jail sentences, school curricula, military conscription, dole 
payments or medical prescriptions. These sets are flexible and, while they tend to 
predominate within the boundary of the state, there are many which transcend 
borders. In short, networks are regularised sets of social processes.
66 That is not to say that social processes are the sole domain o f the state. They are important 
elements of all social life. In this instance, the concept provides a useful analytic view of the 
workings of states understood as forms of social rule.
67 Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996, p. 38.
68 This definition is adapted from the notion of networks set out by Manuel Castells in his work 
on network societies. He defines a network as ‘a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point 
at which a curve intersects itself. What a node is, concretely speaking, depends on the kind of 
concrete networks of which we speak ... They [nodes] are coca fields and poppy fields, 
clandestine laboratories, secret landing strips, street gangs, and money-laundering financial 
institutions, in the network of drug traffic that penetrates economies, societies and states
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2.3.3 How the State Functions
Having established the way in which states are configured, we now turn 
to the material aspects of state power. As the emphasis here is on the important 
role of state reproduction, the idea of state power-as-practice is advanced as a 
way to analyse this phenomenon. The state can be thought of as a bundle of 
institutions that collectively make moral, political and social claims which frame 
the social relations of the people bounded by the limitations set by a given body 
of institutions and delimited territory. This bundle is located at the centre of a 
series of social networks and its claims radiate outwards in a centripetal fashion. 
This set of institutions is distinguished from other social institutions by the nature 
of these claims, the most important of which is the transcendental claim that it is 
the highest legitimate moral authority within its territory. This is a necessary 
antecedent to the traditional Weberian statement that the state is the institution 
which claims the monopoly of legitimate violence in given territory.69 The 
ultimate deployment of violence is not the best means of distinguishing the state 
from other social institutions. The state is marked out as manifestly distinct by 
the totalising nature of the state’s claims and the way these claims are materially 
enforced. State institutions can be differentiated from non-state institutions which 
perform similar roles because they are institutions of control which frame social 
relations within the society based on the transcendent claim to moral authority 
which, in turn, has a dual international and domestic anchor. The institutions, 
taken individually, are pillars of the state—they support the overarching set and 
reinforce its claims—while at the same time they are that which they support. 
They should be considered to be both the structures of the state that themselves 
configure the state. Finally, the international context and production of this 
institution is of paramount importance. States must be thought of as institutions 
that carve up the social world into separate formal entities, but are substantively
throughout die world.’ Manuel Castells, Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 
1. The Rise o f the Network Society Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 470.
69 See Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 901-40. For a discussion of this see Randall Collins, 
Weberian Sociological Theory Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 145-166.
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part of a broader social whole. The transcendent claim to authority over a 
territory is premised on the assumption that the world is made up of similar 
parcels of authority which each regard as of the same type.
It is important to distinguish this modem territorialised form of social 
power from earlier forms of mle. First and foremost, the modem state is a secular 
idea which has, at its root, a disenchanted rational base. Second, unlike the 
absolutist states of previous eras or the Byzantine, Ottoman, or Mongol empires, 
it is a globalised form. Modem states rely on the principle that the entire planet is 
divided into domains which are morally equal. In instances they may have 
treated other states or empires as equal, but the idea of mle underpinning the 
modem state is historically unique and qualitatively different from which has 
gone before. The modem state is, furthermore, institutionally rationalised in the 
sense that its functional institutions are differentiated and professionally 
administered in a manner clearly different from previous periods.
This theory of the state builds on Mann in a number of ways. First, here
70the nature of authority is not simply the endowed quality which Mann ascribes. 
Rather, this theory of the nature of authority relies on a specific plea to a 
transcendent and yet contingent social property.71 Second, the polymorphic- 
institutional-functional description is reinforced by a view of the institutions and 
their functions as a source of power. That is the idea of state power-as practice. 
The function is served not just in the instrumental sense that, for example, 
taxation provides the state with the means to pay people to enforce laws, 
adjudicate disputes and so on. In deploying institutions of power justified in 
terms of a transcendent moral claim, these institutions serve the state by 
reinforcing its position as a solid network of social power. The institutions are 
not merely the means for producing and reproducing state power, they are the 
real forms of it at the same time as being the reinforcement mechanism. Hence, 
the playing out of state power can be described as a form of ‘power-as-practice’, 
that is the process of state power is itself usable because it is invoked in the name 
of the state. This notion is central to the process of state reproduction for it
70 Note Mann’s definition: ‘it exercises some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, 
backed up by some organized physical force.’ Mann, Sources o f Social Power, Vol. II, p. 55.
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considers the ways in which states as social institutions are able to reproduce 
their universalising form of political and social domination.
State ‘Power-as-Practice’
The concept of power-as-practice adds a third processual dimension to 
Skocpol’s functional notion of state institutions. Skocpol argues that state 
institutions have two roles: they extract power from society and then deploy it to
77control the territory and population. The concept set out here argues that the 
practice of this extraction and deployment is itself a crucial third aspect of state 
functional power. Power-as-practice attempts to probe the process of state 
reproduction for it is central to the state’s political power.
To consider the idea of power-as-practice in more detail we shall examine 
the institution of state resource extraction to demonstrate the implications of this 
assertion. All states must extract resources to perpetuate their dominance over 
their population and territory. How a state does this depends on its resources, 
level of development, and economic and political. For example, the notion of 
income tax as a source of state revenue is unheard of in some states, while people 
in other states willingly part with 40% of their income. Some states rely on the 
taxation of income, others on revenue derived from state owned enterprises, 
others from the sale of oil and so on. However they do it, states must acquire 
resources if they are to rule. Skocpol writes that a state ‘first and fundamentally 
extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive 
and administrative organizations.’73 For her, state power relies, in the first 
instance, on the extraction of resources. Only then, when it has this material 
power, can the state deploy these resources to consolidate its base and go on to 
reinforce its rule through various power extraction and deployment mechanisms 
such as restructuring class relations, nationalising industry and so on.
71 In the modem instance this is the principle o f sovereignty, for a discussion of this see Thomas 
J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
72 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.
73 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 29.
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This is only partially correct. Skocpol orders the processes of state power 
based on the claim that states firstly tap these reservoirs of power and then 
deploy the resources to consolidate state power. For her, the chronological order 
is important. States clearly need resources; the power of discourse and ideology 
is limited without economic and physical backing. Yet the presumed temporal 
distinction between extraction and deployment limits the understanding of the 
role that specific institutions play in establishing and reproducing the state. A 
more complete view of the institution of resource extraction should see it as a 
structure of state power, as a ‘source’ of social power, but not just in the 
instrumental sense which informs Skocpol’s claim.
When resource extraction is considered from the power-as-practice point 
of view, it becomes clear that it has three mutually reinforcing dimensions. The 
first is an instrumental one, the second is as a representative of the singular and 
multiple identity of the state and third as an incarnation of the moral claim to 
transcendent authority.
The first dimension is an instrumentalism which has more depth than 
Skocpol gives it. The resource extraction institution acts as a transmission belt 
taking material resources from the broader social context—both international and 
domestic—to the state. The institution extracts fuel for the state’s domination of 
society. As such, the state is defined partially by its central location in networks 
of power and by its tendency to centralise the structures of these networks. This 
results in a broader centripetal patterning of social power within states. This has 
been examined in detail by others who broadly argue that, due to technological 
developments,74 the mechanisms, justification for and concentration of the state’s
7^acquisition of the means of domination radically changed. The threat of war, m 
the context of the military revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
meant that European states needed to extract massive amounts of wealth to pay 
for security. This presaged a wholesale centralisation of state power, and a
74 The most prominent of these material developments is the revolution in inter-state war 
practices and technology, but one could easily add revolutions, ideas, and religion to the list of 
transformative social phenomena.
75 Three of the more prominent studies are Charles Tilly and Gabriel Ardant (eds.), Formation of 
National States in Western Europe Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975, Mann, 
States, War and Capitalism; and Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975.
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change in the nature of the state’s fiscal relationship with society and with the 
international lending institutions of the time, and, ultimately, led to a 
restructuring of the relationship between state and society. In short, the physical 
threat of destruction facilitated a justifiable extension of the state’s right to the 
wealth of the society below. This principle still stands. Though it is not war that 
interests us here, it is the mechanism of the centralisation of the removal of 
wealth from the society whether by tax, ownership and trade of commodities, or 
ownership of the means of production.
Second, the institution of resource extraction is also a representative of 
the singular and multiple identities of states. It is singular in that it represents to 
its subjects a single voice that must be obeyed. If it is not adhered to, coercive 
mechanisms will swing into action. For example, in Britain today, failure to 
comply with taxation legislation will result in prosecution and possible 
incarceration. At the same time as the state is taxing its subjects or imposing 
tariffs on goods passing through its borders, it is simultaneously enforcing 
adherence to its criminal code, educating its citizens, censoring art, or paying for 
operations. This is what Mann refers to as the polymorphous ‘erratically
77entwined crystallisations’ of state power networks. Thus, the process of fuelling 
itself with the material wherewithal to project its power is both a singular and 
multiple face of state power.
Broadly speaking, the institutions of state serve a clear purpose, to extract 
wealth, coerce citizens, and wage war; in other words, they support the 
overarching state edifice. This portrayal leaves out one important element. To 
understand this third dimension we need to go back a step. If we take Skocpol’s 
claim that states first and foremost extract resources and then utilise them to 
buttress their position, we are left with an obvious question—how do states 
acquire these resources in the first place and then go on re-acquiring them as 
needed? The simplistic answer is via force: the state is formed by those who have 
the preponderant coercive power which allows the forcible removal of wealth 
from the population. The ruthless acquisition of peasant produce under War 
Communism and the subsequent collectivisation under Stalin in the early years
76 The best exposition o f this was originally Hintze Historical Essays and more recently, Tilly, 
Coercion, Capital.
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of the Soviet Union might be one such example.78 Is this brutal, very primitive 
accumulation, all that is at the heart of state power? The logic seems to be that, 
once the pump of state resource acquisition has been primed via the forced 
extraction of wealth, the vague invocation of ‘state power’ is enough to explain 
the reproduction of power networks. This does not tell the full story. Central to 
the acquisition of wealth over time, not merely in the first instance, is the third 
dimension of state power in institutions, that is, a meaningful incarnation of the 
broader moral claim to transcendent authority made in the name of the state. 
States are what they do and they do what they are. This is not tautological, but is 
the process of power-as-practice. By carrying out actions in the name of the state 
they not only reinforce the state materially through the product of those actions— 
wealth, oil, booty, food—they give the state purpose, they define what it is, what 
it does and they justify its presence. In short, they buttress the legitimacy of the 
moral claim to transcendent authority.
The institutions of power are not merely instrumental mechanisms, but 
are themselves manifestations of power. They embody the state, give it purpose, 
and establish the limits of the politically possible. State institutional power 
should be understood as a continual process of accumulation, reinforcement, 
domination and control which produces and reproduces the state, or, in certain 
circumstances, fails to reproduce it. The Skocpol view—first extract and then 
act—tells only part of the story. To be able to extract resources over time you 
have to wield state power. In this instance, state power is not necessarily 
coercive, but is fundamentally bound up in the institution itself. Institutions of 
the state involve the simultaneous duality of state power—the moral claim to 
transcendent authority and at the same time the mechanistic element which 
serves the material requirements of the functioning of rule. When a state extracts 
material resources the act buttresses its position within society both materially 
and ideationally.
Material resource extraction is a fundamental element of state power. The 
empty state coffers in France in the 1780s (due to the royal state’s involvement in
77 Mann, ‘Polymorphous State’, p.6.
78 On which see E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 Volume Two, London: 
Macmillan, 1952, pp. 147-268; on expropriation of the peasants by force see Moshe Lewin, The
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costly international warfare) caused a weakness in the state which drove the 
division in the ruling class and allowed the revolution to take place.79 As an 
effective institution of state, resource extraction, and all other institutions of 
state, should be understood in all three of the dimensions set out above; that is, as 
a multiple and singular faces of the diverse modem state, as an instrumental 
mechanism of power and as a power source projected through the realisation of 
the claim to transcendent authority which underpins the state. To summarise, it is 
the interplay of these dimensions in their simultaneous international and 
domestic context which provides the robust base to the political claims of the 
state.
We have considered what the state is, and how it functions. The final 
point is to make clear why it functions. The purpose of state power has often 
been conflated with the description of what the state does and how it operates. 
This confusion is understandable given the complexity of the modem state and 
the fact that its functions serve both to define it and to perpetuate it. But one must 
not over-endow the entity with intentionality nor establish unreliable links 
between purpose and outcome. Given states’ complexity and polymorphic 
nature, only in rare circumstances can one trace any such singularity of intent and 
outcome.80
Often the state’s purpose has been associated with those who have 
benefited from the pattemings of structured power.81 One needs to make the 
distinction between specific instances of state instrumental purpose and the 
broader, social purpose of the state. The pre-eminent purpose of state power is 
the reproduction of the structures of power that have established the pattern of 
institutions in such a manner as to produce their predominance. The moral claim 
which underpins the state’s authority takes as its reference point the international. 
Thus, implicit in this primary purpose of the state, is the reproduction of the
Making o f  the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History o f  Interwar Russia London: Methuen, 
1985, pp. 142-77.
79 See C.B.A. Behrens, The Ancien Regime London: Harcourt Brace, 1967, pp. 138-62, and 
Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 51-67.
80 For example in the context of total war.
81 Most famously associated with the Marxist view of the state. See, for example, Jessop, The 
Capitalist State; and Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism.
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broader international pattemings of social power which permit states to make and 
successfully cling to this claim for moral authority.
A social-instrumental purpose related to this must also be considered; that 
is, the way in which states maintain a civil order within. This refers both to the 
establishment of patterned norms for reasonable behaviour and punishments for 
deviance from these, as well as the broader establishment of the framework for 
the existence of its population. Two different writers illustrate this second 
dimension well. On the one hand Windsor claims that the state is a self­
regulating entity that is ‘a social form which comprises the framework for the 
relations of its citizens.’82 On the other, Mann emphasises the recursive 
relationship between autonomy and social life conceived more broadly: 
‘autonomous state power is the product of the usefulness of enhanced territorial 
centralisation to social life in general.’
Regardless of how elites alter state institutions, whether they introduce 
conscription, nationalise industry, or impose income taxation, the purpose of 
these institutions is fundamentally double: to re-produce state power and to shape 
the society in a given manner, that is to establish the framework for social 
relations both within and between states.
2.3.4 International Elements o f State Power
The state, theoretically and empirically, cannot be understood in isolation 
from its international context; it is nothing if not international. The modem state 
exists in a triple international context: as a domestic centralising power 
institution; as an international actor; and as a power repository lying at the nexus 
of these two political realms. Because of this, the international provides 
important sources for the accumulation of state social power. It is useful to 
distinguish between the structural and instrumental ways in which this occurs. 
The ‘structural’ elements are the ways in which the international provides the 
broader social context for the existence and perpetuation of the modem state as a
82 Philip Windsor, ‘The Justification of the State’ in Michael Donelan (ed.), The Reason o f States: 
A Study in International Political Theory London: Allen and Unwin, 1978, p. 187.
83 Mann ‘The Autonomous Power’, p. 135.
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form of political rule. These are social settings or contexts which do not have 
immediate instantiation, but without which the modem state simply could not be. 
First, the state derives the possibility of being from the international. The modem 
state is the product of the historical development of the demarcation of the social 
world into territorial units which are each dominated by one central authority. 
The formal authority of the state derives from the mechanisms which have 
carved up the social realm into particular political realms. Second, the 
demarcation of space into parcels of absolute institutionalised authority is the 
source of state autonomy.84 Third, the principles of statehood, derived from the 
international realm, bestow the state with a strong sense of legitimacy and add a 
practical edge to the moral claim of authority. Finally, it is one of the sources of 
the social forces which shape the patterning of state power. The international is 
the source of the moral claim to transcendent authority and the practices of 
international politics provide a material dimension that further consolidates the 
domestic claims of the institutions of power.
These ‘structural’ dimensions are prerequisites for the instrumental 
elements, for it is this broader context which allow states to utilise this extra­
territorial space. First, states use the international as a source of material 
resources. This involves things such as tariffs, trade, and the importation of 
resources not within its territory, as well as in less direct forms, such as entry 
charges and monetary loans from international lending organisations. Second, the 
international is a source of ideas which states can deploy as they see fit. The 
examples of this are massive. From privatisation to nationalisation, states have 
always looked outward as well as inward for inspiration. Also, they have sought 
to be the inspiration, or model for others to follow. Third, the state can utilise the 
international geopolitical situation for instrumental advantage. For example, 
states have used what appears to be a threatening international environment to re­
order society or to enforce martial law, to increase spending on the military to
84 On autonomy see Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanics 
and Results’ in John A. Hall (ed.), States in History Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, pp. 109-36; 
Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 24-33; Giddens, Nation-State and Violence', Hobson, 
Wealth o f States. There are at least three ways in which states can be described as having 
autonomy: i) states reflect institutionalised power separate from the dominant social forces of 
society below; ii) their power has a degree o f independence from international forces; and iii) 
they have autonomy to act with a sovereign finality. Autonomy does not, however, mean the total 
freedom and ability to act howsoever the state pleases.
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shore up support. In the case of direct hostilities modem states tend to re-order 
radically the economic base of the society. They can introduce conscription 
where previously it was politically impossible, they can introduce more arbitrary 
forms of justice and so on. Finally, states can use the international as a reference 
point for their own action. Social developments in other states can prompt 
changed societal choices in the home state. Just as states use their society and 
territory to produce institutions of power networks, they use the international 
system for the same purpose. If one does not conceive of the state in its triple 
international context, then it is easy to overlook the diverse sources of power and 
autonomy which shape, weaken, reinforce or challenge the institutions of the 
state.85
When thinking about the state, however, one must be conscious of the 
problem of the singular. States do many things at the same time. For example, in 
1979 the Soviet state provided medical care and treatment to all its citizens, it 
claimed to have harvested 179 million tonnes of wheat in the state and collective 
farms,86 it invaded Afghanistan and provided millions of roubles and technology 
in aid and arms to Cuba and other ‘fraternal* states. It did many other things 
besides. How, then, is it reasonable to talk of a single Soviet state of 1979? It is 
plausible if one links the range of functional institutions with the moral claim 
mentioned earlier. The state acts at the same time singularly and in multiple 
forms and locations. The singular is met by the subject of the power network 
when it comes up against a state decision which limits action. That is, the state, 
in its singular form, can be seen in specific situations such as the handling of 
applications for exit visas, imposing court sentences, making a declaration of 
war, imposing taxation demands or deciding to liberalise the media. The reason it 
is able to do all this is the state’s moral claim which is a double claim hiding 
inside a single plea. The state claims ultimate moral suasion by virtue of its 
invocation of the transcendent necessary to its claim to sovereignty and by its 
very existence which conjugates this claim into a meaningful material form.
85 Sources of power can also be sources of weakness. The later chapters of the thesis will explore 
this idea in more depth.
86 Speech by President Leonid Brezhnev, ‘State Plan and State Budget for 1980’ in Keesing’s 
Contemporary Archives Vol. XXVI, London: Keesing’s, 1980, p. 30113.
81
The state is a powerful social actor. We have shown that the international 
and processual dimensions of state power can be understood by considering the 
moral claim that the state makes for itself in its necessarily international context. 
As a totality, the modem state should be conceived of as an agglomeration of 
social power networks. It should be thought of as consisting of both institutions 
and functions in which power-as-practice is central to its workings, and it must 
be thought of as having and imparting some sort of order.87 While these highly 
complex entities are not as neatly ordered as Swiss watches, they are not utterly 
chaotic. The identifiable patterning of the networks of power is the key to 
understanding the nature and dynamics of specific states. Ultimately, the idea of 
the modem state here hinges on two points: its international location and its 
processual development. The institution cannot be divorced from its 
intemationality, nor can the production and reproduction of its systems of rule be 
ignored.
To summarise the second part of the chapter, the view of modem state 
power used in this thesis sees the state as an international social power actor 
which consists of a bundle of social institutions. These social institutions are 
united by their representation of a practised transcendent moral claim to authority 
and, at the same time, serve the instrumental purpose of supporting the state and 
shaping social relations within and between states. Domestically, states are 
located centrally in terms of their institutions and their power networks which are 
centripetal and territorially constituted. While they are formally bounded, their 
sources of power come from networks which transcend boundaries. That is, they 
have sources that are both domestic and international, and thus must be 
understood in terms of their origins and unfolding in their dual international and 
domestic contexts. While the patterning of state institutions is unique, they all 
share common characteristics and purposes, that is, to reproduce the structures of 
power and to establish the framework for social relations. The key to 
understanding the modem state lies in the understanding of it as a bundle of 
instrumental institutions serving particular purposes which it does by making a
87 By this we mean order in the sense o f a patterning o f power networks within die state which 
imposes a predictable social pattern on relations in society, as well as imposing a predictable set 
of relations upon die larger political system. That is, states impose order on the world political 
system through the formation of an international system of sovereign states.
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moral claim to a transcendent authority. This link between instrumentalism and 
transcendentalism is found in the process of state reproduction termed here state 
power-as-practice. This novel theory of the workings of states puts the process of 
production and reproduction at the centre of its explanatory framework. More 
specifically, it does so from an international point of view which corrects some 
of the functional limits of existing historical sociological theories of the state and 
introduces an important ideational aspect to balance the materialist bias of other 
approaches. The task now is to apply this understanding of state power to the 
Soviet case so as to come to terms with the international sources of state power. 
In this way we may determine the relationship between the Soviet Union’s 
international confrontation with the capitalist West and the rise and fall of the 
Soviet state.
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Chapter
3
3 Th e  In t e r n a t io n a l  D im e n sio n s  o f  So v iet  State
Pow er
The challenge, in analysing the Soviet state, lies in the identification of the limits 
of state power. The Soviet Union did not have a clearly circumscribed state in the 
way that most liberal-capitalist or authoritarian states do. This was the result of 
two important developments. First, between 1917 and 1928, the Bolshevik party 
undertook a rapid and violent reformulation of society, and its relationship with 
the state, which smashed the divisions between the public and private spheres.1 
In liberal-capitalist states, the private sphere of social and economic relations 
developed reasonably free from state interference. In some states, such as Britain 
in the nineteenth century, social conditions existed which bred an active political 
pursuit of a minimal involvement of the state m people’s lives. In such states, 
the ideas which determined the limits of the state were property rights, individual 
rights and free exchange. These ideas were predicated on a legitimate distinction 
between relations in which the state had a right to interfere and those in which it 
did not. Central to this was the belief that the state had clearly demarcated 
institutions to pursue the facilitation of property rights, individual rights and free 
exchange. Even if, as was the case in post-World War II Britain, the state 
undertook the nationalisation of certain sectors, such as health care or transport, 
it did not mean that the distinction between public and private had ended, but 
simply that the shape of these demarcated spheres had been altered.3 The
1 On this generally see E.H. Carr, The Russian Revolution from Lenin to Stalin, 1917-1929 
London: Macmillan, 1979.
2 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill were significant writers whose ideas influenced the ideas 
and political practice of English liberalism. On liberal England and its politics see Anthony 
Howe, Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846-1946 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
3 Clement Attlee’s speech to both houses of the US Congress in September 1945 emphasised that, 
despite Britain’s widespread nationalisation programmes and the Labour Party’s professed
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Bolsheviks laid waste to such an embryonic state of affairs as existed in Russia in 
1917. They utterly rejected this division. Due to their violent objection to the 
principles which produced this separation—the right to private property, 
individual rights and free exchange—the clear distinction between private and 
public was obliterated.
The second reason for the absence of a clearly delineated and formally 
demarcated state function was the chaotic formation of the state. Having smashed 
the foundations of a liberal order, the Bolsheviks needed to find new means for 
ordering society based on the radically different principles which they espoused. 
Initially, the state was to be a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ that would usher in 
communism as the world revolution took hold.4 This did not occur. The 
revolution was invaded, society was at war with itself and the party had no 
meaningful plan for action. An authoritarian party-state fusion emerged from the 
rubble of the revolutionary society as the best means for imposing order and 
achieving the Bolsheviks’ revolutionary aims. Curiously, the idea of a state 
separate from, though reliant upon, the party was maintained and enshrined in the 
Constitutions of 1924 and 1932 although there was no functional need for such a 
formal statement. No practical structures existed to establish the role of the state 
and its legitimate and illegitimate rights, the various constitutions were not 
meaningful restraints on state action and did not accurately describe the limits of 
state power.5 The Soviet state became a sprawling, protean morass. Dominated 
by the CPSU, it was an extensive bureaucracy. It owned the means of production, 
it ran the kindergartens, it made paper-clips, it administered healthcare, it funded 
revolutionary movements around the world—in short, it can be reasonably 
argued that the Soviet state did most things in the USSR. Yet clearly, the state
socialism, he and his party were not fundamentally illiberal. The first drafts of his speech 
included a reference to himself as the first socialist prime minister to address a joint sitting. This 
remark was removed from the final version. Attlee Papers Box 23, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
4 For a view and justification of the type o f social order to be built after the revolution see V.I. 
Lenin, State and Revolution: The Marxist teaching o f the state and the task o f  the proletariat in 
the revolution Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992 [orig. 1918]. For a discussion of its implications 
see E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923. Volume 1 London: Macmillan, 1950, 
pp. 233-49.
The USSR had four constitutions: 1918, upon die foundation of the Soviet Republic; 1924, upon 
the creation of the USSR; 1936, as an articulation of the Stalinist principles o f socialism; and 
1977, to mark the onset of ‘developed socialism’. The Soviet Constitution, in its various forms, 
was an ideological document and not a functional one. The problematic nature of taking the
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was not everything, there was a society of people who acted autonomously. 
There was a large and active ‘second economy’,6 and there were limits to Soviet 
power.
Given this morass—the overwhelming size and scope combined with 
unreliable documentation and sources—how can one make judgements about the 
Soviet state? The theory set out in Chapter Two provides one way to examine 
such an entity. From around 1928-31 the system of Soviet rule became a settled 
affair. While there were changes and reforms right through to 1991, the basic 
structures of the USSR were established during this period. In this way it is 
reasonable to talk about the underlying character of the Soviet state across a 
longer period of time and to try to gauge the role of the international 
confrontation in the production and reproduction of Soviet power. This chapter 
will consider the consolidation and reproduction of Soviet power and the role of 
international confrontation in this process. Its purpose is to examine the nature of 
the Soviet state, and particularly the international aspects of its power, using the 
theoretical model set out in Chapter Two, and will do so in the following way. 
First, it will consider the CPSU’s role in this process, it will then examine the 
broader pattern of Soviet power, finally, it will set out the international sources 
of Soviet power.
Soviet constitution at face value can be seen in Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The Truth 
About Soviet Russia London: Longman, Green and Co., 1942.
6 See Gregory Grossman, ‘The “Second Economy” of die USSR’ in Problems o f Communism 26, 
Sept-Oct 1977, pp. 25-40; and F.J.M. Feldbragge, ‘Government and the Shadow Economy in the 
Soviet Union’ in. Soviet Studies 36.4,1984, pp. 528-43.
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3.1 T h e  CPSU a n d  t h e  S o v ie t  S t a t e
The CPSU was without question the most important institution of the 
Soviet state.7 Therefore, the study must firstly consider the role of the 
revolutionary party in the broader system of rule.8 Sakwa writes that ‘[t]he Soviet 
Union, in effect, had two operative governments, the party and the state system.’9 
Skocpol refers to the early Soviet Union with the paired term ‘party-state’, so 
difficult was it to distinguish between the two.10 This section will consider 
whether the characterisation of ‘party-state’, that is, a functional and institutional 
elision of two institutions, is an accurate depiction of the patterning of state 
power in the USSR or whether Sakwa’s distinction is more accurate.
While the party’s importance clearly varied over time—for example, 
under Stalin it played a much smaller role in policy-making and implementation 
than it did under Brezhnev—it was the repository of the legacy of revolutionary 
vanguardism. As such, the party claimed to be the ‘representative of the workers’ 
will’ and the institution with the greatest control over Soviet society.11 While 
formal statements of Soviet power reveal little about its actual function, the 
rhetorical articulation of the role of the party in the constitution of 1977 is 
revealing:
7 See generally Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party o f the Soviet Union Third Edition, 
London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1970.
8 For various discussions of the Soviet system of rule see: Archie Brown, Soviet Politics and 
Political Science London: Macmillan, 1974; Robert Conquest, The Soviet Political System 
London: Bodley Head, 1968; Ronald J. Hill, Soviet Union: Politics, Economics and Society from 
Lenin to Gorbachev Second Edition, London: Pinter, 1989; Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How 
the Soviet Union is Governed Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979; David Lane, 
Soviet State and Politics Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985; Mary McCauley, Politics and the Soviet 
Union London: Penguin, 1977; Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective Second Edition, 
London: Routledge, 1998; Robert G. Wesson, The Soviet Russian State New York: John Wiley, 
1972.
9 Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, p. 96.
10 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis o f France, Russia and 
China Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 206-35. For more detail on the ‘party- 
state’ see Carl Linden, The Soviet Party-State: The Politics o f Ideocratic Despotism Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1983, particularly pp. 1-29; see also Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 1, 
pp. 214-32 on the early relationship between party and state.
On Stalin’s treatment of the party see Helene Carrere d’Encausse, Stalin: Order through Terror 
London: Longman, 1981; on 1he party under Brezhnev see Seweryn Bialer, Stalin’s Successors: 
Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980, pp. 81-96.
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The leading guiding force o f Soviet society and the nucleus o f its 
political system, o f all state organisation and public organisation, is 
the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union. The CPSU exists for the 
people and it serves the people. The CPSU, armed with Marxism- 
Leninism, determines the general perspectives o f the development o f  
society and the course o f the home and foreign policy o f the USSR, 
directs the great constructive work o f the Soviet people and imparts a 
planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their 
struggle for the victory o f communism.12
Despite this prominent sounding claim, the formal role of the CPSU was as a 
ruling body and not just a governing one. Scholars are divided on what sort of 
label to put on the CPSU. Various descriptions such as executive, ruling, 
governing, leading, and dictating have been put forward. To avoid such semantic 
wrangles, we shall consider the functions of the CPSU as they pertain to the state 
and its various structures of power.
3.1.1 Ideology and State Functions o f the CPSU
1 ^Soviet ideology was a complex and potent force with many dimensions. 
Sakwa summarises nine sets of issues which characterise the ruling ideology 
over time.14 Without question, it was the form, nature and dynamics of the 
ideology, and the way it was translated into effective forms of rule, that 
distinguished the Soviet Union from other states and which worried the states of 
the liberal Western world. For Sakwa, ideology was not just a broad underlying 
principle or a device to mask the domination of the ruling class, it was a 
foundational part of the state, it was a clear element of the authority structure.15 
As he writes, ‘[t]he Soviet state had ideology built into its foundations to inspire
12 Article 6 of the 1977 ‘Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics’ in USSR: Sixty Years o f the Union: 1922-1982. A Collection o f  Legislative Acts and 
Other Documents Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982.
13 This refers to the protean Marxism-Leninism with which the Soviet Union ruled, see generally 
Stephen White and Alex Pravda (eds.), Ideology and Soviet Politics Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1988.
14 The nine are: a basis in dialectical materialism; a Leninist notion o f voluntarism; a belief in the 
economic determinants o f social relations; a commitment to Marxism-Leninism; a belief in the 
scientific basis o f communism; a heavy technocratic bias in notions o f social change; a fusion of 
political ideology with social beliefs; a profound teleology; and a malleability. Sakwa, Soviet 
Politics in Perspective, pp. 171-4.
15 Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, pp. 174-7.
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and legitimise its actions and its very existence.’16 While ideology was clearly 
central to the state’s system of control and its institutional forms, it was not a 
blueprint for action; nor did it spring forth from the air. The CPSU was the point 
at which ideology became a material form of political rule. Ideology, in this 
sense, was a crucial form of state that was also, in a sense, distinct from the state.
From this point of view, the CPSU’s most significant function was its 
role as the source and repository of the underlying ideological principle of state
1 7socialism. This was important in a number of senses. First, as the holders of the 
ideology, the party wielded tremendous practical power. Second, the party was 
the vanguard of society, taking the historical place of the revolutionary catalyst 
which, in theory, should have been the role of the working class. While this was 
in some ways a rhetorical device, it had clear functional implications in terms of 
the nomenklatura, the production of a supervisory apparat and, most famously, 
in the leading role played by the politburo and the vozhd or leader. Third, as a 
further result of the ideology, the CPSU was the only permitted political entity in 
society. Fourth, the party defined its right to rule in terms of a sort of manifest 
expression of historical will, but, crucially, this historical will rested on a moral 
promise, the promise to deliver socialism, to catch-up with the industrialised 
West and to deliver a better life for all. All this built in to the foundations of the 
party’s claim to rule a weakness which was later to play a large role in its 
undoing.
Thus ideology functioned to legitimate CPSU rule, to reinforce its total 
grip on society and the state and to establish the larger political framework in 
which this ruling elite operated. The actualisation of an ideological principle into 
a functional form of political rule meant the fusion of a set of principles and an 
organisational body to create a functioning form of authority and control. This 
unity made the CPSU unique for it did not stand separate from the state, but 
penetrated the institutions of government, socialised the society below and
16 Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, p. 177.
17 The term is David Lane’s, he defines it as ‘a society distinguished by a state-owned, more or 
less centrally administered economy, controlled by a domestic communist party which seeks, on 
the basis o f Marxism-Leninism and through the agency of the state, to mobilise the population to 
reach a classless society.’ David Lane, The Rise and Fall o f State Socialism Cambridge: Polity, 
1996, p. 5. The use of this phrase emphasises the functional nature of the ideology. For more on 
the specifically Russian origins of this see David Lane, Soviet Economy and Society Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1986, Chapter One.
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provided an underlying principle of social organisation which structured society. 
Thus, the ideological justification for revolutionary rule permeated the morass of 
Soviet life and, through this, the Soviet state became acutely internationalised as 
the underlying values were, in essence, relative claims pegged to the 
achievements of the international social norm.
State socialism was a functioning element of state domination which 
relied on a value system based on moral superiority and social competition. This 
value system did not and could not exist in a vacuum. It required a liberal- 
capitalist order to function. Its claims were made in terms of absolutes—the 
elimination of class, and the creation of a state which administered things—yet 
the practice of these claims was relative. The malleable idea of state socialism, 
and the CPSU’s practice of it in the context of a hostile geopolitical context, 
established the framework in which the party made and buttressed its claims to 
rule. Hence international confrontation can be understood as a product of the 
CPSU ideology, but, more than that, it became a part of the larger ideological 
dimensions justifying party rule because it placed the relative success or failure 
of the claims of state socialism in the lap of the party and the state.
The legitimacy of the Soviet state was a second area in which the 
ideological dimensions of the CPSU was significant. Legitimacy refers here both 
to the sense that rule by the Soviet state was carried out more through consent 
than coercion, which seems to have been the case from 1953 on, and to the sense 
that the elite felt a sense of belief in what they were doing.18 It refers also to the 
way in which the state could justify the actions of a command economy. This 
style of legitimation, linking material achievements to political rule, has been 
labelled by Holmes as ‘eudaemonic’ legitimation.19 Clearly, the party linked its 
claims to legitimate rule and authority to the success of its internationally 
oriented claim of social provision. This claim had a clear effect on the political 
possibilities for the restructuring of political and social life under Soviet rule.20
18 The notion of legitimacy here draws on Weber and Habermas’s views, see Jiirgen Habermas, 
Legitimation Crisis London: Heinneman, 1976, and Max Weber Economy and Society: An 
Outline o f an Interpretive Sociology New York: Bedminster, 1968 Vol.l, pp. 212-301.
19 Leslie Holmes, The End o f Communist Power: Anti-corruption Campaigns and Legitimation 
Crisis Cambridge: Polity, 1993.
20 During the mid 1950s there was concern in die West, that, due to the apparent success o f Soviet 
industrialisation, their ‘model’ would appeal to developing countries as one to adopt. For a good
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3.1.2 Capturing the Institutions of State
While a very important functional element of the party was its role as the 
repository of the underlying principle of the Soviet state, there was a range of 
more material aspects of the CPSU’s role. The USSR had been made by the 
Bolshevik party which had became the CPSU.21 For the Bolsheviks’ claim to 
state power to have any meaning, they had to exercise state power and 
successfully defend it. This they did by creating and centralising the functions of 
state in a brutal fashion.22 In the context of chaos—Civil War, national economic 
crisis and a hostile international environment—the party had a great impetus to 
centralise. The Bolshevik party was the only political group with the 
organisational and coercive capacity to be able to impose order on the society 
and this they did through coercion and centralisation. This established the 
pattern of rule that was to follow, in varying forms, for the following 60 years.
In a more direct sense, CPSU control over the state was seen in the efforts 
to penetrate the ostensibly separate institutions of the state, such as the 
Ministries, the state owned enterprises and the military.24 These efforts 
demonstrate most clearly the linkages between the state and the party, and the 
murkiness of the distinction between state and party. They reveal that the party 
was pre-eminently an organisational body. Its role was not to run the steel 
production or the trains. Rather, it supervised these tasks and it did so in a
example o f the concern this caused and discussion of what should be done about it see Raymond 
Aron et al, The Soviet Economy: A Discussion London: Martin Seeker & Warburg, 1956.
21 It formally became the CPSU in 1952, one o f Stalin’s final acts which some interpret as his 
symbolic burial of the ideals and aspirations of the Bolshevik seizure o f power.
2 Harry Best, The Soviet State and its Inception New York: Philosophical Library, 1950; Carr, 
Russian Revolution, pp. 38-60, pp. 106-130; Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 1, pp. 151— 
232; Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution London: Fontana, 1992, pp. 506-65, pp. 671-713; 
William Henry Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution Volume 2, New York: Universal Library, 
1965, pp. 25-65, pp. 96-117, and pp. 359-77.
23 On this dimension of state building see Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 206-33, 
and Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 1, pp. 151-83 and on the original capturing of the state 
see pp. 214-32. On the general economic conditions see E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 
1917-1923, Volume 2 London: Macmillan, 1952, pp. 28-145; on war communism see pp. 147- 
267; and on NEP see pp. 280-358; see also Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime 
1919-1924 London: Fontana, 1994, pp. 436-488 (on the Civil War) and pp. 497-501.
24 See generally Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party Third Edition, 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1986.
91
number of ways. Sakwa argues that the party is best thought of as an executive 
branch of government and he sets out the following six mechanisms through 
which it had control of the state: the use of party groups in soviets, institutions 
and mass organisations; influence channelled through networks of primary 
political organisations; nomenklatura control of significant appointments; 
interlocking membership of various institutions such as a local party boss 
heading a local soviet; the primary decision making body was the Central 
Committee Secretariat; and party pressure for accountability in the 
implementation of decisions.25 As a broad sketch of the means of influence, 
Sakwa’s picture is fair. The problem is the use of the word ‘control’. This implies 
that the party controlled mechanisms and outcomes, and, while the institutions 
existed to try to ensure party dominance and loyalty, in such a monolithic system 
one could show ‘loyalty’ without demonstrating effective compliance. In such a 
system, if political authority is strong then it is very effective. If, on the other 
hand, it is weak then, due to the unclear nature of the state and the loose formal 
anchor of political authority, those in positions of non-political power (such as 
military, security or economic actors) can resist pressures for control and 
compliance. The problem is precisely that the monolithism of the state provides 
not only the possibility for great control, but also the potential for an inability to 
control.26
This point is made by Whitefield who argues that, since 1965, power in 
the USSR did not lie overwhelmingly with the politicians supposedly controlled 
by the CPSU, but was somewhat inchoate.27 He argues that industrial power 
emasculated political authority, which, in the long run, led to perestroika and 
glasnost being introduced by Gorbachev as a means to undermine the ministries 
hindering the reform process.28 He argues that the CPSU was weak, that the 
nomenklatura system was ineffective as a means of control and that the 
Secretariat of the Central Committee had been captured by the ministries. While 
his argument is somewhat overstated in favour of industrial ministries, he 
demonstrates amply that power was more diffuse in the Soviet state than is
25 Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, pp. 96-9.
26 This is one element of state weakness that will probed in later chapters.
27 Stephen Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.
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usually represented. This has implications for Soviet state autonomy. The 
ministries were an arm of the state and thus a representation of the broader moral 
claim of statehood and, as they were backed with this practical authority, they 
were able to effect an autonomous power base themselves. They could act 
independently from the formal and substantive authority of the party, though still 
as an entity of the state. As Whitefield writes:
The terms in which interference in the economy by the party were 
couched... and the organisations which were charged with 
institutionalising these claims...effectively legitimized the activities 
o f constitutional actors whose powers and interests were often distinct 
from those o f politicians.29
Thus, the state means by which the party attempted to control society facilitated a 
diminution of its practical power and further blurred the nature of the Soviet 
state.
The other major function of the CPSU, in terms of capturing the 
mechanisms of state, was that of co-ordination and control of the policy creation 
and implementation process. After Stalin, who had virtually shut the bulk of the 
party out of the effective mechanisms of power, the apparat of the CPSU became 
the prime source of policy.30 The various departments and commissions of the 
Central Committee Secretariat carried out the policy formulation in areas such as 
foreign relations, law, economic and social relations, ideology, agriculture. But 
they did so at the behest of the Politburo, the chief policy decision-making
o  i
body. Through the nomenklatura system,* the party ensured that policy was 
implemented at the ministerial and other levels in the manner that it saw fit.32 
The penetration of the entire range of Soviet bodies, from the military to the 
medicinal, from printing to payments, was completed by this process of party 
approval and appointment. In the military, this often meant the placement of a
28 Kristian Geraer and Stefan Hedlund make a similar point in Ideology and Rationality in the 
Soviet Model London: Routledge, 1989.
29 Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State, p. 14.
30 See above note 11.
31 The Politburo had no real executive authority and its control over ministries was not like a 
liberal-capitalist state’s cabinet. This was a product both of the substantive problems of power 
and the functions o f the ministries. On the Politburo see John Lowenhardt, The Soviet Politburo 
Edinburgh: Canongate, 1982.
32 On the working o f the nomenklatura system see Mikhail Voslenskii, Nomenklatura: Anatomy 
o f the Soviet Ruling Class London: Bodley Head, 1984.
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political officer in a military grouping to ensure that officers lower down the 
chain of command were participating as they ought. The logic was simple; by 
placing their people in all of the key posts, the party could ensure that CPSU 
policy was adhered to and that it was effectively co-ordinated and supervised. 
The final mechanism was the most notorious, that is, CPSU control of the secret 
police. From the very beginning the Cheka was answerable only to the most 
senior members of the party. After Stalin, the party ensured that the service 
would always remain subordinate to its wishes, and it was not until Andropov 
was brought into the Politburo that the KGB had such high representation.34
On paper then, it seems clear that policy was formulated by the CPSU 
and carried out by the ‘government’, the body of ministries, state committees, 
and planning agencies. The ‘government’ received policy instructions and, on 
close supervision by party representatives located strategically throughout these 
bodies, ensured that party decisions were carried out. The picture is one of an 
integrated bureaucratic system with a hierarchy of power reaching an apex at the 
Politburo of the CPSU. The CPSU was the premier institution in the state. It had 
a formal position of authority unparalleled in society, it had a system of control 
and co-ordination and was, most crucially, the vessel in which the ruling 
ideology of the state—state socialism—rested. The Soviets had been effectively 
sidelined by Stalin as genuine participants in the political process. In simple 
terms, the CPSU had captured the state, the economy and society.36 The ‘leading 
role’ of the party promised by the constitutions would seem to be an inadequate 
term. The state had fused itself with the economy and had penetrated many 
comers of society. This had come about because of the ideas, tenacity and 
control of the CPSU.
33 On die KGB see Yevgenia Albats, KGB: State Within a State London: I.B. Tauris, 1995; and 
Amy Knight, The KGB: Police, and Politics in the Soviet Union Revised Edition, London: Unwin 
1990.
34 Andropov was the first and only leader of the USSR not to rise from the party apparat but from 
the KGB, a telling indication of the path to power and the concern about the KGB.
35 Though technically the President o f the Supreme Soviet was the titular head of state, 
Gorbachev’s ‘bumping up’ o f Andrei Gromyko to this role indicates its fundamental lack of 
power. On which see Dmitri Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Empire: Political 
Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev London: Harper Collins, 1999, pp. 490-1.
36 See Linden, The Soviet Party-State, particularly pp. 31-56, for this view, for a detailed history 
of the beginnings of this see Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 1, pp. 214-32.
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Levels of Control
The problem, as Whitefield indicates, is that this picture was hardly 
representative of the actual political power of the CPSU.37 While this power 
clearly existed in certain instances—in extra-judicial action, foreign affairs and 
so on—in the case of the day to day political sphere, the fusion of economy and 
politics had created a structure which allowed for significant autonomy among 
the constituent elements of the state. The problem lay at the heart of the political 
structure that was built on the idea of socialist production. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, the actual practice of statehood embodied in its institutions 
shapes the state, its limits and its possibilities. Ultimately, the disorderly shape of 
the Soviet state and its convoluted networks of power was the result of the party 
perpetually trying, through various means, to control the state. These attempts 
were always only partial successes; the CPSU did not have complete practical 
control over the state. Indeed, it was some way from this state of affairs. But the 
effort to control shaped the constellation of power quite strongly and gave rise to 
the very system it could not control in the manner that it wished to. Thus, the 
CPSU must be seen as a crucial state actor and institution, but not as much for its 
material hold on the state, which was ragged and incomplete, but as the 
repository of the idea which legitimated and justified the state.
3.2 The  Patterning  of Soviet  State  P ow er
Mann states that the Soviet Union was the apotheosis of the modem 
authoritarian state as it was imbued with high levels of both despotic and 
infrastructural power.38 This characterisation may be a fair one, but it does not 
clearly establish the pattemings of power. Using the concepts set out in Chapter 
Two, the following section will characterise the functioning of the Soviet state as 
a product of patterns of social processes and highlight the sources of social
37 Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State.
38 Michael Mann, The Sources o f Social Power, Volume II: The Rise o f Classes and Nation-States 
1760-1914 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 60.
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power—material and ideational—that facilitated the production and reproduction 
of the Soviet state.
By ‘patterning’ we mean the location of, and relations between, the 
elements of state which, taken together, produce its anatomy. The metaphor used 
in Chapter Two portrayed states as constellations of institutions, principles and 
processes which need to be seen in their full context to understand how they 
work. As set out in the final part of the previous chapter, states have various 
configurations of the following four elements which produce their pattern of rule: 
the organisation of functional institutions; the principles of rule; the form of
o n
economic relations; and the relationship between state and society. The Soviet 
state was no exception.
3.2.1 Elements o f State I: Functional Institutions
The institutions of the Soviet state provided much to the Soviet citizen— 
housing, education, food, defence, order, the very future itself—all was delivered 
by the state. Yet its all-consuming nature, and the fusion of public and private 
spheres makes delineating the Soviet state’s configuration difficult. To reiterate 
the point made in Chapter Two, configuration refers to the nature of the 
interaction between principle, authority, and function. For example, the state 
extracts resources, teaches its citizens, and nationalises industry, it does this 
through a series of social relations and processes formalised in institutions of the 
state. These relations, their hierarchies, rules, regulations and networks are the 
result of configurations of state power institutions.
The Soviet state can be characterised as having had a highly centralised, 
top-down, ideologically constrained and informal configuration of institutions. 
The state had high levels of despotic and infrastructural power, but lower levels 
of practical institutional control. Communication between institutions was poor
39 More diverse characteristics such as geography, culture and class do not figure here as this 
schema is predicated on the notion that modem states are institutionally similar. These four 
categories are the elements all states share and which facilitate particular types o f  mle within a 
broader system of similarity. Culture and other factors clearly will play a role in the development 
of the state, but are secondary, in this analysis, to the elements o f the ‘constellation’.
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as was knowledge of how the system functioned.40 Authority was precisely 
defined, but imprecisely utilised and carried out. The monolithic character of the 
institutions led, not only to the much discussed inefficiency of the system, but 
also led to an ineffective utilisation of authority.
Comparing the Soviet and American Configurations
To clarify this point it is illustrative to compare briefly the configuration 
of the Soviet institutions with those of its liberal-capitalist antithesis—the USA. 
The Soviet state, via the efforts of the CPSU, was highly centralised. In all 
spheres, the state was located at the centre and social life radiated out from it in 
practical subordination. From the role of GOSSPLAN and GOSSBANK in the 
economy, to the subservience of the republics to the Union and CPSU, from the 
ideology of Soviet socialism as a supra-national identity to an education system 
laden with Marxist-Leninist values, this centralisation was all pervasive. The 
American state, while being highly centralised, has two key differences regarding 
the form of centralisation. First, it has a clearly demarcated and judicially upheld 
federal division of power. It has two levels of authority, that of the federal 
government, based in Washington with formal final authority, and also that of the 
constituent states which likewise have constitutionally guaranteed lines of 
ultimate authority over which the federal state cannot step 41 While the Soviet 
Union was technically a federation, in practice there was no final authority 
within lower level federal bodies. Second, the American state does not concern 
itself with anywhere near as wide a range of activities as the Soviet state did. 
While it regulates certain elements of economic and social life through, for 
example, environmental requirements or the legal backing of contract law, it 
stands clearly separate from the private sphere of economic and social life. The 
Soviet state was dramatically more centralised than the American state.
40 See Manuel Castells, Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 3. End o f  
Millennium Oxford: Blackwells, 1998, pp. 13-36.
41 M.J.C. Vile, The Structure o f American Federalism Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961; 
Thomas R. Dye, American Federalism: Competition Among Governments Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1990.
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If the Soviet state was clearly vertically organised, so is the American 
state. Yet, while the American system generally follows the formal divisions of 
power—indeed the formal divisions play a very important role in political life— 
in the USSR this was simply not the case. In the USSR the system of rule was 
unclear, informal and changed with time and personnel. In a similar sense, both 
states were ideologically constrained. By this we mean that the underlying 
principles of rule in both systems established limits to the politically possible. In 
the USSR the state could not privatise steel production. Similarly, the reverse is 
true in the USA. The historical development of ideology into solid forms of 
domination, as well as their respective locations at the centre of international 
blocs hostile to the other, meant that the choice for policy action was 
ideologically and politically constrained. Further, if the Soviets had a high degree 
of despotic power—the freedom to act arbitrarily in domestic life—the 
Americans are the diametric opposite. In terms of infrastructural power, the 
penetration of society and the ability to implement its decisions, the Americans 
have reasonably high levels, yet questions should be asked about the Soviet 
powers of implementation. Furthermore, where the Soviets had poor 
communication between institutions, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the 
Americans have good levels of communication.
While life in the Soviet Union was highly bureaucratised, the bureaucracy 
was not rationalised and efficient in the way it is in the West due to its very 
different purpose and its social context.42 The Soviets had multiple and 
overlapping bureaucracies. The departments of the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee, the bureaucracies of the ministries and those of the various 
committees and Soviets at the republic and oblost level all served similar 
functions, often with a great deal of overlap.43 In the USA, while there are 
multiple bureaucracies which have some overlap, they tend to share information 
reasonably freely. Two final contrasts: whereas knowledge of the workings of the 
American state is good, in the USSR it was poor; likewise, authority structures
42 For a discussion on the relationship between bureaucracy and capitalism along Weberian lines 
see Derek Sayer, Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber London: 
Routledge, 1991, pp. 135-48.
43 On this see Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, pp. 96-105, pp. 110-19, pp. 149-68, 
pp. 219-25, pp. 254-69.
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are, in the US, clearly delineated and followed, but in the USSR were formally 
delineated but substantively very chaotic.
3.2.2 Elements o f State II: Principles o f Rule
The principle of rule gives direction to decision-making, delimits notions 
of the politically possible and establishes structures of rhetoric and values which 
must be referred to. It is not sufficient simply to identify a broad category such as 
liberalism or state socialism as the principle of rule. The idea here refers to the 
way in which specific ideas of legitimate rule are conjugated by the state as 
forms of rule and means by which domination is carried out. In the Soviet state, 
there were several underlying principles. The pre-eminent principle was the 
establishment of a communist order. This had a double meaning: the 
achievement of communism within the USSR and the overtaking and eventual 
overthrow of capitalism world-wide. The principle was predicated on this 
necessary internationalism. Despite Stalin’s efforts, the idea of communism was 
not viable in a bounded sense. As an effective and a legitimate form of rule, that 
is one to which both the population and elites would consent, not just be coerced, 
it required an international dimension. Related to this, a number of other 
principles of rule both liberated and constrained the state: an underlying drive for 
emancipation and a formal pursuit of egalitarianism and social justice. But one 
must remember that these were realised in their Soviet socialist sense. More 
specifically, the notion of vanguardism and the role of the party as a duty-bound 
and privileged institution was clear. The idea of the Soviet state as a workers’ 
state was a direct subset of the communist idea and one which had a damaging 
impact when the discrepancy between the idea and the practice hit home. The 
projection of an internationalism via the spread of, and support for, revolution 
and socialism played an important role in the playing out of this idea. This could 
be seen in Eastern Europe and also in the support for third world revolutions in 
the post-1945 period.44
44 On this see Robert Cassen (ed.), Soviet Interests in the Third World London: RHA. and Sage, 
1985; Roger E. Kaset (ed.), The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Third World Cambridge:
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In different periods these ideas were conjugated in different ways. From 
Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’ to Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’, from the reformism 
of the early Brezhnev period to the radical changes embodied by Gorbachev’s 
perestroika, glasnost, and demokratisatsiia, each and every leader and state 
institution had to move in relation to these ideas.45 The ideas can constrain 
action, but primarily they establish the position from which one can move. If the 
famous line in the American Constitution referring to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness’ is a snap-shot of the ideas of the USA, then one might say that in 
the Soviet Union the ideal which established certain limits to the institutional 
dimensions of state was ‘life, equality and the pursuit of communism’.
3.2.3 Elements o f State III: Economic Form
In the Soviet state, the third element of state patterning, the form of 
economic relations and the position of the state vis-a-vis these relations derived, 
in part, from the principles of rule. The form of economic relations in the Soviet 
Union is well known. The economy was organised by the state, the means of 
production were owned by the state and resources were allocated along 
supposedly rational lines 46 On 28 June 1918, the Soviet state nationalised the 
means of production and thus extinguished the separate market relations of the 
economy and established them on a state owned, politically directed and non-
Cambridge University Press, 1987; and Rajan Menon, Soviet Power and the Third World New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986.
45 On the respective different use of ideas see: on Stalinism, Alan Wood, Stalin and Stalinism 
London: Routledge, 1990 and E.H. Carr, Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926, Three Volumes, 
London: Macmillan, 1958-64; on the Khrushchev ‘thaw’, Fedor Burlatskii, Khrushchev and the 
First Russian Spring: The Era o f Khrushchev through the Eyes o f His Advisor London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991, Martin McCauley (ed.), The Khrushchev Era, 1954-1964 
Harlow: Longman, 1995; on Gorbachev, Jerry Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the 
USSR, 1985-91 Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997 and Richard Sakwa, 
Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-90 London: Prentice Hall, 1990.
46 Traditionally known as a planned economy, many have argued that this is a misnomer as the 
term plan connotes much greater order than ever existed. This thesis will use the term command 
economy. For more on this distinction see Sakwa, Soviet Politics in Perspective, p. 278, see also 
Peter Rutland, The Myth o f the Plan: Lesson o f the Soviet Planning Experience London: 
Hutchison, 1985. On the Soviet economic system see Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System 
Third Edition, London: Allen and Unwin, 1986; David A. Dyker, The Soviet Economic System 
London: Crosby, 1976; and Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic 
Performance and Structure Seventh Edition, Boston: Addison Wesley, 2001, pp. 1-175.
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market basis.47 The Soviet economy had four clear political aims: the 
transformation to communism and the overtaking of capitalism; the legitimation 
of the Soviet state; the achievement of full employment; and the provision of fuel 
for the revolution 48 In terms of practical organisation, this meant that the state 
and its success were fundamentally linked to developments in the economic 
sphere.
State ownership of the means of production was the key to the Soviet 
system, and its control of the economy was exercised through the state owned 
monopolies 49 The economy was politically directed by the planning mechanisms 
(GOSSPLAN and its sub-agency GOSSNAB) which determined everything from 
input price to wage levels. Decisions about the economy were political and were 
fuelled by the commitment of the CPSU to extensive growth.50 The development 
of the economy was predicated on extensive growth in inputs and not intensive 
growth based on productivity. This was indicative of the selective political 
economic aims for growth, the result of which was the extremely unbalanced 
nature of the economy. The best example of this was the dramatic imbalance 
between military hardware and technology and the quality of consumer goods.51 
Within each production sector there existed a centralised, hierarchical and 
vertically integrated management-authority structure. This management structure 
had very little scope for initiative as command planning dictated the basis of the
47 Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 2, pp. 99-100. After a short experiment with some market 
elements during the NEP, full nationalisation occurred after Stalin consolidated his rule.
48 On the political nature of the Soviet economy see Lane, Soviet Economy and Society; and 
Hans-Hermann Hohmann, Alec Nove and Heinrich Vogel (eds.), Economics and Politics in the 
USSR: The Problems o f Interdependence Boulder, CO: Westview and Federal Institute for 
Eastern Europe and International Studies, 1986.
49 Between 1924 and 1937 the Soviet state acquired a virtual monopoly on all the legal means of 
production. The following figures are the percentage share of the state sector in the Soviet 
economy in 1937: national income 99.1; industrial output 99.8; gross agricultural output 98.5; 
retail trade 100. Goskomstat, Nardodnoe Khaziaistvo SSSR za 70 let Moskva: Finansi i statistika, 
1987, p. 42. Note the exception in the production of agriculture, a sphere in which there were 
three forms o f ownership: state; co-operative (kholkoz); and private. Note also that there was 
doubtless a sizeable, though unmentioned black market aspect of the economy.
50 Though in the last days there were shifts to more intensive growth and consumer oriented 
production. This was slight and not representative of Soviet economic development.
1 On the size o f Soviet military expenditures see R.T. Maddock, The Political Economy o f  Soviet 
Defence Spending Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988, particularly pp. 66-94; on the problems of 
consumer goods see Marshall I. Goldman, USSR in Crisis: The Failure o f an Economic System 
New York: W.W. Norton, 1983, pp. 97-100, p. 123.
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day-to-day running of production. Thus, the Soviet state did not stand outside 
economic relations and provide what Adam Smith described as the ‘orderly 
oppression of law’, but itself seized the economy and imposed the ‘disorderly 
oppression of Soviet socialism’ as an economic model.
3.2.4 Elements o f State IV: State-Society Relations
Our final concern is with the role of state-society relations within the 
pattern of the Soviet state. One could go so far as to describe the Soviet system 
of social life as a form of statism, which Moshe Lewin claims refers not merely 
to the location of the state at the centre of social life but ‘an ideology extolling its 
superiority as the highest principle of social organisation, for which Hegel’s 
“absolutization” of the state...would serve here as a fitting description.’54 
Similarly, Castells defines Soviet statism as:
a social system organised around the appropriation o f the 
economic surplus produced in society by the holders o f power in 
the state apparatus ... oriented toward power maximising; that is 
toward increasing the military and ideological capacity o f the state 
apparatus to impose its goals on a great number o f subjects and at 
deeper levels o f their consciousness.55
Hungarian economist Janos Komai also recognises this when he writes that the 
political-economic structure of Marxism Leninism ‘proliferates with an 
elemental force, propagating itself and penetrating into every social 
relationship.*56
Yet society clearly lived life free, on the whole, from the direct control or 
observation of the state. It is easy to think of the USSR as a society in which the 
state penetrated every level in a panopticon-like state of observation and control.
52 Seweryn Bialer gives a brief overview of the political character o f the Soviet economy, The 
Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline New York: Knopf, 1986, pp. 6-7; for 
other overviews of elements of die economy see above note 46.
53 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1976 [orig. 1776].
54 Moshe Lewin, Russia/USSR/Russia: The Drive and Drift o f  a Superstate New York: New 
Press, 1995, p. 18.
55 Castells, End o f Millennium, p. 6.
56 Janos Komai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy o f  Communism Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992, p. 369.
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This was not the case, as the levels of apathy, and alcoholism so dramatically 
demonstrated in the 1970s and 1980s. It provided for all forms of social need 
such as education, welfare, and medical care. Its relations with society were not 
entirely coercive and while a massive political apathy hung over the land, the fact 
that this mass disenchantment did not translate into direct action was due to the 
continuing ability of the state to satisfy the basic material needs of society. Yet 
there was clearly a real ignorance of the nature of the population and its needs 
and desires. Andropov articulated this when he said, in 1979, ‘[w]e have not 
properly studied the society in which we live and work and have not yet fully 
discovered the laws governing its development, particularly the economic
S7ones.’ The Soviet state set out to structure social life in a very particular way. 
Though it displayed a basic ignorance of the needs of the population, it played an 
extremely active part in the life of its citizens, through the provision of the 
entirety of social and economic services expected by its population.
To summarise, the USSR was a protean state. Reliant on informal 
networks and not formally delineated processes of rule, it lurched from party- 
launched initiative to initiative, and did not follow or establish clear systems of 
rule. Its monolithism undermined the practice of authority and decision-makers 
had little substantive knowledge of the actual workings of the system.58 Lewin 
captures its essence well when he writes that the result of years of Soviet rule 
was ‘an economic system without economics and a political system without 
politics.’59 The Soviet constellation was huge, disorganised, over-stretched and 
internationally exposed, at both the strategic and ideological level, to forces well 
beyond its control and its understanding. In short, the Soviet state can be said to 
have been an institutional quagmire, an economic nightmare and an ideological 
powder keg. Indeed, this then returns us to the question with which Chapter Two 
began: how did the USSR survive for so long? There are a number of tentative 
answers to this. First, that a high level of coercion had become socially routinised 
goes some way to explaining the passivity of the populace. Furthermore, there
57 Quoted in Bialer, Soviet Paradox, p. 122. This reference to Taws of development’ is revealing. 
It suggests that they were aware o f that their way had problems, yet they were not aware o f their 
flawed understanding of the nature of social life.
58 This was one of the reasons why, in the crises of the 1980s, Gorbachev found foreign affairs so 
much more amenable, at least there he knew where he stood.
59 Lewin, Russia/USSR/Russia, p. 93.
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was a unity among the elites regarding power and interests. The second aspect of 
an explanation is that the Soviet state drew remarkable strength from its hostile 
international engagement with the liberal capitalist world. One of the key 
features of the process of Soviet state reproduction was the existence of 
international sources of power which reinforced its position. It is to these 
international sources of power that we now turn.
3.3 The International Sources of So viet  State
P ow er
Tilly’s argument that the technological requirements of the military 
revolution required states to increase massively their administrative and coercive 
capacity led him to the pithy remark that ‘war made the state and the state made 
war.’60 Such a claim could easily be extended to explain the formation and 
consolidation of the Soviet state. The exigencies of the post-1917 period drove 
the Bolsheviks to consolidate their power by increasing massively the 
administrative, coercive and distributive capacities of the state. The war with the 
counter-revolutionary forces, both internal and international, solidified the Soviet 
forms of state and consolidated their power base. The shift to rapid 
industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation, and away from the NEP of the 
Lenin period, was a response to the economic and social chaos of the time and 
was also the best way for the Bolsheviks to perpetuate their Soviet form of rule.61 
From its inception, the international played a central role in shaping the Soviet 
state. It is worth reiterating here that state power, while formally bounded, has 
sources and deltas which are substantively cross-border. The modem state is a 
specific formation of geopolitical space. The appearance of a territorially de­
limited and circumscribed power is an important product of this formation, it is 
not a mask but rather a practice which has developed over time. The structures
60 Charles Tilly and Garbriel Ardent (eds.), The Formation o f National States in Western Europe 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
61 This view is accepted by two scholars with two very different political views: Skocpol in her 
Sources o f  Social Revolution, pp. 206-35; and Richard Pipes, Three Whys o f the Russian 
Revolution London: Pimlico, 1998, pp. 63-84, and in his Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime, 
pp. 436-88; pp. 497-501. Each has, however, a quite distinct interpretation o f events.
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which create the appearance of firm delineation reinforce the state as a form of 
rule and are central elements of modem state power.
3.3.1 The Internationalised Soviet State
The international was at the heart of the Soviet state’s constellation; the 
central organising principles of rule were internationally produced and reliant on 
developments beyond the state’s borders. Furthermore, the international provided 
the state with a range of material and ideational forces which it could harness. 
Here we shall consider four general categories of social power that were 
international in the sense that Soviet state institutions drew on, and were 
supported by, resources beyond their territorially sovereign sphere. These 
categories are: structural factors; material factors; social-cultural factors; and 
international confrontation. This section will examine the ways in which the 
international system of sovereign states provided the Soviet state with the means 
to reinforce its system of domination.
Structural Elements
The international system confers the possibility of statehood, that is, 
institutionalised domination of a territory. When an institution of rule is formed 
and is recognised by other members of the system as being functionally similar, 
it provides an important, though not final, dimension to that institution’s claim to 
legitimate authority.62 The international system confers upon a state legitimacy 
and an element of structural power. Although this does not occur 
instantaneously, and is a product of specific social practices, over time, the 
situation becomes normalised and the group which has been able to structure the 
institutions of rule has a distinct advantage. This was clearly the case in post­
revolutionary Russia. The Bolshevik triumph from the chaos that followed their 
)
seizure of power gave them not only an institutional edge—they ruled because
62 Consider the problems of Afghanistan, or Chechnya given the international unwillingness to 
recognise those who claim to be their legitimate rulers compared with East Timor or Cambodia.
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they could and the liberals and whites could not—but, over time, through 
international recognition and participation in international life, they achieved an 
internal legitimacy that no amount of coercion could ever bring about. The 
international context of their seizure of power did not just necessitate the creation
t
of a dictatorial state and hierarchical structures of coercion and control, it 
bestowed legitimacy and authority on a newly formed USSR. With the 
recognition by the USA in 1932, the formation of the USSR as a sovereign state 
was complete.
Instrumental Elements
The major means of resource extraction from the international were the 
export of commodities (due to the Soviet state’s monopoly on foreign trade), the 
sale of the produce of state owned enterprises to other states and the acquisition 
of goods needed within the USSR such as grain and machine parts. The most 
important in financial terms were sales to Western capitalist states of wheat in 
the 1930s and oil and gold in the 1960s and 1970s.63 There were quantities of 
products exported to non-COMECON states, generally missiles and arms, but 
these were rarely traded with the West. COMECON states were the source and 
destination of manufactured goods and components. Importantly, the West and 
COMECON states were the source of materials which the state required but 
lacked or could not produce itself such as grain in the 1970s, computer 
technology, and so on.64 A remark from the rector of the Soviet Foreign Trade 
Academy illustrates this:
63 In 1978 oil and oil related exports accounted for USD 5.3 billion. On this and Soviet foreign 
trade more generally see Ed A. Hewett, ‘Foreign Economic Relations’ in Abram Bergson and 
Herbert S. Levine (eds.), The Soviet Economy Towards the Year 2000 London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1983, pp. 269-310.
64 See Nove, Soviet Economic System; Krylov, Soviet Economy, pp. 221-32; IMF, World Bank, 
OECD and EBRD, Study o f the Soviet Economy Three Volumes, Paris: Joint Publication of IMF, 
WB, OECD and EBRD, 1991, Vol. 1, pp. 435-42, Vol. 2, pp. 41-5.
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Like other countries, the Soviet Union uses the advantages o f foreign 
economic relations to create additional possibilities for more rapid 
economic development, higher production efficiency and accelerated 
scientific and technological progress. In addition, stronger trade and 
economic ties help promote political relations between countries and 
improve the international situation.65
Social-Cultural
The third area is the cultural-social, and specifically the utilisation of that 
most international of ideas, modem nationalism. This aspect manifested itself 
most obviously in sporting and cultural forms. The Soviets placed a heavy 
emphasis on international excellence in sport.66 The arena of international 
sporting competition, particularly the Olympic games, gave the state a way to 
demonstrate its superiority in a manner that resonated both domestically and 
internationally. The second was the cultural-artistic. This appealed less to the 
sensibilities of much of the CPSU elite, but was found to be a resonant marker 
with which the Soviets could attach themselves both to the past and the future 
and demonstrate their part of and superiority to the world at large. The 
international context of cultural achievement provided a significant source of 
state affirmation of its ruling principle and domestic legitimacy. This field 
provided a way for an internationalist ideology to invoke very nationalistic ideals 
to buttress its claims to rule.
International Confrontation
Finally, the international confrontation between the liberal-capitalist 
states and the USSR permeated state structures and became a fundamental 
element of the state’s social power. As set out earlier, from the outset the USSR 
confronted, and was in confrontation with, the rest of the world. The Allied 
intervention of 1918-21 was driven largely by the desire to crush the revolution
65 Boris Vaganov, ‘Foreign Economic Relations’ in Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 
Soviet Economy Today: With Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development o f  the USSR 
for 1981-85 and for the Period Ending in 1990 Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981, p. 176.
66 On which see N.N. Shneidman, The Soviet Road to Olympus: Theory and Practice o f  Soviet 
Physical Culture and Sport London: Routledge and Keagan, 1979.
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whose ideas so challenged the world.67 Furthermore, the Versailles Treaty had 
had a profoundly anti-Bolshevik character, derived from the deep-seated hostility 
held by Wilson and company towards the ideals and aspirations of the Russian 
Revolution which had become formalised in the principles of state rule.68 To 
reiterate the idea set out in Chapter One, ‘international confrontation’ refers to 
the chronic conflict between social systems which had three dimensions: socio­
economic, ideological and geopolitical. It was the product of two rival and 
mutually contradictory evangelical world views and was, in its latter phase, 
transformed through the development of mammoth military power and by 
political developments into the Cold War which established the structural 
parameters for international politics for its duration.69 The confrontation may 
have seemed, during the most tense and frightening moments, to be about nuclear 
advantage, strategic initiative and megadeaths. It was, in reality, a confrontation 
about quality of life, about which system would prevail in providing a better life 
for the mass of people, fought out in the context of the nuclear nightmare.
3.3.2 International Confrontation and Soviet State Structures
How did this international conflict translate into the stuff of state power? 
The way in which states conduct their international relations emanates, to a 
certain extent, from their system of rule. The patterns of state power—liberal- 
capitalist, centralised-authoritarian, or diffused-absolutist—set limits to the 
manner in which a state relates to the outside world. The reverse of this claim is 
also true. The various ways in which a state relates to the rest of the world— 
through international trade, diplomacy, treaties, organisations or war—shapes the 
material and ideational conditions of life within the territory and, more 
specifically, affects the ability of the state to rule. In this vein, Rosenberg writes,
67 Though one must emphasise that the counter-revolutionary impulse was not the sole 
determining factor, the sheer confusion o f the time and the particular dilemmas o f a nineteenth 
century power political mind-set attempting to deal with the singular challenge of the twentieth 
century. For a discussion from such a view point see George F. Kennan, Soviet American 
Relations, 1917-20. Volume II: The Decision to Intervene Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1958.
68 On the counter-revolutionary element in the Treaty of Versailles see Amo J. Mayer, Politics 
and Diplomacy o f  Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-revolution at Versailles, 1918-19 
London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1968.
69 See Chapter One, pp. 36-47.
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‘it would be impossible to understand the Soviet presence in the international 
system in terms of states and markets. It was precisely an attempt to abolish both
7ftof them.’ It was this, the desire to destroy the system of states and markets 
within and without, which made the international system such a highly charged 
arena.71 But, it was the larger confrontation—of which the Cold War was the 
second half—which crucially affected some of the key mechanisms of social rule 
utilised by the Soviet state.
In the Soviet case, the hostile international engagement with the liberal- 
capitalist states became an embedded element of the state’s structure. Over time, 
it became a political glue that gave legitimacy to the system of rule, drove its 
material development, stimulated its economy, and provided it with a dynamic 
and malleable underlying organisational principle. It should be emphasised that it 
was not the only thing holding the state together, but it was a central element in 
the reproduction of state power.
International Confrontation and the Idea of Power
The ideational was the broadest sense in which the international conflict 
became a source of power. It was the international reference point for the 
revolutionary claims of the state and provided a very real and material 
dimension—in the dual sense of purpose and direction and also of threat and 
challenge—to the underlying organisational principle of the state. There were at 
least five aspects of the way in which the idea of competition and the very real 
conflict permeated the state and provided it with the means with which the 
institution could perpetuate its rule. These were: 1) the sense of legitimacy which 
confrontation bestowed on the state and particularly the CPSU’s efforts to 
control it; 2) a means for the justification of privations, difficulties and the 
direction of social life dictated by the state; 3) the provision of a structuring sense
70 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire o f Civil Society: A Critique o f  the Realist Theory o f  
International Relations London: Verso, 1994, p. 134.
71 One must not overstate this. While the aim was clearly to live in a communist world, the 
doctrine of peaceful coexistence became increasingly important as the Cold War wore on. During 
detente the capitalist world economy became an increasing source of material goods. The belief 
was that in peaceful conditions the ‘true’ superiority of the Soviet system would become clear. 
For an articulation of this see N.A. Tikhonov, Soviet Economy: Achievements, Problems, 
Prospects Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1983.
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of purpose, that is the system was an embodiment of the belief that humanity 
could know its problems, correct them and progress to a better way of life; 4) as 
a source of prestige; and 5) in its dual incarnation as a purpose and a challenge, 
the international confrontation established a set of political limits for action, and 
set the parameters of the politically possible in a manner conducive to the 
CPSU’s continued position of dominance within the state. If Whitefield is right 
to argue that the authority of the political actors in the USSR was weak due to an 
inability to regulate the mechanisms of power,72 then one must concede that the 
international confrontation was a point at which the politicians could activate the 
potency of the state power that was within their grasp.
The larger historical project of the building of communism, the spread of 
the revolution and the overthrow of capitalism was to be driven by the successful 
utilisation of the power capacity of the Soviet state. The ideational aspect was 
supported by and also drove the material ways in which the state was made 
strong by the international confrontation. The greatest beneficiary of this was the 
military. Both technologically and economically, the military threat of the 
capitalist powers helped the state feed the military and helped the military to fuel 
the state. This became even more dramatic in the post-war phase. The 
development path of intensive industrialisation based on the ‘metal-eating’ 
outputs was designed to industrialise as rapidly as possible in a manner that 
would also provide real security from without and an increased means for 
coercion within. The growth and eventual retardation of the Soviet economy was 
influenced by the privileging of the military that was facilitated by the 
international confrontation and perpetuated by its second half, the Cold War.
International Confrontation and Soviet State Political Economy
The Polish economist Oskar Lange described the Soviet economy as a 
war economy.73 He determined that its single purpose of rapid industrialisation in 
the context of the pursuit of socialism made it similar to a capitalist economy 
fundamentally reordered by a condition of total war in which everything in the
72 Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State.
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economy is straining for one end—the defeat of the immediate threat to the state 
and society. The international confrontation was a structuring element in this war 
economy; it was the war being fought by the economy. The conflict stimulated 
the economy and more generally acted as an economic road map. One of the 
major difficulties in a command economy is the determination of the rational 
calculation of needs without the meaningful indicators of value, scarcity or worth 
that are present in a capitalist system. The conflict provided some sense of value 
and worth from which meaningful, if flawed, decisions could be made. Due to 
the centrality of the political economy to the Soviet party-state-economy fusion, 
this aspect will be examined in detail in the following chapter.
International Confrontation and Political Institutions
The international confrontation penetrated the political institutions in a 
number of ways. As shown earlier, the ordering of political authority was a 
product of substantive practice and not of formal allocation. Thus, the conflict 
provided a means for establishing and reaffirming a functional hierarchy within 
the various arms of power. Again, it must be stressed that it was not the only way 
that this occurred, but was one among a number of important means. 
Furthermore, the confrontation provided a more useful context for the 
formulation of foreign relations. The Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence 
had, after WWII, been developed into what has been termed ‘expansive’ peaceful 
coexistence, but this, combined with the somewhat platitudinous ‘correlation of 
forces’ was the only informing idea on the practice of Soviet foreign policy. In 
the face of this, the Cold War phase of the international confrontation provided a 
clear and immediate organisational framework.74 This does not mean that Soviet 
foreign policy can be understood as purely the product of revolutionary rhetoric. 
Rather, it means that the conflict with the capitalist West provided a more 
immediate set of markers for the formulation of foreign policy decisions where 
Marxism-Leninism failed. Finally, the international confrontation penetrated
73 Oskar Lange, ‘The Role of Planning in a Socialist Economy’ in Morris Bomstein (ed.), 
Comparative Economic Systems: Models and Causes Homeward, IL: Irwin, 1965, pp. 200-1.
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social life. That people lived their lives in the context of the messianic struggle 
for communism was evident in a number of areas, most prominently in education 
and the transmission of values and ideas. This is unsurprising given the Leninist 
faith in praxis and the necessity of theory and ideas in social organisation. Also, 
in daily life the international confrontation pervaded individuals’ lives as it was 
invoked as the justification for privations, shortages and overly coercive 
behaviour.
In sum then, the Soviet confrontation with the capitalist West over socio­
economic systems, geopolitics and ideology figured highly in the organisation 
and functioning of the Soviet state. The conflict provided the state with clear and 
effective sources of social power. Furthermore, the deep penetration of the 
conflict into the form of the state acutely internationalised the Soviet state. The 
successful reproduction of its form was reliant on, and sensitive to, matters 
beyond its borders in a much greater way than liberal-capitalist states.
Conclusion
The Soviet state, like all states, spilled over its formal boundaries to 
produce and reproduce itself. It drew on domestic and international sources of 
power to facilitate its domination over the Soviet citizenry. Unlike most modem 
states, the Soviet state was extremely rigid and was not able to respond at all well 
to changes in these conditions. Furthermore, the command economy and the state 
were so closely linked to the international confrontation that the political- 
economy became, in many ways, the true battleground of the socio-systemic 
conflict. In particular, the Soviet state’s fate was tied inextricably to two related 
phenomena: the Cold War and the command economy. Success in one field 
would mean success in the other, which would ensure the state’s strength. 
Unbeknownst to the leadership, failure in one meant the eventual collapse of the 
state. Having established the international configuration of the Soviet state and 
its political patterns more broadly, we must recognise that the political economy 
of the Soviet Union was of fundamental importance to the playing out of the
74 In such a teleological state, in which decision makers placed so much faith in human rationality 
and a notion of theory, die provision of purpose had a much greater social purchase there than it 
might have had elsewhere.
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international confrontation, its end and the state’s demise, and so it is to this field 
that we turn next.
113
Chapter
4
4 In t e r n a t io n a l  C o n fr o n t a t io n  a n d  t h e
Political  Ec o n o m y  o f  t h e  So viet  Sta te
We either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically... Perish or 
jbrgpfull steam ahead1
We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this 
distance in ten years. Either we do so, or we shall gp under.2
These oft-quoted remarks of Lenin and Stalin reflect the conditions of 
international competition and hostility that the young Bolshevik regime made for 
itself. They are usually cited to demonstrate the regime’s use of external military 
pressure to mobilise industrialisation. While this is a legitimate interpretation, 
their broader meaning must also be recognised: these exhortations illustrate the 
centrality of modernisation, industrialisation and economic performance to the 
development of Soviet state power and the international context in which this 
occurred. As the previous chapter has shown, the Bolsheviks seized the state, 
took control of the productive forces of Tsarist Russia and set about trying to 
create a new form of society. This new state self-consciously tried to establish an 
economic system that was manifestly better than that found in the industrialised- 
capitalist West. The programme and its institutions were inherently competitive, 
and it was the claim to moral and economic superiority that laid the seeds of both
1 V.I. Lenin, quoted in Hans-Hermann Hohmann, ‘The Place of Economic Policy Objectives on 
the List o f Soviet Political Priorities’ in Hans-Hermann Hohmann, Alec Nove and Heinrich 
Vogel (eds.), Economics and Politics in the USSR: The Problems o f Interdependence Boulder, 
CO: Westview and Federal Institute for Eastern Europe and International Studies, 1986, pp. 41 -  
57; p. 41.
2 Joseph Stalin, ‘The Tasks of Business Executives’ Speech Delivered at the First All Union 
Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry, 4 February 1931, in J.V. Stalin, Works
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Soviet international confrontation and, ultimately, the failure of the Soviet state. 
The construction of a highly politicised form of economy was so important to 
Soviet power because it was the pre-eminent political justification for CPSU rule 
and because it placed the Soviet party-state-economy fusion directly in an 
international comparative framework.
The previous chapter has shown the fused nature of the Soviet party- 
state-economy and examined the first two parts of this triangle. However, as the 
political-economic programme was of such central importance to the state—it 
was the purpose of the state and the Bolshevik motivation for seizing of state 
power—this chapter will explore the political economy of Soviet state power and 
will use the idea of power-as-practice to shed light on the role of the economy as 
a reinforcing practice of state power. Specifically, this chapter will explain the 
way in which the international confrontation was embedded in the structures of 
the state and will show that the international confrontation helped to produce and 
reproduce the foundations of state power in such a way that the state would be 
made strong and then, when the conditions of conflict changed, critically weak. 
The socio-systemic confrontation, conceived in the sense of both the competition 
of social systems and the geopolitical challenge discussed in Chapter One,3 
helped shape the contours of the economy and, due to the political fusion of state 
power set out in the previous chapter, overtly politicised its workings and 
performance. The international confrontation provided a macro criterion of value 
for the Soviet economy—indeed for the state more broadly—and hence became 
an important part of the ideological and political glue which made the fusion of 
state-party-economy more robust.
The chapter has three parts. The first will argue that the Soviet political 
economy can be characterised as a ‘war economy.’ This illustrates the singularity 
of the Soviet economy and sheds light on the role played by the international 
confrontation in the development of the economic system. The second will then 
use this characterisation as the basis for an analysis of the Soviet economy. This
Volume 13, July 1930-January 1934, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955 
[orig. 1949], pp. 31-44, p. 41.
See Chapter One, pp. 34-47. International confrontation refers to the chronic antagonism which 
existed between the Soviet Union and the capitalist West. While the confrontation varied in 
intensity, it had three main dimensions: socio-economic competition; geopolitical conflict; and
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section will use a comparative economic systems schema to elucidate the 
influence of international confrontation on the economy. The final section will 
show how these international elements developed certain weak spots, or fissures, 
in the state. This thesis contends that the end of the Cold War robbed the Soviet 
state of a crucial source of social power and thus contributed to the state’s 
vulnerability. The chapter does not seek to explain why the Soviet economy 
performed so poorly, nor why it seemed to implode in the late 1980s. Rather, it 
seeks to establish the extent to which the international context of Soviet state 
power shaped its economy so that one may determine the extent to which a 
change in that international context would destabilise aspects of state power.
4.1 T he  Soviet  E conom y  as a  W ar  E c onom y
I  think that, essentially, it [the Soviet economy] can be described as a sui 
generis war economy. Such methods of war economy are not peculiar to 
socialism because they are also used in capitalist countries in wartime.4
The Soviet Union was always at war. The civil war, the Great Patriotic 
War, the Cold War and the Afghan War were all conflicts that were central to 
Soviet fife. For 49 of the 74 years of its existence, the Soviet Union was in overt 
conflict with outside powers. By considering the Stalinist purges, collectivisation 
and forced industrialisation as a war conducted by the state on Soviet society, 
one could add yet more years to this total. One could reasonably claim that the 
Soviet state was bom of war, tempered by its heat and ultimately destroyed by its 
permanence.5 Given such a historical legacy, it should be uncontroversial to 
characterise the political economy of the Soviet Union as a war economy. This 
description does not derive simply from the historical circumstances of war, but 
from the broader economic goal which the Bolshevik revolutionaries set for
ideological challenge. At its base it was a conflict between two antagonistic and mutually 
contradictory social systems over which could provide the superior way of life.
4 Oskar Lange, ‘The Role of Planning in a Socialist Economy’ in Morris Bomstein (ed.), 
Comparative Economic Systems: Models and Causes Homeward, IL: Irwin, 1965, pp. 200-1.
5 For a similar interpretation, though only in passing, see Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: 
The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 London: Routledge, 1995, 
p. 371.
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themselves: surpassing capitalism.6 Since 1928, when the foundations for the 
Soviet economy were set in place, the Soviet economy was at war; it was at war 
with capitalism.
The broader idea of the Soviet economy as a ‘war economy’ is not new. 
Lange used the notion to illuminate the nature and development of early socialist 
planning and its purposive affinities to the phenomenon of ‘war economy’ in the 
capitalist world. He is not alone in touching on this idea, Burks writes that
the Russian version of the centrally planned economy is an extreme form 
o f the kind of economy a Western industrial state might develop for the 
purpose o f waging a prolonged and decisive war. In Soviet Russia, 
preparation for war, or the waging of it, has been the overwhelming 
concern of the rulers o f the country for the last 57 years. It would not be 
far from the truth to assert that in an international situation o f nuclear 
stalemate, waging a ‘cold war’ is a necessary correlate o f a command
O
economy of the Soviet type.
Marie Lavigne echoes this sentiment, noting that conditions for planning are 
ideal in wartime because there are only a few, very clear priorities, there is an 
obvious objective and it can be implemented with rigid discipline.9
Others have characterised the Soviet economy in different ways. These 
views tend to come from the left and specifically from those who argue that the 
USSR was not in any meaningful sense a socialist economy. Harding maintains 
that the Soviet state was an ‘organic labour state’, that is, a state which serves the 
prerequisites of the productive system and in which all elements of society— 
political systems, workers, classes, etc.—are directed to the maximisation of 
productive capacity.10 His argument sheds an interesting light on the economy’s 
obsession with productive capacity to the detriment of other aspects of social life, 
but his representation is too deterministic. He overlooks precisely who or what
6 In the sense that the Bolsheviks clearly set out to establish a superior economic system that 
would usher in a new historical phase. As Harding shows, while underlying motivation remained 
the same, the means to achieve this changed once they had seized power. See Neil Harding, 
‘Socialism, Society and the Organic Labour State’ in Neil Harding (ed.), The State in Socialist 
Society Basingstoke: Macmillan and St Antony’s College, 1984, pp. 1-50.
7 Lange, ‘The Role of Planning in a Socialist Economy’.
8 R.V. Burks, ‘The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union’ in Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. 
Kaplan (eds.), The Soviet Union and the Challenge o f the Future. Volume 1: System and State 
New York: Paragon and PWPA, 1989, pp. 115-65; p. 120.
9 Marie Lavigne, The Economic Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy Second 
Edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, p. 12.
10 Harding, ‘Socialism, Society and the Organic Labour State’.
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was directing the nature of production. Furthermore, Harding ignores the 
international dimensions of both the state and the nature of production, thus 
creating a rather artificial concept. The characterisation set out here overcomes 
this weakness by placing the political economy of Soviet power in the context of 
the international competition which shaped its development.
Cliffs theory of state capitalism is a more extreme view. His theory 
essentially argues that, because the means of production in the USSR were still 
owned by the state, and not held in common, and because the workers were still 
subjugated to a ruling class, the state was in essence capitalist.11 His argument is 
damaged by the teleological assumptions which underpin it, and from the 
presumption of the historical correctness of Marx’s theory of value and notions 
of crisis. Furthermore, Cliff completely overlooks the significant ways in which 
the Soviet economy was distinct from a capitalist one. Good examples of this 
were the allocative mechanism and the incentives and purposes of production. 
Moreover, he utterly neglects state power as a specific autonomous form of 
social power. Thus, his reductive understanding of the economy is one which not 
only ignores the international confrontation and its role in the development of 
Soviet power, but also does not consider the ways in which the Soviet economic 
system was clearly different from capitalism.
The characterisation of war economy here derives from a larger view of 
the Soviet economic system and is distinct from Harding and Cliffs views. This 
view highlights two important aspects of the Soviet economy: first, it clarifies the 
way in which the Soviet competition with the liberal capitalist West established 
priorities and objectives and shaped the institutional implementation of the 
economy; second, it demonstrates the singularity and rigidity of the Soviet 
political economy and the resulting rigidity of the state.
11 Tony Cliff, State Capitalism in Russia Revised Edition, London: Bookmarks, 1996.
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4.1.1 Defining a War Economy
The notion of a ‘war economy’ derives from the term used to describe the 
characteristics of a liberal-capitalist economy after its transformation in 
conditions of total war. The term refers not to the threat, nor the fight itself, but 
to the functioning of the economy after its restructuring for the purpose of 
fighting the war. During conditions of total war, a liberal capitalist state exerts its 
considerable muscle to the fullest extent to recast its economy so as to fight off 
the immediate and massive threat to its existence or to project a massive 
challenge to other states. This temporary transformation is radical and, because 
of this, the threat or objective has to be clear, present and overwhelming to 
demand such a dramatic overhaul. A good example of this was Britain during
World War II. The government was reluctant to undertake such a shift and
1 0impose the necessary strictures, but the Nazi challenge required it.
An important characteristic of a liberal-capitalist economy is that it has 
1 ^no purpose. It exists as an aggregate of transactions in a more or less regulated 
market-place in which participants may be individuals, groups, firms or states. 
Production occurs in a system of consumer choice and for the purpose of profit. 
Arguments that such economies serve the purposes of the ruling class or the 
state, or that the purpose of the economy is to feed, employ or enrich the 
population, do not undermine the argument that the economy as a whole has no 
purpose in an instrumental sense. The very principles upon which the system 
operates—private property, free exchange, legitimate profit—do not allow the
12 W.K. Hancock, The British War Economy London: HMSO, 1949. Interestingly, the British felt 
the need to formulate proper legislation permitting the concentration o f emergency powers in die 
central government as they had lost a number of legal actions taken by citizens during and after 
World War I against unreasonable action, see pp. 83-8 for details. Hancock’s comment is telling: 
‘In its organisations for the country’s war effort, the British Government was never hampered by 
the insufficiency of legal powers; but it held these powers subject to good behaviour, as a trust 
bestowed upon it by Parliament and people for a specific purpose within a specific period o f  
emergency.’ Italics added, p. 88.
13 This refers to an absence of a specifically instrumental purpose. Many have argued that the 
purpose of a liberal economy is the impersonal regulation of transactions and others would argue 
that the philosophical justification of freedom is its purpose. For examples of this see: John Stuart 
Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy with Some o f Their Applications to Social Philosophy 
Volumes II and HI of The Collected Works o f John Stuart Mill Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1965, see particularly Books IV and V; Friedrich von Hayek, Law Legislation and Liberty: 
A New Statement o f the Liberal Principles o f Justice and Political Economy Three Volumes, 
London: Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1982, see particularly Volume 1: Rules and Order.
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imposition of an overarching instrumental end. Under conditions of total war, 
states fundamentally reorder their economies to impose an end, that is, to fight 
off a threat.14 In reorienting the economy to serve a purpose a state must 
temporarily suspend the principles and proper functioning of the liberal-capitalist 
system. Such singularity can only be forced under extreme circumstances and the 
conditions will not be tolerated once the objective has been achieved.
A war economy can be thought of as having the following characteristics. 
First, war provides an overwhelming objective for economic activity. Economic 
activity no longer turns on profit and loss but on the requirements for waging and 
winning war as dictated by the state. Second, the threat of war provides a means 
for prioritising economic activity, for example, giving the production of fighter 
planes priority over tractors or railroad carriages over automobiles. Rather than 
taking instructions from profit motive, market signals and price information, 
production priorities are determined by different messages: instructions from the 
centre, material limits of supply and so on. Third, the intentions in the economy 
change at the micro level. At the micro level objectives cease to be about 
profitability or market share but about fulfilment of instructions and state 
requirements.15 Fourth, the war economy establishes quite different rules to 
which the participants must adhere. These changes tend to affect private parties’ 
legal obligations to the state and the like, rather than entailing fundamental shifts 
in forms of ownership, property rights or contractual arrangements. For example, 
certain forms of economic activity previously considered legitimate are 
outlawed, such as black market trade in food, hoarding or trade with certain other 
parties such as the enemy; punishments for transgression can similarly increase 
in severity. Finally, because the war economy is a different framework in which 
economic activity occurs, sociological shifts can be produced by the social 
changes engendered by the transformation. This refers to changes in the social 
and political dimensions of life. These may manifest themselves in morale shifts 
amongst the population, or changes in dietary, political or social expectations. In
14 On this see generally John J. Carson, Manpower for Victory: Total Mobilization for Total War 
New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1943; Burnham P. Beckwith, Total War: The Economic Theory 
o f a War Economy Boston: Meador Publishing Company, 1943; Berenice A Carroll, Design for  
Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich The Hague: Mouton, 1968.
15 While objectives might have changed, firms are still permitted to make a profit or a loss and 
the leniency of states on bankrupt businesses tends not to increase too markedly.
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short, in capitalist states the existence of a war economy is a fundamental but 
temporary break with previous socio-economic structures. This disturbance in 
the economic framework alters the social ground on which the economy is built.
In a liberal-capitalist economy, a condition of ‘war economy’ can be said 
to involve these five changes. But to characterise the Soviet economy as a war 
economy requires a slightly broader categorical schema because of the scale of 
the Soviet economy and the fact that its economy was not a temporary 
transformation of a liberal order. To this end, the concept of ‘war economy’ 
denotes the condition in which a state’s economy has a clear purpose, ordered 
priorities, obvious objectives, particular rules of economic relations which derive 
from the over-riding war purpose and a framework of relations established by 
this specific aim. Most importantly, these conditions should be the norm of 
economic relations and should persist over a period of time. It is the duration and 
permanence of these conditions which clearly differentiates a war economy from 
a liberal capitalist one; the liberal system is marked by the absence of an overt 
instrumental socio-political purpose over the longer-term.
The Soviet economy clearly exhibited these five characteristics. It 
displayed a purposive economic direction, it had clearly established economic 
priorities with visible objectives, rules and frameworks related to the purpose. 
The question then is not whether there was an underlying purpose, but what that 
purpose or purposes might have been. Hohmann argues that the purpose of the 
economy was the building of communism,16 the IMF claims that it was to catch 
up with the West through a ‘dash for growth’,17 and Nove contends that it was to 
legitimate and reinforce CPSU rule.18 These are the three most common views of 
the purpose of economic activity in the USSR. However, they are not mutually 
exclusive interpretations; they fit together if one takes as a unifying purpose the 
victory over the capitalist West through the provision of a superior economic 
form. Thus the ‘war’ of the war economy was the competition for the hearts and 
minds of people. The purpose, in simple terms, was the overtaking of capitalist 
socio-economic development by the Soviet communist model.
16 Hohmann, ‘The Place of Economic Policy Objectives’, p. 55.
17 IMF et al, A Study o f the Soviet Economy Paris: Joint Publication of the IMF, World Bank, 
OECD, EBRD, 1991, Volume 1, p. 8.
18 Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System Third Edition, London: Allen and Unwin, 1986, p. 3.
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This broader aim established the context of these three interpretations of 
purpose set out above: the building of communism; the catch-up with the West; 
and the legitimacy of CPSU rule. Nove writes that the stated aim of the 
leadership was to ‘build communism’ and that this aim ‘legitimates the 
monopoly rule of the CPSU, which claims to lead the people to this objective.’19 
Yet it is wrong to imply that the Soviet state was merely an edifice for the 
maintenance of CPSU power, the vested interests within the CPSU. The beliefs 
of the elites and their actions clearly indicate that CPSU rule was about more 
than simply clinging to power by whatever means necessary. The unifying thread 
which gave the three purposes of the economy greater coherence and helped to 
turn the instrumentalism of the economy into an effective means of state rule was 
the international confrontation with the capitalist West.
4.1.2 International Confrontation and the Soviet War Economy
It is not enough to identify the underlying purpose and then be satisfied 
that the Soviet Union had a war economy. We need to show specifically how the 
international posture of the Soviet Union penetrated the state’s economic 
institutions. There were five central ways in which the Soviet confrontation with 
the capitalist West contributed to the shaping of the economic system: the 
conflict provided a telos; it helped to establish settings and priorities; it provided 
a singularity of purpose; it built structural problems into the system; and it gave a 
concrete grounding for the relationship between legitimacy and ideology which 
facilitated the efficacy of the CPSU’s grip on state power.
19 Nove, The Soviet Economic System, p. 3, italics added. For a recent articulation o f this see N.A. 
Tikhonov, Soviet Economy: Achievements, Problems and Prospects Moscow: Novosti Press 
Agency Publishing House, 1983. For a similar articulation see Tigran Khachaturov, 
‘Introduction’ in Novosti Press Agency, Soviet Economy Today: With Guidelines for the 
Economic and Social Development o f the USSR for 1981-85 and for the Period Ending in 1990 
Moscow and Westport, CT: Novosti Press Agency and Greenwood Press, 1981, pp. 3-16, 
particularly p. 10 and p. 16.
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Telos
Laidi writes that the Cold War was a teleological international system 
which bound peoples’ ideas and states’ interests into an inescapable system of 
meaning. Such a system of meaning was clearly present in the Soviet Umon; 
indeed the project of the Bolshevik revolution had been world-wide revolution, 
that is, a projection of Lai’di-type meaning upon the world.21 The implication of 
Lai'di’s view is that we need to take a step back from the teleological 
implications of the Cold War for the international system, and to address the 
source of that teleology. If the notion of a telos is understood as an endpoint for 
social development which is linked with a specific means for achieving that end, 
then it is clear that the Soviet social system generally, and the economic system 
specifically, were profoundly teleological. The telos of the Soviet economy was 
the provision of a ‘better life’ through the conquering of the capitalist social 
system by a supposedly superior rational planning system which resolved the 
irrationalities of the market process of allocation and accumulation. This end­
point was not merely present at the metaphysical level. The importance of an all 
encompassing political project to the organisation and functioning of the 
economy was clear and most striking in three specific economic areas: the 
decision-making process; the planning mechanism;22 and the price system.23
The Marxist-Leninist disposition of the CPSU made fertile ground for 
principle-driven economic decisions. The telos of war economy gave the Soviet
20 Zaki Laidi, A World Without Meaning: The Crisis o f  Meaning in International Politics 
London: Routledge, 1998, p. 22.
21 Laidi writes that ‘meaning’ involves ‘a triple notion o f foundation, unity and final goal. 
“Foundation” meaning the basic principle on which a collective project depends; “unity” 
meaning that “world images” are collected into a coherent plan of the whole; and “end” or “final 
goal”, meaning projection towards an elsewhere that is deemed to be better.’ Laidi, A World 
Without Meaning, ip. 1.
22 On economic planning see: Nove, The Soviet Economic System, pp. 17-47; Peter Rutland, The 
Myth o f the Plan: Lessons o f Soviet Planning Experience London: Hutchison, 1985, pp. 101-67; 
Abram Bergson, The Economics o f Soviet Planning New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1964; Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, Soviet Economic Planning, 1965-1980 Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1980; and Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and 
Structure Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2001, pp. 89-111.
23 On Soviet pricing mechanisms see Nove, Soviet Economic System, pp. 173-99; Ed A. Hewett, 
Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 1988, pp. 130-5; Janos Komai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy o f
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economy a reasonably coherent framework of social meaning with which it could 
ground policy decisions and economic action. There is a well-worn story which 
illustrates this. A Soviet economist at a conference was overheard saying to a 
colleague ‘when the revolution comes, we will have to keep one capitalist 
country so that we know what level to set prices at.’24
Each of these three systems—decision-making, planning and price— 
clearly required specific decisions based on information about the economy. The 
Soviets fiercely rejected market information systems, thus, information had to be 
derived in different ways. The system which was used essentially meant that both 
macro and micro decisions were based on specific principles rather than other 
more objective measures. At the macro level, each Five Year Plan and its 
mindless optimism was influenced by both the aim to improve the previous 
levels of production and the desire to catch-up and over-take the West in 
production levels.25 For an example from the micro level, the absurdly expensive 
retail food price subsidies had a dual political purpose: to provide basic material 
goods at a very cheap price unlike capitalist states, where the irrationalities of 
the market ruled and the state rarely intervened; and to keep the people 
placated.26 The damaging isolation of the economy from the world markets—the 
prime aim of which was to shield the economy from externally driven price 
fluctuations—is a further example of the impetus that the war economy had on 
economic decisions.27 When a decision was to be taken, the information which 
formed the basis on which it was made was derived from information systems
Communism Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, pp. 146-159; and Alan Abouchar (ed.), The 
Socialist Price Mechanism Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977.
24 This story has been attributed to at least Wladimerz Brusz, Alec Nove, and an anonymous 
Czechoslovak economist; it is most likely apocryphal.
25 On the Five Year Plans see Nove, An Economic History’, and on the Stalinist approach to 
economic development see Robert W. Campbell, The Failure o f  Soviet Economic Planning: 
System, Performance, Reform Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp. 33-48; for 
detail on the pre-World War II plans see R.W. Davies, Mark Harrison, and S.G. Wheatcroft 
(eds.), The Economic Transformation o f the Soviet Union Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993, and from 1965 see Kushnirsky, Soviet Economic Planning.
26 On the retail price subsidies see Marshall I. Goldman, The USSR in Crisis: The Future o f an 
Economic System New York: W.W. Norton, 1983, pp. 66-77; Zhores Medvedev, ‘What Caused 
the Collapse of the USSR’ in International Affairs (Moscow) 44.2,1998, pp. 84-95.
27 On foreign trade and economic relations see Ed A. Hewett, ‘Foreign Economic Relations’ in 
Abram Bergson and Herbert S. Levine (eds.), The Soviet Economy Towards the Year 2000 
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983, pp. 269-310; and Marshall I. Goldman, ‘The Changing 
Role of Raw Material Export and Soviet Foreign Trade’ in Joint Economic Committee, Congress 
of the United States, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change Washington DC: USGPO, 1979, 
Volume l,pp. 177-95.
124
characterised by principle and value-driven processes and not information 
reflecting accurate measures of social need, cost or scarcity. The confrontation 
with the West established parameters in which these principles could have a 
meaningful impact on decision-making. The underlying telos played a clear 
functional role in the Soviet economy.
Related to this functional role, Burks writes that the Soviet system needed 
a supernal mission to hold it together. Although he does not explain why this 
should be the case, he claims that:
[t]o operate successfully, a polity o f this nature must be charged with an
overriding objective such as the need to manage a world revolution, build
socialism in one country, or repulse the invasion o f an overpowering 
28hereditary enemy.
He implies that there was a need for some sort of emergency sociological ‘glue’ 
to keep the political-economic system working, and, to an extent he is right. 
However, he is wrong to spread the ‘objectives’ so widely and to overlook the 
broader social framework which gave each of the points he draws out salience; 
that is, the confrontation with the capitalist West. The international hostility of 
the struggle between economic systems established the context for claims about 
socialism in one country, the defeat of fascism, the promotion of world 
revolution, and the overtaking of capitalism. The immediate challenges meant 
that this larger context was able to have a firm and coherent purchase on the 
minds of the elite and helped these ideas to resonate with the society at large. In 
sum, the international confrontation provided a telos to a war economy system. It 
gave a sharper edge—in both the narrow geopolitical sense, but also in the 
broader socio-economic system sense—to the invocation to ‘build communism’. 
The political economy was given a purpose, a direction to head towards and a 
framework with which principle could be translated into specific economic 
decisions.
The telos of socio-systemic competition found fertile ground in the Soviet 
political system of ‘theorised’ Marxism-Leninism. The competition penetrated 
the economy through the provision of specific patterns of planning and price 
systems and provided a broader sociological bonding mechanism which, in
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holding the system together, helped to strengthen state power. The telos suffused 
the system, helped to give it a coherent framework and was central to prescribing 
the clear limits and boundaries of acceptable political discourse and decisions.
Priorities
Beyond the context of telos, the confrontation with the West was a 
central touchstone for planners and decision-makers who established the settings 
and priorities of the economic system. Under Stalin, the Soviets established an 
economic system predicated on extensive growth with a specific focus on heavy 
industry and military production.29 While Khrushchev and Brezhnev made 
repeated declarations to move priorities away from Type A production,30 in 
terms of the allocation of resources, investment and manpower, heavy industry 
continued to predominate.31
Castells notes that the Soviet economy had a logic of ‘cascading 
priorities’ which made economic development so successful in its first twenty 
years. These prioritised tiers were: 1) agriculture had to feed the cities and labour 
had to move to industry; 2) consumer goods had to concede to capital goods 
(type A); 3) heavy industry had to be subordinate to military requirements which 
were, he argues, the cornerstone of the system.32 Castells’s characterisation is a 
useful one, as it focuses on the political nature of the priorities of the economy 
and hence on the political moulding of economic structures. However, there is an 
underlying one-dimensional military imperative driving Castells’s cascade of 
tiers. According to his logic, military pre-dominance derived from some 
unidentified imperative of the system which might have been realist-geopolitical, 
revolutionary-internationalist or some combination of the two. If  one puts the
28 Burks, ‘The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union’, p. 149.
29 On the Stalinist basis of the economic system see Nove, An Economic History, pp. 159-225; 
Alex F. Dowlah and John E. Elliott, The Life and Times o f Soviet Socialism Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1997, pp. 67-103; and on the prioritisation of these elements leading to the 
singularisation of production see Goldman, The USSR in Crisis, pp. 47-62.
30 This was the Soviet notation for heavy-capital intensive production, as opposed to Type B 
which referred to light industry production such as consumer goods.
31 On this see Dowlah and Elliott, The Life and Times o f Soviet Socialism, pp. 126-31; and 
Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, pp. 227-38.
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conquering of capitalism, in both the military and socio-economic sense, as the 
cornerstone of Castells’ schema, then the logic of the system is located in a 
dynamic historical-political context. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of 
the international stance of the Soviet regime to its own macro-priorities and its 
economic structures.
The broader set of priorities established a clear focus with which to 
determine particular economic settings. For example, Lavigne argues that 
decisions on economic settings, plans and the like derived from five priorities: 
investment over consumption; industry over other branches; heavy industry over 
other industry; productive over non-productive; and capitalist encirclement 
leading to war preparation and the dominance of military industrial production. 
As Nove writes, ‘investment decisions [became] a function of politically 
determined priorities and their material-balance logic.’34 The political nature of 
the economic decision-making process required a political framework. 
International confrontation with the West provided this backstop and the 
economic context of a higher order which shaped the nature of such decisions. 
The ordering of the priorities of the economy derived from the broader context 
which, in turn, established a framework that helped to produce specific decisions 
such as plan calculations, price setting, and the allocation of investment. The 
internationalised nature of the economic order—resulting from the international 
confrontation—helped to shape the actual form and running of the economy, 
though, of course, it was not the only consideration in the decision-makers’ 
minds.35
32 Manuel Castells, Information Age: Economy, Society, Culture. Volume 3. End o f Millennium 
Oxford: Blackwells, 1998, p. 14.
33 Lavigne, The Economic Transition, p. 50
34 Nove, The Soviet Economic System, p. 145.
35 There was a host of other considerations such as short-term party politicking, and so on, but the 
international confrontation set limits and parameters for action.
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Telos, Singularity and its Problems
Above all, a war economy must have a clear and identifiable overarching 
purpose. The purposiveness of the macro-economic system, despite its chaotic 
micro-manifestations, clearly distinguished the Soviet system from a traditional 
liberal-capitalist one. The imposition of a singular and politically defined 
purpose on an economy and society was to have unforeseen consequences. 
Specifically, the playing out of the telos in a highly singular fashion had two 
significant implications: singularity built in specific problems and left them 
uncorrected; and singularity encouraged a systemic reliance on coherence and 
unity which prevented problems from being acknowledged and made the system 
rigid.
The Soviet economy had an overarching singular purpose: to build 
communism through a ‘historically superior’ form of production and so provide a 
qualitatively and quantitatively better life for the Soviet people than that 
provided in the West. The means the regime chose to fulfil this purpose had a 
number of effects such as the maintenance of power by the CPSU, corruption, 
and military predominance. However, the most obvious manifestation of the 
singularity of purpose was the establishment of a cascading set of priorities. The 
nature of these priorities built the problems of the hypertrophic system into its 
foundations. Writing on the system’s economic decline prior to its collapse, 
Ellman and Kontorovitch rightly point out: ‘The ultimate causes of the slow­
down are all rooted in the fundamental characteristics of the Soviet system.’36 
Like many analysts, they argue that the larger structural problems of the Soviet 
economy were an inevitable product of the particular nature of Soviet economic 
development and that these problems were thrown into stark relief in the context 
of a far more robust global capitalist economy.37 The singular purpose drove an
36 Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovitch, ‘Overview’ in Michael Ellman and Vladimir 
Kontorovitch (eds.), The Disintegration o f the Soviet Economic System London: Routledge, 1992, 
pp. 1-39; p. 13.
Some authors who note these fundamental problems of the economy include: Goldman, USSR 
in Crisis; Vladimir Kontorovitch, ‘The Current State of the Soviet Economy: Deepening Crisis or 
Recovery?’ in Alexander Shtromas and Morton A. Kaplan (eds.) The Soviet Union and the 
Challenge o f the Future. Volume 2: Economy and Society New York: Paragon and PWPA, 1989, 
pp. 8-30; Sei Fujita, The Soviet Economy as a Social Experiment: Lessons from the Twentieth
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economic strategy that had profound problems at its base. These problems were 
exacerbated by the relative nature of the purpose. The economy and society 
could only make sense in an international relational fashion, and, as history has 
shown, the dynamic nature of capitalism and the static development of the Soviet 
war economy made the structural limitations of Soviet economy glaringly 
obvious.38
The Soviet system was a tightly bound and coherent system. Its power 
and strength relied on a logic of unity. Some have used the metaphor of ‘USSR 
Inc.’ to convey the unity of the system.39 This is useful in that it portrays the 
centralisation of the system and the fact that the CPSU ran the economy virtually 
in toto, but it does not convey the rigidity of the system. The Soviet economy 
had a set of hierarchical elements in which ‘the sum of the parts makes up an 
integral whole.’40 Furthermore, the system could not cope with economic 
relationships and institutions that were inimical to it, such as market exchanges, 
or a free press.
The rapid unravelling of the system in the late Gorbachev period 
illustrated the reliance of the system on a singular logic, as well as demonstrating 
that the leadership clearly did not understand how tightly bound the socio­
economic system was. As Yuri Orlov, writing in the New York Times in 1991, 
argues:
Gorbachev understood nothing when he began.... All he knew was that 
socialism must be improved. His idea was simple, and close to Western 
thinking: if  you take socialism and add democracy and free speech, all will 
be well. But what he discovered was that the system designed by Lenin 
was such that once you pulled out one brick, the whole thing fell apart.
Century Osaka: Osaka University of Economics and Law Press, 1999; William Easterly and 
Stanley Fischer, The Soviet Economic Decline: Historical and Republican Data Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau for Economic Research, Working Paper 4735, 1994; Padma Desai, The Soviet 
Economy: Problems and Prospects Oxford: Blackwell, 1987; Gin: Ofer, Soviet Economic 
Growth: 1928-1985 Los Angeles: RAND/UCLA Centre for the Study o f Soviet International 
Behaviour, 1988.
38 On the relative nature of the problems see Ellman and Kontorovitch (eds.), The Disintegration 
o f the Soviet Economic System; Komai, The Socialist System, particularly Chapter 16 and 
Goldman, USSR in Crisis. He portrays this well: ‘As long as Soviet citizens look only to their 
past, they have plenty to be grateful for. However, if they look ahead or even sideways to 
Western Europe or even Asia, then there is likely to be considerable resentment and bitterness.’
p. 100.
Trevor Buck and John Cole, Modem Soviet Economic Performance Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987, pp. 1-7; Nove, Economic System, pp. 235-7
40 Komai, The Socialist System, p. 366.
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N ow  he’s trying to push the brick back in. This is the farce and the 
tragedy.41
The party-state-economy triad was a rigid structure. It was a tightly bound inter­
locking set of institutions, but one that could not be changed in any profound 
sense, neither in principle, structure nor values. This rigidity was a part of the 
foundation stone of the Soviet system and derived directly from the state’s 
Stalinist footing. It is important to stress that the war economy was not the sole 
cause, but a contributing factor to this unrecognised built-in obsolescence and 
rigidity.
As economies develop and industrialise they become more complex. 
Elements of the system can develop dynamics of their own which are related to, 
but independent from, the underlying structures of the economy. This process 
can produce what may be called the problems of permanence. In a war economy, 
such developments can seriously undermine the system, both in terms of 
economic function and socio-political rule. The problems of permanence had, in 
the USSR, two major implications. For the USSR, the success of development in 
areas such as education and social welfare meant that there were sociological 
changes in societal expectations and demands with which the state could not 
cope. In a more typical war economy situation, that is, one of limited duration, 
the objectives remain clear and focused. In the Soviet instance, as time went on, 
the objectives of an economy structured around goals and objectives began to be 
unclear both to society at large, as well as to the elites. The goal became 
perpetually deferred to the point where no one, not even the elites, truly believed 
it would be achieved. Related to this was the basic problem of morale in which a 
population and state reared in a system defined by a clear purpose loses its way 
as the purposiveness seeps away. In short, the singularity of purpose of a war 
economy helped to organise the economy, but it entrenched a static rigidity and 
the problems of permanence into its foundations.
41 Yuri F. Orlov, in the New York Times 10 February 1991, p. A4.
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War Economy and the CPSU
The term war economy has been chosen not simply because of the 
mechanical similarities, but also because of the way it emphasises the penetration 
of international hostility into domestic state structures, and hence into society 
more broadly. Specifically, this characterisation emphasises the centrality of 
international confrontation to the state and therefore, to the CPSU. As Shtromas 
and Kaplan write, ‘its [the CPSU’s] monopoly of power depends on its 
remaining the master of economic enterprise.’42 The CPSU’s claim to legitimate 
power was initially predicated on the Leninist notion that the Bolshevik party 
was the agent of historical forces that were about to engulf the world. Their faith 
was not rewarded and the principles of legitimate rule were reformulated; their 
claim to the right to rule became linked to the ideology of the construction of 
communism within, and the surpassing of capitalism without. The core principle 
of the economic system was that the CPSU must have institutionalised command 
of all major aspects of economic activity.43 Because of this, the economy’s 
control and success were central to the party’s ability to retain its hold on power. 
As Nove writes, ‘the underlying principles on which the economy [was] run 
imply that the Soviet planning apparatus and political leadership claims to know 
what society needs and issues instructions so that the needs of society are met.’44 
The war economy helped the CPSU strike a chord of legitimacy within 
and below. By presenting itself as the defender of the Soviet state and society 
from without as well as the provider of a better life within, the CPSU achieved 
the necessary legitimacy to rule. Most importantly, the international posture gave 
the party an exclusive position of political power and established a limit to 
possible political and economic action within the state. These commitments 
established limits to the politically feasible forms of economic change, structure 
and reform. Market options were out of the question, private ownership and 
profit incentives were unthinkable. Also, it established clear and tangible criteria 
for failure which, by the 1970s began to become clear to certain elements of the
42 Shtromas and Kaplan, ‘Introduction’ in Shtromas and Kaplan (eds.) The Soviet Union and the 
Challenge o f  the Future. Volume 2, pp. xi-xxxiii; p. xv.
43 On this formal principle see Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, p. 101.
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leadership.45 The war economy’s aim was the overtaking of capitalism in a 
political and economic sense, and on both fronts the system manifestly failed 
even to keep up. Ultimately, the confrontation with the capitalist West—which 
became institutionalised in the structures of the economy—helped to translate a 
broader ideological belief system into a specific decision-making framework.
4.2 International Confrontation  and  the Soviet
E conomy
Hewett notes that to distinguish economic systems from one another it 
can be instructive to focus on three elements: the decision-making hierarchy, 
which has the responsibility and power over resource allocation; the information 
system, which provides decision-makers with the data to base actions on; and the 
incentive systems which are deployed by the elite to induce resource allocation 46 
This three part schema will be the framework used to show the ways in which the 
international confrontation shaped the structures of the economic system by 
addressing three questions: how did the confrontation shape the actions of those 
who had power to determine resource allocation; how did it influence their 
information systems; and how was the international confrontation used to 
motivate and induce resource allocation mechanisms.
Before we go further, it is helpful to consider the basic pattern and 
characteristics of the Soviet economic system. The Soviet system of economic 
organisation had five key characteristics: 1) state ownership of virtually all forms 
of production; 2) a highly centralised bureaucratic system co-ordinating 
economic activity; 3) a mono-hierarchical decision-making system; 4) economic 
exchanges that were planned in an imperative style based on physical 
measurement; and 5) an overwhelming predominance of the CPSU over the state
44 Nove, Economic System, p. 9, italics in original.
45 One moment which sparked Gorbachev’s mind on the need for reform was a trip to Canada 
where he saw, first hand, just how far behind the West the USSR was. Mikhail Gorbachev, 
Memoirs London: Bantam, 1997 [orig.1995], pp. 190-2.
46 Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, p. 98. He derives the schema from John Michael 
Montias, The Structure o f Economic Systems New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976.
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and economy.47 These characteristics emphasise the centrality of the party and 
the political-economic nature of the institutional relationships. The Soviet 
economy produced very specific phenomena which derived from these 
institutions and their activities, the most notable of which were: forced growth; 
under-employment; chronic shortages; poor quality and quantity of consumer 
goods; declining growth rates over the long term; low productivity; and an 
inability to adapt technology to the productive process. This has led some to
•  ASdescribe the Soviet economy as having been a shortage economy.
4.2.1 Decision-Making Hierarchy
Within this broader context, how were the actions of the elite influenced 
by the conditions of international confrontation? First, and most obviously, the 
confrontation—particularly in the Cold War phase—established and reinforced 
both the militarisation of the economy and the decision to devote the highest 
levels of investment and the best manpower to the military-industrial sector. As a 
consequence, design and procurement systems which were different from the rest 
of the economy were also produced.49 This ensured that the military got the best 
planners and managers and, as the state was the only customer, the sector had a
47 This view and the following discussion is derived from the following sources on the economic 
system, non-Soviet: Nove, The Soviet Economic System', Ellman and Kontorovitch (eds.), The 
Disintegration o f the Soviet Economic System', IMF et a l . , A Study o f the Soviet Economy Vols. 
1-3; David Lane, Soviet Economy and Society Oxford: Blackwell, 1985; Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the United States, Soviet Economy in a Time o f Change Washington 
DC: USGPO, 1979, Volume 1; Nicolas Spulber, Restructuring the Soviet Economy: In Search o f  
the Market Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991. Soviet sources: Tikhonov, Soviet 
Economy', Novosti Press Agency, Soviet Economy Today, Central Statistical Administration, The 
USSR Economy: A Statistical Abstract London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1957; and Goskomstat, 
Narodnoe Khaziaistvo CCCP za 70 Let Moscow: Finansii i statistika, 1987.
48 The notion of a shortage economy in the Soviet style command economy is best examined by 
Janos Komai, The Economics o f Shortage Two Volumes, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1980. 
While the text is primarily focused on Hungary, the broader theory is relevant to our case.
49 On which see Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline 
Knopf: New York, 1986; on the military dimensions of the economy more generally see Henry S. 
Rowen and Charles Woll (eds.), The Impoverished Superpower: Perestroika and the Soviet 
Military Balance San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990; R.T. Maddock, The Political Economy o f  
Soviet Defence Spending Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988 and Michael Checinski, ‘The Impact of 
Defence Policy Options on the Dynamics of the Soviet Economy’ in Shtromas and Kaplan (eds.), 
The Soviet Union and the Challenge o f the Future. Volume 2, pp. 31-69.
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quite different dynamic.50 Writing in 1953 on the remarkable speed and strength 
of Soviet industrialisation, Kennan illustrates the politicised prioritisation of the 
economy:
had the US. ..  chosen to refrain from the development o f a modem 
transport system, prohibited construction of residential housing beyond a 
limit o f some 5 m2/person, and had left for consumer goods only 28% of 
the total industrial output and had she then devoted to the development o f  
heavy industry and armaments production the resources thus saved—had 
these things been done, I have no doubt that the pace o f industrial 
development in American over that period would have been little short of  
phenomenal.51
The international confrontation ensured that the retardation of the economy was 
perpetuated at the cost of a more balanced form of economic development during 
the Cold War phase.
The second place that the effect of the international confrontation could 
be seen was the decision to introduce and maintain, despite its massive costs, a 
comprehensive social welfare system. If the sole purpose of the economy was a 
purely military or geostrategic confrontation, it would not have made sense to 
maintain such huge subsidies of bread and basic foodstuffs. But the international 
confrontation was a competition between socio-economic systems and hence the 
political options of the decision-makers were dictated by these exigencies. They 
were locked into particular commitments and the provision of economically 
costly social benefits was a necessary dimension of this. The ability to proclaim 
that life was better in the USSR and was constantly improving was central to the 
Soviet state and its international posture.53
50 Nove, The Soviet Economic System, p. 171. The sphere was totally isolated from the rest o f the 
economy. There was no possibility o f ‘spin-offs’ from the system’s sole high-performing sector.
51 George F. Kennan, ‘Discussion’ in Raymond Aron et al., The Soviet Economy: A Discussion 
London: Martin Seeker and Warburg, 1956, pp. 83-6; p. 84.
52 On the scope o f the social benefits enjoyed by Soviet citizens see Tikhonov, Soviet Economy, 
pp. 186-7, though one must be aware of the limitations of both the quality and their availability. 
For a western description of trends in education and healthcare from 1950 onwards see Michael 
Ryan and Richard Prentice, Social Trends in the Soviet Union from 1950 Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1987, pp. 71-97.
53 This system was also left untouched for fear of arousing popular discontent, but this placation 
was not the initial reason for the system’s introduction.
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The confrontation ensured that the remains of markets in official 
economic exchange were crushed.54 The party could not countenance the 
introduction of procedures that were antithetical both to the principles which had 
put the economy on a war footing and to the systems of resource allocation 
which ensured the coherence of the system over which they were masters. Komai 
notes that the economic system produced what he calls a ‘soft budget constraint’ 
in micro-economic activity.55 That is, a situation in which firms have no direct 
pressure to curb spending within their enterprise. If a firm were to overshoot its 
allotted budget, the firm knew that it could rely on easy subsidies, generous tax 
breaks, and soft credit and pricing from the state to get it out of trouble. In short, 
for managers there was no fear, in budgetary terms, to discipline their action. The 
soft budget constraint was a direct product of the CPSU’s economic system. The 
existing political commitments meant that the CPSU’s hostility towards market 
principles of fiscal discipline and the possibility of enterprise failure could not be 
compromised for fear of being seen as losing the argument to the West and, more 
directly, losing its own position of power and influence.
The impact of the international confrontation on Soviet decision-makers 
can also be seen in their manipulation of statistics. Soviet statistics were 
notoriously unreliable; Western analysts spent countless years trying to model 
the economy so as to understand the exact nature of the Soviet economic 
system.56 Soviet statistics were plainly uninformative, both for the Western 
student and for the Soviet planner. There were three reasons for this. First, the 
statistics system was not revealed to the outside world and was distinct from
54 Market exchanges clearly existed in the system, the na levo black market and the co-operative 
food markets being the most obvious, see generally Gregory Grossman, ‘The “Second Economy” 
of the USSR’ in Problems o f Communism 26, Sept-Oct 1977, pp. 25-40; and F.J.M. Feldbragge, 
‘Government and the Shadow Economy in the Soviet Union’ in Soviet Studies 36.4, 1984, 
pp. 528-43.
Komai, The Socialist System, pp. 140-49; for a more detailed articulation see Janos Komai, 
‘The Soft Budget Constraint’ in Kyklos: Internationale Zeitschrift fur Sozialwissenschaften 39.1, 
1986, pp. 3-30, and Komai, Economics o f Shortage.
56 Some of the better examples are: Abram Bergson, The Real National Income o f Soviet Russia 
Since 1928 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961; Abram Bergson, Productivity and 
the Socialist System: The USSR and the West Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978; 
Michael Ellman, ‘Did Soviet Economic Growth End in 1978?’ in Jan F. Drewnowski (ed.), Crisis 
in the East European Economy: The Spread of the Polish Disease London: Croom Held, 1982, 
pp. 131-42; Richard Erwin, ‘The Soviet Statistical Debate: Khanin versus TsSU’ in Rowen and 
Woll (eds.), The Impoverished Superpower, pp. 63-92; and Mark Harrison, ‘Soviet Economic 
Growth Since 1928: The Alternative Statistics of G.I. Khanin’ in Europe/Asia Studies 45.1, 1993, 
pp. 141-67.
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more traditional Western methods. Second, the statistics were greatly 
exaggerated and manipulated for political reasons. Third, they were used to hide 
subsidies and the like and also obscured from view non-state economic 
exchanges such as the black market and barter. Part of the reason for this 
obfuscation was the role that statistics played in the socio-systemic competition; 
statistics functioned as a billboard of the success or failure of the economy. As a 
result, they were subject to great exaggeration and inaccuracy. As highlighted by 
Harrison, such exaggeration and dubious statistics lulled the regime into a false 
sense of complacency regarding the success and long-term durability of the 
system.57
The war economy reinforced the logic of the system in the minds of the 
decision-makers and it penetrated the formulation of plans and plan processes. It 
did so in the sense that the planners were constantly looking over their shoulders, 
determining what to do based on perceptions of what needed to be done vis-a-vis 
the capitalist economies. That is not to say that they were literally comparing 
figures on a monthly or daily basis. Rather, they were basing their plans on a 
broader goal that was inherently linked to progress beyond their control, that is, 
the socio-economic success of the capitalist world. One way of thinking of this is 
to conceive of the Soviet party-state as a ‘mobilisation regime* in which the 
confrontation with the capitalist West provided a central disciplining measure for 
mobilisation.58
In summary then, the leadership’s decision-making actions were clearly 
shaped by the international confrontation. The confrontation influenced decisions 
on the form of the economy, and reinforced decisions about its shape; it fuelled 
an ignorance of the system and helped to ward off market systems of exchange. 
As well as being a competitive back-drop for political and intellectual 
manoeuvring, the international confrontation was an element of the economy’s 
decision-making structures.
57 Harrison, ‘Soviet Economic Growth’, p. 143.
58 See Hohmann, ‘The Place of Economic Policy Objectives on the List of Soviet Political 
Priorities’.
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4.2.2 Information Systems
An economic system is a series of institutions, principles and 
mechanisms which ensure the orderly allocation of resources amongst a 
population. The mechanisms which transmit information through the system are 
vital to the form of its development and influence the distribution of resources. 
The elements of information transmission—the nature of its deployment, the 
mechanisms of its transfer and its accessibility and transparency—are central to 
the formation and development of an economic system. In the Soviet Union, one 
might have thought that the quality of information flows would be good; because 
the party had control of the state, its coercive and extractive arms could have 
ensured that all relevant information would be passed upward. This did not 
happen. The CPSU always had an uncomfortable relationship with the movement 
of information. From its control of the press to its jamming of foreign radio 
stations, the flow of ideas and data was something that always made the CPSU 
uneasy. We shall consider two aspects of the way in which the international 
confrontation influenced the movement of information in the Soviet economy: 
prices and knowledge. In a market system, price plays a crucial informational 
role in the struggle for resources. In the Soviet system, prices had no 
informational content, yet they did serve a clear set of purposes.59 Second, we 
will consider how the conflict influenced the CPSU’s knowledge of the 
economy, how the economy functioned and what its strengths and weaknesses 
were.
The Price Mechanism
Prices are a good example of the informational problems of the Soviet 
system. The price mechanism hindered the short-term functioning of the 
economy and also troubled the longer-term development of structures of 
information flows that were necessary for coping with the changing 
circumstances of the system. Primarily, prices were intended to support the
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planning mechanism. Despite the centralisation of the system, they were very 
poorly connected throughout the economy. There were four sorts of Soviet 
prices: those used for exchanges between production units; those used in 
agriculture; those used in foreign trade; and those used in retail exchanges.60 In 
the early Stalin period, prices relied purely on planner direction which was an 
overt rejection of the Taw of value’ inherent in market prices. The limits of this 
system quickly became apparent and the price system developed into a Taw of 
value in transformed form’, that is, a sort of cost-accounting.61 Like most 
elements of the Soviet economy, the model established under Stalin became the 
basis for the pricing system. Prices, apart from foreign trade,62 were developed 
along a cost plus basis, that is, a price represented the nominal ‘cost’ plus a 
percentage on capital.
The CPSU had placed universal provision of basic goods at negligible 
cost at the centre of its political programme.63 This was to be achieved by 
banishing the market and fixing prices through subsidies and inducements for 
producers. Thus, prices were determined by political principle. Komai identifies 
three such principles: prices should reflect ‘socially necessary’ costs, so aspects 
of production cost such as land, rent and capital were not considered part of the 
socially necessary cost; prices should be the means by which producers are 
encouraged to perform; and prices should be stable.64 These principles were not 
the only ones, there were other principles at work. It was apparent that prices 
served to try to even out income disparities and to provide all with the basic 
material necessities of life. Although, in the shortage economy, food may have 
been cheap, it was hard to come by and queuing, hoarding and the na levo black 
market became everyday features of life. Furthermore, there was a fiercely anti­
market principle at work—labour, capital and the like could not be permitted into
59 IMF et al., A Study o f the Soviet Economy, Vol. 1, pp. 9-10; Spulber, Restructuring the Soviet 
Economy, pp. 41-7; Nove, The Soviet Economic System, pp. 173-87.
60 Nove, The Soviet Economic System, pp. 173-5; Gregory and Stuart, Russian and Soviet 
Economic Performance, pp. 124-9; and Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, pp. 130-1.
61 Nove, Soviet Economic System, pp. 175-86; Nicolas Spulber, The Soviet Economy: Structure, 
Principle, Problems Revised Edition, New York: W.W. Norton, 1969, pp. 36-42.
62 On foreign trade prices see Goldman, The USSR in Crisis, pp. 146-50; Nove, Soviet Economic 
System, pp. 280-5.
This must be understood in a larger sense. The Stalinist institutions did not reflect, in an 
immediate sense, this goal, but die aim was of absolute centrality to the CPSU’s claim to mle.
64 Komai, The Socialist System, p. 150.
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the pricing mechanism as it was not ideologically or politically acceptable so to 
do. Prices, therefore, reflected ‘cost’ which, due to Soviet dictates, in turn 
reflected neither the utility nor the scarcity of goods and thus had no indicative 
role to encourage the production of goods. As Nove says ‘prices of this type 
cannot serve as any sort of guide as to the needs of society or of the customer, 
that is, as to a social utility howsoever defined.’65
Prices ultimately reflected the political priorities of the party and 
bureaucratic fudging. Buck and Cole show that prices of the Soviet type have 
two benefits: first they more easily facilitate the aggregation of outputs in the 
gross-output measure planning system; and second, they can more easily achieve 
social goals.66 The IMF notes that the information content of prices was actively 
suppressed as ‘the planners were intent on maintaining the stability both of 
producer prices, to facilitate the planning process, and of retail prices.*67 Soviet 
prices were, in this sense, arbitrary. For the CPSU, it was a perfectly 
reasonable—if instrumental—system. Market prices displayed an exuberance 
which could lead to poverty, famine and deprivation. The CPSU rightly 
recognised that the market was volatile no matter what goods were being traded; 
it could be as unpredictable with bread as it was with bowler hats.
This highly politicised pricing system became hugely expensive in terms 
of time, material and human resources. For example, in 1980, the annual 
subsidies paid to agricultural producers to keep retail prices down was around 35 
billion rubles; indeed, 23 billion went on wheat and dairy alone—the retail price 
of meat was about half the wholesale price paid to the producer.68 Furthermore, it 
had the obvious problem of feeding an ignorance of the workings of the system. 
Such a mechanism did not encourage the passing on of information about 
production conditions up the vertically organised systems of the Soviet economy. 
Despite constant reform efforts to induce information exchange, there were no 
mechanisms to ensure that it occurred in an effective manner.69
The price system fuelled serious production problems. In capitalist states, 
production decisions are overwhelmingly economic decisions based on
65 Nove, The Soviet Economic System, p. 176.
66 Buck and Cole, Modem Soviet Economic Performance, p. 14.
67 IMF et al., A Study o f the Soviet Economy, Vol. 1, p. 9.
68 Goldman, The USSR in Crisis, p. 77.
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production information largely drawn from prices (costs, demand, profitability 
etc.). The informational content of price is extremely important as it is a concrete 
base on which decisions can be made. In the USSR, there was no concrete 
economic information of the kind which prices represent. Rather, the information 
upon which economic decisions were made was political. In any economic 
system a point of reference is necessary for decisions; in the USSR the buck 
stopped with political priorities. It was at the point of political priorities and their 
calculation that the international confrontation and its consequent war economy 
inflicted itself on the day-to-day life of Soviet citizens and the longer-term 
development of the system.
In simple terms, the pricing mechanism was a political tool and not an 
economic mechanism. This political tool reflected three inter-related dimensions: 
short-term party political decisions; longer-term political commitments; and the 
international confrontation’s war economy which reinforced these other two 
dimensions. Historically, the ideology and legitimacy of the party hinged on the 
commitment to the principles which underpinned the confrontation with the 
West. Over time, the conflict built into the system specific limitations to political 
action. For example, Gorbachev had long wanted to introduce more radical price 
reform, but he was prevented from doing so, knowing full well what the reaction 
from the population would be. When eventually prices were raised in April 1990, 
the long-held fears of instability were realised.70 The international confrontation 
influenced the price mechanism in the following ways: it was partly responsible 
for the introduction of the system; it established the base of the mechanism due 
to its hostility to market principles and thus built into the system some inherent 
limitations; and the ideological competition prevented the acceptance of other 
ways of doing things as, politically speaking, one could not accept the 
opponent’s method. Also, in a more direct sense, there was a fear that market- 
type reforms would contaminate the system and structure and thus threaten the 
party’s position of power. So the international confrontation can be said to have 
been an important contributory factor in the structure of the price mechanism and 
the playing out of the priorities it induced.
69 Hewett, Reforming the Soviet System, p. 137.
70 Nove, An Economic History, pp. 412-3. The consequences of this action were exacerbated by a 
rise which was too great and broader economic conditions which were not supportive.
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Structural Knowledge
The Soviet leadership did not understand how their economy
71 •functioned. It is safe to say that no one really knew, in the sort of detail 
available to liberal-capitalist states, how the economy functioned, and what its 
performance levels truly were. The system was highly centralised in a mono- 
hierarchical sense, and its structures of economic production were monolithic to 
say the least. The desire to maintain centralised control over such a 
geographically huge and economically diverse country in the CPSU’s dictatorial 
style induced problems of information processing. In the specific instance of 
industrial management, it became clear that ‘in most instances, the centre does 
not know just what it is that needs doing, in disaggregated detail, while the 
management in its situation cannot know what it is that society needs unless the
79centre informs it.’ In commenting on past reforms, Hewett notes that 
‘[ijnattention to the logic of the system is apparently what has contributed to the 
failure of so many past efforts at reform in the Soviet Union as well as in Eastern 
Europe.*73
The conflict with the West clearly did not produce the ignorance of the 
system. However, the internal conditions which it induced contributed in two 
ways to the structural poverty of knowledge. First, as mentioned above, the 
internal Soviet means for measuring the economy were warped by international 
confrontation conditions.74 The Central Statistics Directorate’s (TsSU) 
obfuscations, and the lack of information carried in prices, were two examples of 
informational ignorance heavily affected by the conflict and its political 
implications. As a result of this, the centre used a range of non-price and non- 
aggregate statistical methods to try to glean information. These included the 
planning commission, direct bureaucratic information, operative horizontal
71 For a polemic on Soviet Union’s ‘elaborate mechanisms of deception’ see Wisla Suraska, How 
the Soviet Union Disappeared: An Essay on the Causes o f Dissolution Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1998.
72 Nove, The Soviet Economic System, p. 76.
73 Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, p. 96.
74 Harrison, ‘Soviet Economic Growth’.
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information, signals of shortage and surplus from the economy at large and 
signals of catastrophe.75 Second, related to this was the ideologically blinkered 
view of productive and non-productive contributions to the system. The Soviets 
made a clear distinction between measures of productive contribution and non­
productive contribution. A good example of this was the railway signal man who 
was deemed to be productive when he switched tracks to allow a freight train 
carrying industrial produce down the line, but was deemed to be non-productive 
when the same action allowed a passenger train to pass by.
4.2.3 Incentives
The problems of adequately motivating workers and managers in the 
Soviet economy is well known.76 The concern here is the extent to which the 
Soviet international confrontation influenced the incentive mechanisms of the 
CPSU. Like other aspects of the political-economic system, the conflict 
contributed to, but did not determine, the incentives of the system. When 
injecting incentives into an economic system, states generally have two distinct 
forms of policy choice: the material and the moral. With the former, the CPSU 
used wages, rewards, bonuses, promotion and other traditional devices to induce 
appropriate action.77 Also, it was notorious for using other less traditional 
methods to ensure that its economic ideas were carried out; the forcible 
collectivisation of agricultural production being an infamous example. The 
moral form of incentives in the Soviet Union was a set of exhortations issued via 
propaganda, party offices and local political organisations; it was in this arena 
that the international confrontation was most evident.
There are two related senses in which the conflict shaped this latter moral 
dimension of the incentive system. First, it provided a meaningful context for the
75 Komai, The Socialist System, pp. 156-7.
76 Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, pp. 198-230; Burks, ‘The Coming Crisis in the Soviet 
Union’; and Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson (eds.), The Soviet Worker: From Lenin to 
Andropov Second Edition, London: Macmillan, 1984.
77 For wages, bonuses and other traditional methods see David Lane, Labour and Employment in 
the USSR Brighton: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1986; Nove, The Soviet Economic System, pp. 201- 
22.
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justification of the privations of the Soviet system. The state openly demanded 
hard work from the citizens and denied them the deserved rewards for this work. 
The ‘Stakhanovite movement’ of the thirties is a well-known example of this, but 
it was present in greater and lesser forms across the Soviet economy.79 The 
international confrontation provided the crucial backdrop which made the call for 
discipline and motivation effective. For it was the war to create communism 
within, combined with the perception of encirclement by hostile capitalist 
powers, that gave this call meaning in people’s minds. It gave an extra impetus 
for action so that coercion was not the only motivating force. The state further 
indicated that things were better in the USSR than in the West, for example, by 
highlighting racial segregation in the southern states in the USA, or 
unemployment in Britain. While these may not have been openly believed by the 
entire population, it established a clear pattern of incentives which helped to 
move the economy and to develop it in a fashion that, in the long term, was 
unsustainable. The second, and related, dimension to this moral incentive was the 
simple idea that things would get better. The promise of communism and mature 
socialism was long held out to the Soviet citizens. The establishment of an 
incentive to work and to sacrifice for a specific end provided the citizenry and 
the elite with a coherent means to measure the ‘achievements’ of the state. In 
simple terms, it built into people’s lives, at all levels of society, an expectation of 
sorts that the state would deliver a particular way of life. In doing so, it also 
provided a personal edge to the sense of failure when the state did not live up to 
the ideological commitments which lay at its centre.
Unbeknownst to the leadership, the Soviet Union’s international relations 
had internationalised its structures of power such that any clear change in 
international posture was inevitably going to destabilise its domestic institutions. 
In the context of an already troubled economy and society, the implications of 
such a dual crisis were to be dire. Thus far we have established that the 
international confrontation with the capitalist West penetrated the Soviet 
economy. This penetration was such that it is reasonable to claim that the
78 R.W. Davies, The Soviet Offensive: The Collectivisation o f Soviet Agriculture, 1929-30 
London: Macmillan, 1980.
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international confrontation was, in a number of ways, embedded in the economic 
structures of the war economy.
4.3 Fissures and  the International Confrontation
The Soviet economy had many structural weaknesses and inherent 
deficiencies. This final section will explore the way in which the conditions of 
the war economy generally, and the international confrontation specifically, 
contributed to the structural fissures of the Soviet economic system. Fissures are 
simply lines of weakness which develop over time. They may not be the break­
points or fault-lines of system collapse, but are inherent problems. The purpose 
here is not to examine these fissures in detail, but to consider the extent to which 
the war economy and the confrontation contributed to these fissures, and the 
extent to which these drove other broader structural problems of the party-state- 
economy. We shall focus on four significant fissures to which the conflict was 
central: the structural limits of economic development; the ideological 
vulnerability to poor performance; the rigidity of a unified system; and the 
blindness to longer-term problems induced by relative success in the short-term.
4.3.1 Structural Limits
Many scholars believe that the Soviet economy was always doomed to 
fail both in its aim to surpass capitalism and in absolute terms. With the benefit 
of hindsight, this judgement seems fair. Yet, to understand the nature of the 
collapse of the Soviet economy, one must put its structural shortcomings in the 
context of the political project which gave rise to the peculiar mechanisms of the 
Soviet command system. The first task then is to set out the structural 
weaknesses of the economy. From there we can judge the role of the war 
economy in contributing to and reinforcing these underlying limits.
79 For a description of this and its personal implications see Anatoly Kravchenko, I  Chose 
Freedom: The Personal and Political Life o f a Soviet Official London: Robert Hale, 1947, 
pp. 187-91.
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After its initial development, from 1928-1949, the Soviet economy 
settled into a pattern of long-term deterioration. This is most evident in large 
scale indicators such as GNP or the Soviet statistic of NMP.80 While the extent of 
growth and size of the decline vary between models, all measures of the Soviet 
economy, including the Soviet one, concluded that, from the mid-1950s, a steady 
and precipitous decline in economic performance was observable, as the 
following table illustrates:
Various Estimates of Soviet National Product, 1950-1989
Figures are an average growth rate over the period as an annual percentage
Period IMF81 a Levine8^ TsSU6' CIA84 Khanin
1950-60 — — 10.2 5.2 7.2
1960-65 6.5 5 6.5 4.8 4.4
1965-70 7.8 5.2 7.7 4.9 4.1
1970-75 5.6 3.7 5.7 3.0 3.2
1975-80 4.3 2.7 4.2 1.9 1.0
1980-85 3.2 — 3.5 1.8 0.6
1985-89 2.7 - 3.0 b 2.7 b 2.0 b
Notes:
a IMF measures follow 1961-65,1966-70 ... pattern. 
b 1985-87.
80 NMP refers to National Material Product, the official Soviet equivalent to gross domestic 
product. See Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy, p. 69; Stanley Fisher, 'Russia and the 
Soviet Union Then and Now’ in Olivier Jean Blanchard, Kenneth A. Frout and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
(eds.), The Transition in Eastern Europe: Volume 1, Country Studies Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press and National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994, pp. 221-57; pp. 227-230; 
Easterly and Fischer, The Soviet Economic Decline, pp. 4-8; Desai, The Soviet Economy pp. 8 -  
11; Ofer, Soviet Economic Growth, pp. 14-22; Anders Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for 
Economic Reform Second Edition, London: Pinter, 1991, pp. 17-21; Harrison, ‘Soviet Economic 
Growth Since 1928’, pp. 155-8; Herbert S. Levine, ‘Possible Causes o f the Deterioration of 
Soviet Productivity Growth in the Period 1976-80’, pp. 153-68, in Joint Economic Committee, 
Congress of the United States, Soviet Economy in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects 
Washington DC: USGPO, 1983, Volume 1, p.154.
81 IMF et al., A Study o f the Soviet Economy, Vol. 1, p. 84.
82 Herbert S. Levine, ‘Possible Causes of the Deterioration of Soviet Productivity Growth in the 
Period 1976-80’, p. 154.
83 From Harrison, ‘Soviet Economic Growth Since 1928’, pp 155-8; cited also in Aslund, 
Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform, p. 17.
84 CIA, Handbook o f Economic Statistics, 1990 Washington, DC: USGPO, 1990, p. 64.
85 Harrison, ‘Soviet Economic Growth Since 1928’, p. 146. Khanin was a Soviet economist who 
devised an alternative modelling scheme for calculating Soviet economic growth levels.
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There is a range of reasons posited for this decline. Levine argues that it 
was due to a decreasing return on capital, a low elasticity in the substitution of
or #
capital for labour and the low rate of the introduction of new technology. This 
view is echoed by Easterly and Fisher who reiterate the claim that the decline 
was the result of the low elasticity of substitution between capital and labour, but 
they emphasise this phenomenon in the context of extensive growth. Others 
stress the reliance on extensive growth where enterprises were failing to maintain 
productivity,88 an inability to incorporate technology, the defence burden, the 
lack of incentives, and demoralisation.89 Aganbegyan maintains that decline was 
due to the exhaustion of the people and technological backwardness.90 Burks 
emphasises the reliance on extensive growth, the increasing complexity of the 
economy and the problem of a lack of technological innovation.91 Ellman and 
Kontorovitch contend that the relaxation of discipline, the loss of control due to 
increasing complexity and the depletion of natural resources on which the
09economy was too reliant were to blame. Goldman puts the problem down to an 
inability to adapt to changing economic conditions and an over-reliance on
Q*3
commodities for economic growth. It is clear that there is a general consensus 
that the following were particular problems: an over-reliance on extensive 
growth; a poor rate of technological adoption; the easing of the pressure to 
perform from above; poor worker morale; increasing complexity; and a 
deformation of the economy based on military hypertrophy at the cost of other 
sectors.
The international confrontation played a role in a range of these structural 
problems. The most obvious connection was the militarisation of the economy 
due to the imperatives of the international confrontation, and particularly its 
second phase, the Cold War. Such over-commitment of the economy occurred 
due to the international circumstances of the state. Interestingly, this sector was
86 Herbert S. Levine, ‘Possible Causes of the Deterioration o f Soviet Productivity Growth in the 
Period 1976-80’, p. 154.
87 Easterly and Fischer, The Soviet Economic Decline, p. 23.
88 Desai, The Soviet Economy, pp. 7-60.
89 Ofer, Soviet Economic Growth, pp. 26-7.
90 Abel Aganbegyan, The Challenge: The Economics of Perestroika London: Hutchison, 1988.
91 Burks, ‘The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union’, pp. 116-8.
92 Ellman and Kontorovitch (eds.), The Disintegration of the Soviet System, pp. 10-15, see also 
Kontorovitch, ‘The Current State of the Soviet Economy: Deepening Crisis or Recovery?’.
93 Goldman, USSR in Crisis.
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in some ways a twin economy separate from the rest of the system. Unlike, for 
example, American military procurement systems which are linked to the rest of 
the economy in very obvious ways—such as the use of missile navigation 
systems in commercial airlines—Soviet military production was isolated from 
the rest of the economy. This was the one area in which the Soviets were 
internationally competitive, yet they were not able to derive any direct benefits 
from it for society at large.
The prioritisation of a particular type of industry and of a specific form of 
economic modernisation was a hallmark of the Soviet system and the Soviet 
development model. Debates have centred on whether this was the only path of 
development available to the Bolsheviks, and, while it is not our purpose to 
answer this question decisively, it is clear that there was nothing necessary in 
that choice.94 The prioritisation of heavy industrial development, with a distinct 
emphasis on military production, derived from a range of sources. The decision 
was clearly influenced by the Soviet aim to catch up with and overtake the West 
in terms of productive capacity. But there was more to it than that. The emphasis 
on industrial-military development was a deliberate choice influenced by: 
internal party politics, particularly of Stalin’s manoeuvrings during the ‘New 
Course’ debate, its suitability to a dictatorship, its compatibility with the 
demands of heavy production, the military requirements of the challenging 
period of the 1930s, and the speed with which it could deliver meaningful 
comparative growth. But it was pursued for another reason, its ability to support 
the ideological and material requirements of the systemic competition. The result 
was that the priorities dictated by this ‘catch up’ were in heavy industry 
productive goods at the cost of consumer goods.95 This priority was achieved by 
a method of extensive growth, that is, growth in production was achieved 
primarily through increases in inputs of labour, natural resources and capital and 
not through further increases in productivity.96
The inability to involve adequately technology in production derives from 
the structural characteristics of the economy. There was no incentive to introduce
94 See for example, Alec Nove, Was Stalinism Really Necessary: Some Problems o f Soviet 
Political Economy London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964.
95 For an example of the deformation of consumer goods and the privations of Soviet life 
compared with life in the West, see the table in Appendix II.
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the enterprise level efficiency gains that technology could bring. Incentives were 
plan-fulfilment based, and thus reliant on, quantitative measures of 
productivity.97 Thus technology had to be forced in from the top down, an 
inefficient way to implement change. Furthermore, there was a sense that such 
change was not necessary, particularly given the Brezhnevian stasis in which 
many such ideas were mooted. Linked to this was the increasing complexity of 
the economy as it matured. Growth in complexity was not matched by similar
no
changes m the highly centralised management structures.
The reluctance to move away from the extensive growth/mono- 
hierarchical centralised system led to serious problems. The international 
confrontation reinforced the system’s inherent conservatism, but did not play a 
major role in preventing the state from coming to terms with its problems. 
Finally, worker morale was not directly related to the war economy, but, as time 
wore on, the ability of the conflict to mobilise began to wear thin, particularly 
given detente and the indications that, for Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the victory 
of socialism was not going to come by way of war but by way of the superior 
demonstrative force of socialism. As Dowlah and Elliott write, ‘Soviet 
socialism’s superiority over capitalism now came to be perceived as depending 
on a particular and optimistic pattern and pace of economic performance.’99
Thus the international confrontation played a role in inculcating an 
inherently limited macro-economic strategy which built into the foundations of 
the economy certain inherent weaknesses. It played a role in the undermining of 
Soviet power and, in the context of the claims Khrushchevian claims for the 
Soviet economy, it left the state open to questions about its right to rule.
96 Buck and Cole, Modem Soviet Economic Performance, pp. 139-50.
97 Buck and Cole, Modem Soviet Economic Performance, pp. 18-9.
98 For nine management problems to do with complexity and over centralisation see Nove, The 
Soviet Economic System, pp. 109-10.
99 Dowlah and Elliott, The Life and Times o f Soviet Socialism, p. 139.
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4.3.2 Ideological Vulnerability
One of the most important fissures that led to a sense of illegitimacy both 
inside and outside the ruling elite was that the state was vulnerable to economic 
failure in comparative terms. If the war to produce a better life within and a 
communist victory without was perceived to have been lost, then the justification 
for the party’s monopoly position over the state and economy was open to 
criticism. Thus, the war economy built into the system a precise means by which 
its success or failure could be measured. Success in the conflict was the 
necessary precursor to the party’s position of authority. The CPSU positioned 
itself in an overwhelming position of despotism on the basis of its claim to be the 
sole guiding force capable of achieving the revolutionary aims of Soviet 
socialism. Furthermore, the regime also relied on this sense of a supernal mission 
to ensure internal party coherence and societal acquiescence.
The aims and method of Soviet rule—the subsuming of state and 
economy, the destruction of private property, and the criminalisation of market 
relations in favour of centrally administered ones—were dictated and justified by 
the larger aims of the struggle for communism. Central to the means and aims of 
the Soviet state was the notion that it was going to make life better for its citizens 
and the people of the world in socio-economic terms. The state made no bones 
about the privations necessary to achieve such an aim, and thus the international 
confrontation, particularly in its Cold War phase, became the means by which 
the privations of the Soviet system were justified and which were stoically bome 
by the population. The CPSU may have been cynically trying to fleece the 
economy or merely reinforcing their power, but regardless of their motivation, it 
is the deployment of the justifications which is important. For, at the heart of the 
party-state-economy, there was a flaw—what if the state could not deliver on its 
promises? This flaw is central to the story of the unravelling of Soviet power and 
it is important to be aware of its origins and the role of the international 
confrontation conflict in providing the justification and rhetorical appeal which 
legitimated the CPSU’s claims to power.
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4.3.3 Rigidity and Coherence
The Soviet state was a tightly packed inter-locking network of 
institutions, values and principles. In retrospect, the reliance of the system on the 
necessary affinity of all elements of the system is reasonably clear. This system 
was also shown to have a rigid character; it was inflexible to change and its 
support mechanisms were highly interdependent—they could not cope with 
much alteration to their structures. Within the formal economy, no market 
relations could be introduced because the level of information flow necessary for 
it to function would not be acceptable to the party, to say nothing of their 
ideological hostility towards markets. Likewise, the bureaucracy could not be 
scrutinised to ease corruption for similar informational control reasons. In short, 
the statism mentioned in Chapter Three drove the unity of the system.100 The war 
economy was central to this statism and coherence. The war economy played a 
central role in fusing the party-state-economy together and keeping them in 
mutually reinforcing positions.
There are two important dimensions to this fusion. First, the international 
posture of the Soviet Union helped to ensure that the means by which economic 
relations were mediated were maintained. The centrally organised command 
economy was a very specific form of organisation which could only function in 
one way. The existence of a war economy with a dictatorial party attempting to 
drive the society in a particular direction, ensured an essentially unchangeable 
economic system.101 The mechanisms of planning, transport and communication 
all relied on the political monopoly of the CPSU which, in turn, relied on its 
monopoly of economic power. Second, the singularity of the edifice was 
underlined by the conditions of international confrontation. Singularity refers to 
the devotion of the economy to one form of production and its specific system of 
support. The war economy system meant that heavy industrial production was 
privileged and it built rigidity into the system. The singular mechanisms could
100 See Chapter Three, p. 102.
101 This refers purely to the mechanics of the economy and not to society which had an organic 
and changing sociological aspect. For a similar view see Ljubo SirC, ‘Can the Current Economic 
Problems o f the USSR Be Solved Within the Framework of a Communist System of Economic 
Management?’ in Shtromas and Kaplan (eds.), The Soviet Union and the Challenge o f the 
Future: Volume 2, pp. 206-238.
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not cope with any change without an unravelling of the economic structures of 
the system. For example, if resources were diverted, to the production of high 
quality shoes, there were no mechanisms to ensure that the shoes were not stolen 
and sold on the black market, nor were there means by which quality could be 
ensured due to the fascination with quantitative measures. To change priorities 
not only meant a different product mix but a radical change in the mechanisms of 
economic relations; and this was a change that the Soviet economy could not 
accommodate. The rigid unity of the system was reinforced by the international 
confrontation. Although the international conflict did not alone create the party- 
state-economy, it was crucial to the foundations of that system.
4.3.4 False Sense o f Success *
The Soviet ‘war economy* was predicated on relative achievements. Due 
to this relativism it was deemed successful when it appeared to be doing better 
than the capitalist economies and not when it was either fulfilling its Marxist 
credo of satisfying people’s needs nor, in less ideological terms, adequately 
coping with the demands of the Soviet people. As a result, at three moments— 
each suggested below -the Soviet economy’s relative success made the elite 
blind to some of the fundamental weaknesses outlined above. In this sense, the 
war economy fuelled the ignorance of the system by making the Soviet economy 
appear stronger and more robust than it was.
The most obvious example of this was the dynamism of Soviet economic 
growth during the early 1930s when the capitalist states were still reeling from
1 09the Great Depression. This contributed to the sense in the USSR that their 
system was clearly superior, isolated as it was from the shocks of the capitalist 
system and growing at histprically unprecedented levels. Their basic 
expectations were being fulfilled. This then led to the second moment. In the 
early to mid-1950s the Soviet economy was performing well.103 The West, in 
particular the US, was concerned that the Soviet model would be pursued by
102 Nove, An Economic History, pp. 189-93.
103 Nove, An Economic History, pp. 342-51. See the papers in Aron et al., The Soviet Economy 
for a good example of western intellectual response to this success.
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post-colonial states and some economists even argued that capitalist economies 
had to adopt elements of the Soviet model to keep up.104 Despite this relative 
success, particularly in terms of post-war reconstruction and industrial growth 
rates, general problems were already visible in terms of the ratchet problem in 
production,105 the frozen patterns of productivity and the inherently conservative 
nature of the plan.106 This was a moment when a more sober reflection on the 
economic realities might have taken events down a different path and prevented 
reinforcement of an already ossifying system. The other moment of relative 
success came in the 1970s, when the Soviet economy was not performing well
1 07on its own terms. Yet, due to the jump in oil prices in 1973 and 1978, Soviet 
foreign currency earnings sky-rocketed and the petro-dollars that were 
overflowing the coffers of the OPEC states were being spent on that other major 
export of the Soviet economy, arms. The West was in recession and the Soviets 
were receiving a sorely needed cash injection, which gave them a false sense of 
economic success when no such notion was warranted. Furthermore, the 
international political success of revolutionary movements in Ethiopia, Yemen, 
Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and even Iran further fuelled a sense that in 
international comparative perspective, the Soviet system was not doing too 
badly.
The comparativist condition of the economy, which was the result of the 
competition with capitalism, impelled a focus on the relative merits of the system 
and not more internally-focused assessments. It fuelled an ignorance of the 
problems of the system and lulled the leadership into a sense of security and 
conservatism regarding the economy upon which their power was so clearly 
reliant. Not only did the international confrontation shape the crucial foundations 
of the political and economic systems, it helped to shape some of its inherent 
flaws.
104 For example Peter Wiles, ‘What is to be done about the success of Soviet Industry’ in Aron, 
The Soviet Economy, pp. 27-40.
105 The ratchet problem refers to instances when production levels were deliberately held back so 
that the following year’s target could be more easily reached. This was induced by the planners 
determining each year’s growth as a percentage increase on the previous year. Naturally, this 
encouraged inefficient use of resources and chronic ‘ratcheting’.
106 Nove, An Economic History o f the USSR, pp. 364-9.
107 Herbert Block, ‘Soviet Economic Performance in a Global Context’ in Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the United States, Soviet Economy in a Time o f  Change Washington 
DC: USGPO, 1979, Volume 1, pp. 110-41.
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4.4 C o n c l u sio n
Ellman and Kontorovitch argue that the Soviet economy was supported 
by three ‘load bearing bricks’: the active role of the party in the economy; the 
official ideology; and the centralised bureaucratic system.108 For them, the 
removal or damaging of these ‘bricks’ undermined the system as a whole. This 
analogy is useful, but does not capture the story completely. This chapter has 
shown that these three systems—party, ideology and state—were reinforced as 
successful mechanisms of rule by the international confrontation. The 
confrontation was not, however, the sole driving force shaping everything in the 
economy; such a claim would be an overstatement. On the other hand, it is 
equally wrong to claim that the ideology-legitimacy nexus of the CPSU and its 
international stance had no impact whatsoever. The international confrontation is 
one among a number of important factors which explain the nature and shape of 
Soviet economic development. Its contribution can be summarised as follows: 
the pre-eminent role played by the international confrontation in the Soviet 
economy was to provide a macro criterion of value, thus profoundly influencing 
the shape and development of the foundations of the economy and its links to 
state power.
In observing the workings of the German war economy during World 
War I, Lenin was impressed with its efficiency and strength and was particularly 
taken by the concentration of state-capitalist power. He took inspiration from this 
and argued strongly that such a form of organisation was necessary for Bolshevik 
success. Central to Lenin’s idea was the notion of a huge central bank organising 
orderly economic relations: ‘This will be country-wide book keeping, country­
wide accounting of the production and distribution of goods, this will be, so to 
speak, something in the nature of the skeleton of socialist society.’109 It was at 
this ‘skeletal’ level of state organisation that the international—in the form of 
hostile socio-systemic confrontation—penetrated the Soviet party-state- 
economy. It was a crucial element of the working system which helped to hold
108 Ellman and Kontorovitch (eds.), The Disintegration o f the Soviet System, pp. 20-2.
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the party-state-economy together. It did so by acting as a point of reference. As a 
structuring idea it performed the important role of being a macro-criterion of 
value underpinning the idea of the Soviet state. It was central to the telos of this 
profoundly teleological system and crucially located this value on an 
international comparative footing, one which was to prove precarious in the 
coming years.
The competition with capitalism in its socio-economic, ideological and 
geopolitical aspects clearly affected the formation of the economy as a war 
economy and the development of fissures in its core. It is important to stress the 
dual dimensions of this competition. On the one hand, some of the fissures did 
develop into broader problems that contributed to the vulnerability of the state, 
but on the other the structures of the economy were very much reliant on an 
unchanging external posture. Many of the important core structures of the Soviet 
system were made stable by the continuing external conditions of international 
confrontation, particularly reinforced by the second phase of Cold War. 
Unfortunately, such realms are rarely static; these structures were fundamentally 
destabilised when the Cold War was scaled down and ended in the 1980s. 
Having shown that the socio-systemic conflict was embedded in the structures of 
the Soviet state and economy, the next chapter will return to the international 
stance and will examine the ending of the Cold War so that we can make a 
judgement on the extent to which the removal of the international confrontation 
contributed to the vulnerability and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union.
109 V.I. Lenin, quoted in Nove, An Economic History, p. 36.
Chapter
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5 Th e  En d in g  o f  th e  C old  War
In hundreds o f years from now, when people have forgotten the names o f the 
countries their ancestors camefrom, they will still remember the name ofLenin.
in ‘Three Songs about Lenin’1
We want peace/id competition between different social systems to develop unimpeded, 
to enaouragp mutually adamtagms co-operation rather than confrontation and an 
arms race. We want people o f every country to enjoy prosperity welfare and 
happiness. The road to this lies through proceeding to a nuclear-free, non-violent 
world We have embarked on this road, and call on other countries and nations to 
follow suit
Mikhail Gorbachev2
The Cold War was the second phase of the Soviet confrontation with the 
capitalist West. It was created by the revolutionary commitments and practices of 
the Soviet state, and was brought to an end by their removal from the heart of the 
regime. The first quote, which features several times in Dziga Vertov’s Stalinist 
propaganda film, depicts the wholesale aim for change which lay at the centre of 
the Soviet project and which caused such fear in the West. The second quote 
indicates just how far from the Leninist ideal Gorbachev wanted to take the 
Soviet Union. It was this journey, from revolutionary internationalist power to 
accommodating liberal-socialism (to which the West was receptive), which, 
together with a resurgence of global capitalism, dropped the curtain on the 
international confrontation and caused such trauma in the Soviet Union.
1 Three Songs About Lenin, Dir. Dziga Vertov, Moscow, 1934.
2 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World London: 
Collins, 1987, p. 254.
3 Receptive in the sense of being willing to talk and act with a reasonable degree of sincerity. One 
must not, however, ignore the dual policy being pursued, particularly in the early Reagan period, 
with the arming of third world insurgencies, SDI and the support of the mujahadeen in 
Afghanistan.
155
The end of this conflict removed the Cold War from the structures of 
international politics and, of course, meant the end of the longer-term 
confrontation which had beset the Soviet state since its inception. The radical 
shift in foreign and domestic policy within the Soviet Union, and its acceptance
by the Western alliance—particularly America’s conservative foreign policy
elite—took place between 1985 and 1990, but was also the product of longer- 
term processes. The previous chapters have shown the importance of the 
international confrontation to the Soviet state. The purpose of this chapter is to 
trace the ending of this conflict so that we can determine how these changes 
helped to undermine Soviet state power. The first section will briefly reiterate the 
understanding of international confrontation used in this thesis and will 
emphasise the analytic importance of understanding the end of this conflict as a 
process. The second section will examine the development and motivation of 
Soviet new thinking and the translation of these new ideas into concrete policy 
action. This section will also consider the part played by the USA and will 
characterise this role as essentially reactive. The conclusion of the chapter will 
emphasise the need to place the end of the Cold War in the context of longer- 
term historical developments.
5.1 M eanings and E ndings
5.1.1 The Cold War and its Conditions
As discussed in Chapter One, the Cold War should be thought of as the 
second and more acute phase of a larger international confrontation between the 
Soviet Union and the capitalist West, between two competing and inherently 
conflictual social systems. The confrontation was a conflict which had which 
three aspects: competition between socio-economic systems; geopolitical 
conflict; and ideological antagonism. The second phase—the Cold War—had 
three central elements: the continued contest of socio-economic systems; a 
geostrategic competition which had the nuclear arms race at its centre; and an
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involvement in, and conflict over, third world struggles.4 This understanding of 
the Cold War draws attention to the struggle’s ideological dimensions for these 
were the terms which would ultimately determine its outcome. It further 
emphasises the dynamic of the conflict and the role played by both ideas and 
interests in fuelling the antagonism. Moreover, a view of the Cold War as a part 
of a larger confrontation places the conflict in its proper historical time-frame.
The Cold War was produced from the pre-war confrontation between the 
capitalist West and Soviet communism by three historical developments. The 
conflict was the product of the growth of Soviet power, the destruction of rival 
powers and ideas—notably that of the other great powers to emerge from the 
nineteenth century Britain, Germany, and Japan—and fascism, the other major 
contestatory ideology of the twentieth century. It was compounded by the 
willingness of the USA to engage internationally and to act to make the world 
safe for capitalism. Prior to 1945, the international confrontation had been more 
ideological and socio-economic and not as clearly a geopolitical struggle 
between a US-led west and the USSR. Reagan was right to note that, from the 
start, the Soviets had supported the idea of world revolution,5 but initially did not 
have the military, economic or ideological power to project themselves to this 
end. Likewise, America had the inclination to make the world in its own image, 
and it had a virulent hostility to the Bolshevik revolution and all that it stood for, 
but was not willing or able to impose itself on the world. The Second World War 
changed all that.
While the conflict was made by these developments, it was not 
immutable. To continue, the conflict relied on the perpetuation of those 
conditions through the reinforcing action of political actors within the blocs. 
While the Cold War influenced and shaped life in Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East, it could not be ended there; it could only end when the foundational 
conditions changed, when the ideas, capabilities, willingness and actions of both 
sides which perpetuated a system of confrontation began to change.
4 See Chapter One, pp. 36-47. This draws on Fred Halliday, The Making o f  the Second Cold War 
Second Edition, London: Verso, 1986.
5 Edmund Morris, Dutch: A Memoir o f Ronald Reagan London: Harper Collins, 1999, p. 436.
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5.1.2 The Process of Ending
There is a tendency in much of the literature on the end of the Cold War 
to focus on the improvement in Soviet-American relations and to remain 
preoccupied with the nuclear arms agreements, as though the Cold War had just 
been a geostrategic game which was resolved by a series of arms negotiation 
talks in the late 1980s.6 These negotiations were, of course, important to the 
change in world politics, but were not the only factors. The end of the Cold War 
must be seen in all its dimensions, that is, as the product of fundamental change 
in the five conditions set out Chapter One, and, importantly, as a development 
which occurred over time. The world did not wake up one morning and find 
itself at peace. The shift occurred gradually and unevenly over a five year period. 
It was the product of varying incremental movements, in the principles and 
structures which produced the Cold War. Symbolically, one may point to the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, or the lowering of the Soviet flag 
over the Kremlin as the moment when the Cold War ended. While symbols are 
important, such singular moments can be misleading. The Cold War was slowly 
surpassed by developments in world politics which meant, very simply, that its 
foundations had evaporated and that, as a structuring force in international 
politics, the Cold War ceased to matter.
The beginning of the end of the Cold War has been seen by some as the 
dialogue at the Geneva Summit of 1985, and by others as the 27th Congress of 
the CPSU held between 25 February and 6 March 1986. The shift in values and 
material commitments were then most dramatically articulated in Gorbachev’s 
speech at the UN on 7 December 1988. As an effective structuring force in world
6 For examples of this see Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States 
and the Soviet Union, 1983-91 Revised Edition, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1998, and Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story 
o f the End o f the Cold War London: Little Brown, 1993. Much o f the memoir literature also 
lingers lovingly on the arms control negotiations, summit meetings and high-level diplomacy, to 
the neglect o f the larger-scale historical developments, the domestic constituents in both states to 
which the negotiators were playing and the larger international context in which these 
negotiations were taking place.
7 The five conditions of the post-war period which transformed the confrontation to its acute 
phase were: 1) the ideas of the Russian revolution and their rejection by an evangelical Western 
capitalism; 2) the ability o f both blocs to act on their ideals; 3) the political willingness of both 
sides to engage in conflict; 4) the lack of any greater force, either materially or ideologically, to 
prevent conflict; and 5) a logic of competition compelling reactions.
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politics, it was laid to rest with Gorbachev’s reluctant acceptance of a re-unified 
Germany as a full member of the Nato alliance. During this intervening period, 
four of the most important factors driving the Cold War—Soviet values, Soviet 
intentions, and Soviet actions, and the reaction to these changes by the US-led 
alliance—all radically changed. It is important to think of these in a 
developmental sense because the decisions and actions of the elite were not 
enough on their own to undermine the conflict. It was pushed over the edge by 
the application of various changes to international political life which 
reformulated the structures of world politics.
The end of the Cold War should not be thought of as just an easing of 
Soviet-American relations which gave the cue to the rest of the world to breathe 
easy once again. Soviet novoie myshlenie, new thinking, in foreign policy had a 
sweep that encompassed all of its foreign relations—from relations with the 
socialist countries, to normalisation of relations with China, India, Asia and the 
Middle East. The end of the Cold War was about nothing less than the retreat of 
a set of revolutionary ideas and practices which had been challenging world 
politics; hence, the end of the Cold War should be seen in this full international 
context.
5.2 T h e  M e a n in g  a n d  S o u rc e s  o f  t h e  E n d  o f  t h e
C o ld  W a r
5.2.1 The End o f the Cold War
The Cold War was ended by the Soviet Union’s move away from its 
ideologically-charged international posture and the acceptance of this move by 
the US-led Western alliance of liberal-capitalist states. It was a development 
which took a number of years and was not clearly mapped or planned by either 
side. The process of ending the conflict was gradual, but its velocity should not 
be underestimated. Between 1980 and 1983, the prospect of an end to Cold War 
was virtually impossible to imagine. Ronald Reagan had been elected on a 
hawkish foreign policy platform and, initially, he had been surrounded by
159
profoundly anti-Soviet advisers.8 In May 1982, NSC adviser Warren Clark first 
articulated what became known as the Reagan doctrine. He said that the USA 
‘must be prepared to respond vigorously to opportunities as they arise and to 
create opportunities where none existed before’ so as to advance USA interests 
and values world-wide.9 These ideas became evident in vigorous efforts to ‘roll­
back’ what were seen to be Soviet successes in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, 
Nicaragua, Angola, El Salvador and Guatemala, and which were thought to 
derive from the duplicitousness of detente. In 1983 (barely five years before 
Gorbachev’s speech to the UN), in describing how the Soviets had sacrificed 
morality to the cause of the revolution, Reagan delivered these infamous words 
to a group of evangelists in Florida:
I think the refusal o f many influential people to accept this elementary fact 
o f Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian 
powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s; we see it 
too often today...Let us pray for the salvation o f all those who live in the 
totalitarian darkness... the focus of evil in the modem world.... I urge you 
[anti-nuclear campaigners] to beware the temptation...to ignore the facts 
o f history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the 
arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the 
struggle between right and wrong, good and evil.10
Reagan refused to meet with any Soviet officials until late in 1984.11 Yet, by 
1988, in his symbolically dramatic summit in Moscow when asked if he still 
thought of the Soviet Union as an evil empire he said that he was ‘talking about 
another time, another era.’12 This rhapsodic moment was made possible by two 
important shifts: the decision by the Soviet elite, specifically Gorbachev and his 
reformist clique, to normalise the Soviet Union; and the slow and reluctant
8 Some of the conservatives included Richard Allen followed by Warren ‘Bill’ Clark as NSC 
adviser with Richard Pipes working underneath him, William Casey as Director of Central 
Intelligence, Casper Weinberger as Secretary of Defence, and a range of members of the 
notorious Committee on the Present Danger which had stoked the embers o f detente into the 
flame of the second Cold War, on which see Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers o f Crisis: The 
Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment London: Pluto Press, 1983.
9 Quoted in Morris, Dutch: A Memoir o f Ronald Reagan, p. 459.
10 Morris, Dutch: A Memoir o f Ronald Reagan, p. 473; the full text of the speech can be found in 
Paul D. Erickson, Reagan Speaks: The Making of an American Myth New York: New York 
University Press, 1985, pp. 155-66.
11 Reagan had had a secret meeting with the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, in early 1983. 
However, his meeting with Gromyko in late 1984 was his first with a member of the governing 
body, see Chapter One, p. 44 and note 131 for details of the conversation.
12 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, p. 299.
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acceptance of this shift by the US and the less reluctant acceptance by its 
Western partners.
The end of the Soviet international confrontation involved three
developments: a new set of ideas upon which Soviet international relations were
1 ^  • * • to be founded were developed; a translation of these ideas into concrete action,
that is, a willingness to act upon these new ideological principles; and an
American willingness to accept this new state of affairs which was then reflected
in a new alignment of American capabilities. The more dramatic changes were
undertaken and led by the Soviets, while, the generally positive American and
Western response was important, it essentially reacted to Soviet developments
and did not propel them.
The most profound change in the conditions of the Cold War was the 
development of a radically changed Soviet view of its place in the world and the 
way in which it conducted its relations with other states and people. This view 
had its origins in the broader effort to reform the Soviet economy and society; as 
Gorbachev said, new political thinking in foreign policy and perestroika were 
‘two sides of the same coin.’14 But the development of these ideas should to be 
considered in two contexts: first, the international context of successful global 
capitalism and a US-led Western alliance; and second, the domestic context of 
reform and restructuring which required constant radicalisation and resulted in 
increasing social and political instability. Soviet ideas on how the USSR should 
position itself developed in clear reaction to these two conditions. In this dual 
context, one can see three clear phases of Soviet foreign policy thinking and 
action which derived from the idea of normalising Soviet ideology and the USSR 
more generally. The first phase of ‘demilitarisation’ dates from mid-1985 until 
late-1987. The second, ‘liberal normalisation’, dates from mid-1987 to mid-1989, 
and the final phase, ‘reactive improvisation’, dates from late 1989 to the end of
13 Note that these were international relations and not simply a re-evaluation of Soviet-US 
relations. They involved a wholesale rethinking of the Soviet Union’s place in the world.
14 Quoted in Roy Medvedev and Giulietto Chiesa, Time of Change: An Insider’s View o f Russia’s 
Transformation London: I.B. Tauris, 1991, p. 262. The position taken by Gorbachev should be 
understood as having a longer history than may be immediately apparent. It derived not only 
from the Andropov period, but also from the earlier Khrushchev period in which the language 
and ideas that Gorbachev was to make famous first began to take shape in Soviet political life.
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1991.15 Soviet new thinking between 1985 and 1991 was ultimately characterised 
by the slow rejection of a ‘two competing systems’ view of the world and the 
acceptance of the norms and values of international liberalism. This was matched 
by a reluctant rejection of the ideas of the Russian Revolution which had 
provided the ideological justification and political blueprint for Soviet rule and 
its role in the world. It is instructive to separate, for analytic purposes, the 
development of ideas for and intentions to change from the practical application 
of these principles.
5.2.2 The Development o f New Thinking 
Demilitarisation: 1985-1987
The 27th Party Congress, held between 25 February and 6 March 1986, is 
commonly noted as the first enunciation of the new Soviet position. However, 
incipient signs of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy were evident earlier than 
this. The initial glimmer appeared in an interview published in Pravda on 7 April 
1985 in which Gorbachev spoke of the need for an improvement in US-Soviet 
relations and announced a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate range 
weapons and on nuclear weapons testing.16 In the Central Committee plenum 
held on 23 April, of that year a more detailed discussion on domestic reform and 
the need for an improved international posture was held.17 Gorbachev’s 
appointment of Shevardnadze as foreign minister and then his articulation of a 
possible new strategic doctrine of ‘reasonable sufficiency’ in Paris in October 
1985 further indicated that something resembling a new pattern was beginning to
15 Gorbachev also describes three phases in the development of ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy 
although he periodises them differently. He defines the first period as 1986-1988 which involved 
the search for an end to the Cold War, the second as the period between 1988 and 1990 which 
marked the end of the Cold War. The third phase he claims was reached in 1991 and was marked 
by what he calls the search for a ‘new paradigm for humanity’ in Gorbachev, On My Country, 
pj). 186-7.
Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: America-Soviet Relations and the End o f the Cold 
War Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994, p. 214.
17 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs London: Bantam, 1997 [orig. 1995], pp. 221-24; Anatoly S. 
Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2000, pp. 29-31. The published promulgations were referred to in Russia subsequently as 
Gorbachev’s ‘April Theses’, a reflection on Lenin’s theses of the same name. The author thanks 
Anna Kuzovaya for this point.
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emerge. The symbolic high-point of this early period was the public face 
presented to the world of arms negotiations made by Gorbachev at the Geneva
1 ftsummit. This was followed by a speech, provided by Gorbachev and the 
Politburo, and read on Soviet television on 15 January 1986. The speech 
proposed that the US and USSR remove all intermediate range nuclear weapons 
from Europe and that nuclear weapons should be eliminated world-wide by the 
year 2000. It also announced an extension of the Soviet nuclear testing 
moratorium.19 While it is clear now that ideas were bubbling to the surface— 
ideas which were already changing Soviet actions—there was still no coherent 
articulation of Soviet relations with the rest of the world.
The 27 Party Congress ended this wait. In his five hour political report 
to the Congress, Gorbachev made plain that a qualitatively new phase of Soviet 
foreign policy was about to be embarked upon. While the early language of the 
report was reliant on familiar CPSU cliches, Gorbachev went on to develop the 
view of the Soviet Union’s relations with the world which was to characterise 
this period: the desire to end the military dimension of the international 
confrontation. This, he said, derived from the growing belief in the 
interdependence of the world in an age of nuclear weapons and the desire to free 
the Soviet economy and foreign policy from the heavy burden of the arms race 
and militarised systemic conflict. As Gorbachev said in his speech:
The clash and struggle o f  the opposite approaches to die perspectives o f  
world development have become especially complex in nature. N ow  that 
the world has huge nuclear stockpiles and the only thing experts argue 
about is how many times or dozens o f times humanity can be destroyed, it 
is high time to begin an effective withdrawal from the brink o f  war, from 
the equilibrium o f  fear, to normal, civilised forms o f  relations between the 
states o f  the two systems.20
At first glance, this was not too dissimilar from some of Khrushchev’s claims.
However, the genuine novelty of this position could be seen in the major thrust
18 For details see Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 139-54; and George P. Shultz, Turmoil 
and Triumph: My Years as Secretary o f State New York: Charles Scribener’s Sons, 1993, 
pp. 597-607.
Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 156-7; Gorbachev, Memoirs, pp. 531-4.
20 CPSU Central Committee, Political Report of the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union 
Central Committee to the 27th Congress o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union Moscow: 
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986, Delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee, 25 February, 1986, pp. 13-4.
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of the Soviet concern: that ‘the prevailing dialectics of present day development 
consists in a combination of competition and confrontation between the two 
systems and in a growing tendency towards interdependence of the countries of 
the world.’21 The emphasis was on the de-militarisation of the US-Soviet 
relationship and the pursuit of a process of normalisation with the rest of the 
world. During the 1985-1990 period, the reform process was characterised by 
efforts at normalisation—that is, the desire to make the Soviet Union and its 
relations with the world ‘normal’. The norm which was to replace the 
revolutionary posture was a form of liberalism. Central to this first phase of 
reform was the idea of liberal interdependence, the view that states are 
irrevocably linked by common bonds, common problems and mutual 
vulnerability. The two phenomena which were inducing this situation were 
perceived to be environmental degradation and nuclear weapons. Despite the 
commitment to an interdependence view of the world, the different systems and 
values of the two blocs were still recognised, as Gorbachev said, ‘the 
objective...conditions have taken shape in which confrontation between 
capitalism and socialism can proceed only and exclusively in forms of peaceful 
competition.’23
In this first phase of new thinking, Gorbachev did not totally remove 
Marxist-Leninist ideology or the idea of a contest between Soviet communism 
and the capitalist West from the USSR. However, he did move beyond the 
stagnant dogmatism of the preceding twenty years and called into question the 
traditional Soviet view of the conflict between two social systems which had 
gone under the guise of ‘peaceful coexistence’.24 The aim was to make genuine 
this otherwise hollow rhetorical claim. The over-riding emphasis during this 
phase was on the demilitarisation of Soviet international relations based on what
21 CPSU Central Committee, Political Report, p. 23; italics added.
22 On the decline of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and beliefs in foreign policy see Sylvia Woodly, 
Gorbachev and the Decline o f Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989.
23 CPSU Central Committee, Political Report, p. 76.
24 On the traditional Soviet view of Cold War and particularly a nuanced discussion of the history 
of the idea of ‘peaceful coexistence’ see Margot Light, The Soviet Theory o f International 
Relations, 1917-1982 Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988, especially pp. 35-42 and pp. 44-68.
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has been described as, in IR theory terms, a liberal/idealist view of the nature of 
world politics.25
Liberal Normalisation: 1987-1989
The ideas of reform in foreign policy, while articulated in sweeping terms 
in 1986, were further developed following the warmer reception they received in 
the West in 1987 and 1988. There were also developed by demokratisatisiia 
which was implemented to continue at home the reform process that had been 
hindered by recalcitrant entrenched party interests. Despite progress in US- 
Soviet relations and the signing of the Delhi declaration on the principles for a 
non-violent and nuclear weapon free world, the ideas underpinning Soviet 
international relations were still developing. While there had been a clear 
articulation, there had not been a systematic discussion of precisely what new 
thinking in international relations entailed. This new phase was characterised by 
an acceleration of the process of normalisation and an increasing acceptance of 
the norms of an international liberalism. Increasingly, the Soviets were moving 
away from their revolutionary aims and towards a more ‘status quo’ view of the 
world and their place in it. During this period, foreign policy radicalisation 
matched the increasing boldness of domestic reform.
The Washington summit of December 1987, at which the intermediate 
range nuclear force (INF) treaty was signed, saw a further development of new 
thinking when the Soviets dropped their fervent opposition to SDI.26 This period 
also saw an increase in Soviet commitment to normalising relations around the 
world; Afghanistan and Nicaragua are the most obvious examples.27 In his 
speech on 2 November 1987 celebrating the seventieth anniversary of the 
October revolution, Gorbachev made what was one of the clearest statements yet 
of the new Soviet view of its past and its place in the world. The speech further
25 On the argument that, in the early phases of new thinking, Gorbachev was influenced by a 
highly liberal-idealist view see Peter Shearman, ‘New Political Thinking Reassessed’ in Review 
o f International Studies 19.2, 1993, pp. 139-58, particularly pp. 149-52.
26 See Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 257-71; Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 306 and 
pp. 325-37.
On this generally see Margot Light, ‘Soviet Policy in the Third World’ in International Affairs 
67.2,1991, pp. 263-80.
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elaborated the ideas presented to the 27th Party Congress and placed the emphasis 
firmly on disarmament while also recognising the significance of universal 
human values. He stated that ‘we have become convinced of there being no 
model of socialism to be emulated by everyone.’ His closing words indicated 
that there was still a conviction that there were two social systems that were part 
of one world: ‘In October 1917 we parted with the old world, rejecting it once 
and for all. We are moving towards a new world, the world of communism. We 
shall never turn off that road.’29
On 16 March 1988, these ideas were again raised in a speech to the 
Yugoslav Federal Assembly. There Gorbachev indicated the next development 
of Soviet new thinking by signalling two important moves. First, he declared that 
interventionism in Eastern Europe was illegitimate. Second, he approved and 
underlined the importance and legitimacy of separate socialist forms of 
development. This significant shift in Soviet thinking about the world was, 
characteristically, either ignored by the Western world or treated with suspicion.
The pre-eminent systematic articulation of Soviet new thinking as an 
active political programme was made on 7 December 1988 at the UN. This 
moment was heavy with symbolism and was a clear signpost that the process of 
ending the confrontation between Soviet communism and the capitalist West was 
well advanced. At the UN, the commitment to separate systems and values was 
dropped, and the emphasis was instead put on the unity of humanity and the 
interdependence of world politics. As Gorbachev said, ‘[t]he world economy is 
becoming a single organism, and no state, whatever its social system or 
economic status can develop normally outside it.’31 In this speech, Gorbachev 
made three dramatic claims which captured the international imagination in a 
manner not unlike Churchill’s Fulton speech of March 1946, an outcome 
intended by the speaker.32
28 Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues’ transcript in the 
New York Times, 3 November 1987, p. A11.
29 Gorbachev, ‘October and Perestroika’.
30 Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990 Hemel Hempstead: Philips Lane, 
1990, p. 336; Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 622.
31 United Nations General Assembly, A/43/PU.72 7 December 1988, Address by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, General Secretary o f the Central Committee o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet 
Union, President o f the Presidium o f the Supreme Soviet o f the USSR, p. 6
32 Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 592; see also Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, pp. 201-3.
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First, Gorbachev rejected the legacy of the Russian revolution and the 
commitment to a separate set of socialist values. He argued that the Russian 
revolution belonged to the past: ‘we have entered an era when progress will be 
shaped by universal human interests. Awareness of that dictates that world
' I ' l
politics too should be guided by the primacy of universal human values.’ 
Second, he rejected the use of force as a legitimate tool of foreign policy, noting 
that political problems could only be solved through political means. Further, 
Gorbachev stressed the centrality of freedom of choice to the universal human 
values he had praised: ‘it is also quite clear that the price of freedom of choice is 
mandatory.. .Denying that right to peoples, under whatever pretext or rhetorical 
guise, jeopardises even the fragile balance that has been attained. Freedom of 
choice is a universal principle that should allow of no exception.’34 Finally, he 
flagged a raft of arms reductions in Europe and the Soviet Union which had the 
Western alliance pinching itself in disbelief. The major commitments made were 
a reduction of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe by 500,000 men, the withdrawal
*> r
of six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the 
reduction of 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft. In Gorbachev’s 
words, ‘we shall maintain our country’s defence capability at a level of 
reasonable and reliable sufficiency so that no one will be tempted to encroach on 
the security of the Soviet Union and our allies.’36 At the time, it was the 
announcement of arms reductions which caught media and political attention, but 
the USSR’s international political posture was truly transformed by the first two 
principles—the rejection of socialist values and the rejection of the use of force 
as a tool of foreign policy—which began not just to chip away at, but to rip out 
the foundations of the international confrontation which had beset the USSR 
since 1917.
33 United Nations General Assembly, Address by Mikhail Gorbachev, p. 8.
34 United Nations General Assembly, Address by Mikhail Gorbachev, p. 11.
35 This was a total of approximately 10,000 tanks.
36 United Nations General Assembly, Address by Mikhail Gorbachev, pp. 27-8.
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Reactive Improvisation: 1989-1991
Gorbachev’s speech to the UN was not just a signal to the world that the 
internal Soviet conditions which had brought about the Cold War were past, it 
was a broader attempt to revive international organisations, and especially the
7^UN. This larger aim was indicative of the fact that, at this point, Gorbachev and 
his foreign policy team still felt very much in control of events. Yet, on the day 
he gave the speech, a devastating earthquake hit Armenia and Gorbachev was 
forced to cut short his visit and return to his increasingly chaotic country. This 
event was a poignant metaphor of his split existence; internationally involved in 
reordering the international system on a distinctly safer basis, and domestically 
increasingly less in charge, as the once great Soviet Union under went a 
disorderly breakdown of power.
The final phase of Soviet foreign policy re-orientation was characterised 
by a reactive quality which saw momentum move away from the Soviet Union, 
because of the increasing domestic impotence of the reformist elite and 
Gorbachev in particular.38 By 1989, the ideas of new thinking had found a life of 
their own, seen most dramatically with the departure of the Eastern European 
communist states from June 1989 onwards. Initially, the playing out of the ideas 
in Eastern Europe was supported by Gorbachev and the foreign policy elite. On 
6 July, Gorbachev gave his famous ‘Common European Home’ speech to the 
council of Europe in Strasbourg, and, in Helsinki on 25 October, he emphasised 
that the USSR had no right to interfere in the affairs of Eastern Europe.39 Both of 
these speeches were in line with, and did not develop the ideas informing, Soviet 
foreign policy beyond the UN speech. But there were significant announcements 
of the Cold War endgame still to come. At the Malta Summit of December 1989,
37 In an interview in Pravda in September 1987, Gorbachev noted that it was becoming clear that 
the military antagonism of the previous years could only be prevented through the revival of 
international organisations, and specifically the UN. See Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 570.
38 Shearman argues that, in this period ‘new thinking’ shifted from being shaped by a 
liberal/idealist view of the world to a more realist view. Shearman, ‘New Political Thinking 
Reassessed’.
39 It is this latter speech which prompted Gennadi Gerasimov, the Soviet foreign ministry 
spokesman, to joke at a press conference that the Brezhnev doctrine had been replaced by the 
Sinatra Doctrine. This was confirmed, in more serious tones, by a communique from the Warsaw 
Pact leaders following their meeting of 26-27 October 1989.
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Gorbachev told Bush that the US was no longer seen as an enemy by the Soviet 
Union: ‘We don’t consider you an enemy any more...things have changed. We 
want you in Europe. You ought to be in Europe. It’s important for the future of 
the Continent that you’re there. So don’t think that we want you to leave.’40
Despite his commitment to the self-determination of the countries of 
Eastern Europe, Gorbachev was extremely reluctant to accept German 
reunification within Nato. But he was forced to accept this most uncomfortable 
of developments with vague promises about limits to Nato expansion41 and three 
financial assurances from the FRG.42 These assurances were: that the FRG would 
assume all of the GDR’s economic obligations to Moscow; that it would extend a 
USD 3 billion line of credit to the USSR; and that it would cover the costs of 
Soviet troops in East Germany during the transition period.43 Furthermore, while 
there was a sense within the leadership that it was only fair to accept this, there 
was also a realisation that there was very little that the Soviet Union could 
reasonably do to stop these unpalatable developments.44
Following this period, Gorbachev began to move to the right within 
Soviet domestic politics to try to shore up his power base and reinforce the 
powers of the presidency.45 This resulted in Shevardnadze’s resignation on 
20 December 1990.46 By this point, however, the Cold War was over. Europe 
was no longer divided, and the values and ideals of the Soviet Union were no 
longer at odds with the rest of the world. The US-led West had nothing to oppose 
and third world conflicts had been drained of their Cold War colouring. The final 
chapter of the Cold War, German unification within Nato, undertaken without a 
genuine Soviet blessing, was unquestionably the symbol of this phase. Reluctant
40 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 163; see also George Bush and Brent 
Scowcroft, A World Transformed New York: Alfred Knopf, 1998, pp. 168-73; and Chemyaev, 
My Six Years with Gorbachev, pp. 233-5.
41 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 239.
42 Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, pp.235-40, and pp. 271-3.
43 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 296; on the negotiations generally see James A. 
Baker, The Politics o f Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 New York: G.P. 
Putnam’s & Sons, 1995, pp. 230-8, and pp. 244-59.
44 Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir o f a Soviet 
Interpreter University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 172.
45 See Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account o f  the 
Collapse o f the Soviet Union New York: Random House, 1995, pp. 421-48.
46 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 442-5; Garthoff, Great Transition, p. 442; Eduard 
Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991, pp. 197-200; 
and Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, pp. 312-3.
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to allow the principles that they had articulated to be properly played out, there 
was little that the Soviets could do. The ideals of 1988 had developed a 
dynamism of their own which had overrun their Soviet progenitors. Furthermore, 
it was Gorbachev’s increasing reliance on his last area of political success— 
foreign policy—which further hindered both his domestic political credibility 
and also his ability to shape international developments in his favour. Dobrynin 
summarises this well: ‘From 1989 on Soviet diplomacy became progressively 
less effective because of the urgent pressure of Gorbachev’s domestic political 
agenda and his efforts to sustain his weakening reputation at home by what 
appeared to be success abroad.’47
5.2.3 Soviet New Thinking and Action
There were four clear ways in which new thinking, when put into practice 
by the Soviet elite, led to a new ordering of world politics: the massive reduction 
in strategic and conventional arms; the adoption of a new strategic military 
doctrine; the participation in a new system of liberal global relations; and the end 
of support for third world revolutions, revolutionary movements and ‘fraternal’ 
communist regimes.
Arms Reduction
Soviet commitment to nuclear and conventional arms reduction—its 
retreat from the arms race aspect of the Cold War—was the most dramatic part 
of the unmaking of the international confrontation. The moratorium on nuclear 
testing announced in April 1985, less than a month after Gorbachev took office, 
gave an early indication of the direction in which the Soviets were going. On 
27 September of that year, Shevardnadze delivered a letter from Gorbachev to 
Reagan suggesting an agreement for both sides to cut their long-range nuclear
47 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War 
Presidents, 1962-1986 New York: Times Books, 1995, p. 628.
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capacity by 50%.48 This presaged the discussion at the Geneva summit at which 
Gorbachev accepted American suggestions for a 50% reduction in strategic arms 
and an interim agreement on intermediate range forces. The possibility of 
agreement was dashed by the Americans’ commitment to SDI, their 
determination to link arms reduction to it, and Gorbachev’s implacability in the 
face of missile defence systems.49 A year later, this was followed by a whole raft 
of cuts proposed by Gorbachev at the Reykjavik summit including 50% cuts in 
all categories of strategic arms50 and further concessions on INF. During 
negotiations, this expanded into a total elimination of all INF missiles in Europe 
and all ballistic missiles over a ten year period.51 This too collapsed in the face of 
American and Soviet intransigence over SDI. On 28 February 1987, Gorbachev 
finally de-linked SDI from an INF arms reduction package52 and, on 8 December 
that year,53 the INF treaty which eliminated all medium and short range 
missiles—about 4% of their respective arsenals—was signed.54
In arms reduction, 1988 was a year of symbolic import but little further 
substantive agreement. The Moscow Summit was largely ceremonial55 although, 
as noted above, the UN speech marked a distinct acceleration of Soviet unilateral 
pronouncements.56 On 7 April 1989, Gorbachev announced a cessation in the 
Soviet production of weapons grade plutonium, but further negotiation and 
agreements were put on hold due to the Bush ‘pause’ in relations with the
48 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, p. 129; on this more generally see Shevardnadze, The Future 
Belongs to Freedom, pp. 81-2.
49 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 144-50; Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 238-48; 
Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 597-607.
50 This included the previously excluded land and sea based heavy ICBMs and bombers.
51 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 189-205; Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 287-91; 
Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 757-777; and Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, pp. 
81-6.
52 For an explanation which links Gorbachev’s shift to the critique of his position made by Andrei 
Sakaharov see Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of  
the Cold War New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000, pp. 409-11.
53 At precisely 1.45pm, a time suggested by Nancy Reagan at the behest of her astrologer, 
Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, p. 259.
54 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 257-66; Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, pp. 
142-3; Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 326-37; and Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 1009- 
15.
55 While nothing new was achieved, the symbolic affect was great. Many feel that this summit 
played a large role in ending both sides’ long held views of the other state as an ‘enemy’, see 
Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 351-8; and Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 292-307.
56 See above notes 31 and 35.
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Soviets.58 It was not until the Malta Summit that the Soviets were able to re­
establish a proper working relationship with the American administration of the 
sort needed for such politically risky arms negotiations agreements.59 Once the 
relationship had been re-established, the arms reduction agreements which 
definitively ended the arms race dimension of the Cold War came thick and fast.
Despite difficult negotiations and increasingly trying domestic political 
circumstances for the Soviets, the Washington summit of May-June 1990 
produced remarkable results culminating in the signature of the Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty on 19 November.60 This treaty committed the 
Soviets to a 70% reduction in conventional forces stationed West of the Urals. In 
conventional terms, which had been of central importance to Soviet military 
strategy, new thinking resulted in the reductions flagged at the UN, the massive 
withdrawal of tank battalions mentioned earlier, the withdrawal of six Soviet 
divisions from Mongolia and the disbanding of twelve divisions which had been 
stationed along the Chinese border. This was followed in July 1991 by the 
signature of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In terms of absolute 
quantities, START was the most momentous of all the agreements yet signed. It 
involved the reduction of 25% of the American and 35% of the Soviet strategic 
arsenals, and had taken nine years of negotiations to produce.61 Yet the treaty 
was something of a damp squib by the time it was signed, for world politics had 
changed so dramatically in those nine years. The process of demilitarisation 
which began with a nuclear test moratorium, had, by the end of 1989, led to a 
situation in which no Soviet troops were involved in conflict anywhere in the 
world, and culminated in the signature of START. Soviet military capability had 
been dramatically changed, both in terms of strategic-military allocations and 
strategic posture and purpose.
57 New York Times, 8 April 1989, p. A l; see also Todd Perry, ‘Stemming Russia’s Plutonium 
Tide: Cooperative Efforts to Convert Military Reactors’ in Nonproliferation Review 4.2, 1997, 
pp. 104-14.
8 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 25-78.
59 Gorbachev, Memoirs, pp. 658-65.
60 On the Washington summit see Baker, The Politics o f Diplomacy, pp. 252—4; Beschloss and 
Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 215-28; and Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 410-30. On 
CFE see generally Stuart Croft (ed.), The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty: The 
Cold War Endgame Aldershot: Dartmouth Press, 1994.
61 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 454-8; on the negotiations and the treaty more generally 
see Kerry M. Karchener, Negotiating START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Quest for  
Strategic Stability New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992.
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New Military Doctrine
The second aspect of the transformation in Soviet action was the 
assumption of a new military doctrine by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. 
The demilitarisation of strategic and conventional forces was matched with a 
broader strategic vision. In a speech to French National Assembly members on 
3 October 1985, during his first trip abroad as General Secretary, Gorbachev 
flagged a raft of potential arms cuts based on a possible change in armaments
ft)doctrine which he labelled ‘reasonable sufficiency’. The general direction m 
which military strategy was tending was articulated in typical Gorbachev fashion 
in his 1987 book, Perestroika'. ‘Never, under any circumstances, will our county 
begin military operations against Western Europe unless we and our allies are 
attacked by Nato! Never, I repeat never!’63 This developed into what came to be 
known as ‘non-offensive defence’, also known as ‘necessary sufficiency’.64 This 
represented a wholesale transformation to a security doctrine informed by a 
liberal-interdependence view of strategic relations and not the traditional Soviet 
notion that class conflict and capitalist antagonism were the driving forces of 
geopolitics.65
The traditional Soviet security doctrine had been founded on the premise 
that capitalist growth was inherently militaristic, that inter-state warfare was the 
result of class conflict which was the inevitable nature of capitalist international 
relations, and that the Soviet Union and its bloc were encircled by an alliance of 
hostile capitalist powers. This view was also influenced by an historical sense of 
strategic inferiority, the product of 150 years of invasion and strife. These ideas 
and circumstances produced a formal strategic doctrine characterised by 
‘offensive defence’, a strategy based on preventative action in the large buffer
62 New York Times, 4 October 1985, p. A12.
63 Gorbachev, Perestroika, p. 203.
64 Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, p. 333.
65 It has been a matter of debate as to whether official doctrine actually informed action in a 
practical sense. It is clear that it did to a certain extent. But even if it was not the ultimate 
determinant, and we cannot say for certain that it was not, the symbolic importance of the official 
shift must not be underestimated as it represents a genuine political gesture o f a change in values 
and its consequent political and strategic priorities.
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zone of Eastern Europe.66 The defensive strategy was underpinned with a 
commitment to nuclear deterrence which relied primarily on the Soviet arsenal of 
heavy ICBMs and required the control and domination of the buffer zone. The 
new view of military security was built on the idea of a ‘common European 
home’, which presumed the view of Europe as a single entity, from the Atlantic 
to the Urals. This moved beyond the idea necessary to traditional Soviet 
defence—the pliant submission of Eastern Europe.67
On 29 May 1987, a communique was issued following a meeting of the 
Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation which, 
following pressure from Moscow, announced the shift in the Pact’s military 
doctrine to a strategic defence posture. Specifically, this involved the 
renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, any further territorial claims and 
the formal declaration that no state was seen as an enemy. This moved the 
USSR and the Pact from a position in which the military had been organised for 
fighting and winning wars to a position in which it was organised for war 
prevention. The new doctrine had a clear impact on the Soviet military as the 
drastic reduction in conventional forces set out above demonstrates. Furthermore, 
it led to a restructuring of the military to increase defensive capacity and to 
decrease its offensive strength both in Europe and in Asia. It also entailed a 
reduction in militaiy production of approximately 20% and further meant that 
training exercises focused more heavily on defence.69 The impact of new 
thinking on Soviet military strategy and its consequent effects on military
66 The cornerstone was a nuclear deterrent combined with a commitment to waging a war which 
involved, in the event of a nuclear strike, a rapid conventional thrust across Western Europe to 
the English channel. On the pre-1985 security doctrine and its perception in the West see Gregory 
Flynn (ed.), Soviet Military Doctrine and Western Policy London: Routledge, 1989. On the 
historical development of the Soviet military doctrine see Willard C. Frank Jr and Phillip S. 
Gillette (eds.), Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, 1915-1991 Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1992.
67 On the new Soviet doctrine see generally Christoph Bluth, New Thinking in Soviet Military 
Policy London: RIIA and Pinter, 1990; Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and the Revolution in 
Soviet Military Doctrine Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1990; and William C. 
Green and Theodore Karasik (eds.), Gorbachev and His Generals: The Reform o f the Soviet 
Military Doctrine Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990.
68 See Raymond L. Garthoff, ‘New Thinking and Soviet Military Doctrine’ in Frank and Gillette 
(eds.), Soviet Military Doctrine from Lenin to Gorbachev, pp. 195-209; Oberdorfer, From the 
Cold War, pp. 231-2; Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 306. No first use had been Soviet 
policy, but it was not unilateral and had an exception based on external provocation. The shift 
was to a unilateralist position.
69 Garthoff, ‘New Thinking and Soviet Military Doctrine’, pp. 201-5.
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capabilities were a vital step towards the creation of a new context for world 
politics and the ending of the Soviet confrontation with the capitalist West.
Liberal International Relations
While Soviet softening of its relations with America was certainly an 
important element of the end of the Cold War, it was only part of the story. 
Soviet engagement with America was the centre-piece of a larger effort to 
improve Soviet relations in a global sense. As Gorbachev remarked: ‘one must 
not in world politics restrict oneself to relations with just one country alone, even
7 nif it is a very important one.’ On 23 May 1986, Gorbachev gave a speech to the 
ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he insisted that the diplomats rethink Soviet 
relations with Europe and specifically that they should no longer look at Europe 
through the prism of Soviet relations with the United States.71 The normalisation 
of Soviet relations aimed to remove Soviet foreign relations from the fetters of 
Soviet-American acrimony. Across Europe, the Soviets dramatically improved
77relations, most notably with the FRG, Spam, France and Great Britain. But the 
commitment to a globally focused normalisation was demonstrated outside the 
more obvious centres of Soviet interest.73 On 28 July 1986, Gorbachev 
announced the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Mongolia.74 The 
signing of the Delhi declaration in November 1986 was also part of this broader 
effort to globalise more benign relations.75 In February 1987, Shevardnadze
70 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 221.
71 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 242.
72 On the influence of and relationship between Gorbachev and European political leaders see 
Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, pp. 115-7.
73 See generally Light, ‘Soviet Policy in the Third World’ and Melvin A. Goodman, 
‘Introduction: Moscow’s Plans for Conflict Resolution in the Third World’ in Melvin A. 
Goodman (ed.), The End o f Superpower Conflict in the Third World Boulder, CO: Westview, 
1992, pp. 1-18.
74 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives Vol. XXXI, London: Keesing’s, 1985, p. 34529. The 
announcement referred to six troop regiments from Afghanistan and ‘substantial’ numbers from 
Mongolia.
75 Palazchenko, My Years With Gorbachev, pp. 58-60.
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undertook a tour of Asia to revitalise relations with states in the region and to
7 (\emphasise the importance of Asia to the Soviet Union.
On 22 December 1988, agreements between Angola, South Africa and 
Cuba were signed which removed Cuban troops from Angola and established the 
independence of Namibia.77 These developments were brought about directly by 
Soviet pressure on Cuba and Angola, and British pressure on South Africa 
following the defeat of its forces. These agreements demonstrated the Soviet 
belief in a new way of doing business in international relations and, importantly, 
demonstrated its support for the political resolution of conflicts. This was 
followed several weeks later by the Vietnamese announcement, on January 6, 
that it would remove all of its forces from Cambodia. This decision was the 
direct result of Soviet pressure on the Vietnamese and reassurances to the 
Cambodians.78 In May 1989, relations with China were normalised, ending 
decades of acrimony and hostility, and easing tension on the world’s most 
militarised border; perhaps this normalisation was the most notable shift of this 
set. It is clear that Soviet new thinking did not simply revolve around a 
Washington pole, it was characterised by action which displayed an awareness of 
the global influence of the great powers in a Cold War context. More 
importantly, it was marked by a firm desire to ensure political solutions to 
conflicts and struggles around the world. These efforts were propelled by an 
attempt to reduce the costs, in both economic and political terms, of the 
consequences of Soviet Cold War foreign policy as well as a change in 
underlying beliefs. Most significantly, they represented a clear break with the 
traditional role that had been played by the Soviet Union in world politics 
generally, and regional conflicts specifically.
76 Palazchenko, My Years With Gorbachev, p. 62-3. It was in the deliberately innocuous setting 
of an Australian government lunch that Shevardnadze announced the Soviet decision to de-link 
SDI conditions from any potential INF agreement.
77 W. Martin James, A Political History o f the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990 New Brunswick, 
NJ : Transaction Publishers, 1991, and Peter Clement, ‘U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Africa’ in 
Goodman (ed.), The End o f Superpower Conflict in the Third World, pp. 79-83.
78 See Jack Turner, Soviet New Thinking and the Cambodian Conflict Unpublished MPhil Thesis, 
University of Oxford, 1994.
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Revolutionary Regimes Jettisoned
The fourth change in Soviet action was its ending of support for third 
world revolutionary movements and regimes, its withdrawal from international 
engagements and its effective termination of the international communist 
movement.79 One of the most important aspects of the end of the Cold War was 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Afghanistan had become a ‘bleeding 
wound* in the side of Soviet power, and the leadership saw it as a miscalculation 
which was hurting Soviet interests at home and abroad.80 As the Soviet incursion 
was costing an enormous amount in monetary, morale and military terms, the 
decision to withdraw was made for both instrumental and values-based reasons. 
On 5 July 1990, Gorbachev told Pravda that the intervention in Afghanistan had
O 1
cost around 60 billion roubles. Moreover, the various sanctions imposed by the 
West since 1980 had damaged the Soviet economy. These sanctions not only 
hindered economic performance, but made efforts to normalise political relations 
more difficult.
In values-based terms, things were less straightforward. Initially, 
Gorbachev had pushed for victory via an escalation in 1985-6, but, when it 
became clear that things were not going their way, the decision was taken to 
withdraw from the fiasco. It was then presented in more values-based terms. On 
Soviet television on 8 February 1988, a sombre Gorbachev announced that on 
15 May Soviet troops were to begin a wholesale withdrawal from Afghanistan. 
Between then and 14 April, the foreign ministers of the USA, the USSR, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan negotiated the terms and conditions of withdrawal and 
the status of the Afghan government. The withdrawal was completed on 
15 February of the following year. As Reuveny and Prakash point out, the
79 See generally W. Raymond Duncan and Carolyn McGuiffert Ekedhal, Moscow and the Third 
World Under Gorbachev Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990; and Chemyaev, My Six Years with 
Gorbachev, pp. 205-8.
80 See Fred Halliday, ‘Soviet Foreign policymaking [sic] and the Afghanistan War: from “second 
Mongolia” to “bleeding wound’” in Review of International Studies 25.4, 1999, pp. 675-691.
81 Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, p. 336.
82 On the Soviet withdrawal see generally, Diego Cordovez, Out o f Afghanistan: The Inside Story 
o f the Soviet Withdrawal Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; Barnett Rubin, The 
Fragmentation o f Afghanistan New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995; and Amin Saikal 
and William Maley (eds.), The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989.
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Afghanistan war decreased the legitimacy of the military, encouraged non- 
Russian republics to pursue independence and helped to produce new pre- 
glasnost forms of political participation.83
The Soviet Union had supported the Sandinistas in Nicaragua up to and 
after the 1979 revolution.84 On 16 May 1989, the Washington Post reported that 
the Soviets had stopped supplying them with weapons and aid.85 While the 
USSR did not end its economic aid to Cuba, it did try to get Castro to follow the 
proposed political solution to the problem of El Salvador, but with little 
success. The removal of support for revolutionary states entailed more than 
simply the ending of economic or military aid to revolutionary regimes, it was 
part of a larger strategy which left the international communist movement as 
politically moribund as its members’ economies.
The best illustration of the Soviets’ wholesale departure from the support 
of third world revolutionary regimes was the Soviet diplomatic support of the 
US-led UN response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Shevardnadze said that ‘if the 
world community could not stop the aggressors against Kuwait then it would 
have gained nothing from the end of the Cold War.’87 It was the ultimate 
illustration of the shift in Soviet foreign relations, for it involved the support of a
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UN-sanctioned war against a former client state. This demonstrated both their 
commitment to a new way of addressing international problems, their support for 
international organisations, and that their past ideological and strategic 
commitments were very firmly part of history.
To summarise, Soviet action which derived from new thinking consisted 
of four important developments: the scaling back and reconfiguration of military
83 Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, ‘The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet 
Union’ in Review o f International Studies 25.4, 1999, pp. 693-708.
84 See generally John A. Booth, The End of the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution Second 
Edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
85 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 340-1; Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 662; Garthoff, The Great 
Transition, p. 379, p. 407.
86 Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 698-9.
87 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 247.
88 The Soviets were far from unified behind the Gorbachev/Shevardnadze position. The hard­
liners in Moscow were fiercely against what they considered to be a heavy handed piece of 
American unilateralism. Furthermore, in keeping with the dictates of new thinking, the Soviets 
were far more committed to a diplomatic settlement than the Americans. To this end, Primakov 
spent many hours trying to talk Hussein around. See Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest 
Levels, pp. 270-2, and pp. 330-7; Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 432-449; Baker, The
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allocations; the adoption of a new military doctrine; the formation of a more 
normal posture across the gamut of international relations; and the withdrawal of 
support for third world conflicts and revolutionary regimes. Through these, new 
thinking produced actions which helped end the chronic international 
confrontation and radically reformed the structures of international politics.
5.2.4 The Reasons for Soviet Change
The shifts in Soviet ideology and in their philosophy of international 
engagement, were remarkable. Yet it is far from clear precisely why such 
changes came about. Many have argued that the Soviets changed tack because of
on
the disastrous state of their economy, some have argued that it was due to the 
rise of a Western-focused elite,90 and others have claimed that the sage firmness 
of Reagan’s Republican-right position produced the change.91 Yet none of these 
positions is entirely accurate. The development of such a radical new way of 
doing things clearly had multiple origins. These sources of change can be 
attributed both to structural developments, that is, long term changes in society 
and problems in the economy, as well as to more agential factors to do with 
individual values, approaches and beliefs. While one should be wary of over­
attributing coherence to a process that was clearly anything but, one can identify 
four related sources of the Soviet shift: instrumental; normative; normalisational- 
developmental; and popular support-based.
Politics o f Diplomacy, pp. 1-16; pp. 281-83; pp. 308-313; pp. 346-51; pp. 396-408; and 
Gorbachev, Memoirs, pp. 711-30.
89 Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the material incentives of declining economic performance 
and the globalisation of production induced the changes, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. 
Wohlforth, ‘Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case 
for Ideas’ in International Security 25.1, 2001, pp. 5-53. See also Ralph Summy and Michael E. 
Salla (eds.), Why the Cold War Ended: A Range of Interpretations Westport, CT: Greenwood, 
1995.
90 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea o f the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End o f  
the Cold War New York: Columbia University Press, 2000; and Jeffrey Checkel, Ideas and 
International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behaviour and the End o f the Cold War New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
91 Robert G. Patman, ‘Reagan, Gorbachev and the emergence of “New Political Thinking”’ in 
Review o f International Studies 25.4, 1999, pp. 577-601; and Richard Pipes, ‘Misinterpreting the 
Cold War: The Hardliners got it right’ in Foreign Affairs 74.1, 1995, pp. 154-60.
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Instrumental Sources
After the event, many have claimed that the Gorbachev-led shift in 
foreign policy orientation was a clearly-thought-out strategy that was part of the 
broader effort to reform the Soviet Union. The argument is essentially that the 
reformers recognised that a benign international environment was necessary to
• 09pursue domestic reform and, thus, systematically set out to achieve this. As 
shown in the previous chapter, the Soviet economy and society were in a grim 
state. Gorbachev and company had, initially, made it their business to reform 
society and the economy by tinkering with aspects of the economic system and 
not challenging the underlying structures. They realised that the effort was going 
to be arduous and costly and would require a change in foreign policy. Thus, 
foreign policy reform was to be one of the means to provide ‘a better life for 
Soviet people and to establish higher models of social organisation and social 
justice.’93 Shevardnadze, in his memoir, writes as much when he says that, in 
1986, the chief national objective was ‘to create the maximum favourable 
external conditions needed in order to conduct internal reform.’94 Such a view of 
the overall process is too neat, although there was, no doubt, an element of this 
intention within the elite. Between 1985 and 1987, the reformers manifestly 
misunderstood the scale of domestic reform necessary. To be credible any 
correlation between domestic and foreign policy reform must account for this 
misunderstanding. Furthermore, the neat instrumental argument attributes to 
Gorbachev an organisational forethought which history has shown he simply did 
not have.95 The process was reasonably incoherent and was not simply the 
product of an instrumental calculation of interests. However, one should not 
reject the instrumental source of change outright. It is clear that the new thinking 
in foreign policy was designed by the leadership to achieve certain payoffs 
within Soviet society.
92 Gorbachev makes this case, see his On My Country, p. 66.
93 Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech at the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Meeting, 10 April 1987, 
full text in J.L. Black (ed.), USSR Documents, 1987: The Gorbachev Reforms Gulf Breeze, FL: 
Academic International Press, 1988, p. 316.
94 Shevardnadze, The Future, p. xi.
95 For two criticisms along these lines see Dobrynin, In Confidence and Valery Boldin, Ten Years 
That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era As Witnessed by his Chief o f Staff New York: Basic 
Books, 1994.
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One of the prime motivations for the Soviet demilitarisation of relations 
with the West and the world at large was the crippling cost of the arms race and 
its resulting deformation of the economy. No one really knew quite what the 
Soviets were spending on defence; no meaningful objective calculus of 
expenditure or cost existed.96 Gorbachev writes in his memoirs of his surprise at 
discovering that military expenditure was approximately 40% of the state budget 
and that military production accounted for around 20% of Soviet gross national
07product. The turn in military posture was influenced by a ‘guns or butter’ view
QQ
of reform. Believing that the Soviet economy could not go on functioning in 
the old way, the leadership made the choice, haphazardly and poorly thought-out 
though it was, for butter and not guns.
The instrumental aspect of ‘new thinking’ was not, however, simply 
about freeing the economy and society from the crippling impact of the arms 
race, which was itself both a cause and effect of Cold War. There were two other 
key intentions: first, it aimed to reel-in the draining cost of its overseas 
commitments, what could be called the cost of empire. The three largest 
instances of overseas cost were Afghanistan, Eastern Europe and the support for 
third world regimes—with Cuba being the single largest recipient.99 The direct 
cost of Afghanistan has been mentioned, but it was also the effect of sanctions, 
as well as the cost on Soviet morale more generally which were of concern. 
Second, the Soviet Union needed to participate in the world on reasonable terms. 
Eastern Europe had long since proven to be an expensive client region. The 
realisation that, in terms of trade, the Soviet Union was exporting primary 
material and importing finished goods from its supposedly inferior allies had 
spurred some of the early ideas of reformers. New thinking aimed to change this 
state of affairs. The longer-term view was to try to transform Eastern Europe 
from a security zone into a link to the world markets of the global capitalist
96 See Chapter Four, note 49.
97 Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 277.
98 This was brought up in terms of ‘disarmament or development’ in his speech on the seventieth 
anniversary of the revolution. See Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, p. 325.
99 On Cuba’s economic dependence on the Soviet Union see Peter Shearman, The Soviet Union 
and Cuba London: RIIA and Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1987, pp. 1-32. In Izvestiia, on 
1 March 1990, the Soviets published a debtors list of socialist countries from whom substantial 
credits were owed. The top of the list was Cuba owing 15,490.6 million roubles, this was 
followed by Mongolia with 9,542.7 and Vietnam with 9,132.2 million. See Light ‘Soviet Policy 
in the Third World’, p. 273 and Goodman, ‘Introduction: Moscow’s Plan’, p. 5.
181
economy.100 Pravda notes that Eastern Europe’s value to the Soviet Union had
declined dramatically, as a sphere of domination and source of legitimacy, as a
reliable part of the international communist movement and as a cordon
sanitaire.101 Moreover, it was becoming a burden in financial and political 
1
terms. Gorbachev noted that Eastern Europe was surviving on an expensive 
‘artificial respirator’ and that the ‘Soviets could no longer continue economic 
relations along these lines.’103
The realisation of the stagnation of the economy, the consequent 
demoralisation of society and the desire to change this was central to Soviet 
reforms, both in domestic and foreign policy. The Soviet economy could produce 
international standard jet fighters, but could not manufacture durable shoes. One 
way to solve this problem was to participate in the capitalist international 
division of production. The leadership also felt that normal economic relations 
were necessary for peaceful relations, to stimulate the economy and supplement 
its own productive capacity. Ultimately, the Soviets recognised that it was 
necessary to participate in the global economy if the USSR was to become a 
truly modem state with balanced development. As a result of this recognition, the 
leadership wanted to shift its foreign relations so that it could participate in the 
liberal world order.
The other broadly instrumental purpose served by the shift in Soviet 
foreign policy was the effort to overcome a range of Cold War political obstacles 
which had hindered Soviet economic development. As a direct result of the 
conflict, the West had created a series of hindrances to damage the Soviets. The 
prime example of this was CoCom. CoCom was a committee of Nato 
countries104 plus Australia and Japan which produced a list of ‘strategically 
important technology’ which was not to be sold to the USSR. It was the 
coordinating mechanism of a form of economic warfare against the Soviet
100 Alex Pravda, ‘Soviet Policy Towards Eastern Europe in Transition: The Means Justify the 
Ends’ in Alex Pravda (ed.), The End of Outer Empire: Soviet-East European Relations in 
Transition London: RIIA and Sage, 1992, pp. 1-34; p. 5.
101 Pravda, ‘Soviet Policy Towards Eastern Europe’, p. 6.
102 On this see Valerie Bunce, ‘The Empire Strikes Back: The Evolution of the Eastern Bloc from 
a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability’ in International Organization 39.1, 1985, pp. 1-46.
103 Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 604.
104 Not including Iceland who opted out.
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Union.105 Its ostensible purpose was to ensure that the West and Nato maintained 
their military advantage over the USSR through a strategic embargo of goods 
although, at times, it was used to bully non-member states into adhering to its 
dictates.106 It both deprived the USSR of technology and developments available 
in the wider world, and also reinforced the liberal-capitalist trading system.107 It 
is clear that, in reaction to such structural hindrances, the leaders of the Soviet 
Union tried to change foreign relations to help reform the Soviet economy and 
Soviet society more broadly.
The instrumentalism behind Soviet new thinking needs to be seen as an 
important motivating factor, but two points need to be emphasised. First, it was 
not as coherently pursued and rationally calculated as is often presented. Second, 
it was not just about establishing a benign and less costly international 
environment for the reform process; the aim was to become a full and 
participating member of the international system so that Soviet society could be 
improved.
Normative Sources
While instrumentalism was a central motivation, it was not the only 
driving force behind the changes within and without the Soviet Union. 
Gorbachev and his foreign policy team represented a new generation of Soviet 
leaders and, importantly, embodied a new set of ideas and norms which had been 
produced by the society which they in turn sought to revitalise. To a certain 
extent, the ending of the Cold War and the embrace of new thinking were due to 
a belief in the values which were at the heart of the reforms. New thinking 
derived from the reluctant recognition that capitalism could be successful 
without necessarily being bellicose, and was reinforced by a belief that the 
destructive power of nuclear weapons had radically changed the nature of 
conflict. The risk of utter annihilation was simply too great to justify the
105 See Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics o f East-West 
Trade Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.
106 Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 3.
107 On economic warfare against the Soviet Union more generally see Henry R. Naus and Kevin 
Quigley (eds.), The Allies and East-West Economic Relations: Past Conflicts and Present 
Choices New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1984.
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militarised dimension of the international conflict which had persisted for so 
long. Finally, there was shift in the understanding of the role of class in 
international politics.108 No longer did the Soviets believe that class conflict was 
the prime dynamic of world politics. Rather, they had begun to believe in the 
liberal interdependence view of international relations.
A changed set of beliefs about how the world worked reflected changes 
in the broader value system of the leadership. Thus, new thinking meant that a 
sense of separate socialist values was left behind and a qualitatively different 
and, importantly, liberal set of values and rights replaced it. These were the 
values of universal human rights, self-determination, democratic government, the 
immorality of nuclear weapons and a belief in the mutual nature of security.109 
The pursuit of nuclear arms reduction, the shift in strategic doctrine, the step 
away from third world revolutionary regimes, the embrace of international 
organisations and the improvement in global relations were all undertaken, to a 
certain extent, because of a belief in these liberal values. Furthermore, the 
acceptance of the revolutions of 1989 was in keeping with these values.110 
Palazchenko remembers Shevardnadze saying, regarding Afghanistan and 
Eastern Europe, ‘if they stand for something and have any real support among 
their people, they must cope themselves.’111 This was a clear illustration of the 
implications of these beliefs for Soviet action. Perhaps more than the military 
reduction or the shift in strategic doctrine, the acceptance of liberal norms truly 
represented the end of the international confrontation. For the change 
represented, not the ineffable hand of history, but a recognition, both from above 
and below, that the Soviet set of values were fundamentally lacking. The chronic 
confrontation between Soviet communism and Western capitalism had been as 
much about ways of life as about military power, and the acceptance of norms, 
which had previously been so vigorously rejected, meant a rejection of the 
fundamentals of that conflict.
108 Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, pp. 320-2.
109 See generally Archie Brown (ed.), New Thinking in Soviet Politics Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1992.
110 As well as the mistaken thought that they would stay in the socialist fold.
111 Palazci^fako, My Years With Gorbachev, p. 89.
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Developmental-Normalisation
These two strands of agential motivation overlapped in the third which is 
a more structural change. At the heart of the domestic and international reforms 
lay the desire to make the Soviet Union ‘normal’. Brown argues that the new 
thinking in foreign policy was consonant with domestic reforms, that they were 
in keeping with the desire to make the Soviet Union a modem state with a
119developed economy and normal relations with the world. While not using the 
word ‘normal’, Gorbachev, writing in his memoirs, demonstrates this intent: ‘we 
understood that in today’s world of mutual interdependence progress is 
unthinkable for any society which is fenced off from the world by impenetrable
i  1 o
state frontiers and ideological barriers.’ This recognition of Soviet abnormality 
was the product of the development of Soviet society itself. The growth of the 
economy, urbanisation and a massive increase in education meant that Soviet 
society grew within itself the means to realise its faults and to try to rectify 
them.114 The generation which came to rule the Soviet state had travelled, was 
educated and was aware of how out of step its state and society was from the 
prevailing international norms. The arrival of Gorbachev in a position of power 
gave an opportunity for societal dissatisfaction to be expressed at the higher 
levels in an effort to try to change society.115 That Gorbachev and the reformers 
were not a minority clique amongst a hard-line consensus was bome out by the 
general acceptance of the majority of the Gorbachev reforms and concessions by 
the military. This was due to a recognition within the military that the economy 
had to be reformed if military power was to survive. Also, it is clear that, within 
the military, there had also been a change in generation. The new generation,
112 Brown, Gorbachev Factor, p. 237.
113 Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 519.
114 Moshe Lewin, The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1988.
115 Thus, had Romanov and not Gorbachev acceded to the general secretaryship changes would 
merely have been postponed. Society was pregnant with the realisation of its ills. While the 
proponents of reform and many of their ideas were domestically generated, there was also an 
international impact on the shaping of these ideas. See generally Checkel, Ideas and 
International Political Change; K.M. Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical 
Investigations in Security Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. Evangelista also 
makes the case, though less convincingly, for the role of peace movements in inspiring reform 
and its shape, see his Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
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while more conservative than Gorbachev or Yakovlev, was well aware of the 
need for normalisation.116
Domestic Constituencies
To understand the Soviet sources of change one must look to the 
instrumental, the ideational, the developmental and also to the domestic political 
context. Much of the impetus for specific decisions came from the political 
context in which the elite found themselves. For example, for many, Chernobyl 
was a catalyst which helped encourage a recognition of the need for rapid and 
fundamental change.117 Also, foreign policy was used to gamer support for the 
leadership within the USSR. In cmde terms, foreign policy success in the West 
was central to Gorbachev’s power in the mid-1980s. Gorbachev used foreign 
policy to manoeuvre domestically, and foreign policy choices in turn reflected 
that manoeuvring. It made him popular within the USSR and meant that, 
politically, he had a greater freedom to act. Yet this itself was subject to 
diminishing returns. As Gorbachev become unpopular at home due to the chaos 
he had helped to unleash upon his people, his foreign policy ‘triumphs’ began to 
be seen as failings. Boldin is typically damning: ‘the new thinking in 
international affairs, combined with other perestroika measures, however well
110
intentioned, effectively wrecked the country’s military defence complex.’ 
Dobrynin is critical, but in a more measured fashion; he feels that Gorbachev 
sacrificed longer-term Soviet and Russian interests in his desire to be popular 
with the West. In Gorbachev’s increasing reliance on what Weber might have 
termed ‘external prestige’ to buttress his rapidly weakening domestic position, it 
is clear that America extracted concessions at too low a political price from 
Gorbachev, which only made worse his position at home.119
In sum, Soviet change stemmed from four interrelated sources. First, the 
desire to improve society within via a more benign policy without. Second, it 
came from the ideas of new thinking which themselves were the product of both 
international and domestic developments. Third, change came from the
116 Medvedev and Chiesa, Time of Change, p. 167.
117 Gorbachev, Memoirs, p. 106; Medvedev and Chiesa, Time of Change, pp. 6-7
118 Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World, p. 296.
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development of Soviet society and its production of people willing and capable 
of assessing their society critically, and fourth it was produced, to a degree, by 
domestic politics and political experience.
5.2.5 The American Response
While the Soviets changed dramatically during this period, American 
policy was essentially reactive to these changes. During this period, the 
underlying philosophy underpinning American foreign policy did not change in 
any dramatic sense. While it is undeniable that the nature of relations between 
the two powers improved and remarkable levels of concord were reached, the 
informing ideas and values of American foreign policy remained constant. The 
US reacted to Soviet shifts and did not, in any meaningful sense, induce them. 
While Reagan’s hostility in his first term may have helped clear the ground for 
the reformers, the process of reshaping international politics was pre-eminently 
driven by the Soviets.120 The Soviet Union was changing and ended up no longer 
behaving in a manner which the capitalist states—particularly the US—felt it had 
to fight against or to fear.
It is important, however, to draw a distinction between the response, of 
the Reagan and Bush administrations to the Soviet shifts. Curiously, as a result 
of being virulently anti-Communist, Reagan was, in domestic political terms, 
able to react more positively to the Soviet overtures than Bush. Bush was 
hindered by longer-term accusations of being ‘soft’ on communism. Yet, even 
Reagan’s reaction was coloured heavily by the restrictions of his domestic 
political circumstances.121 While each administration had its own views, one can 
identify a number of continuations in attitude and approach. First, both
119 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 629.
120 Patman overstates his case that Reagan’s bellicosity was one o f the most important factors 
facilitating the emergence of new thinking within the political elite. He is right to say that Reagan 
helped Gorbachev in his manoeuvring to achieve the position of General Secretary. But, the ideas 
Gorbachev was using, the people he surrounded himself with, and, most importantly, the nature 
of Soviet society more broadly were well beyond any influence Reagan may have had—change 
in the Soviet Union was going to happen. Robert G. Patman, ‘Reagan, Gorbachev and the 
Emergence of “New Political Thinking’”. On this latter point see also, Brown, The Gorbachev 
Factor, pp. 226-7.
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uncharitably pocketed concessions without an equitable or reciprocal reaction. 
Second, the expectation that the Soviets would and should go further than the 
Americans was continued. Third, both shared an inability to see the shifts in the 
Soviet Union as genuine and, finally, both administrations were sceptical of 
Gorbachev’s sincerity.122
Reagan Administration
Initially, Reagan espoused the rearming of America, the rolling back of 
Soviet success in the third world and the strengthening of Western resolve in the 
face of what he saw as an implacable foe.123 In his first two years in office, there 
was little indication that Reagan was particularly interested in talking to the 
Soviets in terms of arms control or nuclear stockpile reduction. He deliberately 
fostered acrimonious relations with the USSR and contributed heavily to the 
heightened tension of the 1978-84 period. The low ebb of this period of hostility 
was reached in 1983 which saw: the ‘evil empire’ speech;124 the Soviet shooting 
down of KAL 007; the most extensive military exercise in Nato history (testing 
command and control procedures for nuclear war in the North Atlantic); the 
deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe; and the collapse of 
START and conventional force negotiations in Geneva and Austria. For the first 
time in decades there were literally no ongoing discussions between the two 
powers.125
Following pressure from Shultz,126 a precipitous drop in public esteem
• 1 '}7with regard to his handling of international affairs prior to an election year,
121 FitzGerald argues case that Reagan’s decision to establish positive relations with the Soviets 
related directly to domestic political inducements. FitzGerald, Way Out There.
122 Although by late 1989 the Bush administration had overcome this last element. Although they 
lost cmcial time to this prevarication.
123 On what came to be known as the Reagan doctrine see James Scott, Deciding to Intervene: 
The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy: Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.
124 See above note 10.
125 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 51-68; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 357-77.
126 During the early period Shultz was the only member of the administration who advocated 
matching military pressure with political dialogue. His memo to Reagan of March 1983 was the 
first attempt to plan a possible constructive dialogue, see Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 265- 
6 .
127 According to polls conducted by Richard Wirthlin, 51% disapproved of Reagan’s handling of 
foreign affairs and 43% felt he was increasing the chances of war, Oberdorfer, From the Cold
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and the departure of hard-line NSC adviser Clark, Reagan began to soften his 
rhetoric and make overtures for dialogue. This began with a speech on 16 
January 1984 in which Reagan called for increased dialogue between the powers 
on arms limitations.128 June to August of that year saw a series of arms limitation 
offers exchanged between Moscow and Washington, but little of substance came 
of it.129 Importantly, INF and START negotiations recommenced in 1985, but, 
despite a softening of rhetoric, with occasional set-backs,130 there was little 
significant change in America’s policy towards the USSR and its allies around 
the world.
Publicly, Reagan justified his mellowing after 1985 with the claim that he 
was pursuing arms control now because, due to his propitious action, the US had 
finally caught up with the Soviets and was at last able to ‘negotiate from
1 o 1
strength’. Others have argued that Reagan had a profound hatred of nuclear 
weapons and was acting in a calculated fashion to meet that end.132 The reality 
was rather more complex. Reagan clearly had no love of nuclear weapons, nor of 
communism for that matter. But his attitude towards the Soviet Union and its 
consequent impact on the foreign policy stance of the United States was 
unchanged. His values, so stark and clear, were one of his most valuable political 
assets and he knew it. Concessions to the Soviet Union—which were few— 
tended, not just to be driven by his values, but were also pitched at a domestic 
political audience. To understand the development of a more conciliatory stance 
by the US one needs to ignore the ‘negotiate from strength’ rhetoric and place 
Reagan’s anti-nuclearism alongside three important factors: the increasing 
influence of more moderate advisers within the administration; the increasingly 
unthreatening face of the Soviet challenge; and the requirements of his domestic 
audience to which Reagan paid the closest attention. So Geneva, Reykjavik,
War, pp. 70-1. At the beginning of 1983 his approval rating was 35%, the lowest approval rating 
of a mid-term president in forty years. This was attributed to a combination of recession and fear 
of war; see Morris, Dutch: A Memoir o f Ronald Reagan, p. 469.
128 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 72-3.
129 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, pp. 83-7.
130 Most memorably the ad-libbed voice check in which Reagan said ‘I have signed legislation 
outlawing Russia forever, the bombing begins in five minutes.’
131 FitzGerald, Way Out There, p. 314.
132 Morris subscribes to this view in Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan, as do: Shultz, Turmoil 
and Triumph', Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, Gates, From the Shadows", and, naturally, Reagan 
himself in his An American Life London: Hutchison, 1990.
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Washington and Moscow should be understood, not just as the popular story of 
‘two good men struggling to free humanity from nuclear weapons’, but also 
understood as leaders of states trying to achieve certain outcomes for their 
domestic constituencies. In Gorbachev’s case, to lift the burden of a militarised 
international confrontation from a tired population’s back. In Reagan’s, to lift his 
popularity, and to answer his anti-nuclear critics while giving as little away as 
possible. Interestingly, after each summit with Gorbachev, Reagan’s popularity 
would rise dramatically.133
The softening of US-Soviet relations was made possible by the 
Americans’ willingness to talk. Had they refused, it is hard to imagine 
Gorbachev unilaterally pursuing a demilitarised international relations; the 
Soviet military, for one, would have been far less sanguine. But beyond this, the 
American response should be characterised as reactive—they did not initiate an 
easing of tensions, nor did their bellicosity induce a pacifist turn within the 
Soviet Union. Although they were not the initiators of improved Soviet- 
American relations, or an improved system of world politics, their reactions to 
Soviet overtures were important to bring these into being. A reactive nature does 
not imply inertia or listlessness; the Americans could have reacted in a number of 
different ways and their selection of policy from among these choices was 
generally positive. America’s relations with the USSR must also be seen as 
cautious and conservative. Gorbachev was not perceived as genuine in his 
reforms by many both inside and outside the administration.134 As late as 1988, 
conservative American commentators such as William Safire and Henry 
Kissinger were criticising Reagan for cutting deals with the USSR which was, in 
their eyes, ‘an unchanging enemy’ which had negotiated breathing room.135 
FitzGerald captures the general tenor: ‘all the Reagan administration had ever 
done was to talk to the Soviets, pocket the concessions they made and take credit
133 After the 1987 Washington summit, Reagan’s approval rating rose to 58%, Garthoff, The 
Great Transition, p. 94.
134 Congressman Richard Cheney (R.) Wisconsin, represented many conservative minds at the 
time who thought of the reform process as an attempt to get ‘breathing room’: ‘I’m not sure it is 
in our interest that he [Gorbachev] succeed. We could just end up with a tough, more impressive 
adversary.’ Quoted in Joseph S. Nye, ‘Gorbachev’s Russia and U.S. Options’ in Seweryn Bialer 
and Michael Mandelbaum (eds.), Gorbachev’s Russia and American Foreign Policy Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1988, pp. 385-408; p. 393.
135 See FitzGerald, Way Out There, and Sidney Blumemthal, Pledging Allegiance New York: 
Harper Collins, 1990, pp. 249-51.
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for having forced Gorbachev to do what he was doing anyway for his own 
purposes.’ That said, it is important to realise just how hard it was for someone 
like Reagan, and for his administration, to talk to the Soviets.
Bush Administration
Despite Bush’s campaigning on continuing the Reagan legacy, a clear 
break existed between the two administrations. All key personnel within the 
White House changed and the general tenor of policy was dramatically different 
from the Reagan years.137 But, one must remember that these were different 
times; the conditions of world politics had changed dramatically in eight years. 
Despite this, the Bush administration, in its attitude to foreign policy, and 
specifically towards the Soviet Union, maintained some of the key elements of 
the Reagan period. The scepticism towards the Gorbachev overtures that was 
evident in the Reagan administration was more glaring during Bush’s first year. 
This was remarkable given the improvement in relations and the clear evidence 
of Soviet sincerity. Partly, this derived from the fact that Bush had less political 
room to manoeuvre, but it was also due to the personal commitments of the 
people in charge—particularly Bush, Baker and Scowcroft—who were 
inherently more cautious and conservative than their equivalents in the later 
Reagan administration.
This conservatism can be seen in their reaction to the pronouncements at 
the UN in December 1988 which they perceived to be part of a ‘propaganda 
campaign’. The Bush administration did not wish to take hasty action in case it 
helped the Soviets capitalise on this campaign. Scowcroft confirms this in his 
memoir: ‘I was suspicious of Gorbachev’s motives and sceptical of his 
prospects.. .He was attempting to kill us with kindness rather than bluster.’138 At 
every point in US-Soviet negotiations there was a meanness of spirit, a surprising
136 FitzGerald, Way Out There, p. 472.
137 Matlock describes the arrival of the ‘Bush people’ in the White House as resembling a ‘hostile 
take-over’, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 185.
138 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 14. If the concern was primarily about the long 
term political viability of Gorbachev in the face of conservative opposition, then it might have 
been more understandable. But the idea that they did not believe him is remarkable.
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condescension,139 and an underlying distrust. The informing belief of the Bush 
administration was that the shift in Soviet international relations was not due to a 
Reaganite ‘peace through strength’, nor a revolution in the Soviet Union, but was 
due to forty years of sustained pressure. They believed that containment had 
worked.140
After the strategic ‘pause’ in relations,141 Bush’s general policy toward 
the Soviets was clear. It was a dual-pronged approach which sought to improve 
relations with the Soviet Union while being cautious to defend US interests in the 
face of existing military power. This somewhat banal piece of policy took four 
months to produce. Some months later, what had been perfectly obvious to the 
rest of the world for some time, finally pierced the Washington bubble. By 
September 1989, the Bush team reached an epiphany of sorts; they realised that 
Gorbachev and his reformers were ‘for real’.142 In these months their inaction 
had contributed to Gorbachev’s loss of control of his power base. Interestingly, 
Bush claims that he did not ‘dance on the wall’ due to a desire not to poke 
Gorbachev in the eye.143 Given the emphasis he put on personal relations in his 
foreign policy, this may have been part of the reason, but it was also due to his 
own caution and conservatism which feared a Soviet reversal and the 
implications that such an outcome might have for him and his ‘legacy’.
In allowing the improvement of international relations to continue to be 
Soviet-led, Bush also followed the Reagan lead. While the Soviets were focusing 
not simply on the US axis, the US was not substantially changing its broader 
posture.144 Under Bush, as under Reagan, America behaved in the manner of its 
choosing, with scant regard for the concerns of third parties.145 Bush also 
continued the Reagan approach of accepting concessions without reciprocating 
equally either in kind or in type.146 The major agreements signed were largely the
139 The condescension expressed towards Gorbachev regarding economic reforms was an 
example o f the mean-spirited arrogance which characterised some American attitudes at this 
time.
140 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 28.
141 In retrospect a good opportunity for co-operative action, present in the first 6-8 months of 
1989, was squandered by an overly cautious and suspicious administration.
142 Oberdorfer, From the Cold War, p. 371; Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 93.
143 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 148-51.
144 The one exception was the move away from support o f the Contras, but this had come from 
domestic political scandal.
145 The interventions in Panama and the Philippines during 1990 were good examples of this.
146 See Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 119.
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result of Soviet concessions. More importantly, the decision to allow self- 
determination in Eastern Europe had little to do with America or American 
pressure. The radical shift in Warsaw Pact doctrine was internally derived and 
the USSR’s acceptance of a unified Germany was due to German inducements, 
what proved to be empty promises from Nato, and the Soviet inability to act. It is 
reasonable to ask precisely what active role the Americans played in the dramatic 
events of 1989-90—the answer: they sat back slightly confused, and spoke 
words of encouragement and then happily wrote history in their favour. Bush, in 
his memoir, captures this: ‘I think our accomplishment or contribution was in 
how we guided and shaped the final critical events...We set the right tone of 
gentle encouragement to the reformers in Eastern Europe, keeping the pressure 
on the communist governments to move toward greater freedom without pushing 
the Soviets against a wall and into a bloody crackdown.’147 In their conservatism, 
the Bush administration missed a historic opportunity to support the Gorbachev 
reforms within the USSR with economic and other non-military support
1 ASmeasures. These could have helped give stability to a process of profound 
social change and dislocation by smoothing the economic and non-economic 
costs of the more radical reforms in the Soviet Union. This they refused to do 
and their legacy is the poorer for it.
History has given credit to Bush and Reagan, yet it must recognise that 
the Americans changed fewer of their military capabilities, their strategic 
intentions and underlying beliefs than did the Soviets. While the American’s 
philosophy of international relations barely changed at all, their willingness to 
talk in reasonable and open terms was of crucial importance to Gorbachev and 
the changes he was trying to impose, despite the ongoing hostility in the form of 
SDI and third world conflicts.149 The Americans helped give Gorbachev a very
147 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, p. 565.
148 Jack Matlock, then American ambassador to the USSR, had sent a range of policy options to 
the incoming administration for just this purpose, yet it was ignored except for a small section on 
joint cooperation on transnational issues. See Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 177-200.
149 American policy can be thought of as a reverse image of the traditional ‘dual track’ of 
revolutionary foreign policy. ‘Dual track’ refers to a revolutionary state’s strategy of, at the same 
time conducting ‘normal’ diplomacy, and also challenging the international system through the 
support of revolutionary challenges and die export of revolution. In a reversal of this method, the 
Americans had undertaken ‘normal’ diplomacy with Gorbachev, while at the same time seriously 
challenging Soviet influence in the third world with a strident counter-revolutionary policy. On 
the ‘dual track’ of revolutionary foreign policy see Fred Halliday, Revolution and World Politics: 
The Rise and Fall o f the Sixth Great Power Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 133-57.
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important platform by embracing him as a person to talk to, to take seriously and, 
belatedly, believe in. In this way, they helped the Soviets limp into international 
normality for a brief year before the maelstrom of change destroyed them 
forever.
5.3 The End  of the Cold W a r  in  H istorical
Perspective
The end of the Cold War must be understood as the end of the larger 
international confrontation and not merely a rapprochement between American 
and Soviet leaders. The Cold War system of relations was built up by the ideas, 
intentions and actions of the Soviet and Western blocs and it established a 
structure which shaped world politics and its development for decades. The 
chapter has shown that the international confrontation was brought to an end by 
change in all three aspects—ideas, intentions and actions—on the Soviet side, 
and a change in intention and belated change in actions on the American-led 
side. The confrontation was the product of the actions of the two major powers 
and their allies, but was also a structuring limit to the scope of their actions. In 
short, the end of the Cold War was a victory for the agents of the system over its 
perceived limits. Remarkably, as late as October 1989, members of the Bush 
administration were counselling against thinking, saying and acting as though the 
Cold War was over.150 Yet, it was clear for all to see that it was, if not utterly 
gone, then withered beyond recognition.
The Cold War had been more than simply a state of affairs which was 
defined by the status of the relations between the two main protagonists. It was 
the second half of a socio-economic, geopolitical and ideological international 
confrontation between Soviet communism and the capitalist West. The Cold War 
had been transcended by the removal from the system of the core value of 
ideological rivalry which had produced the confrontation. This movement of 
ideas led to the scaling down of the arms race and the end of great power 
interventions in third world affairs. These developments had been propelled by
150 Vice-President Dan Quayle and Scowcroft were the two most prominent, see Beschloss and 
Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 123.
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material developments, particularly the growth in Soviet society, the limits of the 
Soviet economic system and the recognition of the need to be a part of the liberal 
world order. The centre-piece, Eastern Europe, had been given its freedom to 
chose,151 the Soviets had retreated from all of their military commitments outside 
their territory, they had pushed for peace deals in conflicts they had previously 
supported and fuelled, and had even tried to tell Castro what to do. The 
Americans were slow to react. While they were arguing about SDI, ‘Gorbachev 
launched a political revolution in the Soviet Union. Few in Washington 
understood what he was doing or where he was going, and the Cold War was
i c j
over long before the American foreign policy establishment knew it.’ The 
conflict had been changed by the actions of the Soviets who were themselves 
reacting to longer and shorter term changes in economy and society.
The Cold War was the second phase of the longer-run international 
confrontation between Soviet communism and the capitalist West. Accordingly, 
Cold War hostility had its origins not in the breaking down of a war-time 
alliance, but in the ideas and aspirations of the Russian revolution and the fear 
and loathing this induced in the West. As the Cold War had a history longer than 
the fifty or so years of its usual attribution, so too the end of the Cold War had a 
historical trajectory longer than the 1985-90 period discussed above. The two 
most significant longer-term dimensions of the end of the Cold War were the 
Helsinki Final Act and the development, within the USSR and Eastern Europe, 
of the social and economic conditions for bringing about its end. Helsinki was 
seen as a betrayal at the time of its conclusion by activists and dissidents who felt 
that the West had turned its back on them. In return for Soviet lip-service to 
international norms, the post-war European borders were officially recognised by 
the Western powers. Yet it was, on the one hand, the hectoring of President 
Carter and other international players after the agreement was signed,153 and on 
the other, the recognition within the Soviet Union and specifically the CPSU that
151 The reform process in Eastern Europe had a range of origins— dissident movements within, 
peace movements without, reform minded communists and so on—but the entire process of 
change was reliant on the Soviet decision not to intervene to prevent change. As George Bush 
remarked while flying out of Hungary in July 1989, ‘if there were no Gorbachev, there would be 
nothing of what we’ve just seen in Poland and Hungary.’ Quoted in Beschloss and Talbott, At the 
Highest Levels, p. 92.
152 FitzGerald, Way Out There, p. 17-8
153 Gates makes a similar point at the end of his memoir, see From the Shadows, pp. 555-6.
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these were norms which they themselves aspired to, that slowly helped push the 
Soviets to realise that they could not go on relating to the world in the old way. It 
was Helsinki interacting with the population of a reasonably developed and 
highly educated state which was the catalyst. The international confrontation was 
terminated by the rejection of the values and practices of the Russian revolution 
and the adoption of a new set of values and practices. Of the five conditions of 
world politics which produced the Cold War out of the larger international 
confrontation set out in Chapter One, none was left intact by the end of 1990.154 
The USSR’s domestic shift and its acceptance by the US-led capitalist West were 
the two key factors in this development.
The Soviet Union had, in its development, the seeds of its own 
destruction. It raised social and economic expectations to levels that it could not 
possibly meet and made them central to its claims to international 
competitiveness. As it was within the state, so it was without. Soviet society had 
developed a population and elites who had expectations of its international 
position—as a leader of social justice, an international defender of emancipation, 
and a military superpower—which it manifestly could not meet. It was this dual 
expectation, that things should and must be better inside and outside the state, 
which drove the new generation of leaders. It was the values and ideas of 
Helsinki and the UN, and the instrumental desire to improve the economy which, 
over time, drove the shift in ideas, intentions and actions which brought about the 
Soviet change. It was the linking of liberal ideas of world politics to concrete 
material realities—the economic and social retardation of the Soviet Union— 
which brought the curtain down on the Cold War. These were two developments 
which had their origins as much in the world of 1917 as in the world of the 
1980s.
Crockatt writes that ‘while the Soviet Union’s capacity to sustain itself 
was limited to and by the Cold War system, the United States was never so 
constrained, since it had access to the resources of the world system.. .The Cold 
War did not so much collapse as it was bypassed.’155 As shown in earlier 
chapters, the international confrontation was a central element of Soviet power; it
154 See above note 7.
155 Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World 
Politics, 1941-1991 London: Routledge, 1995, p. 371.
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was at the heart of the ‘logic’ of the Soviet state, but was not central to the USA. 
Clearly the confrontation was important to America, but the main logic of 
American power was capitalism, and, by following a kind of Kennanite position, 
it was able to withstand the challenge of the Soviet Union and its form of socio­
economic power. On the other hand, the international confrontation had 
penetrated the Soviet state, in both ideological and material terms. On moving 
away from the conflict, the Soviet Union distanced itself from its revolutionary 
legacy most rapidly and most profoundly in its foreign policy. Foreign policy 
reform was, so to speak, the vanguard of the second Russian revolution. It was 
precisely this vanguardism which meant that the Cold War was transcended and 
not ended as such. It was transcended because the Soviet Union ceased to be a 
revolutionary power and it ceased to present a face of challenge to the 
international system. Rather, the Soviet Union adopted the norms of liberal 
international relations and, slowly and reluctantly accepted the norms of liberal 
capitalism domestically.
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Chapter
6
6 Th e  Vulnerability  o f  a  G reat Po w er
Your dearest wish is for our state structure and our ideological system never to 
change to remain as they are for centuries. But history is not like that Every 
system either finds a way to devdap or dse it collapses.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, 19731
There is no way that one man can preserve the Soviet Union.
Boris Yeltsin to reporters in Washington, DC, June 20,19912
It was the spring of 1988 when Mikhail Gorbachev said to Colin Powell, ‘what 
are you going to do now that you’ve lost your best enemy?’ For many this was 
and still is the pressing question of world politics.4 But no one considered the 
question that Gorbachev should have been asking himself—what was the Soviet 
Union going to do now that it had lost its ‘best enemy’? With the end of the Cold 
War, the circumstances of Soviet existence had changed profoundly. The 
ideology, which had been a foundational and organisational core of the state, was 
gone. The confidence of an Eastern European buffer zone of ‘fraternal’ states had 
disappeared virtually overnight, and CPSU rule was frail and getting weaker by 
the day. Within the Soviet Union, the reform process was unleashing social chaos 
which, along with divisions in the ruling elite and the leadership’s uncertainty
1 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Letter to Soviet Leaders London: Harvill/Collins and the Index on 
Censorship, 1974 [orig. 1973]; p. 58.
2 Quoted in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f
the o f the End o f the Cold War Boston: Little, Brown, 1993, p. 400.
3 Colin Powell with Joseph E. Perisco, A Soldier’s Way: An Autobiography London: Hutchison, 
1995, p. 375.
4 For an example of a response to this question see Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of
Civilisations’ in Foreign Affairs 74.3, 1993, pp. 22-49.
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regarding just how to go about repairing the state, clearly meant that things could 
never again be as they were.
In the period between the December 1988 UN speech, which was the 
highest point of the Gorbachev arc, and late August 1991, the Soviet state 
became an ineffective institution. Ultimately, on a cold and snowy 8 December 
1991 in Belovezhsky Forest, Byelorussia, Leonid Kravchuk, Boris Yeltsin and 
Stanislau Shushkevitch, put it out of its misery. They signed an agreement which 
formally disposed of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.5 The Soviet 
monolith which had, only a few years ago, been the source of so much fear and 
loathing, was gone. It was replaced by its fifteen constituent republics and a 
loose knit Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
This final substantive chapter has two aims. The first is to show the ways 
in which the ending of the Cold War helped to destabilise the Soviet state and 
helped to produce the condition of Soviet state vulnerability. The second is to 
show how the vulnerability and consequent weakness of state institutions 
allowed three major social forces—elite fragmentation, nationalist/republican 
demands, and economic crisis—to dissolve the mechanisms with which the 
Soviet Union had been able to operate and reproduce itself. The aim is to 
demonstrate that the Soviet state was incapable of adapting to the new social 
conditions it found itself in. The underlying purpose of the chapter is to use the 
historical sociological theory developed in this thesis to examine the international 
dimensions of the failure of the Soviet state with specific reference to the role of 
the end of the international confrontation in hindering the reproduction processes 
of the Soviet state.
In Chapter One, vulnerability was defined as the condition in which the 
means by which the state had previously reproduced its dominance could not 
continue, but new means had yet to be found, leaving the state vulnerable to 
challenges to its authority.6 This chapter will show that the end of the Cold War 
contributed in several crucial respects, both structural and contingent, to the 
conditions which made the state vulnerable to forces with which it ultimately
5 Source on the conditions, Michael Dobbs, Down with Big Brother: The Fall o f the Soviet 
Empire New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997, p. 442. The exact phrase in the agreement was abrupt: 
‘The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is ceasing its existence.’ Cited in Dobbs, Down with Big 
Brother, p. 424.
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failed to cope. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union was not a state on the brink 
of destruction. It was not a seething cauldron of animosity and desperation only 
held together by the invocation of a mythical enemy and a vigilant and ruthless 
KGB.7 Yet by late 1990-early 1991, the populations of many of the republics 
were at one another’s throats, food was hard to come by and buyers’ panics 
drove what supplies could be found out of stores faster than they could be 
unloaded. The economy virtually ceased to function. This fall, from a backward, 
but still functioning, economy and society, to one of utter chaos was the result of 
dramatically changed domestic and international circumstances.
The chapter has three parts. The first will give an overview of the 
constituent elements of the Soviet breakdown and collapse. The purpose of this is 
to make clear what collapsed and to draw the distinction between the forces 
impelling state breakdown and the actual collapse of the Soviet state. Second, the 
chapter will then overview the concepts of vulnerability and state breakdown to 
show how they will be used to make our evaluation. This section will also 
distinguish between the structural and contingent sources of vulnerability. The 
third part will evaluate the extent to which the end of the Cold War played a role 
in Soviet weakness. It will focus on three points: how the sources of Soviet 
power emanating from the international confrontation were no longer extant; 
how the end the Cold War affected Soviet state power-as-practice; and third, 
how, in a more immediate sense, the end of the Cold War was a political weapon 
with which opponents could attack the state. The chapter’s conclusion will look 
at the fatal blows which brought about the final collapse and will evaluate, using 
the concept of state vulnerability, how the end of the Cold War helped to 
contribute to the breakdown of Soviet rule. The end of the international 
confrontation did not cause the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the shift it 
precipitated in the Soviet Union’s international posture and in the larger 
conditions of international politics clearly helped to make a once great power 
vulnerable to forces it had previously been able to withstand.
6 See Chapter One, pp. 31-36.
7 On the stability and perceived success of the Brezhnev period as it appeared in the early 1980s 
see Richard Sakwa, Soviet Politics: An Introduction Routledge: London, 1989, pp. 89-91.
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6.1 C o n s t i t u e n t  E le m e n ts  o f  t h e  S o v ie t  C o l l a p s e
Explanations of the collapse of the Soviet Union abound. Certain scholars 
have asserted that the Soviet Union collapsed because of its despotic nature,8 
while others have argued that it was the product of the reforms in the larger 
context of economic failure; the result of a ‘revolution from above’.9 Some 
maintain that the collapse was due to an inability to cope with the information 
revolution,10 others have argued that it was an inevitable product of the Soviet 
system which was not viable and doomed to failure.11 While it is hard to 
envisage the Soviet Union limping on in the opening year of the twenty first 
century, our imaginations must make that effort. It is fair to say that, eventually, 
the USSR would have crumbled, in the way that all tyrannical regimes do in 
time. But there was nothing inevitable in the nature or timing of the Soviet 
Union’s fall.12 Dallin rightly makes the point that the ‘Soviet collapse [was] the 
product of unintended results, both of socio-economic development and of earlier 
policy choices.’13 The transformation from a strong state to a broken one was the 
result of longer-term developments as well as the specific acts of the Gorbachev 
regime.
8 Wisla Suraska, How the Soviet Union Disappeared: An Essay on the Causes o f Dissolution 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998.
9 David M. Kotz with Fred Weir, Revolution From Above: The Demise o f the Soviet System 
London: Routledge, 1997.
10 Manuel Castells, Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume 3. End o f  
Millennium Oxford: Blackwells, 1998, pp. 2-68.
11 For example, Hillel Ticktin, Origins of the Crisis in the USSR: Essays on the Political 
Economy o f a Disintegrating System Armonck, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997; Martin Malia ‘From 
Under the Rubble, What?’ Problems of Communism 41.1-2, 1992, pp. 89-106.
12 Alexander Dallin, ‘Causes of the Collapse of the USSR’ in Post-Soviet Affairs 8.4, 1992, 
pp. 279-302; pp. 281-2. On this more generally see Robert Strayer, Why Did the Soviet Union 
Collapse? Understanding Historical Change Armonck, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
13 Dallin, ‘Causes of the Collapse’, p. 281.
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6.1.1 Identifying State Breakdown
The Soviet Union existed both as an idea and as a state. Cox writes that 
there were four senses of Soviet existence: it was a functioning planned 
economy; it was an alternative to capitalism; it was a perceived threat to the 
West; and it was an empire.14 That was not all, it was also a set of state 
institutions, the centre of a global challenge to imperialism and capitalism, and 
was thought by many to be the repository of the idea of communism. Some even 
saw the Soviet control of Eastern Europe as a fundamental part of the Union. So 
when one speaks of the collapse of the Soviet Union, to what, precisely, is one 
referring?
The concern here is with the Soviet Union understood as a set of 
institutions of rule. While the other forms of Soviet Union are important, they are 
secondary to the functioning of the Soviet state. In Chapter Two, the thesis 
elaborated a theory of state power which showed that the state can be thought of 
as a bundle of institutions which make a set of moral and political claims which 
are reinforced by the effective use of force, which in turn frames the social 
relations of the people within a circumscribed territory.15 In Chapter Three, this 
idea was applied to the Soviet state, and, following that argument, this thesis 
contends that the ‘collapse of the Soviet Union’ refers, first and foremost, to the 
breakdown of a specific system of rule over a given population and territory. 
This means that the institutions of state—the CPSU, the ministries, the KGB 
etc.—and the patterns through which these institutions relate, both to one another 
and to the population at large, ceased to function in any meaningful sense which 
was identifiable with the old regime.
The formal legal end of the USSR occurred at midnight on 31 December 
1991. It is a useful date, for, while the legal recognition of what was already a 
substantive reality may be seen as a belated and purely symbolic move,16 such a
14 Michael Cox, ‘Whatever Happened to the USSR? Critical Reflections on Soviet Studies’ in 
Michael Cox (ed.), Rethinking the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death o f Communism and 
the New Russia London: Pinter, 1998, pp. 11-31; p. 11.
15 See Chapter Two, pp. 64-83.
16 The CIS treaty had been signed on 21 December. The Russian flag had replaced the Soviet flag 
above the Kremlin at around 7.30pm on 25 December, immediately after Gorbachev had 
resigned, and Yeltsin had taken over the office of President in Staraya Plashad on 26 December.
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view underplays the importance of political symbolism and also ignores the 
significance of the principle of rule which is central to the proper and adequate 
functioning of states.17 One could argue that the Soviet Union ceased to exist 
during the ‘flood of sovereignties’ of 1989, or on 20 December 1989, when the 
Lithuanian Communist Party broke off relations with the CPSU, or even on 
4 May when the Latvian parliament declared itself independent from the USSR. 
But to adhere to these arguments overlooks several important facts. First, despite 
the problems of 1989-90, the USSR continued to function, albeit poorly, at least 
until the coup of 1991. Second, while the USSR was clearly an empire of sorts, 
the loss of empire was not coterminous with the collapse of the state. Third, 
while the Baltic and central Asian states were crucial to the working of the 
USSR, their loss was not catastrophic. The Union was predominantly a Slavic 
affair. Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union must be understood, first and 
foremost, as the failure of the institutions of rule to function effectively in the 
‘heartland’ republics of the RSFSR, Ukraine and Byelorussia.
The breakdown of the Soviet Union was the product of four separate, 
though related, developments: sovereignty and independence claims; elite 
fragmentation; the failure of state institutions; and the formation of new state 
institutions. The first step along this path was taken by the growth of sovereignty 
and independence claims which had a meaningful form and resonated with 
various populations. The first claim to sovereignty was made by the Estonian 
Supreme Soviet on 16 November 1988. Lithuania, Latvia, and Georgia soon 
followed in 1989.18 In the spring of 1990, the Baltic states then declared their 
independence, spurred on by the passing of the Law of Secession from the Union 
on 3 April 1990. This Act presaged more challenging calls for sovereignty. On 
16 July, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet declared its sovereignty which opened the 
floodgates. Eleven days later, Byelorussia’s Supreme Soviet followed suit and by
For accounts of this see Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador’s 
Account o f the Collapse o f the Soviet Union New York: Random House, 1995, pp. 630-47; Don 
Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983- 
1991 Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, pp. 466-75; Dobbs, Down With Big 
Brother, pp. 442-51; Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs London: Bantam, 1997 [orig. 1995], pp. 847- 
51.
17 Interestingly, the various aspects of the Soviet state were considered to be ‘in crisis’ up until 
the hand-over, and then subsequently the crisis was perceived to have receded.
18 On 18 May, 29 July and 19 November respectively.
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the end of the year, ten of the fifteen Union republics had claimed their own 
sovereignty.19
More crucially, in the following year, the flood of sovereignties turned 
into a tide of independence claims.20 While the Baltics had always been different 
from the other republics—closer to Europe, more affluent and more 
nationalistic—in their bid for independence, however, they established the 
pattern for the disintegration of the Union. The Baltic states held referenda on
• 91their independence and were overwhelmingly supported. Shortly thereafter, 
Yeltsin garnered more effective power as RSFSR president and, in a highly 
symbolic moment, was voted in as the first democratically elected Russian leader 
on 12 June with 57.3% of the vote.22 Georgia, following the pattern, declared 
independence on 9 April.23 But it was not until the coup attempt of 18-21 August 
that the calls for independence became overwhelming. On 24 August, Ukraine 
declared itself independent. This declaration was repeated in the following
OA 9S  0(\ onmonths by Byelorussia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan,28 Armenia,29 and Turkmenistan.30 By 26 October 1991, 
every single republic, except the RSFSR, had declared itself independent from 
the Union.
Sovereignty and independence claims alone did not undo the state. But 
they are indicative of a number of developments. First, they show that the 
Soviets’ moral claim to final legitimate authority had eroded to the point of non­
19 Turkmenistan did so on 22 August, Tajikistan on 25 August, Kazakhstan on 25 October and 
Kyrgyzstan on 30 October.
20 For an overview of the sovereignty and independence claims see Helene Carrere d’Encausse, 
The End o f the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations New York: Basic Books, 1993, 
particularly pp. 29-111 and pp. 144-70.
1 Lithuania’s vote on 9 February garnered a 90.47% vote in favour, Keesing’s Record o f  World 
Events London: Keesing’s, Vol. 37, 1991, p. 38014. The votes on 3 March in Estonia and Latvia 
achieved 78% and 74% in favour respectively, Keesing’s Record of World Events Vol. 37, 1991, 
p. 38078.
2 Keesing’s Record o f World Events London: Keesing’s, Vol. 37,1991, pp. 38273.
23 This was after a referendum held on 31 March in which a resounding 98.93% voted in favour, 
Keesing’s Record o f World Events London: Keesing’s, Vol. 37, 1991, p. 38078.
24 25 August.
25 27 August.
26 Both on 28 August.
27 30 August.
28 Both on 31 August.
29 23 September.
30 26 October. The sources for notes 24-30 are from various texts including Matlock, Autopsy on 
an Empire, Carrere d’Encausse, The End o f the Soviet Empire, Keesing’s Record o f World Events 
London: Keesing’s, Vol. 37, 1991 and The Economist.
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existence. Second, their timing, particularly the explosion of independence 
claims after the coup attempt, are good evidence that the conservative efforts to 
seize power marked the beginning of the end for the Soviet state. Third, the 
claims made the Soviet leadership’s efforts to cling to power even more 
desperate.31 In Chapter Two, the thesis argued that state power should be 
understood in processual terms, and particularly that the process of power-as- 
practice was central to the reproduction of state power.32 During 1990 and 1991, 
it was apparent that the inability to practice state power seriously undermined 
both the functioning and the credibility of the Soviet state.
The split in the ruling elite, and particularly the fracturing and ultimate 
death of the CPSU, was the second development which propelled Soviet 
collapse. The CPSU was the most important institution of the Soviet state. As it 
began to fragment, due both to elite divisions and to a waning institutional 
capacity, so too the other large state institutions began to fail. Gorbachev 
contributed to the death of CPSU power in a number of ways. First, he 
dismantled the apparat in the Central Committee plenum in September 1988. 
This was a calculated gamble undertaken to try to circumvent those elements 
within the party which had been blocking reform.33 The next step towards the 
CPSU’s demise was the removal, from the Constitution, of Article 6 which 
guaranteed the party’s ‘leading’ role in the state.34 Both of these were decisions 
taken by reformist elements within the party. However, it was ultimately forces 
from without which were to destroy the party. Yeltsin’s decree of 20 July 1991, 
which banned political activity in state institutions, was the first direct attempt to 
substantially undermine party power. The reality of party emasculation was 
reflected at the 28th Party Congress in July 1991 when it became clear that the 
newly appointed Politburo would have no role whatsoever in the running of the
31 It should be noted that these were only claims. On the whole they were not, at the time, backed- 
up with effective state capacity.
32 State power-as-practice refers to the way in which the institutions of the state are able to 
reproduce themselves through their association with the state as a practised transcendent form of 
moral authority.
33 Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, pp. 166-7.
34 Article 6 was rewritten on 14 March, 1990. The new Article 6 read: ‘The Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union and other political, as well as trade union, youth and other public organisations 
and mass movements, shall take part in the elaboration of the policy of the Soviet state and in the 
running of state and public affairs through their representatives elected to the Soviet of People’s 
Deputies and in other ways.’ Cited in Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Union: 
1917-1991 London: Routledge, 1999, p. 460.
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state. The party’s actual termination began with Gorbachev’s last act prior to his 
resignation as General Secretary: the suspension of CPSU activities on 
24 August 1991, in the aftermath of the failed coup. The party’s termination was 
hastened on 29 August when the Russian Supreme Soviet banned its activities, 
and was killed off completely when Yeltsin issued a decree which banned the 
party outright and claimed its property for the RSFSR on 6 November 1991.
It was the failure of the state institutions, such as the economic, fiscal and 
other institutions, together with the rise of alternative institutions within Russia 
and the republics, which provided the third development that undid the state. The 
failure of a state, in functional terms, requires that the vital organs of state power 
cease to work effectively. In this case, it involved the double movement of a 
declining efficacy of Soviet institutions combined with the rise of alternative 
republican and Russian ones. An example of this was the restructuring of the 
KGB into three separate organisations: a border guard unit; a foreign intelligence 
service; and an inter-republic internal security service. The rise of alternative 
institutions, particularly during 1991, ensured a relatively peaceful transition 
from Soviet to republican rule.
Finally, the death of the Soviet state was finalised by the usurpation of the 
institutions of the Union by the various bodies of the republics. This process 
began on 4 November 1991 when the USSR State Council abolished all the 
Soviet ministries except for those of defence, foreign affairs, and electric and 
nuclear power. On 15 November, Yeltsin issued a series of presidential decrees 
taking control of virtually all financial and economic activity going on in the 
RSFSR. On 22 November, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet took control of what had 
been the state bank of the USSR. Gorbachev’s efforts to hold the Union together 
in some loose—and clearly not Soviet—form led to the publication of a new 
Union Treaty on 27 November. Despite this, the USSR passed the point of no 
return as a functioning and meaningful geopolitical and state entity when the 
Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence, installing former 
communist Leonid Kravchuk as President on 1 December.36 Yeltsin recognised
35 On this see generally Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 612-27. This decision was taken by 
the USSR State Council and was pushed by the republican leaders in the Council.
36 The referendum on independence passed by 90.32% of the vote, Keesing’s Record o f World 
Events London: Keesing’s, Vol. 37, 1991, pp. 38656.
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Ukrainian independence and, on 8 December, signed the Belovezh Agreement 
which declared that the USSR ceased to exist and which established the 
foundation of the CIS. On 13 December, the Central Asian states agreed to join 
the CIS. Finally, on recognising that the Soviet state was an empty vessel on 
17 December, Gorbachev announced that the USSR would cease to exist at the 
end of the year. Two formalities remained: on 21 December, the heads of eleven 
of the newly independent states met in Alma-Ata and signed the treaty forming 
the CIS,37 and, on 31 December, the USSR slipped from view.
To reiterate, the institutions of the Soviet state broke down in the 
following way. A series of sovereignty and independence claims began to 
undermine already weak structures, the CPSU began to fragment and fracture 
and was ultimately banned. In place of the failing Soviet institutions, effective 
Russian and other republican institutions began to emerge. Finally, the remaining 
formal and substantive elements of the Soviet state were swallowed by the 
successor states in a series of decrees and agreements. Why was the state 
susceptible to forces it had, in the past, been capable of resisting? One of the 
reasons for this was the destabilising of the state, in ideational as well as material 
terms, brought about by the end of the Cold War.
6.2 V ulnerability  and W eakness Revisited
This thesis has developed a view of state power which focuses on social 
processes. This approach presumes that the most important action of a state, and 
consequently the one analysts should be most interested in, is the process of the 
production and reproduction of its position of dominance. There should never be 
an assumption of stasis or continuity. Rather, we should presume that specific 
processes have produced a condition which appears to generate stability, and it is 
these processes which we must uncover. Based on this, Chapter One outlined a 
five-stage track of state instability which represents the steps that states go
37 The states represented were the Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byeloms, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
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through when they are failing to reproduce themselves effectively. On this 
track, the second stage was designated as state vulnerability. This is premised on 
the assumption that a state is a system of social institutions which constantly 
produces and reproduces the mechanisms through which it is able to dominate a 
given territory and people, meaning that its political power is contingent on the 
successful reproduction of these mechanisms. However, a state is not always able 
to cope with changes in either the international or domestic context of its 
existence. A change in values may undermine its claim to authority, a war may 
radically weaken its capabilities, or international developments may destabilise 
the ruling elite. Regardless of the nature of the development, whenever a large- 
scale change in circumstances affects the patterns of state rule, the state must 
adjust its means for mediating its relations with the international and domestic 
contexts so that it can continue to rule effectively. But states are not always 
capable of making the correct adjustment, due to ignorance of changes in the 
state’s conditions, or an inability to make the necessary changes due to 
insufficient capabilities, states can be made vulnerable.
Unlike more conventional IR studies in which the term vulnerability 
refers purely to geo-strategic threats to state power and survival.40 Here, 
vulnerability describes a situation in which three clear developments have 
occurred or are in the process of occurring: the state cannot reproduce its rule as 
it had in the past; it has yet to find a new set of mechanisms to do so; and a 
challenge or series of challenges exist which have the potential to destroy it. 
Related to this idea of state vulnerability is the idea of state weakness. This term 
requires a little explanation. Hobson provides a useful approach by 
distinguishing between domestic and international ‘state agential power’. He 
defines domestic state agential power as ‘the ability of the state to make domestic 
or foreign policy as well as shape the domestic realm, free of domestic social- 
structural requirements or the interests of non-state actors.’41 Similarly, he
38 See Chapter One pp. 31-36.
39 On this concept see Chapter Two, pp. 68-71.
40 See, for example, Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability o f Empire Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1994.
41 John M. Hobson, The State and International Relations Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p. 5. This clarifies and develops the ideas found in John M. Hobson, The Wealth o f  
States: A Comparative Sociology o f Economic and Political Change Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997.
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defines international agential power as ‘the ability of the state to make foreign 
policy and shape the international realm, free of international structural 
requirements or the interests of international non-state actors.’42 Although 
Hobson neglects to say just how it is that some states have more or less of these 
two forms of agential power, his is still a useful schema because it reaches to the 
essence of what the state is.
The theory of agential power refers to independent action, but does not 
consider state capacity understood as the basic means by which states can act. 
State capacity is the crude attribute which allows state action. It is the material, 
ideological and moral fuel which provides the state with an ability to act. For 
example, the state has the capacity to enforce its rules through specific systems 
of coercion—which may involve rules of law or simply a crude policing 
system—and it does so by paying for this with its resources. If it were not able to 
recruit enforcers or pay them, then its capacity to enforce its rules would be 
undermined. So, state strength has two dimensions, agential power (the ability to 
act with a degree of autonomy) and capacity (the material dimensions of 
action).43 Thus weakness refers to a situation in which both agential and capacity 
are at low levels. Weakness can contribute to vulnerability, but is conceptually 
distinct from it.
The relationship between state vulnerability and state weakness is 
important and reasonably obvious. A state which is vulnerable, but reasonably 
strong—that is, well endowed with the capacity to act free from certain 
constraints—is much better placed to cope with the challenges of vulnerability 
than states which are weak. Conversely, when a state is weak, it is not 
necessarily doomed. A state which is weak but blessed with good leadership or 
quirks of fortune may be able to survive periods of vulnerability. The state will 
succeed or fail as a result of its actions and its larger international and domestic 
context. No state’s future is pre-determined in a period of vulnerability.
To understand how and why a state has ended up in a situation of 
vulnerability, one must look both to the structural and to the contingent for the 
sources of its problems. Clearly, longer-term developments establish a context in
42 Hobson, The State and International Relations, p. 7.
43 Note that while agential power refers to the independence to resist structural or interest based 
requirements, a sensitivity must be shown to the limits to independence.
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which specific acts or phenomena actually drive the state into this dire condition. 
In the Soviet case, one may point to a raft of longer-term problems which were 
structural contributions to vulnerability. The following conditions were among 
the major structural preconditions for the condition of vulnerability in the USSR: 
the declining economic performance; corruption; ideological disillusionment; the 
limits of industrial development; the inability to cope with the third industrial 
revolution; an easing of control; development of society and changed 
expectations; international pressure; and the relative failure of the communist 
model.44 The contingent elements were: the economic chaos brought on by the 
leadership’s raft of economic reforms; the unleashing of popular forces through 
glasnost and demobratisatsiia\ the efforts of a faction of the elite to capture the 
state; the rejection of the ideology at the heart of the state; and the ending of the 
Cold War. All of these elements, bar the ending of the Cold War, are generally 
agreed to have weakened the state and helped to bring it down, this thesis seeks 
to rectify this omission.
6.3 T he End  of the Cold  W a r  and  Soviet
V ulnerability
This thesis is concerned with the international aspects of the Soviet 
collapse. Specifically, it is interested in the way in which the end of the Soviet 
international confrontation with the capitalist West weakened the institutions of 
the state. As such, this chapter does not consider other, more obvious 
international causes of Soviet collapse, such as the cost of empire, the arms race, 
and Afghanistan. There are two reasons for this. First, many of these have been 
adequately studied and scrutinised and the conclusions of these studies do not 
contradict or undermine the results of this study. Second, this thesis is interested 
in a different form of causation than that brought about by the immediate
44 Others have made similar lists of the longer-term problems of the system, some of which 
overlap with this one. See for example, Dallin, ‘Causes of the Collapse’; Walter Laqueur, The 
Dream that Failed: Reflections on the Soviet Union Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 
pp. 71-2; Anne de Tinguy, ‘Collapse or Suicide?’ in Anne de Tinguy (ed.), The Fall of the Soviet
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instrumental costs of international engagement. The concern here is with the way 
in which the Soviet international confrontation influenced the production and 
reproduction of the Soviet state and how the termination of this conflict damaged 
the institutional structures of Soviet power.
As shown in the previous chapter, the pursuit of a more benign 
international posture was part of an effort to reform the Soviet Union. 
Specifically, one of the aims was to establish better international conditions 
within which to pursue reform. If the Soviets could escape the costly arms race, 
decrease funding to third world regimes and enter the capitalist world economy 
with its more efficient division of labour, then, so the logic went, they stood a 
much better chance of revitalising the Soviet economy and society. Perversely, it 
had the opposite effect. The end of the Cold War did not establish a better 
context for reform or improve Soviet life, but actually destabilised it and, in turn, 
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet state. It was one among a range of 
domestic and international developments which undermined the leadership, its 
political effectiveness, and the state itself. One can identify three distinct, though 
interrelated, ways in which the change in the international posture of the Soviet 
state contributed to the pressure on the institutions of this rigid state. The first 
was the immediate effect that it had on the leadership. Second, the material 
dimensions of Soviet rule were hindered by the absence of the structuring 
mechanisms of the international confrontation. Third, the idea of the Soviet 
Union was undermined by the change in its international posture. The end of the 
Cold War played an important role in creating a situation of great power 
vulnerability. While it was not the sole cause of the weakening of the state, it was 
a significant contributory factor to the creation of a situation in which a state with 
enormous reserves of military and coercive strength could no longer reproduce 
itself in the way that it had in the past.
Empire Boulder, CO: The Eastern European Monographs, 1997, pp. 4-22; and Kotz with Weir, 
Revolution From Above, pp. 34-61.
6.3.1 Immediate Challenges
The most apparent way in which the end of the Cold War damaged the 
state stems from the impact that it had on the leadership and specifically on the 
domestic prestige and political capability of Gorbachev and the reformist elite. 
The sense that he and Shevardnadze had given in to the West and sold the Soviet 
Union’s military capacity short was an important precursor to the split by the 
conservative wing of the CPSU and the military. Seen in the context of the 
economic crisis of 1990-91, the long list of military agreements and geopolitical 
concessions, from the INF agreement to the Soviet concession to a unified 
Germany within Nato, began to be seen as a long list of give-aways in which 
Soviet interests, power and principles had not been protected. From this vantage 
point, the end of the Cold War appeared as a process in which Gorbachev 
sacrificed longer-term Soviet interests in an effort to be popular in the West and 
to use this popularity to his own advantage at home. These sacrifices were, 
furthermore, extracted by the West at too low a price. The end of the Cold War, 
from this perspective, took too American a direction.45 The most immediate 
impact of this was to energise the conservative ranks and to fuel further the 
public disillusionment with Gorbachev and his coterie. Colonel Viktor Abalkin 
articulates this disillusionment: ‘We are like Cupid: armed, naked and we impose 
love on everyone... Sad as it may be, the reality of today’s “new thinking,” the 
priority on “common human values,” well the reality is that the Soviet Union has 
lost its status as a superpower. It is treated as if it should know its place. We are 
bullied now.’46
This resulted in the end of the Cold War becoming something of a hook 
on which to hang other criticisms. The end of the confrontation, far from being 
both of a practical and rhetorical benefit, was a significant liability. This was 
compounded by the lack of US aid, credits or other economic assistance which
45 Two examples of this sentiment can be found in Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s 
Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962-1986 New York: Times Books, 1995, 
pp. 627-36, and Valery Boldin Ten Years That Shook The World: The Gorbachev Era as 
Witnessed by His Chief o f StafiTNew York: Basic Books, 1994, pp. 294-6.
46 Quoted in David Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days o f the Soviet Empire London: Viking, 
1993, p. 386.
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might have mitigated both the severity of the economic crunch and the 
perception that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had frittered away the Soviet 
Union’s last remaining symbols of power, influence and grandeur. It was not just 
the trappings of power which disenchanted people. Both in elite circles and 
among the populace at large, it was also the sense that Gorbachev had given up 
on the principles of communism which had been central to so many lives and 
deaths. For some, he had simply ‘sold out’ the millions who had died in the Great 
Patriotic War.47 Thus the external prestige which had helped launch Gorbachev’s 
reform programme demonstrably hampered his efforts to reform the state and, 
more importantly clearly weakened his hold on power of the state itself. The end 
of the Cold War provided neither prestige nor economic and social benefits and 
only compounded the sense of failure and disillusionment within both the elites 
and the population at large.
As Gorbachev became less popular and as fault lines emerged in the 
CPSU, he turned more and more to the international realm to try to re-energise 
his own political capital. This turning outward for success precipitated a 
downward spiral in the leadership and the state more generally. In venturing 
abroad, in failing to reunify the party, and in failing to deal adequately with the 
very real and tangible economic problems, Gorbachev pushed himself and his
A O
reform process further and further into the mire. Not only did he become less 
popular domestically as a result of efforts to increase his international cachet, he 
also became less effective internationally. His trips abroad in 1990-91 to shore 
up his domestic support and to gain credit from the West were unsuccessful. His 
attendance at the G7 meeting in 1991 was a sad example of this.49 Gorbachev’s 
falling popularity resulted in arguments within American foreign policy circles 
on who to back, with Bush supporting Gorbachev but with others arguing that
47 Marshall I. Goldman, What Went Wrong with Perestroika New York: W.W. Norton, 1991, 
p. 18, see also various criticisms made in Plenums of the Central Committee, and at the 
28th Congress cited in Russel Bova, ‘The Soviet Economy and International Politics’ in Michael 
Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovitch (eds.), The Disintegration o f the Soviet Economic System 
London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 43-58; pp. 50-2.
48 A poll which was conducted regularly in Moscow News demonstrates Gorbachev’s waning 
popularity. The figures were: December 1989, 52%; January 1990, 44%; May 1990, 39%; July 
1990, 28%; October 1990, 21% (percentage approval ratings), cited in Matlock, Autopsy on an 
Empire, p. 447.
49 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 531-9 and pp. 551-9.
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they should be closer to Yeltsin.50 The immediate impact of the end of the Cold 
War was to increase the erosion of support for Gorbachev and his elite. It gave 
succour and political bite to the splits in the CPSU and it further hindered the 
ability of Gorbachev and the elite to manoeuvre the state out of trouble. But it 
was not only in the domestic implications of a decline in external prestige that 
the end of the Cold War contributed to the vulnerability of the Soviet state. 
Significant problems can also be found at the material and ideational levels.
6.3.2 Material Dimensions o f Vulnerability
At first glance, one might think that the international political change 
would not have too great an impact on the domestic life of either the state or 
society. Yet the Cold War’s end challenged the very essence of the Soviet state 
by undermining the CPSU’s claim to rule and the ordering of the institutions of 
state. In Chapters Three and Four, the thesis has shown the various ways in 
which the international confrontation penetrated the Soviet state and helped to 
reinforce its system of rule in a larger sense. It was the unshackling of these 
larger structures of the state which contributed to the destabilisation of the 
system. These elements of rule have both material and ideational dimensions. 
Material refers to the way in which the state rules in concrete terms, and 
ideational refers to the principles and ideas which gives these concrete structures 
an effective social purchase.51 While some may argue that the distinction is 
slightly artificial, it is still useful to distinguish between principle and practice, 
and an analytic separation helps to clarify how the interaction takes place in 
specific circumstances. On the material front then, Goldman points out that the 
sheer chaos in the final years of the USSR was due to the simultaneous 
introduction of political and economic reforms.52 He is referring primarily to the 
problems which resulted from the economic hardship wrought as a result of
50 See George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998, pp. 497-517; and indirectly Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 563-4.
51 The concern is not merely with ideas isolated from their social and historical context. Rather, 
the focus is on the relationship between the ideas and ideologies and the instrumental-functional 
aspects of state rule.
52 Goldman, What Went Wrong, p. 124.
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reform, and the introduction of glasnost which facilitated the vocalisation of 
complaint. It was this challenge of simultaneity which seriously hindered state 
action, but a third level of reform should be added to this challenge: the 
complications introduced by the international political shift. The leadership 
pursued a radically different international posture and implemented fundamental 
economic and political changes in the domestic sphere simultaneously. This 
simultaneity produced a context of chaos in which all of the arms of the state 
were groping in the darkness, to say nothing of the reaction of the population to 
this disturbing state of affairs. The simultaneous nature of reforms only 
exacerbated the trauma within the state and the social disorder experienced by 
the population.
The second manner in which the end of the Cold War damaged the 
material dimensions of Soviet state power was its removal as a macro criterion of 
value. The international confrontation had acted, in the fields of economic 
planning, foreign policy, social policy and even education, as a key organising 
principle in the Soviet state. This point was made in detail in Chapter Four, but is 
worth reiterating. The Soviet state had been structured around the achievement of 
specific aims. One of these was the development of a qualitatively better social 
system than that provided by capitalism. This grandiose aim was at the root of 
the confrontation between Soviet communism and the capitalist West. The 
confrontation, at both the social and military levels, helped to provide the state 
with guidance about the ‘needs’ of society. It facilitated ‘knowledge’ with which 
it could make plans for social organisation. In education, as in military spending, 
the international competition made its presence felt.
In a more direct sense, the international confrontation penetrated the 
economy and acted as a broader structuring force within the command system. It 
influenced key structural mechanisms and greatly shaped the nature of many 
commands. As shown in Chapter Four, the confrontation provided a telos\ it 
helped order priorities and gave purpose and order to the decision-making 
hierarchies of the CPSU, the information systems of the price mechanism and the 
incentive mechanism. Laqueur notes that the
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population had been indoctrinated to believe that a rapacious and 
aggressive enemy made it necessary for the Soviet Union to engage in 
costly defence to preserve the achievements o f the regime. This state o f  
siege mentality was widespread and deeply rooted. How could the partly 
leadership and the police apparatus be justified without an omnipresent 
enemy?5
Laqueur argues that the Cold War justified the privations of the Soviet system 
based on this threat.54 He is right, but his strictly instrumentalist interpretation is 
an overstatement. The confrontation with the West helped to justify actions, but 
the justifications were not purely cynical. There was a belief in the threat from 
the West and that belief was matched by a sense that the Soviet way was 
necessary to make things better. Thus, in this triple sense, the international 
confrontation supported the Soviet state. The confrontation was not used purely 
in an instrumental fashion by the state. It was an instrumental dimension of a 
larger ordering principle which permeated the state. As a consequence, the end of 
the Cold War undermined the mechanisms and justifications for, not only the 
form of state, but also for the repressive nature of Soviet rule. Ultimately, the end 
of the confrontation meant that the directional capacity of the Soviet state had 
been dramatically undermined.
One example of the problems caused by the departure of the Cold War 
priorities can be seen in the effort to come to terms with the market system and 
the subsequent struggles over the type and form of a new economic system. Once 
the leadership had belatedly realised that the economy needed more radical 
reform than had been attempted in the first two years, it was clear that there was 
no consensus about what to replace the old system with, or even how to go about 
pursuing change. Three significant attempts were made. The first centred on the 
Enterprise Law, the second on the 500 day plan and the third on the Anti-Crisis 
plan of 1991.55 Each of these efforts failed. The reform process was as much 
hindered by the flip-flopping of the leadership as it was by the larger problems
53 Laqueur, The Dream That Failed, p. 59.
54 Though it was not the only justification. The ideology o f single party rule, Leninist discipline 
toward a single line, and the utilisation of the fear of counter-revolution from within were also 
used to justify privations.
55 See Anders Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic Reform Second Edition, London: 
Pinter, 1991, pp. 114-53, and pp. 203-24.
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besetting the economy.56 The economic disaster was compounded by the lack of 
consensus among the elites about the direction in which to take the economy. 
The removal of several of the core elements of the economic system which were 
a product of the international confrontation—the priorities and ordering 
principles—helped to destabilise the economy and contributed to the condition of 
vulnerability whereby weakness was compounded by the inability to replace the 
system.
In ending the Cold War and so moving away from the international 
confrontation of geopolitics and socio-economics, the Soviet state lost a 
mechanism by which value could be measured and knowledge generated. In the 
context of the reform process and its consequent chaos, the end of the Cold War 
stripped away the elements of the system which helped to make it work. It 
destabilised state institutions and consequently helped to induce a condition of 
vulnerability. The end of the Cold War was not the pre-eminent reason for the 
failure of various institutions of the state in a purely material sense. There were 
other factors such as bankruptcy, wage blowouts, inflation and the ambivalence 
of the leadership to the problems exploding in society.
6.3.3 Ideational Vulnerability
At its heart, the international confrontation was produced by 
contradictory and antagonistic views on how the world should be ordered. It is 
not surprising that, of the various ways in which the conflict penetrated the 
Soviet state, some of the most significant were in the ideational sphere. It was 
clear that ideology was central to the unity of the CPSU, to its claim to rule and 
to its organisation of people’s lives. In writing about the lapse in faith in 
communism of the ruling elite, Dallin emphasises just how important the idea of 
faith was ‘for the cohesion of a regime that had chosen to make its ideology so 
central and weighty a core of its system.’57 Jack Matlock, America’s ambassador 
to the USSR in the 1980s, correctly notes that ‘the Cold War could not end, truly
56 On which see generally Goldman, What Went Wrong, pp. 203-38; Ellman and Kontorovitch 
(eds.), The Disintegration, pp. 20-28.
57 Dallin, ‘Causes of the Collapse’, p. 287.
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and definitively, until the Soviet Union had abandoned its system’s ideological 
linchpin, the class struggle concept. And once it did, the system itself had no
r o
arguable rationale.’ Matlock is right to note that, without the underlying 
revolutionary ideology, both the Cold War and the very state itself had little 
reason to be.
In Chapter Three, the thesis pointed out five ways in which the 
international confrontation reinforced the Soviet state’s ideological claim to rule 
and provided it with important sociological ‘glue’ which held the elite together 
and helped the Soviet state to predominate. The first was the sense in which the 
confrontation facilitated the state’s efforts to control the population. The second 
was the way the confrontation was used as a means to justify the privations and 
difficulties of Soviet life and to justify the direction of social life dictated by the 
state. Third, it provided a structuring sense of purpose. Fourth, the conflict was a 
source of prestige and a demonstration of the necessity of communist ways of 
life. Finally, in its dual incarnation as a purpose and a challenge, the 
confrontation established a set of limits for political action. The confrontation set 
the parameters of the politically possible in a manner conducive to the CPSU’s 
continued position of dominance within the state. In short, the international 
confrontation was a cornerstone of the practised idea of Soviet rule.
While the end of the Cold War clearly undermined these five elements of 
state control and so destabilised Soviet power, there is more to the end of the 
Cold War, in ideational terms, than the removal of these struts. Chapter Two 
showed the importance of a processual understanding of state power and 
specifically the centrality of power-as-practice to the workings of the modem 
state.59 The end of the Cold War severed the link between Soviet ideology and 
the practice of state rule. To maintain effective rule states need to ensure, not 
simply that they are materially capable of clinging to power; they need to have 
more than just enough tanks, guns and money to reproduce themselves in an 
effective manner. To reproduce, states need to have a meaningful transcendent 
claim which is then translated by state power-as-practice into a reproducible
58 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 649.
59 See above note 32.
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system of rule. Without this, the state may limp on, but in an increasingly 
decrepit manner.
The thesis has shown, in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, the importance 
of revolutionary values to the Soviet state’s transcendent moral claim. 
Furthermore, these chapters have shown that states need to have meaningful 
incarnations of the larger transcendent moral claim to give their material powers 
greater social effect. The international confrontation was just such an incarnation. 
The nature of the moral claims made by the CPSU and consequently by the 
Soviet state—the construction of communism, inside and outside the USSR, the 
dictatorship of the party, the right to rule based on the theory of Marxism- 
Leninism and the idea of class conflict and proletarian internationalism—in the 
face of a hostile West, produced the confrontation. If the conflict is thought of, 
not just as a set hostile actions, but as a larger structure of the Soviet state, as a 
part not just of its ideology, but as a central form of state power-as-practice, then 
the ideational implications of the end of the Cold War are put into a new light. 
The end of the Cold War meant more than just an end to arms races and third 
world intervention. For the Soviet state, it meant that the link between ideology 
and political practice was severed. More importantly, the transcendent moral 
claim which the CPSU had been making as a justification for its pre-eminent 
position had been removed. Without the confrontation between Soviet 
communism and the capitalist West, then precisely what was the Soviet state for 
and how was it to rule? Central to CPSU rule was the usurpation of the market 
system and indeed the international system itself. In surrendering to the very 
values it had opposed, the Soviet state surrendered its claim to rule. In failing to 
practice the ideology at the heart of its system the Soviet state fundamentally 
altered the nature of the state and it was made to struggle to survive, a struggle 
which it quickly lost.
In short, the end of the Cold War demonstrated clearly that the CPSU 
could no longer rule as it had in the past. The values on which it had made its 
claim to rule were shown to be internationally and domestically moribund. In 
pursuing a more benign international posture, Gorbachev and his elite set about 
undermining some of the key ideas and practices of the Soviet state. The end of 
the confrontation not only hampered institutional claims, but also the functional 
efficacy of state power-as-practice. These changes created the condition of
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Soviet state vulnerability. One must wonder whether the leadership would have 
acted with the same zeal had they had known the implications of their actions. 
The tenacity with which Gorbachev clung to power in his final years would have 
one believe otherwise. The end of the Cold War and consequent condition of 
vulnerability also show us that that the Soviet state, in ideational and material 
terms, was extremely rigid. Not only was the system rigid, it was, in ideological 
terms, tightly interwoven and unified; if one element of the structure was altered, 
the knock-on effects were great. The shift in foreign policy which led to the 
unpicking of the idea behind Soviet rule demonstrates that the state was like a 
tightly wound spring. The Soviet failure in the international confrontation 
undermined the CPSU, its promotion of values which flatly contradicted 
everything that it had stood for and the way it had practised rule thoroughly 
undermined the idea and practice of a particularly Soviet state.
The international confrontation played an important role in Soviet state 
power. It had helped to provide a moral claim, mechanisms for material 
capability, a sense of legitimacy, a justification for actions and, most importantly, 
was a central part of state power-as-practice in the Soviet reproduction of state 
power. The end of the Cold War removed a range of power sources from the 
Soviet state and helped to create the circumstances in which the institutions of 
the USSR could no longer reproduce Soviet dominance as they had in the past. It 
was not the only reason for the vulnerability. Long term economic decline, 
developments in society, the relaxation of control and disillusionment within the 
CPSU also contributed to this condition. To understand fully the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, one must add the end of the Cold War to the forces of nationalism, 
economic crisis and elite fragmentation which ultimately led to the dissolution of 
this once powerful monolith.
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6.4 V u l n e r a b i l i t y  a n d  T h e  C o l la p s e
The speed with which a great power can fall is remarkable. From a 
situation of vulnerability, which emerged during 1988 and was evident from the 
beginning of 1989, the Soviet Union rapidly began to break apart. Independence 
movements proliferated in the republics, the institutions of the state (particularly 
the CPSU) and the economic structures fractured. The collapse was caused by 
developments operating on distinct chronological scales: the long-term structural 
(phenomena such as declining economic capacity, and disillusioned population), 
shorter-term contingent (actions such as the reforms of the economic and 
political systems and the end of the Cold War) and the fatal blows. This last term 
refers to the blows which, given these two pre-conditions, actually destroyed the 
state by preventing the mechanisms which reproduced state rule from 
functioning. The final section of this chapter will briefly set out the ‘fatal blows’ 
of the Soviet collapse, namely, nationalism, elite fragmentation and economic 
collapse, and relate them to the condition of vulnerability. The purpose is not to 
set out a comprehensive explanation of the Soviet collapse, but to contribute to 
the ongoing debate about the causes of collapse by using the idea of vulnerability 
to examine the role that the end of the Cold War played in undermining Soviet 
power.
6.4.1 Elite Fragmentation
The unity of the CPSU had been central to the success of the Soviet 
state.60 The party had maintained a tenacious hold on power for many decades 
and the fracturing of the ruling elite in the face of economic, political and social 
challenges dealt the first of three blows to the Soviet system. As shown in 
Chapter Three, the CPSU was the bedrock of the state institutions and the fusion 
of party and state was the hallmark of this mono-hierarchical system. The party’s 
ability to isolate any challenges to its authority with great speed and efficacy had
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assured the state’s position of primacy. Once the party began to fragment into 
various groups, this power was terminally shaken.61
Under nationalist, economic and other political pressures, the unity of this 
group began to erode. Gorbachev maintains that the divisions among the 
reformists seriously undermined Soviet power:
During the years o f perestroika the fragmentation o f the democrats, the 
back-biting among them, the attempts by each group to show that it was 
‘more democratic’ than the others ultimately became one o f the reasons for 
the undermining of democratic change and then the interruption of 
perestroika as a result o f the August ’91 coup.62
Reformist division alone was not the sole problem. The formation of a 
conservative bloc was equally important in the fragmentation of the elite and the 
undermining of the Soviet state. The divisions within the party were heavily 
influenced by differing strategies for maintaining political power. Many feared 
that the end of the Union would lead to CPSU collapse and hence their removal 
from power. Others recognised that such movements were likely and that their 
own political futures lay precisely in helping to kill off the USSR.
The divisions culminated in the ruling elite of the CPSU splitting into 
three groups. The first rejected the party and headed in a reformist-democratic- 
nationalist direction and had a decidedly anti-Gorbachev character. This group 
was headed by Yeltsin and other ex-communist leaders from the republics. Like 
Kravchuk and Shushkevitch, they were not all democrats, however, they 
recognised that this separation provided the best chance for their personal 
political survival. The second group clung to Gorbachev and the party and 
believed that the Union and party could survive, not only reform, but the 
introduction of multi-party democracy. The third group were the conservatives 
who wanted a return to the Stalinist/Brezhnevite ways of the past. They were
60 See generally R.J Hill and P. Frank, The Soviet Communist Party Third Edition, London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1986.
61 For a general discussion of the divisions within the CPSU see Jerry F. Hough, Democratization 
and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991 Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997, 
pp. 249-77, and pp. 315-40. On the divisions over the Nina Andreyeva letter see Yegor 
Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1993, pp. 284-311; and Anatoly S. Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, pp. 153-5.
62 Mikhail Gorbachev, On My Country and the World New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999, p. 8.
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people like Yanayev, Pavov, Kryuchkov and Yazov who formed the Russian 
Communist Party (RCP) and who instigated the failed coup. The group was 
characterised most clearly by an anti-perestroika line, anti-Gorbachev sentiments 
and a palpable sense that the past had been betrayed.
The first splits could be seen in late 1987, with Yeltsin’s criticisms, first 
of Ligachev and then of Gorbachev at the Plenum of the CPSU Central 
Committee.63 This resulted in Yeltsin’s expulsion from the Politburo on 
11 November and his removal from the post of Moscow first party secretary 
where he had built up a reputation as a visible and energetic reformer.64 This 
shook the population’s confidence in perestroika generally and Gorbachev’s 
commitment to it more specifically. It also invigorated the conservative 
challenge which led to the publication of Nina Andreyeva’s Stalinist diatribe ‘I 
Cannot Betray my Principles’ on 13 March 1988.65 After this divisive point, the 
election of the Congress of People’s Deputies (CPD) on 26 March 1989 gave a 
public platform to the emergent factions to gain further political capital.66 
Furthermore, Gorbachev’s decision to have himself elected to the Presidency of 
the CPD in the old Soviet style rather than subject himself to popular election 
further isolated him from the reformist faction. A further significant development 
was the decision taken at the 5 February Central Committee Plenum that the 
party should abandon its ‘leading role’ in society and accept some form of 
democracy. On 11 March, the Soviet Constitution was amended to reflect this 
decision.67
While the reformist element was coalescing around Yeltsin, the 
conservative opposition was inspired by the reformists’ method and they too 
used Russian nationalism to achieve good representation in the CPD. This led to 
the formation of the RCP which held its opening Congress between 19 and 
23 June and selected the conservative Ivan Polozkov as first secretary. This
63 See Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 108-19; Hough, Democratization and Revolution, 
pp. 315^10.
64 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 116-7; Hough, Democratization and Revolution, pp. 319— 
20.
65 For discussion of the letter and an intriguing interview with Andreyeva see Remnick, Lenin's 
Tomb, pp. 70-85.
66 See generally, Hough, Democratization and Revolution, pp. 140-74.
67 Gorbachev, Memoirs, pp. 410-1. For a broader discussion of the end of CPSU rule see Hough 
Democratization and Revolution, pp. 249-77.
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separate party was supported and directed by Ligachev and the conservatives.68 
During this period, Yeltsin’s popularity amongst Russians was on the rise and 
Gorbachev’s began to wane.69 Within the CPSU, the formation of a Democratic 
Platform on 20-21 January 1991 gave reformers a better organisational base and 
further undermined Gorbachev’s and the CPSU’s control and authority.70
At the 28th Congress of the CPSU, a new Politburo was selected but, 
significantly, had no real powers. Not only had the reformists and conservatives 
moved away from the party, even Gorbachev had stopped using it as a platform. 
Instead, he used his executive powers as President with the State Council as his 
consultative group. Palazchenko notes that in early April 1990 ‘it seemed 
increasingly clear that the left and right despised Gorbachev equally and there
71was no center—certainly no organised center.’ Significantly, on 12 July 1990, 
at the end of the congress, Yeltsin gave up his membership of the party.72 The 
reformist element had decided to move away from the party.
Attached to the referendum on the new Union Treaty was a question 
regarding the creation of a Russian presidency.73 This question passed with 
69.85% of the vote.74 Demonstrations in favour of Yeltsin followed on 28 March 
and, ultimately, resulted in Yeltsin clearly defeating Ryzhkov (Gorbachev’s 
nominated choice) in the election of 12 June.75 At this point, the CPSU could no 
longer be said to be the centre of power in the state. It had split into three rough 
groups and was no longer in any meaningful sense the ruling body of the Soviet 
state.
Until this point, the interests of the ruling elite had ensured a reasonable 
unity existed. The changing circumstances, different ideological commitments 
and different interpretations of how to maintain their individual and collective
68 Gorbachev, Memoirs, pp. 455-65.
69 See above note 48 for polls on Gorbachev’s declining popularity. In a 1990 poll for ‘Man of 
the Year’ conducted by Moscow News, Yeltsin received 32%, Gorbachev 19%, compared with 
the same poll in 1989 in which Gorbachev had received 46% and Yeltsin 6%, cited in Matlock, 
Autopsy on an Empire, p. 447.
70 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 306.
71 Pavel Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir o f a Soviet 
Interpreter University Park: PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 184.
72 See Sakwa, Rise and Fall o f the Soviet Union, p. 468.
73 Which passed with 76.4% of the vote.
74 Keesing’s Record o f World Events London: Keesing’s, Vol. 37, 1991, pp. 38078-9.
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interests in this new environment were the factors motivating the split. 
Furthermore, the CPSU elites’ ability to formulate and implement strategies to 
assert and protect its interests had diminished greatly under Gorbachev. This 
limited capacity to act, the different directions in which they were tending, 
combined with the larger context in which the ruling elite was no longer as far 
removed from the sentiments of society, resulted in the fracturing of CPSU 
solidarity. The CPSU’s solidarity had been one of its greatest assets. When 
solidarity cracked under the pressure of ideology and interests, the CPSU was 
undone.
The anti-Gorbachev coup of August 1991 marked the end of the life of 
the CPSU and, in many ways, the end of the USSR itself.76 Having already 
forbidden political activity in state institutions, on 29 August the Supreme Soviet 
of the RSFSR banned all CPSU activities and, on 6 November, Yeltsin issued a 
decree which banned the CPSU and the RCP and nationalised their property. 
Thus, the core of the Soviet state was dead. Killed, in the main, by the splits in its 
ranks which resulted primarily from competing views on how to respond to the 
challenges to the state brought about by the reforms, by personal rivalries and by 
the end of the Cold War. Palazchenko and others had suggested early on that one 
way to prevent the rivalries within the party from becoming fatal and to ease the 
transition to multi-party democracy, was to overturn the decision of 1921 to ban
77any dissent from the party line by allowing formal factions within the CPSU. 
These pleas were ignored.
The splintering of the CPSU into three groups played a central role in the 
destruction of the Soviet state.78 The divisions caused a huge amount of 
organisational weakness which further exacerbated economic problems.
75 The results were as follows: Boris Yeltsin 57.3%; Nikolai Ryzhkov 16.85%; Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, 7.81%; Aman-Geldy Tuleyev 6.81%, A. Makashov 3.74%; Vadim Bakatin 3.42%. 
Source, Keesing’s Record o f World Events London: Keesing’s, Vol. 37, 1991, pp. 38273.
76 For accounts of the coup see Vladimir Pozner, Eyewitness: A Personal Account o f the 
Unravelling o f the Soviet Union New York: Random House, 1992; Matlock, Autopsy on an 
Empire, pp. 578-604, Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, pp. 449-90; Mikhail Gorbachev, The August 
Coup New York: Harper Collins, 1991; Chemyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, pp. 373-80 
and pp. 401-23; Hough, Democratization and Revolution, pp. 422-32; and, for the American 
view of the event and their consequent actions, Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels 
pp. 421-42.
Palazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, p. 290.
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Furthermore, it gave impetus to the claims of sovereignty and independence. It 
also allowed RSFSR state institutions to claim, progressively through 1991, 
virtually all the state functions previously held by the USSR for itself and the 
successor republics.79 In rejecting the ideology at its core, the CPSU had 
undermined the key claim to its legitimate rule. That, combined with the 
unpopularity of the party and the party’s own division, left the once all-pervasive 
body an empty husk. As a formal institution of the state, the CPSU was unable to 
reform itself to react to the new circumstances. Over the period of time during 
which this thesis asserts that the state was vulnerable, the ruling elite split and 
fought among themselves over how to reconstitute the state and who was to lead 
this effort. All this stemmed from the two crucial movements at the heart of this 
thesis, the sociological growth of society and the rejection of the values of the 
Russian revolution which had so profoundly shaped the Soviet system.
6.4.2 Economic Collapse
Yeltsin’s ability to tap into people’s frustration regarding the economic 
crisis was crucial to his success in wresting power from Gorbachev and the 
USSR. Furthermore, the economic failure of the Gorbachev reforms meant that 
the state institutions were unable to resist the pressure put on them due to their 
paralysis. Goldman correctly notes that ‘[b]y failing to master the country’s 
economic problems, Gorbachev lost his chance to win the confidence of the 
Soviet people.’80 The problems of the economy were, as noted in Chapter Four, 
significant. The failure of Gorbachev and the reformers to deliver meaningful 
economic results, indeed their exacerbation of an already poor economic 
situation, was a key factor in the break-up.
Under Gorbachev, the Soviet economy went from a parlous situation to 
utter meltdown, and this deterioration cost him and the USSR dearly. While
78 Some have identified four groups: those favouring Western style reforms based around 
Yakovlev; those who clung to Gorbachev; those who supported Yeltsin and his radical populism; 
and those who supported Ligachev and a conservative approach.
79 The key developments were the 20 July decree forbidding political activity in state institutions 
and the 28 August seizure of the USSR State Bank and the Foreign Trade Bank. See above 
pp. 205-7 for further details.
Goldman, What Went Wrong, p. 18.
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longer-term structural problems set the context of decline, ultimately, the
economic crisis was caused by a range of shorter-term crises. These immediate
problems derived from a series of factors, the most obvious of which were the
budget deficits of 1986-88. Those budget deficits drove the huge jump in
inflation and the buyers’ panic which became the hallmark of the economy from
that point onward. The Enterprise Law of 1988 induced further shortages, wage
jumps and an increase in demands for government subsidies for failing business.
This culminated in Ryzhkov’s announcement on 24 May 1990 that the price of
bread and other staples was going to triple as of 1 July, with further rises
announced for 1 January 1991; the announcement prompted a buying frenzy and
yet more social chaos. The economic crisis made the leadership look weak, it
emboldened the opposition (both reformist and conservative), and profoundly
limited the ability of state institutions to function.81 After six years of lurching
reforms, the population had experienced further massive declines in production,
it had suffered exploding inflation with prices shooting ever upwards, the
• 82collapse of intra-regional trade, food shortages and widespread social chaos. 
Viewed from any perspective, the Soviet economy went from a state of general 
stagnation83 to an overt meltdown in the 1990-91 period.84
Scholars offer a range of explanations as to why the system went into 
terminal decline. Ellman and Kontorovitch argue that it was the product of the 
Gorbachev economic reforms.85 They argue that the weakness of the Soviet 
system led to the slow-down, but that it was the making of poor, inconsistent, 
and misinformed decisions which led to the collapse. In their opinion,
81 On the economic crisis see generally, Goldman, What Went Wrong; Ellman and Kontorovitch 
(eds.), The Disintegration; and Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform.
82 See generally, CIA Report, ‘Beyond Perestroyka: The Soviet Economy in Crisis’ in Alexander 
Dallin and Gail W. Lapidus (eds.), The Soviet System: From Crisis to Collapse Revised Edition, 
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995, pp. 322-36; and Aslund, Gorbachev’s Struggle for Economic 
Reform, pp. 182-202.
83 There is some dispute over the levels o f problems in the economy when Gorbachev took over 
in 1985. Goldman argues that it was in crisis in Marshall I. Goldman, The USSR in Crisis: The 
Future o f an Economic System New York: WW Norton, 1983; whereas Burks argues that the 
crisis was yet to come, in R.V. Burks, ‘The Coming Crisis in the Soviet Union’ in Alexander 
Shtromas and Morton A. Kaplan (eds.), The Soviet Union and the Challenge o f  the Future. 
Volume 1: System and State New York: Paragon and PWPA, 1989, pp. 115-65.
84 See Alec Nove, An Economic History o f the USSR, 1917—1991 Final Edition, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1992, pp. 412-9.
85 Ellman and Kontorovitch (eds.), The Disintegration, pp. 1—39.
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the result o f Gorbachev’s economic policy and his changes to the 
economic and political system which he had inherited was to demolish a 
system which functioned, if  far from optimally, and to leave in its place a 
systemic chaos and harmful economic policies which had very adverse 
effects on the operation of the economy and the welfare o f the 
population.86
Harrison argues that the economic crisis was caused by the half-hearted 
compromises of perestroika, the political reforms which undermined the 
administrative system and official sabotage.87 The CIA argues that the problems 
derived from the breakdown of the traditional economic management system, the 
loss of control of financial flows, a badly managed attempt to shift the economic 
emphasis from investment and military production to consumer products and the 
increasing impact of political and social tensions.88 Goldman puts the emphasis 
on a supply side depression which was the result of the decreased power of 
planners, inflation and private shops sucking what few goods there were out of 
the system. The supply side depression was itself exacerbated by labour unrest,
O Q
ethnic turmoil and factory closures. He also argues that rather than improving 
the economy, the inconsistent and indecisive reforms did more damage than 
good.90
Economic mismanagement steadily diminished the credibility of the 
leadership both within the ruling elite and amongst the population at large. This, 
combined with the freedoms of glasnost, made for a potent social and political 
mixture. Gorbachev and the leadership had moved from trying to reform the 
Soviet system to, in the end, trying to establish some form of regulated market 
economy. Not only had they changed course, the leadership had proposed and 
counter-proposed methods for achieving this end. Gorbachev had also shifted his 
political affiliations within the CPSU elite, between reformist and conservative, 
depending on how threatened he felt.91 In so doing, Gorbachev and those around 
him succeeded only in impoverishing the population, wrecking what little of the
86 Ellman and Kontorovitch (eds.), The Disintegration, p. 28.
87 Mark Harrison, ‘Soviet Economic Growth Since 1928: The Alternative Statistics of G.I. 
Khanin’ in Europe-Asia Studies 45.1,1993, pp. 141-67, p. 158.
88 CIA, ‘Beyond Perestroyka,’ p. 328.
89 Goldman, What Went Wrong.
90 Goldman, What Went Wrong, pp. 203-7.
91 On Gorbachev’s political manoeuvring generally see Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 155-211. On his shifts from left to right to left see 
Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 421-448, and pp. 498-522.
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system that still worked and undermining both domestic and international 
confidence in their capacity to manage the state.
This had three major implications. First, it diminished the stature of 
Gorbachev and the reformers and made them vulnerable to the splits within the 
party and to attacks by people and a media which had recently been given the 
power of free speech. Second, it emboldened the opposition within the elite, and 
gave political impetus to their demands. Third, it undermined the capacity of the 
state institutions to function. The end of the Cold War played an indirect role in 
the undermining of the economic function. Its contribution to this dimension of 
vulnerability was indirect in the sense that it helped to provide a context in which 
the criticisms of the leadership had an impact. It undermined key structural 
elements of the economy, particularly the ordering principles and production 
priorities. But it is important to emphasise that this dimension of the Soviet 
breakdown, that is, the escalation of the economic problems to the point of 
collapse, was pre-eminently of national origin. The economic collapse of 1990- 
91 played an important role in undermining Soviet power. In a situation of state 
vulnerability, fiscal and macro-economic crisis dramatically magnified the 
challenge presented to the state.
6.4.3 Nationalism and Resentment
That the Cold War helped to mask a welter of national tensions within the 
Soviet Union and its East European bloc is incontrovertible. That those tensions 
played a central role in the collapse of the USSR is also clear. Suny and Carrere 
d’Encausse, in different ways, make exactly this point.93 Suny shows how the 
nation building of the Soviets had succeeded in encouraging distinct national 
identities as it clamped down on them, in an effort to produce a ‘Soviet’ 
nationalism.94 Carrere d’Encausse maintains that Gorbachev was ignorant of the
92 The one exception to this might be the possible impact that large quantities of Western aid 
would have had if it had been supplied from 1989 as recommended by Matlock. See his memos 
referred to Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, pp. 177-200.
93 Ronald Grigor Suny, Revenge o f the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse o f the 
Soviet Union Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993; Carrere d’Encausse, The End o f the 
Soviet Empire.
94 Suny, Revenge o f the Past.
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problems of nationalism and that his actions fuelled existing problems. 
Furthermore, Castells writes that ‘it was the pressure of nationalism, utilised in 
their personal interest by the political elites of the republics, that ultimately 
doomed Gorbachev’s reformist experiment.’95
Nationalism is consequently regarded as a self-evident explanation of the 
Soviet collapse. Given the ethno-nationalist violence in many parts of the former- 
Soviet Union, this is hardly surprising. While it is wrong to claim that nationalism 
had nothing to with the collapse, it is equally incorrect to assert, in an 
unproblematised way, that nationalism simply undid the USSR. Carrere 
d’Encausse argues that the Soviet Union had been a Russian empire and that 
failure to recognise the resentment in the provinces brought the state to its knees. 
It is clear that resentments against both Russian and Soviet impositions were 
great, but a more sophisticated and thought-out understanding of nationalism is 
needed to make sense of its role in the Soviet collapse and to be validated by the 
historical record.
This thesis sees nationalism as a functional political ideology rather than 
as a self-explanatory force in the way Suny and Carrere d’Encausse conceive it. 
In the Soviet case, the Gellnerite understanding of nationalism is most 
revealing.96 The idea of nationalism as a political ideology which asserts that 
political and national groups should be congruent within a given territory conveys 
the way in which resentments against Soviet and Russian impositions became 
political tools in the hands of local and Union level political actors, as well as 
being sources of more sporadic and aimless violence. It also forces us to think 
about how nationalist demands interacted with political institutions. More 
specifically, the nationalism which destabilised the state refers to two separate, 
though related, phenomena: first, the demand for political independence from the 
USSR; and second, the more disparate forms of nationalist violence which had 
more spontaneous characteristics and more protean goals. Thus far we have 
shown that the end of the Cold War, as well as the specific actions of the CPSU 
elite, help to explain the timing and nature of the economic and leadership
95 Castells, End o f Millennium, p. 38.
96 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
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challenges which pushed the Union into the abyss. How then does this relate to 
the phenomenon of nationalism?
As in Eastern Europe, the political and economic reforms being pursued 
by the leadership at home had unintended consequences. Gorbachev and 
Yakovlev realised the need for an increase in autonomy within the Union, but the 
implications of their actions spun quickly out of their control. Combined with the 
broader politics of glasnost, the circumstances stimulated the long suppressed 
demands for independence within the Baltic states.97 Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania were home to the most consistent pressure for independence seen in the 
USSR. A leader of Sajudis, when discussing the movement’s tactics for non­
violent independence, said ‘[a]t every step of the way Gorbachev will be 
confronted with the choice of allowing us to edge closer toward our goal or 
bringing down his whole policy and probably his own rule with it. For once we
Q O
have the initiative and we don’t intend to lose it.’ That they succeeded in their 
aims is a tribute to the tenacity of the independence movements, but was also the 
result of the incapacity—both political and institutional—of the Union.
The end of the Cold War had a clear impact on the national demands and 
violence of the period. Most clearly, it was the demonstration effect of the East 
European states casting off their communist shackles in 1989 which had the 
greatest impact. Gorbachev’s refusal to support the communist regimes and his 
support for national self-determination at the international level had clear 
implications for his domestic action. The combination of domestic reform and 
glasnost with the international support for self-determination, put Gorbachev 
(who supported increased autonomy but who was terrified of actual independence 
from the Union) in a difficult situation.99
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the nationalist pressures and violence 
which had arisen in the Baltics, Moldova and the Transcaucus republics was the 
spur that it gave to Russian nationalism.100 Without question, once the sense that
97 For an overview of the drive for independence of the Baltic states see Anatol Lieven, The 
Baltic Revolution: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Path to Independence New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1993.
98 Quoted in Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, p. 230, italics in original.
99 See Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), The Rise o f Nations in the Soviet Union: American Foreign 
Policy and the Disintegration o f the USSR New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991.
100 On the development and implications of Russian nationalism see Vladislav Krasnov, Russia 
Beyond Communism: A Chronicle o f National Rebirth Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991.
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Russia deserved independence from the oppression of the Union gained political 
momentum, the USSR, as a meaningful entity, was doomed.101 Even Gorbachev 
recognised this at the time. The creation of a new Union treaty which had 
devolved many of the powers of the USSR was instigated by the ‘rain of 
sovereignties’.102 It was the planned signature of this treaty that was the catalyst 
for the conservative coup of August 1991.
It was not just claims to national self-determination which hindered state 
functioning, nationalism of a more spontaneous kind also played a role. The 
ethno-nationalist strife of the more spontaneous and disparate nature began in 
Kazakhstan in December of 1986 and slowly escalated in different parts of the 
USSR.103 Some of the more notable acts of violence in this period occurred in 
Uzbekistan,104 Nagorno-Karabakh,105 Baku,106 Moldova,107 and Georgia.108 This 
violence resulted in the dispatch of Soviet troops to try to quell the troubles. The 
arrival of troops invariably fuelled the violence, exacerbated its consequences for 
state functions and further damaged the state’s popular support. Also, this 
violence and the breakdown of social order further disrupted the economy, 
particularly in the supply of food and other basic goods, and helped to propel the 
economy further into crisis.109
Nationalism and nationalist violence of this kind questioned the credibility 
of the CPSU and made its governing life more difficult by contributing to 
shortages through the disruption of production and supply chains. Furthermore,
101 Gorbachev agrees with this sentiment, in Gorbachev, Memoirs, pp. 447-50.
102 The new Union treaty required that a republic be treated as a sovereign state with ‘full 
political power on its territory.’ Reproduced in Sakwa, The Rise and Fall o f the Soviet Union, 
pp. 470-1. The treaty was originally published in Pravda on 24 November 1990. For a discussion 
on the formation and implications of the new treaty see Hough, Democratization and Revolution, 
pp. 373-402.
03 The initial riots in Alma-Ata on 16-18 December were due to the replacement of 
Dinmukhamed Kunayev as first secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party with an ethnic 
Russian, see Hough, Democratization and Revolution, p. 127, see also Carrere d’Encausse, The 
End o f the Soviet Empire, pp. 31-4.
104 Among deported Crimean Tatars and Uzbeks.
105 Over the right of the region to move from Azerbaijan to Armenia and to call itself Artsakh.
106 Riots and violence directed mainly at Armenians.
107 Over ethnic Russian attempts to establish a Dniester Republic.
108 Due to ethnic strife and secession attempts from South Ossetia.
109 Nationalism also manifested itself in a raft of declarations by the republics to revert to the 
previous non-Russian official languages. An interesting example o f the contradictions of this was 
the rise of Ukrainian language demands culminating in a law requiring Ukrainian usage in 
government despite the very low levels of Ukrainian actually spoken among the population. See 
Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, pp. 155-7.
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nationalism served to fuelling the splits within the ruling elite, with each group 
reacting to incipient nationalism in ways which it felt best served its agenda. The 
reformers were encouraging independence movements; the conservatives were 
supporting a crack-down and Gorbachev did not know what to do. The Soviet 
state was unable to cope with what Remnick calls the ‘empire of resentments’.110 
These resentments were suddenly allowed to express themselves. The centre, 
which had for so long stifled nationalist complaints, was seen to be supportive of 
similar movements in its ‘outer empire’ and, importantly, was not strong enough 
to do anything about them. Lewin expresses it neatly, ‘the exit of the nationalities 
dealt the coup de grace to Gorbachev’s government, but it was not they who 
caused the downfall. It was the decline and de facto downfall of the regime that 
gave them the chance to leave.’111 The political manifestation of these 
resentments, under conditions of vulnerability brought about by the political, 
economic and social reforms of the 1980s, finally meant that the state, which had 
successfully managed to fend off nationalist claims for 70 years, was unable to 
cope.
National resentments in some parts, and a more Gellnerite nationalism in 
others, made this social phenomenon so explosive. But nationalism did not cause 
the end of the Soviet Union, the state was not broken by the melted antagonisms 
of a multi-ethnic empire. Rather, the weakness of the state allowed the 
resentments and nationalisms to surface. Once on the surface, the elites 
manipulated these frustrations and the Soviet state could not do enough to control 
or satisfy them. A further consequence was that these nationalist demands 
weakened the state in material and moral terms. This weakness, combined with 
the coup, cracked the Soviet Union.
110 Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, p. 190.
111 Moshe Lewin, Russia/USSR/Russia: The Drive and Drift o f  a Superstate New York: New 
Press, 1995, p. 271.
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6.4.4 Evaluation
The term vulnerability reflects three changes in the institutions of state 
rule: the inability to rule in the old way; the absence of a new set of mechanisms; 
and a clear challenge to the state. In the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, all three 
conditions were present. Gorbachev and the leadership had utterly changed the 
nature of the Soviet state’s relationship with the international and the domestic 
spheres. They did so in an effort to revive the Soviet economy and society and 
normalise the pursuit of socialism in a larger context. But, as the reform process 
wore on, it became clear that there was no settled consensus on how to re­
constitute the Soviet state. The competing constituencies were struggling to 
influence the shape of the new state. The reformist elite wanted a democratic 
system whereas the conservatives wanted a sort of Stalinism without the excesses. 
Gorbachev did not know what he wanted, save that he wanted to remain in 
charge, and the nationalists wanted out. The ruling elite began to fragment and, as 
the economy seized up, nationalist violence exploded.
The political struggle over the state became part of the third condition, the 
challenge to state existence. The Soviet state was clearly challenged in a manner
119that can only be described as revolutionary. The state was made vulnerable by 
the efforts to reform the domestic political and economic structures, as well as by 
the reordering of its international relations in the immediate, material and 
ideational senses. These developments, at domestic and international levels, 
caused a fundamental break in the nature and sources of Soviet social power.
In these circumstances, the Soviet state found itself under siege and was 
unable to respond adequately to these challenges because of its low levels of 
agential and capacity power. In short, it was too weak and fragmented to cope 
with the challenges of vulnerability. The longer-term structural problems 
produced a reform leadership which set about, unbeknownst to them, creating the 
conditions of state vulnerability. The reinforcing rods of Soviet rule had begun to 
crack and new ones had not yet been constructed. The state was weakened by
112 Revolutionary in the sense that the new systems that people were arguing for involved a 
wholesale recasting of the fundamental economic and political structures of state and society.
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longer-term economic decline, the failure of its ideological claims and failure in 
its international confrontation with the capitalist West.
That the character of the foreign policy of the USSR was a product of its 
political system is clear. The changes undertaken by the Soviets which ended the 
Cold War reflected the developments within the society, but did not reflect 
changes in the state. When the leadership began to recast the Union’s relations 
with the rest of the world, the implications for its relations with its own society 
were not realised. As the leadership discovered, the state could not be recast by 
incremental reforms; a combination of bureaucratic sabotage, larger institutional 
incapacity and the rigidity of state functions prevented this. As more wholesale 
changes were introduced, the state began to be undermined dramatically and its 
ability to overcome its vulnerability was increasingly diminished.
The international confrontation was not an instrumental mechanism whose 
sole purpose was the control of the Soviet population. The confrontation played 
an important role in a tightly wound and finely balanced ideological system of 
rule. This tight system relied far more than liberal states on its international 
sources of power. More precisely, it relied on the linkage between its 
international relations and its domestic state rule acting as an integrated larger 
structure of power and playing a part in the reproduction of Soviet power. It was 
in and through the conflict with the West that the Soviets demonstrated how and 
why they were there. It was the struggle against capitalism that gave Soviet rule a 
depth of social purpose and efficacy. Without the confrontation, the Soviet state 
needed to be radically reconstituted. The problem was that, as they were changing 
their international posture—with its consequent structural and ideological 
adjustments—they were reforming other institutions of state rule and the entire 
system became vulnerable. The CPSU needed to find something else to justify its 
existence, to give it direction and with which it could reconstitute its power-as- 
practice. Its failure to do so was the result both of poor leadership, but also of the 
inability of the Soviet state to adapt to non-Cold War conditions.
To summarise, the end of the Cold War played an important part in the 
undermining of the Soviet state. It changed the international conditions of Soviet 
existence and contributed to the chaos within the state as the Soviets sought out 
new ways of ruling. It fostered a perception of state weakness, it helped to 
exacerbate economic decline and contributed to the fragmentation of the ruling
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elite. The confrontation with the West had been a central part of the Soviet state’s 
architecture of power. It had played an important role in the production and 
reproduction of Soviet state power, and its removal contributed to the conditions 
which allowed the three fatal blows to kill off the Soviet Union. In transcending a 
conflict which had been at the centre of Soviet life, Gorbachev left behind the 
very structures which had allowed the Soviet state to function and, without an 
adequate replacement, the state was fundamentally weakened. The processes with 
which Soviet rule could function, and the power-as-practice which facilitated 
effective reproduction of state power, had been disrupted by the removal of a key 
instrumental and ideational structure of the Soviet state: the confrontation with 
the capitalist West. The end of the Cold War, unbeknownst to Gorbachev and the 
leadership, undermined certain essential mechanisms which facilitated the 
reproduction of the Soviet state.
The international confrontation with the capitalist West was the product of 
the claims, ideas and practices of the Soviets. The removal of Soviet 
revolutionary ideas as a result of a change in values and as a pragmatic response 
to the dictates of a reform agenda meant that the very foundations of the state had 
to be reformed. This chapter began by noting that Gorbachev should have been 
asking himself what he was going to do since he had removed the Soviet Union’s 
ideological enemy—liberal capitalism—from the practice of Soviet statehood. 
Gorbachev needed to set about finding a new and resonant idea which could have 
allowed the USSR to survive the production of new structures which could once 
again reproduce the Soviet state as a set of functioning institutions. For it was the 
ability of Yeltsin and others to provide just such an idea, generally in some form 
of nationalism, which allowed them to take over where the USSR left off.
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Chapter
7
7 Co nc lu sio n
Dear Leonid Ilyich: A language is a rrmh more ancient and inedtaHe thing lhan a 
state. I  belongto the Russian langmgg.
Joseph Brodsky, 19721
States are rarely expected to collapse. At the time of the Soviet involution no one 
could quite believe their eyes when the USSR underwent what appeared to be an 
involuntary self-immolation. Yet since then, it has been hard to see the fall as 
anything but inevitable. The ossifying economy, the stifling political system and 
the deep sense of depression and disillusion among the population, make it 
difficult to imagine just how it survived at all. Yet such reflections tend to ignore 
that which made the collapse of the Soviet Union appear so surprising—it had 
been a great power. For more than 70 years the Soviet Union had successfully 
led a global challenge to liberal capitalism. It had a massive military force which 
harnessed a destructive capacity unseen in history, it controlled a supreme 
internal coercive power, it had industrialised at an unparalleled rate, it had even 
been the first power into space. Yet this concentration of wealth and power could 
not prevent the fragmentation of the state. In our minds, the notion of a great 
power sits uneasily with vulnerability or weakness. There is a tendency to 
overlook, not only the limits of great power capability, but also the political 
complications, difficulties and obstacles which result from the very 
circumstances which make a state’s power great. The size of empire, the reliance 
on an international alliance system, or the cumbersome workings of a crude 
economic system—each produces great power, but also places limits on the 
workings of that power.
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The Soviet Union was made vulnerable and, as shown in Chapter Six, the 
condition of vulnerability led to a full-scale state breakdown. The international 
confrontation had helped to produce the Soviet Union’s great power status and its 
ending also helped to induce Soviet vulnerability, a process which this thesis has 
charted in some detail. The purpose of this final chapter is to evaluate the claims 
of the thesis, to outline its contribution and to set out some suggestions for a 
future research agenda deriving from its theoretical and empirical insights.
7.1 C o n t r ib u t i o n  a n d  O v e rv ie w
7.1.1 Overview
The thesis set out to examine the relationship between the Soviet Union’s 
confrontation with the capitalist West and the production and reproduction of 
Soviet state power. In doing so from a historical sociological perspective, it has 
shown that this confrontation was an important structural part of the pattern of 
Soviet state power The first chapter established the analytic framework by 
defining the international confrontation as the chronic international conflict 
between the Soviet Union and the West. This confrontation had three aspects: 
socio-economic competition; ideological conflict; and a geopolitical rivalry. The 
confrontation was between two mutually antagonistic universalising social 
systems which fought to shape the world in their own image. That chapter then 
set out the concept of vulnerability by locating it on a five step process of 
political change. Vulnerability was noted as designating the situation in which 
the mechanisms with which the state can successfully reproduce itself are no 
longer effective, no new mechanisms have been found and a clear challenge or 
set of challenges to the continuation of state power exists. This view derives from 
an institutional-functional understanding of the state which argues that states are 
not permanent concrete entities, but contingent social institutions which reflect 
the social circumstances in which they exist. As a consequence, the thesis
1 Quoted in David Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days o f the Soviet Empire London: Viking,
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examined in detail the processes which facilitate the production and reproduction 
of state power over time.
The second chapter set out the historical sociological method of the 
thesis. It developed a theory of modem state power which was used to analyse 
the Soviet state. The theory draws on Mann’s notion of the modem state, but 
develops it by focusing on the international and processual dimensions of state 
power, with a particular interest in the processes of state production and 
reproduction. It emphasises the latter by drawing out the theory of state power- 
as-practice. This theory notes that state institutions are not only functional- 
instrumental mechanisms, but are themselves both the form and the function of 
state power. Hence, the state is thought of as a bundle of institutions which are 
brought together through the uniform practice of a transcendent moral claim to 
authority.
Chapter Three used this theory of state power to analyse the Soviet 
Union. It focused on the broader practices of Soviet power and concluded that 
the international confrontation played an important structural role in these 
practices. In this way, the confrontation was as an international source of Soviet 
power. Specifically, it showed that the confrontation played a role in three key 
aspects of Soviet rule: it was central to the principles of Soviet mle; it penetrated 
the economic system; and it was a part of the Soviet political institutions. The 
fourth chapter examined the role of the international confrontation in the political 
economy. It argued that the Soviet economy, due to its politicised purposiveness 
and singularity, could be thought of as a war economy. This characterisation 
acted as an analytic point of departure for the examination of the role of the 
international conflict in the political economy. It demonstrated that the 
confrontation penetrated both the ideational and material aspects of the Soviet 
economy and that this penetration also built fissures into the system. The fifth 
chapter returned to the international and examined the process of the end of the 
Cold War. It showed that the end of the Cold War was primarily a result of the 
Soviet shift away from the ideas and practices of the Russian revolution in the 
context of a firm but also receptive West. The changes within the Soviet state 
were themselves shown to be the product of both longer and shorter-term
1993, p. 27-8.
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domestic and international developments. Chapter Six then applied the idea of 
vulnerability to the Soviet state to determine the extent to which the end of the 
Cold War contributed to the weakening of Soviet power and its relationship to 
the state’s subsequent collapse. It showed that, not only did the end of the Cold 
War hinder the reproduction processes of the Soviet state, it also aided the forces 
which ultimately drove the state from a condition of vulnerability to total 
collapse.
We can conclude, then, that the end of the Cold War was an important 
contributory factor in the weakening of the Soviet state. While there were other 
significant developments in that weakening, such as the ossification of the 
economy and the disillusionment with Soviet ideology among the population and 
the elites, the end of the Cold War played a central role in helping to propel the 
three forces which ultimately smashed the Soviet state: economic crisis, 
nationalism and elite fragmentation. The concept of state power-as-practice 
makes clear that the international confrontation was fundamental to the Soviet 
state, in both material and ideational terms. A logical consequence of the Soviet 
state’s transcendent claim was some form of conflict with the capitalist world. 
The revolutionary ideas and material practice of statehood and society could not 
coexist in political or rhetorical terms with the capitalist world. Once the ideas 
which had produced the conflict had been jettisoned, the state found itself 
suddenly bereft of an effective transcendental claim. In ending the conflict over 
social systems and by rejecting their revolutionary alternative, the Soviets had 
ended the set of principles which had justified Soviet state rule and around which 
many of its institutions had been organised. In short, because of the end of the 
Cold War, the Soviet state could not reproduce itself as it had in the past.
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7.1.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions
In showing the significance of the end of the Cold War to the collapse of 
the Soviet state, this thesis has made three clear contributions. First, it produced a 
specifically international account of the reproduction and then collapse of the 
Soviet state. Second, it applied a distinct historical sociological method to an 
international problem. Third, through this exercise, it set out one way of 
reconsidering the relationship between domestic and international spheres.
The traditional story of the collapse of Soviet power subscribes to the 
view that the Soviet collapse was an almost exclusively domestic event. Many of 
the major works on the collapse of communism fail to mention the international 
in anything but the most basic sense.2 Yet, as this thesis has shown, such a view 
is incomplete. This thesis has demonstrated that Soviet state power was 
constituted by structures which went well beyond its borders. The process of 
Soviet state reproduction was greatly influenced by international factors and one 
of the most significant was its confrontation with the capitalist West. The victory 
of capitalist structures and values over a brutal and stultifying Soviet 
communism was, in many ways, due to a very real sense that the Soviet Union 
could not match the quality of life provided by the West despite its promise of a 
qualitatively better form of existence. The centrality of this claim to the Soviet 
project, and to the Cold War, meant that the rejection of these values for a ‘we 
gotta have that’ consumer capitalism condemned the Soviet Union to oblivion.
The second major contribution of the thesis is its engagement with, and 
development of, historical sociological approaches in IR. The thesis made three 
specific contributions. First, it developed a theory of the state in which analysis is 
not only focussed on international as well as domestic sources of state 
reproductive processes, but also takes seriously the interaction of material and 
ideational dimensions of state power. Second, by developing the concept of state 
power-as-practice, it adds a third and more dynamic understanding of state 
functions to the institutional-functional model set out by Skocpol. Third, it puts 
the question of the reproduction of state structures firmly at the centre of analysis
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in an attempt to overcome the limits of the assumption of stability and stasis 
which pervades much work.
This thesis demonstrates the analytic utility of an international historical 
sociological method for the study of world politics. Some complain that the 
theoretical pluralism of IR indicates a field in disarray. This is not the case: a 
methodological pluralism and healthy debate across methods is indicative of an 
intellectual vitality and analytic openness which displays the sound condition of 
the state of ER. The historical sociological method utilised in this thesis is one 
which produces insights into the workings of world politics which are not 
available with other approaches. This method has four benefits for the theoretical 
study of world politics. First, it is an excellent means for analysing and making 
explicit the social, historical and, above all, political nature of world politics. 
Second, it facilitates a means for apprehending the balance of domestic and 
international sources of developments in international politics. Third, it forces us 
to reflect on and examine the historical and social development of specific 
events. This means that we will have a greater theoretical awareness of history 
and a more sophisticated and analytically useful understanding of social 
structures in our study. Fourth, it is an approach which is firmly grounded in 
broader social science of which IR is a part, but which it tends to deny, ignore or 
forget. This method helps to provoke an awareness of theoretical and empirical 
developments in parallel fields which can overcome the redundancy of 
duplicated research and theoretical debates.
Historical sociology is not, however, a field which can be simply bolted 
on to IR. Not only does this thesis engage with historical sociology, it critiques 
certain strands to develop a particular analytic method for analysing state power. 
IR has long had a theoretical difficulty in coping with the state. The theory set 
out in Chapters Two and Three is one possible means of conceiving of this social 
actor which allows a truly international understanding of the state. It provides a 
conception of state power that is both historically and politically grounded and, 
in making a claim about what the state is and how it functions, allows students to
2 Hough’s study is a good example. Jerry Hough, Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 
1985—91 Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997.
3 This holds true for British and European IR, but such pluralism does not seem to be so 
widespread in North American circles.
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take the state seriously as a conceptual variable and social actor, and not merely 
as an analytic reification.
This method adds a third dimension to Skocpol’s dual dimensions of state 
functional power; the concept of power-as-practice is used to highlight the 
processual and dynamic nature of the modem state. This notion, which argues 
that the continued practice of state power relies on the simultaneous role of state 
institutions as functional-instrumental bodies, as well as manifestations of the 
transcendent moral claim to absolute authority, can help shed light on the forces 
which strengthen and weaken state power, understood as a form of social control. 
Furthermore, it emphasises that the state exists in a triple international context: as 
domestically dominant actor; as an international actor, with domestic power 
respected by other similar powers; and as the institution which both creates and 
straddles the border of the international and the domestic. It is this triple context 
which makes the state the reference point for legitimate moral and political 
action in the modem world.
In his edited volume reflecting on the Soviet collapse and the failures of 
Sovietology, Cox remarks that the failure of Soviet watchers derived, in part, 
from the epistemological and ontological commitments of the social sciences. 
Specifically, he highlights three problems: the dominance of empiricism; 
resistance to prediction; and, most tellingly, the fact that social scientists are 
much better equipped to deal with stable structures than with change.4 While this 
thesis does not agree that prediction is necessarily what social science should be 
engaged in, it has presented one specific theoretical means to address the 
problem of an ontological and epistemological commitment to stasis and 
presumptions of inertia.
The historical sociological theory of the state set out here takes as its 
starting point a concern with the assumption of inertia. This approach developed 
a number of theoretical strategies which help to rectify the last of Cox’s noted 
deficiencies. The theory examines the processes by which states are made and 
unmade, that is, the political processes through which states produce and 
reproduce themselves. It does this due to a belief that analysts must ask
4 Michael Cox, ‘Whatever Happened to the USSR? Critical Reflection on Soviet Studies’ in 
Michael Cox (ed.), Rethinking the Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death o f  Communism and 
the New Russia London: Pinter, 1998, pp. 11-31; pp. 16-7.
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themselves how social structures remain stable. They must not take an apparent 
stability as a ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ state of affairs. A focus on state power as the 
product of both domestic and international forces which are constantly shifting, 
and on the institutions which reproduce dominance, provides one means to 
overcome the intellectual predilection for stability in IR and the social sciences 
more broadly.
The third major contribution of this thesis is to point to one way forward 
in our struggle to overcome the artificial ‘Great Divide’ which supposedly marks 
IR off from other social sciences.5 Clark writes that globalisation, as both a 
phenomenon and as an analytic concept, ‘challenges head-on the claim to 
structurally differentiated behaviour in the two fields [domestic and 
international].’6 He is right, but does not go far enough. While globalisation most 
starkly puts lie to the myth of socially separate fields and separate logics of 
action, things have always been thus. The historical sociological method 
presented here explicitly seeks to uncover the nature of the relationship between 
the two realms. Indeed, one of the implications of this study is to consider and 
examine precisely how it is that these interrelated social realms have been made 
to appear as though they are discrete. An extremely important line of research 
which emanates from this realisation is an examination of the discursive, material 
and historical social processes which have produced the formal differentiation of 
spheres despite their substantive overlap. Political action has no inherent logic 
determined by the structural conditions of its realm. This approach takes 
international holism as starting point and shows that, by asking precisely how the 
social realm has been carved up into political units, and what the implications of 
this are for social life, we can produce instructive insights into social science 
more broadly and international politics specifically. More generally, by using a 
historical sociological method and emphasising the social and historical contexts 
of world politics this thesis tries to relocate IR as a study of the social world in 
which the relations between states are but one part.
Aron has written that international systems tend to the homogenous or 
heterogeneous depending on the relative similarities of domestic political
5 On the ‘great divide’ as the hallmark of IR see Ian Clark, Globalisation and International 
Relations Theory Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 15-32.
6 Clark, Globalisation and International Relations Theory, p. 16.
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systems and values.7 His insight is useful for characterising the dynamics of 
given international systems, but his writing does not indicate precisely how or 
why this should be the case. Nor does it set out a means for analysing the ways in 
which such different political systems interrelate. A different strategy for 
approaching the relations between orders is proposed by Giddens and others who 
argue that the domestic and international are ‘mutually co-constitutive.’8 Again, 
such a notion sounds compelling, but the concept has no analytic utility beyond 
the descriptive. This problem can be resolved through the use of an international 
historical sociological method. By focusing on the nature of social structures, 
their inter-relationship and their historical production, the student of world 
politics can begin to make sense of how and why the domestic and international 
relate at given moments. This study is one such example. It set out to determine 
the extent to which the Soviet Union’s international confrontation with the 
capitalist West affected and shaped Soviet state power. The research shows that 
the confrontation was produced by the fear and loathing of each side and the 
willingness to act on these sentiments. This established an international order 
which related to, and reacted with, the respective states’ domestic structures in 
very different ways. Ultimately, the Soviet state was deeply reliant on the world 
order its ideology had created and, when it set about changing that order, 
unknowingly, it undermined key elements of its own existence.
In short then, this research has shown that the Soviet international 
confrontation played an important ideological and material role in the 
development and undermining of Soviet state power. The thesis shows that 
students of international affairs need to have a more nuanced understanding of 
the nature and origins of state power. When analysing state actions in 
international politics, IR scholars need to recognise the multi-dimensional nature 
of the modem state and to engage more critically with the historical origins and 
social characteristics of this institution. The conclusions of the thesis demonstrate 
that: the structures of international order have both domestic and international 
origins; that the character of the international system derives from multiple 
sources; and that the political and institutional character of the key elements of
7 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory o f International Relations London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1966 [orig. 1962], pp. 94-124.
8 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence Cambridge: Polity, 1985.
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the system play a crucial role, both in ideational and material terms, in shaping 
the larger structures of the system as well as the smaller structures which 
influence and direct people’s lives.
7.2 E v a l u a t i o n
In a historical sociological examination of the relationship between 
international politics and domestic state structures, there will always be problems 
with and limits to the conclusions. Of the many difficulties and pitfalls, four are 
most pressing and deserve some comment. These are problems which are, in 
some way, shared by all social sciences for they are intimately bound up with the 
social nature of the realm which we study. Yet, due to the strong emphasis on 
social and historical dimensions in this thesis, they are especially pertinent here.
First, the selection of social structures for examination can be arbitrary 
and the means with which analysts justify their choices can leave room for abuse. 
The justification for the choice of particular structures is perhaps the most 
important aspect of any such analysis. Why the scholar has chosen to examine, 
for example, the financial power of the state and not intra-class tensions to 
explain a given development must be explained. While one can never definitively 
answer any social question, the analyst must be self-conscious of the reasons for 
examining one set of phenomena and not others. These reasons must be justified 
for the study to be convincing on its own terms.
The other sense in which this first problem can be seen is in the macro 
historical nature of the method. What Hobsbawm calls the ‘bird’s eye view’ of 
history,9 and what Collins calls macrosociology are different labels for a similar 
challenge;10 that is, the extent to which one can reasonably draw meaningful 
conclusions about such large scale events. The problem is that such an approach 
necessarily involves glossing over many smaller-level events. Collins puts 
forward one method for establishing the link between micro and macro level
9 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age o f Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 London: 
Michael Joseph, 1994.
10 Randall Collins, ‘On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology’ in American Journal o f  
Sociology 86.5,1981, pp. 984-1014.
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events by arguing that macro-structures, such as state, nation, class or economy 
should be understood as aggregations of microsituations.11 While such a 
resolution may not be satisfactory, it is cmcial that the study be sensitive to this 
relationship and that the connection between larger and smaller views is set out 
clearly. Also, the bird’s eye view can obscure important dimensions of social life 
which are not apparently important. It may overshadow workings such as the role 
of decision-makers’ families in formulating specific strategies, or it may ignore 
the role of education in the development of social sensibilities. But mainstream 
IR theories also have to grapple with the problem of how to carve up the social 
world. The debates in IR concerning levels of analysis and the benefits of 
systemic as opposed to reductive theories are attempts to resolve this dilemma. 
As in IR, there can be no final resolution of this problem, except to say that the 
research must do its utmost to scour the landscape so as to highlight the 
important causal relationships.
The problem of how to evaluate competing claims about a particular 
event is the second difficulty that this method throws up and with which the 
student must grapple. In examining the end of the Cold War, some have argued 
that ideas were the crucial structure that undermined the conflict,12 others have 
stated that it was the international pressure of an escalated arms race.13 This 
thesis has argued that the social development of Soviet society in the context of a 
chronic international confrontation led to the decision to move away from the 
values which had underpinned the conflict and which led to the transcendence of 
the competition. How do we judge between these radically different views of the 
core points, particularly when one stresses ideational and others rational or 
material claims? One may have misread the historical evidence, and another may 
be manipulating facts. It is the task of academics to criticise each other’s work so 
as to uncover any misreading of events and any disingenuous or duplicitous 
action. Yet, the challenge of adjudication between methods and conclusions still
11 Collins, ‘On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology’.
12 For example Jeffrey Checkel, Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian 
Behaviour and the End o f the Cold War New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997; and K.M. 
Fierke, Changing Games, Changing Strategies: Critical Investigations in Security Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998.
13 For example Robert Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story o f  Five Presidents 
and How they Won the Cold War New York: Touchstone, 1997; and Richard Pipes,
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hangs heavily in the air. At the very least, we can hope that both reader and 
writer reflect critically on what convinces them and why, on what each finds 
convincing and why they find it so.14 This does not, unfortunately, make for easy 
resolution.
The behaviouralist approach in IR has been one attempt to resolve this 
problem in a definitive sense. But, there are limits to the overly positivistic 
commitments of social scientific attempts to apprehend the world. The pre­
eminent of these is that social life does not exist in laboratory conditions and 
there are no opportunities to re-create the phenomena which we are trying to 
explain and understand. We have to make do with an event happening only once, 
and in a manner which is inherently social and therefore resistant to the artificial 
attempts to produce ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables. Generalisation is 
not the aim of this approach. Rather, the intention is to theoretically uncover 
patterned outcomes and dominant social structures. The approach used here 
rejects the idea that there can ever be a transhistorical ‘independent variable’ 
which can be identified and used across time and place so that ‘generalisations’ 
can be made.15 As such, the aim of the scholar must be to set down a more 
compelling explanation about a given event than already exists, and it must be 
compelling based on rational argumentation and logical and consistent 
judgements.
The third, and perhaps most pressing problem is the question of history. 
An analytic stance which emphasises the historical must be sensitive to the 
politics of history and historiography. Such an approach must be very wary of 
whose history the analysts are using, how they are reading it and must also 
consider whether what those analysts are doing merely adds up to a base 
revisionism in disguise. History can be a corrective to the mistaken musings of 
the present, but it can also be roundly abused to justify specious claims. One
‘Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hardliners got it right’ in Foreign Affairs 74.1, 1995, 
pp. 154-60.
For example Kiser and Hechter inveigh against the inductive method of historical sociology 
which is used in this thesis. They argue that the problems o f selection, testing, and the ratio of 
cases to yield are all too unsystematic to produce ‘sound’ results which are not generalisable. For 
them acceptable explanations are the product of ‘rigorous’ method, testings and generalisable 
theory. Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, ‘The Role of General Theory in Comparative-historical 
sociology’ m American Journal of Sociology 97.1,1991, pp. 1-30.
15 Arguments made by Kiser and Hechter, ‘The Role o f General Theory’ and other positivist 
general theorists.
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must be very sensitive to this danger. The student must scrupulously follow up 
sources, examine who wrote what and for what purpose so as to identify, as 
much as possible, the political and ideological colourings of the evidence. As 
should be clear from the sources used in this study, using memoirs or other forms 
of self-serving literature is not inherently problematic. Provided such material is 
cross-referenced and the scholar is aware of the limitations of the source, 
excellent use can be made of such pieces of history. Historical sociology is the 
attempt to use history to shed light on present circumstances, but it is also about 
making connections between social events that occurred in history. The 
difference between the historical sociologist and the historian lies primarily at the 
level of theoretical self-consciousness. Both approaches have their strengths and 
weaknesses. The student using the method advocated here must always show a 
sensitivity to the possible weakness of historical sources, as well as to the 
strength that such knowledge can lend.
Finally, the problem of verifiability exists. In social science, one of the 
thorniest issues is the question of the verification of claims. The desire for robust 
scientistic claims in international relations led to the growth of behaviouralism in 
the 1960s and helps to explain why quantitative methods are so prominent in 
North America today.16 Despite the efforts of quantitative scholars, their claims 
are often banal and, when scrutinised carefully, no more compelling than more 
traditional approaches.17 How robust can verification ever be in social science? 
How robust should it be? What, indeed, does it really mean to be ‘robust’? Social 
science sets itself apart from other means of studying social life through its 
theoretical self-reflection and self-consciousness. Despite this, most social 
science explanations lie on reasonably shaky epistemological ground. But is this 
a profound problem? In short, no. This thesis echoes the words of Hedley Bull 
who argued that studies of international relations should be scientific in the sense 
‘of being a coherent, precise, and orderly body of knowledge, and in the sense of
16 On behaviouralism and its appeal see generally Klaus Knorr and James Rosenau (eds.), 
Contending Approaches to International Politics Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. 
See especially Morton Kaplan, ‘The New Great Debate: Traditionalism versus Science in 
International Relations’, pp. 39-62 and J. David Singer, ‘The Incompleat Theorist: Insight 
Without Evidence’ pp. 62-86.
17 For a particularly absurd example of the quantitative approach see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 
‘The End of the Cold War: Predicting an Emergent Property’ in Journal o f  Conflict Resolution
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1 fibeing consistent with the philosophical foundations of modem science.’ 
Explanations can, up to a point, be reasonably verified. The key lies in what kind 
of explanation has been sought and what kind produced. As mentioned above, 
the kind of explanation advocated here refers to specific instances and eschews 
generalisable explanatory theory. We must demand that explanations be 
falsifiable in a Popperian sense,19 and scientific in a Bullian sense. Verification 
of the mathematical social scientific sort is as undesirable as it is unhelpful
While this research could suffer from the potential problems outlined 
here, it does not invalidate either its method or its conclusions. This thesis has 
sought to buttress itself against the problems inherent in its method. It has 
justified the selection of the major social structures—the Soviet state and the 
Soviet international confrontation—in reasonable terms and has demonstrated a 
sensitivity to the limits of history and historical sociological method. This is not a 
thesis which is uncontestable. The point of the thesis is to contribute to the 
ongoing debate about the Cold War and its demise and the nature of world 
politics in a broader sense. The study set out to rethink the way in which the 
current international order has been produced by creating a different historical 
narrative through the utilisation of a theoretical device which casts new light on 
the relationship between international and domestic orders. The test for the 
‘robustness’ or soundness of its theory, the validity of its claims and the accuracy 
of its conclusions will be shown not through pseudo-scientistic testing, but in the 
heat of intellectual debate about the period under question. It is in that field that 
the real evaluations will be made.
42.2, 1998, pp. 131-55. Here Bueno de Mesquita argues that, with the right quantitative method, 
the rise and fall of the Cold War was predictable in 1948 based on data sets available at the time.
18 Hedley Bull, ‘International Theory: The Case for Classical Approach’ in World Politics 18.3, 
1966, pp. 361-88; p. 375, italics added.
19 Karl Popper, The Logic o f Scientific Discovery Second Edition, London: Hutchinson, 1972, 
[orig. 1934],
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7.3 F u r t h e r  D e v e lo p m e n ts
The research in this thesis stands on the shoulders of the many historians, 
policy-makers, IR scholars and journalists who have written about and critically 
examined this period, and, in so doing, has opened new avenues for research. 
The first and most obvious area of research that this study suggests is further 
micro level research into the development of the Soviet state. The Soviet Union 
was a peculiar beast, different in many ways from other modem states. Further 
research on this theme would entail examining three things. First, the 
development of the changing values of the ruling elite and the relationship 
between the social development of Soviet society and the absence of 
commensurate change in the structures of the state. Second, the examination of 
the forms of political mle and third, a careful study of the development of state 
institutions and their relationship to shifts in world politics.
The second broad area of research would be a set of micro level historical 
sociological analyses of the Cold War as the second phase of a longer-run 
confrontation between antagonistic socio-economic systems. What the Cold War 
was and how it functioned and influenced world politics is far from settled. This 
thesis has begun some work which reinforces what might be described as an 
inter-systemic view. Further systematic studies are, however, required to 
examine, for example, intervention in third world regimes, the support of 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements and the interaction of 
nationalism and Cold War in third world revolutions. Such research could help to 
shed light, not only on the dynamics of the Cold War, but also on the structural 
features of world politics in the post-war period.
Third, the theoretical and empirical study of the state must be continued. 
This thesis has set out one approach, but more consideration of precisely what 
states are and how they function is needed in IR. Specifically, studies should 
examine other instances in which the shape of states affects international politics 
and the ways in which international politics influences the shape of states and the 
lives of people. Related to this, a further substantiation of an historical 
sociological method within IR can only benefit the study of world politics. It is a 
sound method for the analysis of complex large-scale events such as revolutions,
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wars, state breakdown, and globalisation which are of fundamental importance to 
the world. It is an approach which enriches the analysis of international life by 
underlining contingency, emphasising the analytical importance of historicisation 
and stressing the notion of world politics as a social process. This form of 
analysis can give IR a more socially grounded and historically sensitive view of 
the world it is trying to understand. This is a task that, in the context of 
globalisation, is of manifest importance. Understanding the international realm as 
a social one shaped by complex structures, forces and ideas that have developed 
over time can develop the study of world politics in five ways. First, it can 
provide a view of the state that is both socially and historically grounded and of 
clear analytic utility. Second, it can lead us away from mono-causal, reductionist 
logic and towards a multi-dimensional framework for explanation. Third, it can 
help us reconceive our notions of the international and the domestic realms. 
Specifically, it can provide a better way of conceiving of the international 
system, its constituents and dynamics in an increasingly complex world. Fourth, 
by underlining social structures and their contingency, it can provide a more 
open analytic stance for the analysis of the international social realm. Finally, 
and perhaps most crucially, this view equips us with the artillery for a critical 
scrutiny of the given in both our discipline and our world, a task that is of the 
utmost importance. The research in this thesis has begun to flesh out this 
promise, but far more is needed if it historical sociology is to fulfil its potential in 
IR.
7.4 C o n c lu s io n
Brodsky’s eloquent declaration that he belongs to the Russian language 
demonstrates the problems of the communist project located, as it was, in an era 
of nationalism. Nationalism is itself not natural or inherent—that much is clear— 
but it had and still has a far more effective political resonance than Soviet 
communism ever did. Indeed, Stalin’s attempts to place himself in the lineage of 
powerful Russian leaders such as Peter the Great, the appropriation of the Tsarist 
appearances of the Red Army and even the use of the colour red, all demonstrate 
that the Soviets understood the potency of nationalism. It also draws out the
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concern with the lack of permanency inherent in all social structures. But our 
concern is not with nationalism as such, but with the social mechanisms which 
mediate the relations between state and citizen, between rulers and ruled. 
Precisely how the state manages this relationship is of central importance to its 
function and durability.
The thesis has shown that the Soviet Union’s inability to exist outside of 
the conditions of international confrontation was fatal. In contrast, the existence 
of the USA and other Western states was not entirely structured by the strictures 
of the Cold War competition. The truth of this claim is demonstrated by the end 
of the Cold War and exposes a large hole in the internalists’ account. There is no 
scope in their view for an America that was not determined by its instrumental 
commitments to capitalism and its consequent Cold War. The Soviet Union was 
a system of domination clinging to the burnished husk of a nineteenth century 
ideology, which, when its leaders tried to update it, was destroyed by forces it 
could no longer compete with, nor contain. The functional institutions failed and 
the larger Soviet state structures were outmoded, outperformed and simply 
anachronistic. More importantly, these failed structures fragmented the CPSU 
and caused the elites to act to preserve their interests in ways which undermined 
the ability of the Soviet state to reproduce itself.
The Cold War’s demise was aided by the dynamism of global capitalism. 
But due credit must be given to the raft of leaders who, within the structures of 
global capitalism and an ossifying international communism, took it upon 
themselves to move beyond this frigid system. Gorbachev and his aides 
succeeded in moving the Soviet Union away from the rigidities of its past and 
towards a set of structures more conducive to the aspirations of the people they 
ruled. Yet, in so doing, they loosened the mechanisms with which the state, as a 
system of domination, had been able to function. To understand how and why 
this occurred, the thesis has shown that one must look back over the twentieth 
century to come to terms with what the Soviet Union was, as both an idea and as 
a system of rule. The thesis has shown that the Cold War, and world politics 
more broadly, must be understood in these larger historical terms. IR tends to 
focus too much on the small-scale and the immediate. This study of the Soviet 
collapse and the end of the Cold War shows one way of bringing the larger-scale
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of historical and sociological understanding into explanations of international 
life.
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Appen d ix  I
C h r o n o l o g y  o f  t h e  En d  o f  t h e  C o l d  W a r a n d  
t h e  C o lla pse  o f  t h e  So v iet  U n io n
May 26
Jul 30-Aug 1
Dec 25
Jan 4
Aug 14—17
Oct 21 
Nov 4
Apr 24 
Oct 2 
Dec 13
Jun 8
1972
ABM treaty and Interim Agreement signed in Moscow.
1975
Helsinki ‘Final Act’ concluded under CSCE aegis.
1979
Soviet troops invade Afghanistan.
1980
United States imposes a raft of embargoes on the USSR in 
response to the invasion of Afghanistan. These include a 
grain embargo, the cessation of commercial flights 
between the two states and the suspension of the delivery 
of oil drilling equipment.
‘Solidarity’ labour union movement founded, in Gdansk, 
Poland after a prolonged period of industrial unrest.
Gorbachev elected to full membership of the Politburo.
Ronald Reagan elected president.
1981
Reagan lifts the grain embargo on the USSR.
US announces its decision to deploy MX missiles.
Martial Law declared in Poland by PM Gen. Jaruzelski. 
Solidarity banned after its attempts to conduct a national 
referendum with the aim of unseating the government.
1982
Reagan’s speech to British parliamentarians in the Royal 
Gallery of the House of Lords in which he calls for a
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‘crusade for freedom’ and claims that Marxism-Leninism 
is on its way to the ash heap of history.
Jun 25 
Nov 10
Feb 15 
Mar 8 
Mar 23
Jun 15 
Aug 31- 
Oct 22-
Oct 25 
Nov 2-1
Nov 14 
Nov 24
Dec 8
George Shultz replaces Gen. Alexander Haig as Secretary 
of State.
Leonid Brezhnev dies.
1983
Reagan’s first meeting as president with Soviet 
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the White House.
Reagan’s speech to evangelicals in which he describes the 
Soviet Union as an ‘evil empire’.
In a televised address on national security Reagan calls on 
scientists to begin work to make nuclear weapons obsolete 
with a ballistic missile defence system, hence starting SDL
Andropov speech to CPSU policy plenum suggesting the 
need to reconsider nuclear policy.
Sep 1 KAL 007 shot down by Soviet fighters after straying into
Soviet airspace in what was known to be a ‘radar hole’.
13 Across Europe over 2 million people march to protest
against US deployment of intermediate range nuclear 
forces in Europe.
US invades Grenada ostensibly to rescue American 
medical students.
1 US and NATO conduct their most extensive military
exercise—‘Exercise Able Archer’—which tests command 
and communication procedures of nuclear war systems.
Cruise and Pershing II missiles are deployed in Britain. On 
23, Nov they are deployed in Italy and Germany.
Andropov announces the Soviet withdrawal from arms 
limitation negotiations and military counter-measures to 
Cruise and Pershing II missile deployment.
Soviet negotiators withdraw from START negotiations in 
Geneva with no date set for the resumption of talks.
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Dec 15
Jan 16
Feb 9 
Feb 13
May 8 
Jun-Aug 
Aug 11
Sept 28
Nov 6 
Dec 18
Jan 7-8 
MarlO 
Mar 11
Apr 7
Soviet negotiators withdraw from conventional force 
negotiations in Vienna with no date set for the resumption 
of talks.
1984
Reagan’s ‘Ivan and Anya’ speech in which he calls for 
renewed dialogue between the powers on arms limitations.
Yuri Andropov dies.
Konstantin Chernenko appointed General Secretary of the 
CPSU. Elected to Presidium of Supreme Soviet on 11 
April.
Soviet Union announces that it will boycott the 1984 
Olympic Games in Los Angeles.
Series of arms limitations offers exchanged between 
Moscow and Washington, with little substantive result.
Ad-libbed voice check by Reagan in which the following is 
broadcast ‘I have just signed legislation outlawing Russia 
forever, the bombing begins in five minutes.’
Reagan meets Gromyko at the White House, it is his first 
meeting with a Soviet government official since taking 
office.
Reagan re-elected president.
Gorbachev’s Westminster Address where what, comes to 
be known as ‘new political thinking’, is flagged publicly 
for the first time although in very vague terms.
1985
INF and START negotiations recommence in Geneva. 
Konstantin Chernenko dies.
Gorbachev elected General Secretary of the CPSU by 
Politburo.
Pravda interview with Gorbachev which discusses the 
need for improved Soviet-US relations. Here he also 
announces a moratorium on the deployment of 
intermediate range missiles and proposes a freeze on
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strategic offensive arms and space weapons research, 
testing and deployment.
Apr 23
Apr 26 
May 1 
Ju ll
Jul 2 
Jul 29
Sep 27 
Oct 3
Nov 18-21 
Dec 24
Central Committee Plenum articulates for the first time a 
broad and vague reform program and approves a resolution 
for economic reform.
Warsaw Pact Summit renews the pact for another twenty 
years.
US announces an agreement with the USSR to hold regular 
meetings to discuss regional issues.
Romanov removed from Politburo. Shevardnadze becomes 
a full member of the Politburo and Yeltsin joins Secretariat 
of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
Gromyko retired from Foreign Ministry. He is replaced by 
Eduard Shevardnadze.
USSR announces moratorium on nuclear testing. This is 
instituted on Aug 6, the fortieth anniversary of the 
bombing of Hiroshima.
Shultz and Shevardnadze meet for the first time in Helsinki 
at a conference celebrating the 10th anniversary of the 
Helsinki accords.
Shevardnadze delivers a letter from Gorbachev to Reagan 
in Washington offering an agreement for both states to cut 
their long range nuclear arsenals by 50%.
Nikolai Ryzhkov takes over from Vladimir Tikhonov as 
Prime Minister (Chairman of the Council of Ministers).
In his first trip abroad as General Secretary, Gorbachev 
flags ‘reasonable sufficiency’ as a new Soviet strategic 
armaments doctrine in Paris and makes his first mention of 
a rejection of ideology in Soviet foreign policy.
Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. No substantial 
agreements are reached, but after a series of scripted 
‘spontaneous’ private meetings they agree to hold two 
further summits.
Yeltsin replaces Grishin as First Secretary of the Moscow 
Party Committee.
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1986
Jan 15 
Feb 18
Feb 25-Mar 6
Mar 7 
Mar 14
Mar-Apr 
Apr 15 
Apr 26 
Apr 29
May 14 
May 23
May 27 
Jul 28
A Soviet TV broadcaster reads a speech from Gorbachev 
and the Politburo which proposes that the US and USSR 
remove INF missiles from Europe, that nuclear weapons be 
eliminated world-wide by 2000, and announces that the 
Soviets are prolonging their moratorium on nuclear testing.
Yeltsin becomes a candidate member of the Politburo.
27th Congress of the CPSU, in which both new thinking 
and the new direction in foreign policy are articulated in 
more detail and the basis of the economic reform 
programme is set down. Gorbachev describes Afghanistan 
as a ‘bleeding wound’.
US orders the USSR to reduce the size of its mission at the 
UN due to ‘wrongful acts’ emanating from the mission.
Two US Navy ships deliberately enter Soviet water in the 
Crimea.
US Navy exercises in the Gulf of Sidra off Libya result in 
minor skirmishes with Libyan aircraft and boats.
Clashes between Russian and Yakut students in Yakutia.
US bombing of Tripoli.
Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster.
Commercial air travel between the USSR and US resumes 
after being halted due to the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan.
Gorbachev speaks publicly about Chernobyl for the first 
time.
Shevardnadze holds a meeting in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to discuss and develop the ideas of ‘New 
Thinking’.
Reagan announces that the US will not abide by SALT II 
limits anymore.
Gorbachev announces troop withdrawals from Afghanistan 
and Mongolia, although the numbers from Afghanistan are 
low.
259
Jul 31
Aug 23 
Aug 30 
Sep 29 
Sep 30 
Oct 11-12
Nov 3 
Nov 25
Nov 27 
Dec 16 
Dec 16-18
Jan 15
Jan 20 
Jan 26
Gorbachev refers, for the first time, to a perestroika of the 
political system in a speech at Khabarovsk.
Arrest of Gennadi Zakharov for espionage in New York.
Arrest of Nicholas Daniloff for espionage in Moscow.
Daniloff released and flies back to the US.
Zakharov released and flies back to the USSR.
Reykjavik Summit. Gorbachev tables a raft of cuts and 
Reagan and Gorbachev propose the wholesale scrapping of 
ballistic nuclear missiles. No agreement is reached as 
Gorbachev insists that the US must limit its SDI 
development to the laboratory.
The Beirut weekly Al Shiraa claims that the US has been 
selling arms to Iran in return for hostage releases.
Edwin Meese holds a press conference announcing the 
discovery of a document linking Oliver North to the 
diversion of arms sales funds to the Contra rebels in 
Nicaragua.
Rajiv Ghandi and Gorbachev sign the Delhi declaration on 
the principles for a non-violent and nuclear weapon-free 
world.
Gorbachev allows Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena 
Bonner, to return to Moscow from internal exile. They 
return on 23 December.
Riots in Alma Ata and other cities in Kazakhstan due to the 
replacement of Dinmukhamed Kunayev as First Secretary 
of the Kazakhstan Communist Party.
1987
US lifts an embargo on mine drilling equipment to the 
USSR.
Soviet jamming of the BBC ends.
Central Committee Plenum at which Gorbachev describes 
Soviet economic and social conditions as in ‘crisis’ and 
proposes demokratisatsiia, in the form of multi-candidate 
elections and non-Party appointments to senior posts, as a 
solution. He describes the condition of Soviet Union not as 
‘developed socialism’ but ‘developing socialism’.
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Feb 28
May 23 
May 28
May 28-9
Jun 12 
Jun 25-6
Jun 28-30 
Jul 23 
Jul 25-7
Aug 23
Sep 10 
Oct
Oct 19 
Oct 21
Nov 1
Gorbachev offers Reagan an INF package that is not linked 
to SDI restraints.
Soviet jamming of Voice of America ends.
Mathias Rust lands a light aircraft in Red Square, leading 
to a wholesale reorganisation of senior military officers 
along Gorbachev lines; most notably the sacking of 
Defence Minister Sokolov on May 30.
Warsaw Pact shifts its military doctrine to one of strategic 
defence. The Pact renounces the first use of nuclear 
weapons, any further territorial claims, and declares that no 
state is seen as an enemy.
NATO formally accepts the elimination of all INFs in 
Europe.
CPSU Central Committee Plenum at which economic 
reform is linked to democratization. Alexander Yakovlev 
elected to Politburo.
USSR Supreme Soviet adopts the State Law on 
Enterprises.
Gorbachev announces plans to eliminate Soviet nuclear 
weapons in Asia as well as in Europe.
Crimean Tartar protests in Moscow demanding their return 
to the lands Stalin had expelled them from. Followed by 
large and violent demonstrations in Uzbekistan in early 
August.
Demonstrations in Vilnius, Riga and Tallinn to mark the 
anniversary of the Molotov-von Ribbentrop pact.
Yeltsin and Ligachev clash in the Politburo.
Movement to claim Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia from 
Azerbaijan gathers force in a series of demonstrations and 
clashes through the month.
‘Black Monday’ US stock market crash.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin clash at a Plenum of the CPSU 
Central Committee.
Demonstrations in Minsk to commemorate Stalin-era 
executions.
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Nov 5 
Nov 11 
Dec 7-8
Jan 1 
Feb 8
Feb 13 
Feb 18 
Feb 24
Mar 13 
Mar 16
Apr 14
May 15 
May 27
May 29-
Caspar Weinberger resigns as US Secretary of Defence. He 
is replaced by Frank Carlucci; Colin Powell becomes NSC 
adviser.
Yeltsin is removed, on Gorbachev’s insistence, by Moscow 
Party from his post as First Secretary after repeated 
criticism of Gorbachev and Ligachev.
Washington Summit. The INF Treaty, eliminating medium 
and short-range missiles, is signed.
1988
State Law on Enterprises comes into effect.
On Soviet television, Gorbachev announces the date for the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.
Further rioting in Nagomo Karabakh.
Yeltsin is removed from the Politburo.
Demonstration in Tallinn to mark the seventieth 
anniversary of Estonian independence from Russian 
empire.
Publication of Nina Andreyeva’s ‘I Cannot Betray My 
Principles’ in Sovetskaiia Rossiya.
In a speech to the Yugoslav Federal Assembly Gorbachev 
officially rejects interventionism in Eastern Europe and 
emphasises the legitimacy of separate forms of socialist 
development.
US, USSR and Afghanistan and Pakistan’s foreign 
ministers sign Geneva accords regarding the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan.
First large scale withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan.
The ‘Theses’ for the 19th Party Conference are published. 
They call for democratisation, human rights, and the rule 
of law.
Jun 2 Moscow Summit. INF Treaty Ratification papers are 
signed by Reagan and Gorbachev.
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Jun 9 
Jun 14 
Jun 28-
Jul 7 
Jul 12
Jul 23
Aug 19
Sep 8
Sep 30
Oct 1
Oct 12 
Nov 8 
Nov 16 
Nov 22 
Nov 26 
Dec 7
Foreign travel requirements for Soviet citizens are 
simplified.
Demonstrations in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn to 
commemorate the mass deportations of 1941.
1 Jul 19th Party Conference of the CPSU. Gorbachev proposes
wholesale political reform along democratic lines 
involving a presidential system, a new parliament—the 
Congress of People’s Deputies—an increase in power to 
local Soviets and the removal of the party and state from 
economic management.
Ukrainian Helsinki Union makes a declaration calling for 
the restoration of Ukrainian statehood.
Supreme Soviet of Nagomo Karabakh votes to secede 
from Azerbaijan and to change the region’s name to 
Artsakh.
Mass protests in Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn against the 
Soviet annexation of the Baltic states during World War n.
Programme of the Estonian People’s Front published in an 
Estonian newspaper.
Programme of the Latvian People’s Front published in a 
Latvian newspaper.
Gorbachev reorganises the Politburo. Gromyko retires 
from the presidency.
Gorbachev is elected unanimously as head of the Supreme 
Soviet and becomes president of the USSR.
Sajudis Program published in a Lithuanian newspaper.
George Bush elected president.
Estonian Supreme Soviet declares its sovereignty.
Anti-Armenian riots in Baku.
USSR Supreme Soviet rejects Estonian sovereignty claims.
Gorbachev’s speech to the UN. He makes three major 
points: he renounces the use of force in foreign policy; 
consigns the Russian revolution to history and embraces 
‘universal human values’; and announces huge cuts in
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Dec 22
Jan 6 
Jan 15-21 
Jan 18 
Jan 19
Jan 20 
Feb 1 
Feb 11 
Feb 13
Feb 15 
Feb 24
Mar 26 
Apr 7
Soviet conventional forces—500,000 troops out of Eastern 
Europe.
Armenian earthquake kills 25,000 and displaces over 
500,000.
Agreements between Angola, South Africa and Cuba on 
the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. The documents 
regarding the independence of Namibia are signed at the 
UN.
1989
After pressure from the USSR, Vietnam announces the 
withdrawal of all of its forces from Cambodia.
Ongoing demonstrations in Prague commemorating the 
20th anniversary of the suicide of Jan Palach.
Estonian Supreme Soviet makes Estonian its national 
language.
PUWP (Polish Communist party) announces that it is 
willing to enter round-table talks with Solidarity with the 
aim of lifting the union’s ban.
George Bush inaugurated as president.
Latvian declared the official language of Latvia.
Independent political groups are legalised in Hungary.
Bush orders a ‘pause’ in diplomatic relations with the 
USSR so that a strategic review of Soviet-American 
relations—NSR-3—can be prepared.
The last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan.
The Estonian flag is hoisted in Tallinn on the pre-war 
independence day.
Elections to the Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies. 
1500 of the 2250 seats are free for open elections for the 
first time resulting in a wholesale rejection of party 
favourites.
Gorbachev announces a cessation in the production of 
weapon grade plutonium in the USSR.
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Apr 9
Apr 25
May 2 
May 15-19
May 12-24
May 16
May 18 
May 25
May 29
Jun 3-15 
Jun 4
Jul 6
Jul 7 
Jul 9-13 
Jul 10-4
Unauthorised demonstrations in Tbilisi by informal groups 
pursuing independence. Troops are used to clear 
demonstrators resulting in 16 deaths.
74 members of the CPSU Central Committee are removed 
by Gorbachev.
Soviet troops begin to leave Hungary.
Hungary begins to open its border with Austria.
Gorbachev visits Beijing for the first Sino-Soviet summit 
since the early 1960s.
Bush sets out his view of relations with the USSR in a 
series of university commencement addresses. The first is 
at Texas A&M on the 12th where he describes Soviet- 
American relations as ‘beyond containment’. They 
conclude at the Coast Guard Academy on the 24th.
The Washington Post reports that the Soviets have ended 
their supply of weapons to Nicaragua.
Lithuania declares its sovereignty.
Congress of People’s Deputies opens, Gorbachev elected 
as Chairman.
Bush announces at Nato HQ in Brussels the basis of the 
CFE treaty cuts.
Ethnic rioting in Uzbekistan results in many deaths.
Polish Elections to the Upper and Lower House. The 
Communists are thoroughly routed and Solidarity wins 
handsome victories.
Gorbachev speech to Council of Europe in Strasbourg 
where he articulates the idea of the ‘Common European 
Home’.
Gorbachev speech in Bucharest to Warsaw Pact leaders 
accepting the reforms in Hungary and Poland.
Bush visits Poland and Hungary to great popular acclaim 
from both populations.
Miners’ strike in Kuzbass, Siberia over wages, conditions 
and shortages of consumer goods. These are followed by 
strikes in Donbass, Ukraine.
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Jul 29
Aug 20
Aug 22 
Aug 23
Aug 31
Sep 4 
Sep 23 
Oct 7
Oct 9 
Oct 18 
Oct 23 
Oct 25 
Oct 25
Latvia declares its sovereignty.
Jaruzelski calls on Solidarity, led by Mazowiecki in 
parliament, to form a coalition government. Gorbachev 
urges hard-line communists in Poland to accept. The 
nomination is approved on 24 August by 378 votes to 4 
with 41 abstentions.
The Lithuanian Parliament declares the Soviet annexation 
of 1939 illegal.
Hungarian foreign minister Gyula Horn ignores the 1968 
treaty requiring Hungary to prevent East Germans fleeing 
to West Germany via its borders. The decision is 
announced on 10 September.
Moldavian Supreme Soviet makes Moldovan the official 
language and also reverts from the Cyrillic to the Latin 
alphabet.
General strike in Azerbaijan to demand reassertion of 
control over Nagomo Karabakh.
Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet makes Azeri the official 
language and reaffirms its right to secede from the USSR.
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party officially abandons 
Marxism-Leninism and re-forms as the Hungarian 
Socialist Party.
Local communist leaders in Leipzig refuse to attack 
marchers in the street.
Egon Krenz leads politburo battle which forces Honecker 
to resign. Krenz is named as the new leader.
Hungary declares itself a republic (as opposed to a 
‘people’s republic’).
In Helsinki, Gorbachev declares that the USSR has no 
right to interfere in the affairs of Eastern Europe.
Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov 
states that the Brezhnev doctrine dead and that it has been 
replaced by the ‘Sinatra Doctrine’. This is confirmed by 
Warsaw Pact leaders in a communique issued following 
their meeting of 26-27 October.
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Oct 31
Nov 4
Nov 9
Nov 17-
Nov 19 
Nov 28 
Nov 29
Dec 2-:
Dec 3 
Dec 4
Dec 5
Dec 6
Dec 9 
Dec 10 
Dec 12
Krenz visits Moscow and declares his support for 
perestroika.
More than half a million protesters march in East Berlin 
demanding democratisation and the removal of the Berlin 
wall.
The Berlin Wall is opened as the East German government 
allows its citizens to travel without permission after several 
days of confusion within the ruling party.
-24 Escalating protests in East Germany demonstrating for
freedom and against police brutality, culminates in a 
350,000 strong demonstration on the 24th.
Georgian Supreme Soviet declares its sovereignty.
Kohl plan for reunification is presented.
-Dec 1 Gorbachev visits Italy and establishes formal diplomatic
ties with the Vatican, symbolically ending Soviet hostility 
towards institutionalised religion.
Malta Summit. Gorbachev tells Bush that the USSR no 
longer regards the USA as an enemy. They conclude a 
secret compact on the Baltics in which Bush agrees not to 
push for Baltic independence so long as the Soviets do not 
use force to crush any claims.
The entire East German Politburo resigns.
Warsaw Pact leaders meet in Moscow. All members except 
Romania denounce the 1968 Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia.
A new Czechoslovak cabinet is formed with a majority of 
non-Communists.
Egon Krenz resigns as leader of East Germany, replaced 
by reformist Gregor Gysi.
GDR Communist Party backs confederation with FRG.
Czechoslovak communist leader Husak resigns.
Second Congress of People’s Deputies meets. Gorbachev 
refuses to countenance discussion of the removal of Article 
6 of the Constitution.
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Dec 20
Dec 22
Dec 25 
Dec 28-9
Jan 11
Jan 13 
Jan 20
Feb 3 
Feb 5
Feb 13
Feb 24 
Mar 4
Mar 14
Mar 12
Lithuanian Communist Party breaks off relations with the 
CPSU.
The National Salvation Front proclaims itself the 
provisional government in Romania.
Nicolae Ceaucescu executed in the Romanian upheaval.
Alexander Dubcek is made head of the Czechoslovak 
Parliament and Vaclav Havel is inaugurated as president of 
Czechoslovakia.
1990
Gorbachev visits Lithuania to try to placate the 
independence movements.
Anti-Armenian pogroms in Baku.
After repeated disturbances in Baku, a state of emergency 
is declared; troops enter the city, they are fired upon and 
return fire—83 people are killed.
Demonstrations in Moscow demanding an end to the 
CPSU monopoly on power.
Central Committee Plenum. Gorbachev proposes that the 
Party abandons its ‘leading role’, accepts a multi-party 
system and adopts ‘socialism’. The proposals are accepted 
on 7 Feb.
In Ottawa, American, Soviet, British and French 
representatives agree to the ‘two-plus-four’ format for 
negotiations regarding Germany’s future. Negotiations 
between FRG and DDR on reunification begin.
Sajudis wins a majority in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.
First competitive elections in RSFSR, Ukraine and 
Byelorus for local councils and republican parliaments.
Article 6 of Soviet Constitution, which guarantees the 
leading role of the Party, is amended to rescind this role.
The Lithuanian Parliament votes unanimously to ‘re­
establish’ its independence, Vyautas Landsbergis is 
appointed president.
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Mar 15
Mar 18
Apr 3 
A p ril 
May 1 
May 4 
May 24
May 29 
May 30-Jun 2 
Jun 8
Jun 12 
Jun 19-23
Jun 29
Jul 2-13
Jul 6
Jul 12 
Jul 15-16
Gorbachev elected as the first executive President of the 
USSR at the Third Congress of People’s Deputies.
Free elections in East Germany. Voters back a 
conservative alliance linked to Kohl’s CDP, the reformed 
communist party wins only 16% of the vote.
The law on succession from the Union is adopted in the 
USSR.
The Estonian Parliament ends conscription into the Soviet 
army for Estonian citizens.
Anti-Gorbachev demonstration at the May Day parade in 
Moscow.
Latvian parliament declares itself independent from the 
USSR.
Soviet PM Ryzhkov triggers a buyers’ panic when he 
announces economic reforms which will triple the price of 
bread and other staples as of 1 July.
Yeltsin elected as head of the Supreme Soviet of RSFSR.
Bush-Gorbachev Summit in Washington.
Supreme Soviet of Russia declares that the laws of the 
RSFSR take precedence over Soviet Union laws.
USSR Supreme Soviet passes a press freedom law.
The Russian Communist Party holds its first congress. Ivan 
Polozkov is elected as first secretary.
Lithuanian legislature suspends its declaration of 
independence from the USSR.
28th Congress of the CPSU. The newly appointed Politburo 
has no role in the governing of the country.
FRG and GDR begin negotiations on a final political 
settlement for reunification.
Yelstin gives up his membership of the CPSU.
Gorbachev assents to a reunified Germany within NATO 
after talks with Kohl over aid and financial support.
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Jul 16
Jul 20
Jul 23
Jul 27 
Aug 1
Aug 2 
Aug 3
Aug 9
Aug 22 
Aug 25
Sep 2 
Sep 9
Sep 12 
Sep 20 
Sep 24 
Oct 1
Gorbachev issues a decree ending CPSU control of media 
and broadcasting.
Ukraine Supreme Soviet declares its sovereignty.
The ‘500 Day Programme’ for the RSFSR to shift to a 
market economy is published.
Leonid Kravchuk is elected as chairman of the Ukrainian 
Supreme Soviet.
Byelorussian Supreme Soviet declares its sovereignty.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin cooperate to develop an economic 
reform program to be headed by Stanislav Shatalin.
Iraq invades Kuwait.
Baker and Shevardnadze issue a joint Soviet-American 
statement calling for an arms embargo on Iraq.
USSR Council of Ministers legalises private ownership of 
businesses and the sale of labour.
Turkmenistan declares its sovereignty.
Tajikistan declares its sovereignty.
Abkhaz ASSR declares its independence from Georgia.
Ethnic Russians declare a ‘Dniester Soviet Republic’ and 
attempt to secede from Moldavia.
Helsinki meeting between Bush and Gorbachev on the 
Persian Gulf crisis. A secret agreement is made to link 
Soviet support for UN action with a broader commitment 
from the Americans to help resolve the Arab-Israeli 
dispute.
‘2-plus-4’ Treaty signed in Moscow ending the rights of 
the UK, US, France and the USSR in Germany.
South Ossetia Supreme Soviet declares its independence 
from Georgia.
Supreme Soviet grants Gorbachev executive powers to rule 
by decree during the transition to a market economy.
USSR Supreme Soviet passes legislation on freedom of 
worship.
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Oct 3
Oct 9
Oct 20 
Oct 24
Oct 25 
Oct 27
Oct 28 
Oct 30 
Nov 7
Nov 17
Nov 19
Nov 29 
Dec 2
Dec 17
Dec 20 
Dec 23
German reunification.
USSR Supreme Soviet passes legislation to establish a 
multi-party political system.
DemRossiya holds its first congress in Moscow.
USSR Supreme Soviet issues legislation which asserts its 
supremacy over recent claims of sovereignty.
Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet declares its sovereignty.
Saparmurad Niyazov elected unopposed as president of 
Turkmenistan.
Askar Akayev elected as president of Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan Supreme Soviet declares its sovereignty.
Assassination attempt on Gorbachev in Red Square during 
Revolution Day celebrations.
Gorbachev proposes a radical restructuring of the Soviet 
government.
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is signed in 
Paris between Nato and the Warsaw Pact. It commits the 
Soviets to a 70% reduction in conventional forces stationed 
west of the Urals.
UN Security Council passes Resolution 678 authorising the 
use of force against Iraq; China abstains, Yemen and Cuba 
vote against.
Gorbachev begins a move to the right to try to shore up his 
position. He installs ex-militaiy conservatives to key 
positions, including Boris Pugo who replaces Bakatin as 
the Minister of Internal Affairs.
Gorbachev asks the Congress of People’s Deputies for 
greater executive powers to strengthen government and 
stabilise society.
Shevardnadze resigns as foreign minister, and stays on as 
an interim foreign minister until February.
Gorbachev receives most of the new powers he had 
requested and Gennadi Yanayev is made Vice President of 
Russia.
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Dec 24 
Dec 25
Jan 2
Jan 7
Jan 10 
Jan 11-13
Jan 14
Jan 15 
Jan 17 
Jan 20
Jan 30
Feb
Feb 9 
Feb 23 
M arl
The Fourth Congress of People’s Deputies resolves to 
create a new Union treaty.
Ryzhkov has a heart attack.
1991
Soviet troops on the streets of Vilnius.
Soviet ‘Black Beret’ troops seize the main newspaper 
publishing plant in Riga, Latvia.
Soviet paratroopers are dispatched to the Baltic states, 
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and parts of the Ukraine to 
enforce central rule.
Gorbachev appeals, with no response, for a reinstitution of 
the Soviet Constitution in Lithuania.
Soviet troops in Vilnius are involved in several skirmishes. 
They shoot several people on Jan 11, and open fire on 
demonstrators on Jan 13, killing fifteen.
Yeltsin flies to Tallinn and signs a ‘mutual support pact’ 
with the three Baltic states.
Bessmerytnykh is appointed as the new foreign minister. 
Gulf War begins.
Soviet troops kill four Latvians in Riga in an attempt to 
quell demonstrations and secessionism.
Gorbachev is severely criticised at a CPSU Central 
Committee Plenum.
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Armenia, Moldova and Georgia 
announce that they are not going to participate in the new 
Union treaty referendum, but will allow their citizens who 
wish to vote to participate.
Referendum on independence in Lithuania yields a 90% 
vote in favour of independence.
Ground forces engage in the Gulf War, it is concluded five 
days later.
Coal miners strike in Donbass, Ukraine.
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Mar 3 
Mar 17
Mar 28
Mar 31 
Apr 1 
Apr 4
Apr 9 
Apr 23 
May 20
Jun 12
Jun 14 
Jun 17
Jun 20
Jun 30 
JullO
Jul 17
Referenda on independence in Estonia and Latvia result in 
78% and 74% in favour.
Referendum on new Union Treaty. Result: yes 76.4%; no 
21.7%; spoiled 1.9%. In Russia, the referendum has an 
extra question about the creation of a Russian presidency 
(passes with 69.85% of the vote), and in Moscow it has a 
further question regarding the creation of a mayor (passes 
with 85% of the vote).
Mass demonstration in Moscow in favour of Yeltsin as the 
head of Russia. Troops try to prevent it, but fail.
Warsaw Pact officially ceases to exist.
Retail prices raised in the USSR.
The RSFSR Supreme Soviet gives Yeltsin sweeping 
powers.
Georgia declares its independence.
9 plus 1 agreement over the new Union treaty reached.
USSR Supreme Soviet passes a law on the right to travel 
and emigrate.
Yeltsin is elected as the first democratic president of 
Russia. Results: Boris Yeltsin 57.3%; Nikolai Ryzhkov 
(Gorbachev’s choice) 16.85%; Vladimir Zhirinovsky 
7.81%; Aman-Geldy Tuleyev 6.81%; A. Makashov 3.74%; 
Vadim Bakatin 3.42%.
Gavril Popov elected Mayor of Moscow.
The CFE agreement is formally ratified in Vienna.
Several senior government officials address the Supreme 
Soviet with a range of complaints about Gorbachev.
Yeltsin meets Bush at the White House in his capacity as 
president of the RSFSR.
The last Soviet troops leave Czechoslovakia.
Yeltsin is sworn in as Russian president, he receives the 
blessing of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.
START I treaty concluded in London.
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Jul 20
Jul 29-Aug 1 
Aug 18-21
Aug 20 
Aug 22 
Aug 24
Aug 25 
Aug 27
Aug 28
Aug 29
Aug 30 
Aug 31 
Sep 2 
Sep 6
Yeltsin issues a decree which forbids any political activity 
in all state institutions.
Moscow summit. Bush and Gorbachev sign the START I 
treaty.
Attempted coup to overthrow Gorbachev and to prevent 
the signing of new Union Treaty, which had been 
scheduled to be signed by Yeltsin and Gorbachev on Aug 
20. The coup is led by Vice President Yanayev, PM 
Pavlov, KGB chief Kryuchkov, Defence Minister Yazov, 
Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo, and Supreme Soviet 
Chairman Lukyanov.
Estonia declares its independence.
Latvia declares its independence.
Gorbachev resigns as General Secretary of the CPSU and 
suspends the activities of the party.
Ukraine declares its independence.
Byelorussia declares its independence.
Moldavia declares its independence and changes its name 
to Moldova.
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan declare their independence.
Leadership of the RSFSR announces that it is establishing 
control over the USSR State Bank and the USSR Foreign 
Trade Bank.
The Russian Supreme Soviet bans all CPSU activities by a 
vote of 283-29.
Azerbaijan declares its independence.
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan declare their independence.
America recognises the independence of the Baltic states.
The provisional Soviet executive body—the Soviet State 
Council—recognises the independence of the Baltic states 
and supports their membership of the UN and CSCE.
Georgia breaks all ties with the USSR.
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Sep 23 
Oct 11 
Oct 19
Oct 26 
Nov 4
Nov 6
Nov 15
Nov 22
Nov 27 
Dec 1
Dec 2 
Dec 3
Dec 8
Dec 10
Dec 12 
Dec 13
Dec 17
Leningrad’s name is changed back to St. Petersburg after a 
vote in favour by its residents.
Armenia declares its independence.
USSR State Council restructures and renames the KGB.
The Treaty on an Economic Community of Sovereign 
States is signed by eight republics.
Turkmenistan declares its independence.
The USSR State Council, at the urging of Republic leaders, 
abolishes all the USSR ministries except for defence, 
foreign affairs, railways, electric power and nuclear power.
Yeltsin issues a decree banning the CPSU and the Russian 
Communist Party and nationalises their property.
Yeltsin issues a series of decrees taking control of virtually 
all financial and economic activity in the RSFSR.
The RSFSR Supreme Soviet takes over control of the 
USSR State Bank.
The new Draft Union Treaty is published.
Ukraine referendum on independence. 90.32% vote in 
favour, with Kravchuk as president.
Yeltsin recognises Ukrainian independence.
Supreme Soviet of the USSR approves the draft Union 
treaty.
Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Shushkevitch meet in Belovezh, 
Byelorussia and declare USSR a non-entity and agree to 
form the CIS.
Supreme Soviets of Byelorussia and Ukraine ratify 
Belovezh Agreement.
Supreme Soviet of RSFSR ratifies Belovezh Agreement.
Central Asian States (Armenia, Azerbaijan Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) 
approve the initiative for a CIS and agree to join.
Gorbachev announces that, at the end of the year, the 
USSR and its governmental structures will cease to exist.
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Dec 21
Dec 25 
Dec 26
The heads of the eleven newly independent states (Russian 
Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan) meet in Alma-Ata, where they support 
Belozevh accord and formally establish the CIS.
Gorbachev resigns as president of the USSR.
The Russian flag alone flies over the Kremlin.
Yelstin takes over Gorbachev’s office in Staraya Plashad.
Dec 31 Midnight The USSR ceases to exist.
Appe n d ix  II
Work-time Equivalents of Consumer Goods, March 1982
(Hours unless stated)
Washington Moscow Munich Paris London
Std weekly basket of household 
goods 3.5 people
16.3 46.8 20.4 19.4 22.5
Food (minutes)
White Bread loaf 16 17 27 28 25
Rice 1kg 16 54 10 15 15
Frozen chicken 16 185 24 28 31
White sugar 1kg 9 58 10 9 11
Fresh milk lltr 6 22 7 8 9
Drink (minutes)
Red wine 1 ltr 28 238 13 20 76
Beer 1 ltr 11 16 8 7 18
Ground coffee 500 gms 62 1231 85 48 114
Tea 500 gms 10 53 10 17 5
Vodka 0.7 ltr 61 452 74 107 131
Cosmetics (minutes)
Soap 4 20 6 7 5
2 toilet rolls 7 32 5 13 10
Aspirin 5 246 64 21 9
Clothes washing powder 1kg 16 65 11 24 20
Transport (minutes)
Petrol 10 litres 32 185 61 87 85
Taxi fare 3 kms 21 37 35 27 52
Bus fare 3 kms 7 3 8 9 11
Train fare 60 miles 104 258 86 87 119
Small car (months) 5 53 6 8 11
Subway fare 3km 7 3 8 9 11
Clothing
T-shirt (mins) 19 185 50 53 66
Pair of jeans 3 46 7 6 6
Men’s shoes pair 8 25 5 7 7
Men’s suit 2 piece 25 109 15 13 22
Consumer Durables
Small fridge 44 155 42 53 40
Washing machine 47 165 96 56 81
Colour TV 65 701 143 106 132
Housing and Services
Monthly subsidised rent 50 msq. 51 12 24 39 28
1 month gas (mins) 290 39 125 95 568
1 month water (mins) 32 123 37 95 97
Family medical insurance 22 0 33 0 0
Hotel Room 21 8 19 26 36
This is an illustrative selection of a much wider set of goods and services. Source: Keith Bush, 
‘Retail Prices in Moscow and Four Western Cities in March 1982’ in Leonard Schapiro and 
Joseph Godson (ed.), The Soviet Worker: From Lenin to Andropov Second Edition, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1984, pp. 292-319.
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